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SUMMARY 
Section 71(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has introduced into South African company 
law a provision which for the first time permits the board of directors to remove another director 
from office in certain specific instances. A further significant innovation in the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 is contained in section 162, which empowers a court to make an order declaring a 
director delinquent or placing him under probation in specific instances.  The effect of section 
162 is that a court is empowered to remove a director from the board of directors. The focus of 
this thesis is the removal of directors from office by the board of directors and by the judiciary. 
The thesis explores the underpinning philosophy of the statutory provisions relating to the 
removal of directors from office. It also examines the impact of the power given to the board 
of directors and to the courts to remove a director from office. The grounds and the procedures 
for the removal of directors by the board of directors and the judiciary are examined. The 
fiduciary duties applicable to directors in removing a director from the board of directors are 
also explored. In addition, this thesis examines the removal of directors holding multiple 
positions or capacities in relation to a company, such as an employee or a shareholder with 
loaded voting rights. The remedies which may be relied on by a director who has been removed 
from office by the board of directors are examined. Recommendations are made to strengthen 
and improve the provisions in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 relating to the removal of directors 
from office by the board of directors and the judiciary. Amendments to the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 are suggested to remove ambiguities; to guard against the abuse of sections 71(3) and 
162; to improve the grounds and procedures for the removal of directors by the board of 
directors and the judiciary, and to enhance the remedies that may be relied on by a director who 
has been removed from office by the board of directors.  
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Removal of directors from office; Balance of power between directors and shareholders; 
Ineligibility; Disqualification; Fiduciary duties; Automatic termination clauses; Loaded voting 
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OPSOMMING 
Artikel 71(3) van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 het ’n bepaling tot Suid-Afrikaanse 
maatskappyreg toegevoeg wat die direksie vir die eerste keer in staat stel om ’n ander direkteur 
in sekere spesifieke gevalle uit sy of haar amp te verwyder.  ’n Verdere belangrike vernuwing 
in die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word in artikel 162 vervat, wat ’n hof magtig om ’n bevel 
uit te vaardig wat ’n direkteur misdadig verklaar of hom of haar in spesifieke gevalle aan ’n 
proeftydperk onderwerp.  Die effek van artikel 162 is dat ’n hof by magte is om ’n direkteur 
uit die direksie te verwyder.  Die fokus van hierdie tesis is die verwydering van direkteure uit 
hul ampte deur die direksie en die regbank.  Die tesis verken die onderliggende filosofie van 
die statutêre bepalings wat met die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte verband hou.  Dit 
ondersoek ook die impak van die bevoegdheid wat aan die direksie en die howe verleen word 
om ’n direkteur uit sy of haar amp te verwyder.  Die gronde en prosedures vir die verwydering 
van direkteure deur die direksie en die regbank word ondersoek.  Die fidusiêre pligte van 
toepassing op direkteure by die verwydering van ’n direkteur uit die direksie word ook verken.   
Daarbenewens ondersoek hierdie tesis die verwydering van direkteure wat veelvuldige posisies 
of hoedanighede met betrekking tot ’n maatskappy beklee, soos ŉ werknemer of aandeelhouer 
met gelaaide stemregte.  Die regsmiddele waarop ’n direkteur, wat deur die direksie uit sy of 
haar amp verwyder is, kan steun, word ondersoek.  Aanbevelings word gemaak om die 
bepalings in die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008, wat met die verwydering van direkteure uit hul 
ampte deur die direksie en regbank verband hou, te versterk en te verbeter.  Wysigings aan die 
Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word voorgestel om dubbelsinnighede uit te skakel; om teen die 
misbruik van artikels 71(3) en 162 te waak; om die gronde en prosedures vir die verwydering 
van direkteure deur die direksie en die regbank te verbeter, en om die regsmiddele waarop ’n 
direkteur wat deur die direksie uit sy of haar amp verwyder is kan steun, te versterk.   
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NGAMAFUPHI 
ISigaba 71(3) Somthetho weZinkampani 71 ka 2008 sewuze wangenisa emithethweni 
yezinkampani zaseNingizimu Afrika, umthetho ongowokuqala ovumela ibhodi labaqondisi 
ukuthi libe namandla wokugudluza omunye umqondisi esikhundleni sakhe ngaphansi kwezimo 
ezithile. Olunye ushintsho olusha kuMthetho wama-71 weZinkampani ka 2008 uqukethwe 
yiSigaba 162, wona ugunyaza inkantolo ukuthi ikhiphe umyalelo owazisa umqondisi ngokuthi 
unecala noma obeka umqondisi ngaphansi kophenyo, phecelezi “probation” ngesinye 
isikhathi. Inhloso yeSigaba 162 wukunikeza inkantolo igunya lokugudluza umqondisi 
kwibhodi labaqondisi. Impokophelo yale thisisi wukugudluzwa kwabaqondisi, bagudluzwe 
yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho/nobulungisa. Ithisisi ihlola ifilosofi yemithetho 
ekhishiwe emayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi ezikhundleni zabo, Kanti futhi ihlola 
umthelela wamandla anikezwe ibhodi labaqondisi kanye nezinkantolo ukuthi zigudluze 
umqondisi esikhundleni. Izizathu kanye nengqubo elandelwayo mayelana nokugudluzwa 
kwabaqondisi yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho nazo ziyahlolwa. Imisebenzi emayelana 
nokuthembeka eyenziwa ngabaqondisi ukugudluza umqondisi kwibhodi labaqondisi nayo 
iyacwaningwa Ngaphezu kwalokhu, le thisisi .iphenya ukugudluzwa kwabaqondisi abaqokwe 
ezikhundleni eziningi noma abanegunya elithize ngokwengqubo yenkampani, 
enjengesisebenzi, phecelezi “employee” noma umabelwa-mashezi onamalungelo amaningi 
okuvota, phecelezi, “loaded with voting rights”. Izeluleko ezingasetshenziswa wumqondisi 
ogudluzwe esikhundleni sakhe yibhodi labaqondisi nazo ziyahlolwa. Izincomo nazo ziyenziwa 
ngenhloso yokuqinisa kanye nokuthuthukiswa kwamandla oMthetho we-71 weZinkampani ka 
2008, mayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi ezikhundleni yibhodi labaqondisi kanye 
nomthetho. Izinguquko zoMthetho wama-71 weZinkampani ka 2008 ziqonde ukususa 
izixakaxaka, ukulwa nokudlelezelwa kweSigaba 71(3) kanye no 162, ukuthuthukisa izizathu 
kanye nezingqubo zokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho, 
ukuqinisa izindlela zokulungisa ezingasetshenziswa wumqondisi osegudluziwe esikhundleni 
yibhodi labaqondisi.  
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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION  
2. REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE 
3. METHODOLOGY  
4. REFERENCE TECHNIQUES  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008, as amended (“the Companies Act”) which came into force on 
1 May 2011, introduced into South African law a provision which for the first time permits the 
board of directors to remove another director from office. This provision is contained in section 
71(3) of the Companies Act, and it permits the board of directors to remove a director from 
office in instances where a company has more than two directors and a shareholder or director 
alleges that a director of the company has become ineligible or disqualified to be a director, or 
has become incapacitated to the extent that the director is unable to perform the functions of a 
director and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time, or has neglected or has 
been derelict in the performance of the functions of a director. 
 
Previously, under section 220 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, only the shareholders were 
statutorily empowered to remove a director from the board of directors.1 The novel power 
conferred by section 71(3) of the Companies Act on the board of directors of a company to 
remove a director from office in certain circumstances shifts the balance of power between the 
board of directors and the shareholders in that the shareholders no longer enjoy the exclusive 
power to remove directors from office.  
 
                                                 
1 See on s 220 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 Stewart v Schwab 1956 (4) SA 791 (T); Swerdlow v Cohen and 
Others 1977 (3) SA 1050 (T); Amoils v Fuel Transport (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 343 (W); Barlows Manufacturing 
Co Ltd and Others v RN Barrie (Pty) Ltd and Others 1990 (4) SA 608 (C); James North (Zimbabwe) (Pvt) 
Ltd v Mattinson 1990 (2) SA 229 (ZHC); J Du Plessis “Praktiese Aspekte Aangaande die Ontslag van 
Maatskappydirekteure” 511-516; J Du Plessis “Die Nywerheidshof, Werknemers en Direkteure” 119-122; Kunst, 
Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 422(2)–424 (the previous edition of Henochberg on the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973); Beuthin & Luiz Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 209-211; Esser “Company Law and 
the Spoliated Director” 135; Beuthin “A Director Firmly in the Saddle” 489; MJ Oosthuizen “Swerdlow v Cohen 
and Others 1977 1 SA 178 (W)” 165-169 and Masinire “A Critical Analysis of the Role and Protection of 
Shareholders in the Removal of Directors in the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008” 1988-1990. 
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A further significant innovation in the Companies Act is contained in section 162, which 
empowers a court to make an order declaring a director delinquent or under probation under 
various grounds.2 The effect of an order of delinquency is that a person is disqualified from 
being a director of a company.3 A delinquency order may be unconditional and subsist for the 
lifetime of the director or it may be conditional and subsist for seven years or longer, as 
determined by the court.4 The effect of an order of probation is that a person may not serve as 
a director except to the extent permitted by the order.5 A probation order generally subsists for 
a period not exceeding five years.6 Like an order of delinquency an order of probation may be 
subject to such conditions as the court considers appropriate.7 The effect of section 162 is that 
a court is empowered to remove a director from the board of directors, if any of the grounds 
contemplated in the section are applicable.  
 
Section 71(5) further allows the judiciary a say in the removal of a director from office. A 
director who was removed from office or a person who appointed that director may apply to 
court to review a decision of the board of directors to remove a director from office. 
Furthermore, if the board of directors has decided not to remove a director from office, any 
director who voted otherwise on the resolution or a shareholder with voting rights entitled to 
be exercised in the election of that director may, in terms of section 71(6), apply to court to 
review the board’s decision. The court may either confirm the determination of the board of 
directors not to remove the director from office or it may itself remove the director from office.8 
 
                                                 
2 Kukama v Lobelo & Others 2012 JDR 0663 (GSJ); Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 (GSJ); Msimang NO and 
Another v Katuliiba and Others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ); Rabinowitz v Van Graan and Others 2013 (5) SA 
315 (GSJ); Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC); Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property 
Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA); Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC). 
 
3 Section 69(8)(a) of the Companies Act. See further Rabinowitz v Van Graan and Others 2013 (5) SA 315 (GSJ) 
para 20; Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 159 and Lewis Group Limited 
v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 5. 
 
4 Section 162(6) of the Companies Act. 
 
5 Section 69(5) of the Companies Act. 
 
6 Section 162(9)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
7 Section 162(10) of the Companies Act. 
 
8 Section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act. 
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The Companies Tribunal is also empowered to remove a director from office in those 
companies which have fewer than three directors.9 In such companies the board of directors 
may not remove a director from office but a director or a shareholder of the company may 
apply to the Companies Tribunal to make a determination on the removal of the director.10 The 
Companies Tribunal must exercise its functions in accordance with the Companies Act, and 
must perform its functions impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice, and in as 
transparent a manner as is appropriate having regard to the nature of the specific function.11 In 
carrying out its functions, the Companies Tribunal may have regard to international 
developments in the field of company law.12  
 
A further method under which a director may be removed from office by a court is contained 
in section 137(5) of the Companies Act, in terms of which a director of a company that is under 
business rescue may be removed from office by a court upon the application of a business 
rescue practitioner.13 The grounds under which such an application may be instituted are that 
                                                 
9 Section 71(8) of the Companies Act. 
 
10 Section 71(8)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act. The Companies Tribunal was established in terms of s 193(1) 
of the Companies Act. It is an independent organ of state which is subject only to the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) and the law, and has jurisdiction throughout South Africa (s 193(1)(a) 
and (b) of the Companies Act). Among the functions of the Companies Tribunal are to adjudicate any application 
that may be made to it in terms of the Companies Act and to assist in the resolution of disputes as contemplated 
in Part C of Chapter 7 of the Companies Act (dealing with the voluntary resolution of disputes) (s 195(1)(a) and 
(b)). The Companies Tribunal must also perform any other function assigned to it under the Companies Act or 
any law mentioned in Schedule 4 of the Companies Act. Some examples of the laws mentioned in Schedule 4 are 
the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, the Share Blocks Control Act 59 of 1980, the Co-operatives Act 69 of 
1984, the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993, the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, the Patents Act 57 of 1978, the Designs 
Act 195 of 1993 and the Protection of Businesses Act 99 of 1978. 
 
11 Sections 193(1)(c) and (d). 
 
12 Section 193(3)(a). 
 
13 Business rescue proceedings, as defined in s 128(1)(b) of the Companies Act, are designed to facilitate the 
rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed by providing for the temporary supervision of the 
company and of the management of its affairs, business and property. Business rescue proceedings entail a 
temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in respect of property in its possession, 
and the development and implementation of a plan to rescue the company. Under the business rescue plan, the 
company’s affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities and equity are restructured. The aim of business 
rescue is to maximise the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis. If this is not 
possible, an alternative object of business rescue is to restructure the company so as to produce a better return for 
the company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the company. Chapter 
6 of the Companies Act regulates business rescue proceedings. For a general discussion of business rescue 
proceedings see Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law 
(Unpublished LLD Thesis); Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 442-536(8F); FHI Cassim 
“Business Rescue and Compromises” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 860-925; Delport New 
Entrepreneurial Law 217-237 and FHI Cassim “Business Rescue and Compromises” in Loubser & Mahony 
Company Secretarial Practice 26-1-26-45. 
 
18 
 
the director in question has failed to comply with a requirement of Chapter 6 of the Companies 
Act, or by an act or omission has impeded or is impeding the business rescue practitioner in 
the performance of his powers and functions, the management of the company by the 
practitioner, or the development or implementation of a business rescue plan.14   
 
The Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 states that clause 71 of the Bill 
(now the Companies Act) provides “a more certain and nuanced scheme for the removal of 
directors from office”.15 With regard to the application to declare a director delinquent or to 
place him under probation under section 162 of the Companies Act, the Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 provides as follows: 
 
 “A major innovation of the draft is the introduction of a regime allowing for a court, on application, 
to declare a director either delinquent (and thus prohibited from being a director) or under 
probation (and restricted to serving as a director within the conditions of that probation). The core 
of the regime is set out in clause 162, as one of the remedies available to shareholders and other 
stakeholders to hold directors accountable.”16 
  
These innovations to South African company law are the focus of this thesis. The removal of 
a director by the judiciary under section 162 is a “major innovation”, as stated by the 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008.17 The removal of directors by the 
Companies Tribunal is also examined, albeit briefly. The removal of directors by the 
shareholders, which was permitted by the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and which is a study on 
its own, is not dealt with in this thesis.18 However, where relevant to this thesis, the removal of 
directors by the shareholders will be discussed. The removal of a director from office by a court 
                                                 
14 Section 137(5) of the Companies Act. The right of a practitioner to apply to court for an order removing a 
director from office is in addition to any right of a person to apply to a court for an order contemplated in s 162 
to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation (s 137(6) of the Companies Act).  
 
15 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 8. 
 
16 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 8. 
 
17 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 8. 
 
18 For a discussion on the removal of directors by the shareholders under ss 71(1) and 71(2) of the Companies 
Act, see Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 273-274(3); Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal 
of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 33-51; R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in 
FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 441-452; FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 151-
168; Masinire “A Critical Analysis of the Role and Protection of Shareholders in the Removal of Directors in the 
South African Companies Act 71 of 2008” 1988-1995 and Esser & Havenga “Directors and Other Officers” in 
Loubser & Mahony Company Secretarial Practice 8-17.  
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upon the application of a business rescue practitioner is likewise beyond the scope of this thesis 
and is not addressed in this study.19 
 
2.  REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE 
 
2.1  Removal of Directors by the Board of Directors 
 
The rationale of permitting directors to be removed from office is to enhance the accountability 
of directors.20 But the power given to directors to remove a director from the board must not 
be abused and it must be restrained. While there may be merit in vesting a company’s board of 
directors with this power, questions inevitably arise as to whether the concern of removal from 
office by the board would stifle the actions of a director in managing the company’s affairs and 
whether the power to remove might be abused. This thesis will examine whether sections 71(3) 
and 71(4) of the Companies Act may be strengthened in order to guard against the abuse of the 
board’s power to remove directors from office.21  
 
The grounds and the procedures for the removal of directors by the board of directors are 
examined.22 The removal of directors under the Australian Corporations Act, 2001 (“the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001”), the United Kingdom (“UK”) Companies Act, 2006 
(“the UK Companies Act of 2006”), the United States of America (“USA”) Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act 1984 (the “MBCA”)23 and the Delaware General Corporation 
                                                 
19 For a discussion on the removal of a director by a court on the application of a business rescue practitioner 
under s 137(5) of the Companies Act, see Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South 
African Company Law (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 112-113; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 482(56)-482(57); FHI Cassim “Business Rescue and Compromises” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 887 and FHI Cassim “Business Rescue and Compromises” in Loubser & Mahony Company 
Secretarial Practice 26-27.  
 
20 Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A.2d 946 (Del., 1985) at 959; Aronson v Lewis 473 A.2d 805 (1984) 
at 811. See chapter 2, para 4 where this is discussed further.  
 
21 See chapter 3, paras 3, 6 and 8. 
 
22 See chapter 3, paras 6 and 8. 
 
23 The MBCA first appeared in a completed form in 1950. It was intended not to become a uniform corporation 
law but to serve as a drafting guide for the various States in the USA. Eventually the MBCA became the pattern 
for large parts of the corporation statutes in most States in the USA, notable exceptions being Delaware, California 
and New York. The MBCA is revised from time to time by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American 
Bar Association Section of Business Law. This committee has remained committed to keeping the MBCA an 
enabling statute. Many States amend their corporate statutes to adopt the latest revisions made to the MBCA from 
time to time. The first complete revision to the MBCA appeared in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
(1984). In certain instances developments to the MBCA have lagged behind those made in Delaware, while at 
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Law (Title 8, Chapter 1 of the Delaware Code) of the USA State of Delaware (the “DGCL”)24 
are reviewed and compared with the provisions of the Companies Act, with a view to 
ascertaining what guidance may be obtained from these sources with regard to the removal of 
directors by the board of directors under the (South African) Companies Act. In addition, the 
relevant corporate legislation in some of those States in the USA which permit directors to 
remove a director from the board of directors will be reviewed. The legal principles enunciated 
in case law based on the Companies Act 61 of 1973, and applicable common law principles, 
will be referred to where relevant.  
 
2.2  Fiduciary Duties and Removal of Directors 
 
When the shareholders of a company consider the removal of a director from office in terms 
of section 71(1) of the Companies Act25 they may exercise their vote to do so in any way they 
please because it is well established that their right to vote is a proprietary right which they are 
entitled to exercise in whatever way they desire.26 Accordingly, a resolution by the shareholders 
to remove a director from office may not be impeached on the ground that it was not passed in 
good faith and in the interests of the company.27   
 
In contrast, when the board of directors exercises the power to remove a director from office it 
must do so bona fide in the best interests of the company and not for ulterior reasons.28 This is 
                                                 
other times the MBCA amendments have moved ahead of those made in Delaware (Ferber Corporation Law 18-
19; Cox & Hazen Corporations 34-35; Bainbridge Corporate Law 9; Olson & Briggs “The Model Business 
Corporation Act and Corporate Governance: An Enabling Statutes Moves Towards Normative Standards” 31-32). 
 
24 Refer to para 3 below where the selection of these jurisdictions is motivated. 
 
25 In terms of s 71(1) of the Companies Act, a director may be removed by an ordinary resolution adopted at a 
shareholders’ meeting by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director, subject to 
s 71(2). Section 71(2) sets out the procedures that must be followed before the shareholders may consider such a 
resolution.  
 
26 Pender v Lushington (1877) 46 ChD 317 at 319. As Lord Jessel MR put it (at 321), a shareholder “has a right 
to say, whether I vote with the majority or with the minority, you shall record my vote; that is a right of property 
belonging to my interest in this company, and if you will not, I shall institute legal proceedings to compel you. It 
seems to me that such an action could be maintained, without any technical difficulty.” See further Re HR Harmer 
Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62 at 82; Sammel and Others v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 
680; Desai and Others v Greyridge Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 509 (A) at 519; Kuwait Asia Bank EC v 
National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 (PC) at 221; CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd and Another [2018] 1 All SA 450 (GJ) para 44 and chapter 4, para 2. 
 
27 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-285. 
 
28 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206; Liwszyc and Another v Smolarek and Others (2005) 55 
ACSR 38 at 46-47; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-285. On the fiduciary duties of directors 
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because the exercise of this power is subject to the general fiduciary obligation owed by 
directors to their company. The relationship between a director and his company is one of the 
well-established examples of commercial fiduciary relationships accepted in South African 
law.29 Directors who exercise their power to remove a director for an improper purpose or for 
ulterior reasons may be held to be in breach of their fiduciary duties.30 However, in the leading 
UK case of Lee v Chou Wen Hsien31 the Privy Council held that while each director who 
concurs in the removal of a director must act in accordance with what he believes to be in the 
best interests of the company, it does not follow that a director sought to be removed would 
continue to remain a director simply because one or more of the directors had acted from an 
ulterior motive in removing that director. In light of this decision, this study will examine the 
fiduciary duties of the board of directors in removing a member from the board of directors, 
and the consequences if such fiduciary duties are breached by the board of directors.32 The 
fiduciary duties of directors will only be dealt with in this investigation to the extent that they 
are relevant to the power of directors to remove a director from office. 
 
                                                 
to act in the best interests of the company see Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 
9; Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306; Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank [1970] Ch 62; 
Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 105; Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood 
[2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 618-619; Liwszyc and Another v Smolarek and Others (2005) 55 ACSR 38 at 46-
47; Da Silva and Others v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA) para 18 and chapter 4 para 3.1. 
 
29 See Havenga “Breach of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Liability on what Basis” 366; Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168; S v De Jager and Another 1965 (2) SA 616 (A); S v Hepker 1973 (1) 
SA 472 (W) at 475; Bellairs v Hodnett and Another 1978 (1) SA 1109 (A); Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v 
Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd and Others 1981 (2) SA 173 (T); Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC 
& Others 1988 (2) SA 54 (T); Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 678; Da Silva and 
Others v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA); Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) paras 59-61 and Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum and Oil Corporation 
of South Africa (SOC) Ltd and Another 2015 (6) SA 338 (WCC). 
 
30 See Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 506; Piercy v Mills [1920] 1 Ch 77; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] 
Ch 254; Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC) and Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v 
Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 618 on the fiduciary duty of directors to exercise their powers for a 
proper purpose.  
 
31 [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206. 
 
32 See chapter 4, paras 3 and 4. 
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2.3  The Removal of Directors Holding Multiple Positions in a Company  
 
When a director who is removed from office is also a full time employee of the company, the 
provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”) must be considered.33 The 
validity of an automatic termination clause in the service contract of a director is examined.34 
An automatic termination clause typically states that the termination of board membership 
leads to the automatic and simultaneous termination of a director’s employment by the 
company.35 It will also be examined whether a reverse automatic termination provision, which 
provides for the automatic termination of a directorship upon the occurrence of an event, is 
valid.36 
 
A further consideration to be taken into account when removing a director from the board of 
directors, is whether the director is also a shareholder of the company. Under section 71(1) of 
the Companies Act shareholders may remove a director from office by an ordinary resolution. 
Under section 37(2) of the Companies Act each issued share has associated with it one general 
voting right except to the extent provided otherwise by the Companies Act or determined by 
or in terms of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation in accordance with section 36 of 
the Companies Act. Under section  37(5)(a) of the Companies Act, subject to any other law, a 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may establish for any particular class of shares 
preferences, rights, limitations or other terms that confer special, conditional or limited voting 
rights. Thus it is possible for a shareholding-director to have loaded votes and for additional 
voting rights to be attached to certain shares held by him.37 This research will examine whether 
                                                 
33 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC) para 15; Mpofu v South African 
Broadcasting Corp Limited (SABC) and Others (2008/18386) [2008] ZAGPHC 413 (16 September 2008); Wicks 
v SA Independent Services (Pty) Ltd and Another [2010] JOL 25715 (WCC); Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 
BLLR 607 (LC); SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC); Van Eck & Lombard  “Dismissal 
of Executive Directors: Comparing Principles of Company Law and Labour Law” 20. 
 
34 See chapter 5, para 2.2. 
 
35 This is discussed further in chapter 5, para 2.2. 
 
36 See chapter 5, para 2.3. 
 
37 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL); Beuthin “A Director Firmly in the Saddle” 489; Anon “‘Weighted’ Votes 
Again” D17-D20; Anon “‘Weighted’ or ‘Loaded’ Votes in Private Companies” D5-D16. The expression “loaded 
voting rights” or “weighted votes” is used to describe the device whereby certain shares are given additional 
voting strength above that enjoyed by other shares which, in every other respect, are identical to their participation 
in the company (Anon “‘Weighted’ or ‘Loaded’ Votes in Private Companies” D5). In essence, loaded voting 
rights or weighted votes are voting rights that are disproportionate to shareholdings (FHI Cassim “The Division 
and Balance of Power” 164.)  Loaded voting rights may apply generally to all resolutions or they may be confined 
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a shareholding-director who holds shares with loaded votes would validly be able to prevent 
his removal from office by ensuring that the loaded votes are cast against the ordinary 
resolution to remove him from office.38 
 
2.4  Judicial Removal of Directors 
 
As was mentioned above, the Companies Act empowers courts to remove directors under a 
review in terms of section 71(6). Under this provision, if the board of directors of a company 
has determined that a director is not ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated or has not been 
negligent or derelict (as the case may be) any director who voted otherwise on the resolution 
or any holder of voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director, may apply 
to court to review the board’s determination.39 The court may confirm the determination of the 
board of directors not to remove the director in question from office, or the court may remove 
the director from office if it is satisfied that the director is ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated 
or has been negligent or derelict.40 This thesis will examine the court’s powers to remove a 
director from office under section 71(6) and will consider whether section 71(6) may be 
improved and enhanced.41   
 
As previously stated, a further significant innovation in the Companies Act is contained in 
section 162, which empowers a court, under various grounds, to declare a director delinquent 
or to place him under probation.42 The effect of section 162 of the Companies Act is that a 
court is empowered to remove a director from the board of directors, if any of the grounds 
contemplated in section 162 are applicable. This research will examine to what extent the 
power given to the courts to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation and 
hence to remove him from office usurps the power traditionally given to shareholders to 
                                                 
to resolutions on specific matters (Anon “‘Weighted’ or ‘Loaded’ Votes in Private Companies” D5). Loaded votes 
would be exercisable when voting takes place on a poll, and not when voting takes place on a show of hands.  
 
38 See chapter 5, para 3. 
 
39 Section 71(6)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
40 Section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
41 See chapter 6, para 2. 
 
42 See para 1 above.  
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remove directors.43 It will also examine the judicial removal of directors in the UK, Australia 
and the USA. The procedures and grounds for judicial removal in these foreign jurisdictions 
are compared with such procedures and grounds under the (South African) Companies Act 
with a view to ascertaining whether section 162 of the Companies Act may be strengthened 
and improved.44 
 
In terms of section 162(11) of the Companies Act, a person who has been declared delinquent 
by a court or is subject to an order of probation may apply to a court to have the order of 
delinquency suspended and substituted with an order of probation, at any time more than three 
years after the order of delinquency was made.45 Such a person may also apply to a court to set 
aside an order of delinquency at any time more than two years after it was suspended, or to set 
aside an order of probation at any time more than two years after it was made.46 An application 
to court to suspend an order of delinquency or to set aside an order of probation may not, 
however, be brought if a director had consented to serve as a director or had acted in the 
capacity of a director while ineligible or disqualified, or, while being under an order of 
probation he had acted as a director in a manner that contravened that order, as contemplated 
in sections 162(5)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act.47 This thesis examines the application to 
court to suspend an order of delinquency or to set aside an order of probation in terms of section 
162(11) of the Companies Act. It compares section 162(11) of the Companies Act with the 
equivalent provisions in the UK Companies of 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act of 
2001 in order to ascertain whether section 162(11) of the Companies Act may be improved and 
enhanced. 
 
                                                 
43 See chapter 2, para 6. 
 
44 See chapter 6, para 3 where this topic is discussed. 
 
45 See chapter 6, para 3.11 where this is discussed. 
 
46 Section 162(11)(b). See chapter 6, para 3.11 where this is discussed. 
 
47 Section 162(11). 
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2.5  Remedies Available to a Director who has been Removed from Office 
 
Under the Companies Act a director who has been removed from office by the board of 
directors has certain remedies available to him.  
 
After a director has been removed from office by the board of directors under section 71(5) of 
the Companies Act, he may apply to a court of law within twenty business days to review the 
board’s determination. Alternatively, a person who appointed that director in terms of the 
Memorandum of Incorporation as contemplated in section 66(4)(a)(i),48 if applicable, may 
institute such an application.49   
 
A further remedy available to a director who has been removed from office is that, under 
section 71(9) of the Companies Act, he may apply to a court of law for damages (or other 
compensation) for the loss of office as a director or for the loss of any other office as a 
consequence of being removed as a director.50 Thus, where a company has appointed a director 
for a fixed period and that period has not expired at the time the director is removed from office, 
or the company has not agreed to compensate a director in the event of his removal from office, 
the affected director may claim damages (or other compensation) from the company.51 
 
A director who has been removed from office by the board of directors may also rely on the 
oppression remedy in section 163 of the Companies Act if he is able to establish that his 
removal from office by the board of directors was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly 
disregarded his interests.52 In the event that a director has unlawfully suffered reputational 
damage as a result of his removal from office, or his attempted removal from office, he may, 
                                                 
48 Section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act makes provision for a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation to 
provide for the direct appointment and removal of one or more directors by any person who is named in or 
determined in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation. 
 
49 See chapter 4, para 4.1 and chapter 7, para 2 where s 71(5) is discussed. 
 
50 See chapter 7, para 3 where this remedy is discussed. 
 
51 Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701; Read v Astoria Garage (Streatham) Ltd [1952] 2 All 
ER 292; De Villiers v Jacobsdal Saltworks (Michaelis & De Villiers) (Pty) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 873 (O); Blackman 
et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-285. 
 
52 See chapter 7, para 4 where the oppression remedy is discussed. 
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under the common law, have a right to institute a delictual action for defamation against the 
board of directors.53  
 
This thesis will examine the above remedies which may be relied on by a director who has been 
removed from office by the board of directors.54 The remedies provided to directors who have 
been removed from office by the board of directors under the UK Companies Act of 2006 and 
the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 are compared with a view to ascertaining whether the 
remedies under the (South African) Companies Act may be improved and enhanced.  
 
From the above it is clear that the key research questions to be answered in this thesis are:  
 
 What is the extent and impact of the power given to the board of directors and to the 
courts to remove a director from office?  
 
 What are the grounds and procedures under which a director may be removed from office 
under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, and how do they measure up to the equivalent 
provisions under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK Companies Act of 
2006, the MBCA and the DGCL? Is there scope to strengthen and improve the provisions 
of South African company law on the removal of directors by the board of directors?  
 
 Whether, and which, fiduciary duties of directors apply when the board removes a 
director from office under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, and what are the 
consequences of directors breaching their fiduciary duties in removing a director from 
office? 
 
 What considerations must be taken into account when the board of directors removes 
from office a director who is also an employee of the company, or is a director who holds 
shares with loaded votes? 
 
                                                 
53 See chapter 7, para 5 where the defamation action is discussed. 
 
54 See chapter 7 where these remedies are discussed. 
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 What are the grounds and procedures under which a director may be removed from office 
by a court under sections 71(6) and 162 of the Companies Act, and how do they measure 
up to the equivalent provisions under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK 
Companies Act of 2006, the MBCA and the DGCL?  Is there scope to improve and 
enhance the provisions of South African company law on the removal of directors by the 
courts and what recommendations flow from the research?  
 
 What remedies may be relied on by a former director who has been removed from office 
by the board of directors? 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This study involves a comparative analysis55 of the South African legal provisions on the 
removal of directors with those contained in the UK, Australia and the USA.  
 
The above jurisdictions have been selected for specific reasons. The provisions of the UK 
Companies Act of 2006 on the removal of directors will be discussed because South African 
company law is historically based on the English company law system and the company law 
in both these jurisdictions was recently reviewed.56  Australian company law, which is 
                                                 
55 Zweigert and Kötz define comparative law as “intellectual activity with law as its object and comparison as its 
process” (Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law 2). There are two approaches to comparative 
law: a macro-comparison and a micro-comparison. A macro-comparison is a study of two or more entire legal 
systems (for example English law and Australian law) while a micro-comparison is a comparison of specific areas 
of law or aspects of two or more legal systems (for example, the fiduciary duties of directors) (Samuel An 
Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method 50; De Cruz Comparative Law in a Changing World 233). 
In undertaking a comparative legal methodology, one often has to undertake both a macro-comparison and a 
micro-comparison at the same time, that is, one has to study the procedures by which the rules are in fact applied 
in order to understand why a foreign system solves a particular problem in the way it does (Zweigert & Kötz An 
Introduction to Comparative Law 5). The object of comparative legal research is to decide which rule or principle 
is best (Harding & Őrűcű (eds) Comparative Law in the 21st Century xii). A comparative legal approach gives 
one the opportunity to stand back from one’s own legal system and look at it more critically, and such an approach 
may also provide a warning of possible difficulties and may offer suggestions for further developments (Geoffrey 
Wilson “Comparative Legal Scholarship” in McConville and Chui Research Methods for Law 87). 
 
56 The reforms made to the UK Companies Act of 2006 are significant. The Company Law Review, which 
provides the essential blueprint for the UK Companies Act of 2006, was launched in March 1998, with the aim of 
modernising company law (see DTI Company Law Reform White Paper, Cm 6456, March 2005 at 3). The 
Company Law Reform White Paper sets out four crucial objectives of the company law reform. These are to 
enhance shareholder engagement and a long term investment culture; to ensure better regulation and a “think 
small first” approach to remove unnecessary burdens on small companies; to make it easier to set up and run a 
company and to provide flexibility for the future (DTI Company Law Reform White Paper, Cm 6456, March 2005 
at 3). The UK Companies Act of 2006 repeals virtually the whole of the UK Companies Act of 1985. The new 
Act received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006, but the provisions of the new Act came into effect in stages (see 
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historically largely based on UK company law, will also be reviewed in order to ascertain 
whether any useful guidelines may be deduced which are relevant to South African law.57  
 
Certain States in the USA have given the board of directors the power to remove directors, and 
it will accordingly be beneficial and informative to investigate the scope of such powers.58 The 
State of Delaware is generally regarded as having the most developed corporate law in the USA 
and as being the most important corporate jurisdiction which serves as domicile to the majority 
of public companies in the USA,59 and accordingly this study will examine the corporate law 
                                                 
s 1300 of the UK Companies Act of 2006). The new Act is very lengthy, comprising 1 300 sections and 16 
Schedules. 
  
57 The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 commenced on 15 July 2001. Before 1901 each of the Australian 
colonies had company legislation which was based on the UK Companies Act, 1862. When they ceased to be 
colonies in 1901 and became States they continued to be responsible for company legislation. Until 1961 each 
jurisdiction remained responsible for its own company legislation. Many of the basic ideas in the UK legislation 
persisted in each State’s legislation but divergences developed in some States. By the end of the 1980s the Federal 
Government recognised that a national company law was needed in Australia. The Australian Corporations Act 
of 2001 is a federal statute which applies uniformly in Australia. There is no longer a separate company law which 
applies in each State (see Ford, Ramsay & O’Connor Australian Corporations Legislation 2011 xi-xiii for a 
detailed discussion on the background to the Australian Corporations Act of 2001). While company law in 
Australia is historically based on the company law in the UK and strongly resembles UK company law in 
fundamental respects, present-day company law in Australia under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 is 
less dependent on the company law in the UK (Bruner Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The 
Political Foundations of Shareholder Power 66; Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of 
Corporations Law para 1.020 at 2). Certain features of Australian company law take forms closely resembling 
corporate law in the USA. For example Australian company law has a business judgment rule which is modelled 
on USA law (s 180(2)). Section 198A(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, which provides that the 
“business of a company is to be managed by or under the direction of the directors”, is worded similarly to s 8-
01(b) of the MBCA (see Bruner Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations 
of Shareholder Power 66-77 for a detailed comparison of the Australian company law principles with those of the 
USA and the UK). The provisions on the removal of directors in the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 differ 
in some respects from the model adopted in the UK Companies Act of 2006. For instance, the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 confines the statutory right of shareholders to remove directors to public companies 
only (s 203D of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001). It does not permit directors of a public company to 
remove directors from office (see s 203E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001). There is no Explanatory 
Memorandum to account for these variations (see further Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles 
of Corporations Law para 7.240 at 289). These provisions are discussed in chapter 3 para 2.2. The Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 is administered by a national regulatory authority, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (“ASIC”), while the Australian Securities Exchange prescribes standards for companies 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
 
58 The USA has a federal system where federal law is enacted by the United States Congress while State law is 
enacted by individual State legislatures. Each State has its own legal system and judiciary which is separate from 
the federal system. Generally, State law provides for corporate law matters, which are regulated by the fifty States. 
There are in certain instances fundamental differences between the laws of the various States. Generally, the State 
where a corporation is incorporated governs the choice of law for matters relating to the internal affairs of the 
corporation (see Pinto “Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations” 
322; Bainbridge Corporate Law 10-11; Kershaw Company Law in Context 213 and Bruner Corporate Governance 
in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power 37-38 where the federalised 
government in the USA is discussed further). 
 
59 Bebchuk “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power” 844; Knight “The Removal of Public Company 
Directors in Australia: Time for Change?” 366; Bainbridge Corporate Law 9. Most public corporations in the 
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in Delaware on the removal of directors. However, corporate law in Delaware will not be the 
only focus of the consideration of USA corporate law on the removal of directors, and this 
study will further investigate the relevant legislation in selected other States which permit 
directors to remove a director from the board of directors.60  
 
A comparative legal approach is appropriate for this investigation in order to assess how the 
South African legal provisions relating to the removal of company directors measure up against 
the equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions considered, and to ascertain whether and 
how the South African legal provisions in this regard may be improved. This approach is 
reinforced by section 5(2) of the Companies Act which provides that, to the extent appropriate, 
a court interpreting or applying the Companies Act may consider foreign company law.61 
Besides, large portions of the Companies Act are derived from these foreign jurisdictions. In 
Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd and Others62 
the High Court remarked that company law in South Africa has for many decades tracked the 
English system and taken its lead from the relevant English Companies Act and jurisprudence, 
but section 5(2) of our Companies Act now encourages our courts to look further afield and to 
have regard in appropriate circumstances to other corporate law jurisdictions (be they 
American, European, Asian or African) in interpreting the Companies Act. 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis explores the underpinning philosophy of the removal of directors from 
office. It examines the impact of the power given to the board of directors and to the courts to 
remove a director from office, and the extent to which the balance of powers between the 
shareholders and the directors has shifted from the balance of powers which prevailed under 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
 
                                                 
USA that change their corporate domicile choose to reincorporate in Delaware (Cox & Hazen Corporations 35). 
Some reasons for this are because there is a large body of case law interpreting the DGCL, which provides 
certainty on corporate law matters; Delaware has a separate court devoted predominantly to corporate law cases 
(the Court of Chancery); the judiciary has much expertise and experience in corporate law matters, and the judges 
tend to render their decisions quite quickly (Cox & Hazen Corporations 139-140; Bainbridge Corporate Law 9). 
 
60 For instance the States of Ohio, Massachusetts and Indiana permit directors to remove a director from the board 
of directors. See chapter 3, para 2.4 for an evaluation and discussion of the removal of directors in these and other 
USA States. 
 
61 Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides that a court, tribunal or forum must consider international law and 
may consider foreign law, when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
 
62 2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC) para 26. 
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Chapter 3 examines the grounds for the removal of a director by the board of directors under 
section 71(3) of the Companies Act, as well as the procedures to remove a director. The chapter 
compares the grounds to remove a director and the procedures to do so under the (South 
African) Companies Act with the equivalent provisions under the UK Companies Act of 2006, 
the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and various other States of 
the USA. 
 
The focus of chapter 4 is the fiduciary duties applicable to directors in removing a director 
from the board of directors. The leading decision in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien,63 dealing with the 
fiduciary duties of directors in removing directors from office in the UK, is evaluated. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the removal from office of directors holding multiple positions or 
capacities in relation to a company. The removal of directors who are employees and 
shareholders holding loaded voting rights is discussed.  
 
The judicial removal of directors is canvassed in chapter 6. This chapter examines sections 
71(6) and 162 of the Companies Act. It explores the grounds under which a court may declare 
a director to be delinquent or place him under probation. This chapter further compares the 
judicial removal of directors under the (South African) Companies Act with the judicial 
removal of directors under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and various other States of the 
USA. 
 
Chapter 7 examines the remedies which are available to a director who has been removed by 
the board of directors under the Companies Act. A comparison is made with the remedies 
available to directors who have been removed from office under the UK Companies Act of 
2006 and the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.  
 
Finally, chapter 8 draws some conclusions and makes recommendations on the removal of 
directors by the board of directors and the judiciary under the Companies Act, taking into 
                                                 
63 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
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account developments in the foreign jurisdictions considered. Some amendments to the current 
legislation are proposed. 
 
4.  REFERENCE TECHNIQUES 
 
For purposes of convenience, company directors will be referred to in this study in the 
masculine form and they will be assumed to include the feminine form. The same meaning 
should be denoted to the words “company” and “corporation”. 
 
Authorities are referred to in footnotes in an abbreviated form. The bibliography at the end of 
this thesis contains the full references of every cited source next to the abbreviated form used 
in the footnotes.  
 
Authors are referred to in footnotes by reference to their surnames only, save that where there 
is a reference to more than one author with the same surname the initials of the respective 
authors are referred to. 
 
The full citation of court cases is provided every time reference is made to the particular case. 
Court cases are cited in footnotes in chronological order rather than jurisdictional order. In the 
footnotes, the abbreviation “para” is used for “paragraph” and “s” is used for “section”.  
 
The law is stated as it was on 31 March 2018.
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CHAPTER 2 REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
UNDERPINNINGS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. THE DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN DIRECTORS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS  
3. THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
4. SHAREHOLDERS’ POWER TO REMOVE DIRECTORS FROM 
OFFICE 
5. IMPACT OF THE BOARD’S POWER TO REMOVE A DIRECTOR 
FROM OFFICE 
6. IMPACT OF THE COURT’S POWER TO REMOVE A DIRECTOR 
FROM OFFICE 
7. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWERS WITH REGARD TO 
THE REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the division of powers between directors and shareholders. It 
explores the reason why shareholders have traditionally been given the right to remove 
directors from office. It then examines the extent and impact of the power given to the 
board of directors under the Companies Act to remove directors from office, and of the 
equivalent power given to courts. It is argued that the conferral of this power on the board 
of directors has shifted the balance of power and the dynamics between the directors and 
the shareholders. Some suggestions are made on how to moderate the shift in the balance 
of power between the shareholders and the directors. Finally, this chapter highlights some 
factors which the judiciary ought to consider before exercising its discretion to remove a 
director from office. 
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2. THE DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN DIRECTORS AND   
SHAREHOLDERS 
 
The powers of a company are divided between the board of directors and the shareholders 
in a general meeting or a shareholders’ meeting, and each organ has its own separate 
sphere of authority.1 Until the end of the nineteenth century it was generally accepted that 
the general meeting was the personification of the company and the supreme organ of the 
company, and that the directors were simply its agents subject to the control of the 
company (i.e. shareholders) in general meeting.2 Since the powers conferred upon the 
directors (as the agents) were thought of as having been conferred upon them by the 
shareholders (as the principals), it was deduced that the directors were subject to the 
control of the shareholders in general meeting.3  The implication of this view was that the 
shareholders could at any time by ordinary resolution give the directors instructions on 
how they were to exercise their powers of management.4 
 
This view of the superiority of the shareholders appears to be derived from the influence 
of elements of the law of partnership.5 Historically, in 1837, there were two principal 
                                                 
1 Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; Gramophone 
and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89; Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd  [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA);  John 
Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134; Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All ER 582; Cape 
United Sick Fund Society and Others v Forrest and Others 1956 (4) SA 519 (A); Wessels & Smith v Vanugo 
Construction (Pty) Ltd 1964 (1) SA 635 (O) at 637; Van Tonder v Pienaar 1982 (2) SA 336 (SE) at 341; 
Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London and Suffolk Properties Ltd and Others [1989] BCLC 100; Ben-
Tovim v Ben-Tovim and Others 2001 (3) SA 1074 (C) at 1085-1086; Massey and Another v Wales and 
Others (2003) 177 FLR 1 at 12; Goldberg “Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act, 1948” 177; 
Blackman “Article 59 and the Distribution of Powers in a Company” 286; Sullivan “The Relationship 
between the Board of Directors and the General Meeting in Limited Companies” 569; Pretorius et al 
Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the Cases 207 and 336; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 
85; Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South Africa” 
180-186; Bainbridge Corporate Law 72-75; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 7-13, 7-15 
and 7-20-2–7-25; R Cassim “Governance and Shareholders” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company 
Law 355; Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.061 at 238 
and para 7.070 at 241; Hannigan Company Law 183-186; Esser & Delport “Shareholder Protection 
Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 8-10. 
 
2 Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA); Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 85; 
Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 7-14; Keay “Company Directors Behaving Poorly: 
Disciplinary Options for Shareholders” 657; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company 
Law 358.  
 
3 Aickin “Division of Power between Directors and General Meeting as a Matter of Law, and as a Matter 
of Fact and Policy” 449; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 7-14.  
 
4 Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 358-359. 
5 Aickin “Division of Power between Directors and General Meeting as a Matter of Law, and as a Matter 
of Fact and Policy” 449. 
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vehicles used to conduct businesses on a large scale – the corporation and the joint stock 
company.6 The corporation existed in terms of a Royal Charter7 or an Act of Parliament8 
and had a separate legal existence, while the joint stock company was simply a large 
partnership and did not enjoy a separate legal existence.9 Joint stock companies were the 
more important vehicle and courts applied the principles of partnership in regulating 
them.10 The application of partnership principles to joint stock companies, however, 
posed difficulties because typical joint stock companies had hundreds of members, and it 
was clear that there was no personal relationship between the members, as is the case in 
a partnership.11 In order to address these problems the Joint Stock Companies Act of 
184412 was enacted. This was the first Companies Act to provide for incorporation by 
registration, and it empowered the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies to incorporate a 
company whose documents were registered with him.13 This Act limited the size of 
partnerships, thus forcing large joint stock ventures to adopt a corporate form.14 
Nevertheless, courts continued to invoke partnership principles to resolve company law 
matters and a company was still regarded as a peculiar kind of partnership.15 The status 
                                                 
6 See Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” 557 where these two 
vehicles are discussed. 
 
7 Companies incorporated by a Royal Charter were known as “chartered companies.” The members 
contributed capital to form the companies “joint stock” which was then managed by governors or directors 
appointed by the members (see French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 7) (a 
new edition of this work has been published but it was not available to me at the time of writing this thesis). 
 
8 Parliament could create a body corporate by an enactment which referred specifically to that body 
corporate (French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 7). 
 
9 Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” 557-558; French, Mayson & 
Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 7. 
 
10 Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” 558. 
 
11 Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” 558. 
 
12 7 & 8 Vict. c.110. 
 
13 Kershaw Company Law in Context 489. Registration took place in two stages, a provisional registration 
and a complete registration. The system was revised by the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 which 
introduced a single stage registration system (see French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law 8). 
 
14 Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” 558. 
 
15 See for example Re Yenidje Tobacco Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 426 (CA) where the UK Court of Appeal, in 
deciding whether it was just and equitable that a private company be wound up, decided the matter on the 
basis of the principles which apply to a partnership. The court rationalised its approach on the ground that 
the company was in substance a partnership in the guise of a private company (at 431-432). See further 
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of shareholders in company law at the time was that they were the ultimate proprietor of 
the company, and they had the right to manage the company and to have the company 
run for their exclusive benefit.16  
 
The superiority of the shareholders was enunciated in one of the first cases dealing with 
the relative positions of the general meeting and the directors, namely Isle of Wight 
Railway Co v Tahourdin.17 In this case the directors called a shareholders’ meeting on a 
requisition by the shareholders, but the notice of the meeting issued by the directors did 
not provide for all the objects of the requisitionists. The requisitionists notified the 
directors that they would not attend the shareholders’ meeting called by the directors, and 
subsequently issued a notice calling their own meeting. The directors applied for an 
injunction restraining the requisitionists from calling their own meeting. The court a quo 
granted the injunction but the UK Court of Appeal reversed the decision, and discharged 
the injunction. The UK Court of Appeal, per Cotton LJ, proclaimed that the company’s 
shareholders in general meeting “undoubtedly [had] a power to direct and control the 
board in the management of the affairs of the company.”18  
 
Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin19 concerned a company established by an Act of 
Parliament and subject to the provisions of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 
1845. Section 90 of that Act provided that the directors had powers of management and 
superintendence of the affairs of the company and that the exercise of such powers was 
subject to the control and regulation of any general meeting specially convened.20 It 
follows that the above quoted statement by Cotton LJ was a reference not to the powers 
of the general meeting in general but a reference to the powers of control expressly 
                                                 
Hill “Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder” 42-43 for a discussion of the partnership model of the 
corporation in the nineteenth century. 
 
16 Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” 559; Hill “Visions and 
Revisions of the Shareholder” 42-43. See further Sealy “Directors’ ‘Wider’ Responsibilities – Problems 
Conceptual, Practical and Procedural” 165. 
 
17 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA). 
18 Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA) at 331-332.  
 
19 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA). 
20 See further Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 
at 46 where the Chancery Division discussed s 90 of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845. 
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conferred on the shareholders by the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845. 
Nevertheless, on the strength of Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin21 the view was 
held that in relation to all companies, including those incorporated under the then 
Companies Act of 1862, the position was the same as that prevailing under the Company 
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845 and that a company in general meeting had the power 
to direct and control the board of directors in relation to the conduct of the company’s 
affairs.22 
 
After the nineteenth century, however, there was a fundamental shift in the perception of 
the relationship between the general meeting and the directors. The notion that 
shareholders had the right to override decisions of management or that the company was 
conducted for the exclusive benefit of the shareholders was rejected.23  The general rule 
developed into one which provided that, unless expressly empowered to do so by the 
constitution of the company, the shareholders in general meeting could not control the 
directors’ exercise of their powers, nor exercise the powers conferred on the directors.24 
Insofar as Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin25 held that the directors are bound by 
the instructions of the shareholders’ meeting in carrying out their functions, this case was 
no longer regarded as good law.26 
 
                                                 
21 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA). 
22 See Aickin “Division of Power between Directors and General Meeting as a Matter of Law, and as a 
Matter of Fact and Policy” 451. 
 
23 See Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” 560-578 where the gradual 
attenuation of the rights of shareholders is traced in detail. 
 
24 Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; 
Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley  [1908] 2 KB 89; Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd  [1909] 1 Ch 
311 (CA);  John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134; Scott v Scott [1943] 1 
All ER 582; Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London and Suffolk Properties Ltd and Others [1989] BCLC 
100; Goldberg “Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act, 1948” 177; Blackman “Article 59 and the 
Distribution of Powers in a Company” 286; Sullivan “The Relationship between the Board of Directors 
and the General Meeting in Limited Companies” 569; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 
7-15 and 7-20-2–7-25. 
 
25 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA). 
 
26 See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 85 and Pretorius et al Hahlo’s South African Company Law 
through the Cases 212. 
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In the seminal case of Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v 
Cuninghame27 the question before the UK Court of Appeal was whether the shareholders 
in a shareholders’ meeting had the power to direct the course of action to be pursued by 
the directors (that is, that certain assets of the company be sold) or whether the directors 
could refuse to do what the shareholders in a shareholders’ meeting directed them to do. 
The constitution of Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited 
empowered the company to sell its undertaking to another company having similar 
objects. The directors of the company were empowered to sell or otherwise deal with any 
of the company’s property on such terms as they might think fit. A resolution was passed 
by the shareholders of the company for the sale of the company’s assets on certain terms 
to a new company formed for the purpose of acquiring such assets, and directing the 
directors to carry the sale into effect. The directors were of the opinion that the sale of 
the company’s assets on the proposed terms would not benefit the company. The directors 
accordingly refused to carry the sale into effect. The UK Court of Appeal held that, on 
the construction of the constitution of the company, which provided that the management 
of the business and control of the company were to be vested in the directors, the directors 
could not be compelled to comply with the resolution of the shareholders.28 The UK Court 
of Appeal distinguished this case from Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin29 on the 
basis that the Companies Clauses Act of 1845 was not applicable to the case before it and 
it was therefore not bound by the dictum of Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin.30 The 
court emphatically rejected the notion that directors are merely agents of the general 
meeting, susceptible to direction by the general meeting on any matter.31  
 
In Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley32 the UK Court of Appeal approved  the 
dictum in Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame33 
                                                 
27 [1906] 2 Ch 34. 
 
28 Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 at 45. 
 
29 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA). 
 
30 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA). See Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v 
Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 at 46.  
 
31 Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 at 42-43. 
 
32 [1908] 2 KB 89 at 98. 
 
33 [1906] 2 Ch 34. 
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and asserted that shareholders cannot, even by a majority at a general meeting, interfere 
with the exercise of powers placed in the hands of the directors by the constitution of the 
company. Buckley LJ stressed that directors are not servants to obey directions given by 
the shareholders and they are not agents appointed by and bound to serve the shareholders 
as their principals.34 Instead, Buckley LJ proclaimed that directors are persons who may 
by the regulations be entrusted with the control of the business and who may be disposed 
of that control only by the alteration of the company’s constitution.35  
 
Despite these authorities the matter was not fully settled. In Marshall’s Valve Gear Co v 
Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd36 a different view was adopted. The Chancery Division, per 
Neville J, asserted that the prevailing principle was that, in the absence of any contract to 
the contrary, the majority of the shareholders in a company had the ultimate control of its 
affairs and could assert their rights in a shareholders’ meeting.37 In spite of this judgment, 
the UK Court of Appeal in Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd38 reverted to its previously held 
position and adopted the mainstream view enunciated in Gramophone and Typewriter 
Ltd v Stanley39 that directors are persons who may by the regulations be entrusted with 
the control of the business and who may be disposed of that control only by the alteration 
of the company’s constitution. The UK Court of Appeal in Salmon v Quin and Axtens 
Ltd40 opined that any other construction would be disastrous because it “might lead to an 
interference by a bare majority very inimical to the interests of the minority who had 
come into the company on the footing that the business should be managed by the board 
of directors.” The dictum of Marshall’s Valve Gear Co v Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd41 
was not referred to in Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd42 but counsel for the plaintiff 
                                                 
34 Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89 at 105-106. 
 
35 Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89 at 106. 
 
36 [1909] 78 LJ Ch 46. 
 
37 Marshall’s Valve Gear Co v Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd [1909] 78 LJ Ch 46 at 49. 
 
38 [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA) at 319. 
 
39 [1908] 2 KB 89 at 106. 
 
40 [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA) at 319-320.  
 
41 [1909] 78 LJ Ch 46. 
 
42 [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA). 
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criticised this latter decision as being inconsistent with the principles established in 
Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame43 and 
Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley.44   
 
Thereafter the relationship between the board of directors and the general meeting was 
regarded as having been settled by the UK Court of Appeal.45 The relationship between 
directors and shareholders is succinctly described by the UK Court of Appeal in John 
Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw46 as follows: 
  
 “A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors. Some 
of its powers may, according to its articles, be exercised by directors; certain other 
powers may be reserved for the shareholders in a shareholders’ meeting. If powers 
of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise these 
powers. The only way in which the general body of the shareholders can control the 
exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their 
articles or, if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors 
of whose actions they disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the powers which 
by the articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors can usurp the 
powers vested in the articles in the general body of shareholders.” 
 
In Scott v Scott47 the Chancery Division found that the division of authority between the 
shareholders and directors is important even in the case of family companies. The court 
found that a resolution of shareholders purporting to interfere with the management of 
directors was invalid.48 The Privy Council emphasised in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol 
                                                 
43 [1906] 2 Ch 34. 
 
44 [1908] 2 KB 89. See Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA) at 315. 
 
45 See Aickin “Division of Power between Directors and General Meeting as a Matter of Law, and as a 
Matter of Fact and Policy” 458. 
 
46 [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134. See James North (Zimbabwe) (Pvt) Ltd v Mattinson 1990 (2) SA 229 
(ZHC) at 237 where the Zimbabwe High Court approved of this dictum. 
 
47 [1943] 1 All ER 582. 
 
48 See Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All ER 582 at 584-585. By passing ordinary resolutions the majority 
shareholders attempted to declare interim dividends and have the company’s financial affairs investigated 
by outside auditors. The court held that the resolutions were invalid on the basis that they were attempts by 
the company in general meeting to usurp the powers of the financial direction of the company, which under 
the articles rested solely in the hands of the directors. For an analysis of the relationship between the board 
of directors and the general meeting and a defence of the dictum in Marshall’s Valve Gear Co v Manning, 
Wardle & Co Ltd [1909] 78 LJ Ch 46 see Goldberg “Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act, 1948” 
177 and Sullivan “The Relationship between the Board of Directors and the General Meeting in Limited 
Companies” 569. See also Blackman “Article 59 and the Distribution of Powers in a Company” for a further 
analysis of the distribution of powers in a company. 
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Petroleum Ltd49 that the majority of shareholders cannot control directors in the exercise 
of their management powers while they remain in office. In Breckland Group Holdings 
Ltd v London and Suffolk Properties Ltd and Others50 the Chancery Division proclaimed 
that the jurisdiction to conduct the business of the company was vested in the board of 
directors, and that the shareholders in a shareholders’ meeting could not intervene.   
 
With regard to the distribution of power between the board of directors and the 
shareholders South African law has been influenced by the position adopted by the UK 
courts. For instance, with regard to a friendly association with legal personality under 
common law, the Appellate Division in Cape United Sick Fund Society and Others v 
Forrest and Others51 approved and applied the principle of the division of powers 
between managing bodies and a meeting of members. The Appellate Division further 
approved of the principles established in Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd52 and John Shaw 
& Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw.53 In Wessels & Smith v Vanugo Construction (Pty) Ltd54 
the court stated, with reference to and with approval of Scott v Scott,55 that it has already 
been held that an article in the constitution of a company which provided that the business 
of the company shall be managed by the directors, entailed that the entire management 
of the company rests solely in the hands of the directors. The court consequently asserted 
                                                 
49 [1974] AC 821 (PC) at 837. 
 
50 [1989] BCLC 100 at 106. 
 
51 1956 (4) SA 519 (A). The members of the Cape United Sick Fund Society had requested the board of 
management of the society to convene a special general meeting to consider certain resolutions which had 
the effect of conferring power on a body other than the board of management, of empowering a body other 
than the board of management to obtain legal advice, and of suspending the payment of honoraria to 
members of the board of management. The board of management refused to convene such a meeting. The 
members of the society issued a declaration claiming an order directing the board to convene such a meeting 
or alternatively authorising the members to call the meeting in the name of the society. The society and the 
members of the board excepted to the declaration as disclosing no cause of action in that under the society’s 
constitution it would not be competent for the special general meeting to pass the proposed resolution, or, 
if the resolutions were passed, they would have no force or effect. The Appellate Division held that all the 
resolutions proposed to be moved would be ultra vires the constitution of the society, and that the board 
was accordingly entitled to refuse to convene the meeting. 
 
52 [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA) at 319. 
 
53 [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134. See Cape United Sick Fund Society and Others v Forrest and Others 1956 
(4) SA 519 (A) at 540.  
 
54 1964 (1) SA 635 (O) at 637. 
 
55 [1943] 1 All ER 582. 
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that any resolution by the company in a shareholders’ meeting purporting to interfere 
with this management, was invalid.56 In Van Tonder v Pienaar57 the court relied on and 
agreed with John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw58 that if powers of management are 
vested in the directors they and they alone can exercise them.  
 
More recently, in LSA UK Ltd (formerly Curtainz Ltd) and Others v Impala Platinum 
Holdings Ltd and Others59 the Supreme Court of Appeal approved of the general position 
enunciated in John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw.60 The court reiterated that the 
board of directors and the general meeting are both organs of the company, each having 
its own original powers, and that the directors do not receive their powers as agents of 
the company.61 Accordingly, the court reasoned, in the absence of a contrary provision 
in the constitution of the company, even a unanimous general meeting may not supersede 
the directors’ powers.62 The Supreme Court of Appeal remarked that it is possible for the 
board and the general meeting to have concurrent powers, but opined that courts are 
disinclined to treat managerial and executive powers as concurrent and, unless the 
constitution provides otherwise, they are exercisable exclusively by the directors.63 In 
Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim and Others64 on the issue of the division of powers between the 
board of directors and the shareholders, the court acknowledged that the “pendulum of 
the division of powers between the general meeting and the board of directors has through 
the years swung from the general meeting as the supreme organ to prominence of the 
articles of association.” 
                                                 
56 Wessels & Smith v Vanugo Construction (Pty) Ltd 1964 (1) SA 635 (O) at 637. 
 
57 1982 (2) SA 336 (SE) at 341. 
 
58 [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134. 
 
59 2000 JDR 0187 (SCA). 
 
60 [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134.  
 
61 LSA UK Ltd (formerly Curtainz Ltd) and Others v Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd and Others 2000 JDR 
0187 (SCA) at 38. 
 
62 LSA UK Ltd (formerly Curtainz Ltd) and Others v Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd and Others 2000 JDR 
0187 (SCA) at 38. 
 
63 LSA UK Ltd (formerly Curtainz Ltd) and Others v Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd and Others 2000 JDR 
0187 (SCA) at 38. 
 
64 2001 (3) SA 1074 at 1085-1086. 
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Under the (South African) Companies Act 46 of 192665 and the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 directors did not have original powers and their power had to be delegated to them 
by the shareholders in the then articles of association of the company. A typical provision 
in the articles of association under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was to the effect of 
Article 59 of the Table A (Articles for a public company having a share capital) or Article 
60 of Table B (Articles for a private company having a share capital) which stated as 
follows: 
 
 “The business of the company shall be managed by the directors who may pay all 
expenses incurred in promoting and incorporating the company, and may exercise 
all such powers of the  company as are not by the Act, or by these articles, required 
to be exercised by the company in general meeting, subject to these articles, to the 
provisions of the Act, and to such regulations, not inconsistent with the aforesaid 
articles or provisions, as may be prescribed  by the company in general meeting, but 
no regulation prescribed by the company in general meeting shall invalidate any 
prior act of the directors which would have been valid if such regulation had not 
been made.” 
 
From the above article it is evident that under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 the power 
to manage the company’s affairs had to be delegated to the board of directors by the 
shareholders in general meeting or by the articles of association of the company. If no 
powers were granted to the board of directors through the articles of association the board 
would be powerless to act and the company could act only through its shareholders.66 The 
shareholders thus empowered the board of directors.67  
 
                                                 
65 See Article 83 of Table A (Regulations for Management of a Company Limited by Shares) contained in 
Schedule 1 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. A company limited by shares was a company which had the 
liability of its members limited by the memorandum of association to the amount (if any) unpaid on the 
shares respectively held by them (s 5(a) of the Companies Act 46 of 1926). The model articles in Table A 
could also have been adopted by companies limited by guarantee (being associations formed for purposes 
not for gain) and by unlimited companies (which were companies which did not have any limit on the 
liability of its members) (s 5 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926). Article 83 of Table A of the Companies 
Act 46 of 1926 was worded very similarly to Article 59 of Table A and Article 60 of Table B of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973. See further Henochsberg Henochsberg on the Companies Act 482; Cilliers & 
Benade Corporate Law 86; Pretorius et al Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the Cases 207 and 
336; Kunst, Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 327; Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 250(3) and Havenga “Directors’ Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities and 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 262. 
 
66 See Kershaw Company Law in Context 191-192. 
 
67 Kershaw Company Law in Context 192. 
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Section 66(1) of the Companies Act has now firmly swung the pendulum towards the 
board of directors as the supreme organ of the company. The section represents a 
fundamental change in the philosophy and approach of the balance of power between the 
directors and shareholders. The section provides as follows: 
 
 “The business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction 
 of its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform 
 any of the functions of the company, except to the extent that this Act or the 
 company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.”68  
 
With the enactment of section 66(1) of the Companies Act original power to manage the 
business and affairs of the company has, for the first time, been given to the board of 
directors by statute. The power of the directors is now original and is no longer a power 
delegated by the shareholders through the constitution of the company.69 As the Western 
Cape High Court in Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd,70 Navigator Property Investments 
(Pty) Ltd v Silver Lakes Crossing Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd and Others71 and Kaimowitz 
v Delahunt and Others72 affirmed, in terms of the Companies Act, the ultimate power in 
a company is now with the board of directors, and not with the shareholders (unless 
otherwise provided in the Companies Act or the Memorandum of Incorporation of the 
company). Since the board’s power is derived from statute and not the constitution of the 
                                                 
68 In large companies it would not be practically possible for the directors to manage every aspect of the 
day-to-day business of the company and some management powers would most likely be delegated by the 
board of directors. For this reason the words “be managed by or under the direction of its board” have been 
inserted in s 66(1) of the Companies Act and in other equivalent provisions in foreign jurisdictions. See for 
example s 198A of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, s 8-01(b) of the MBCA and s 141(a) of the 
DGCL, which all incorporate the phrase “under the direction of” the board of directors. See further AWA 
Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Others (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 865-866 and Cilliers & Benade 
Corporate Law 137. 
 
69 See further on s 66(1) of the Companies Act Kaimowitz v Delahunt and Others 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) 
paras 12-13; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 250(1)-262(5); Havenga “Directors’ 
Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 262; Delport New 
Entrepreneurial Law 103-104; Esser & Delport “Shareholder Protection Philosophy in terms of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008” 8-10; Esser & Havenga “Directors and Other Officers” in Loubser & Mahony 
Company Secretarial Practice 8-2 and JS Oosthuizen & Delport “Rectification of the Securities Register 
of a Company and the Oppression Remedy” 244. 
 
70 (1057/2013) [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 25. 
 
71 [2014] JOL 32101 (WCC) para 31. 
 
72 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) para 12. 
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company, as was previously the case, it is now to a lesser extent subject to shareholder 
control.73  
 
The UK Companies Act of 2006 does not contain a provision conferring management 
power or decision-making power on the board of directors. Instead, it is left to the 
constitution of the company to determine the distribution of decision-making power 
between the board of directors and the shareholders.74 In terms of Article 3 of the Model 
Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares and Article 3 of the Model Articles for 
Public Companies, subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the 
management of the company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all the 
powers of the company. Article 4 confers on shareholders the power to direct the board 
of directors what to do or what to refrain from doing by passing a special resolution. The 
regulation of the internal affairs of the company in UK company law whereby the 
company regulates its internal affairs by means of rules laid down in the company’s 
constitution is known as the contractarian model or as “English model companies” or as 
“memorandum and articles” model of companies.75 The constitution of this type of 
corporation is regarded as a contract among all of the shareholders and the company 
itself.76  The fact that it is left to the articles of association to determine the distribution 
of decision-making power between the board of directors and the shareholders, indicates 
                                                 
73 Havenga “Directors’ Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 262. 
In Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd 2016 (5) SA 414 (GJ) para 62 in the context of a 
discussion on the derivative action, the court remarked that a company derives its power to commence 
litigation from s 66(1) of the Companies Act. The court commented that the power conferred on the board 
of directors by s 66(1) to manage the business and affairs of a company includes the power to decide 
whether to embark upon litigation. 
 
74 See Articles 3 and 4 of the Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares and the Model 
Articles for Public Companies, found in Schedules 1 and 3 respectively of the Companies (Model Articles) 
Regulations 2008 (which came into force on 1 October 2009). The Model Articles automatically form the 
articles of association for companies formed under the UK Companies Act of 2006 which, on their 
formation, either do not register their own articles of association with the Registrar of Companies under 
that Act, or, if articles are registered, they do not exclude or modify the Model Articles in whole or in part 
(see s 20 of the UK Companies Act of 2006). 
 
75 Welling, Smith & Rotman Canadian Corporate Law: Cases, Notes & Materials 114; Kershaw Company 
Law in Context 85-93; JS Oosthuizen & Delport “Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company 
and the Oppression Remedy” 232-233. 
 
76 See s 33(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 which states that the provisions of a company’s 
constitution bind the company and its members to the same extent as if they were covenants on the part of 
the company and of each member to observe those provisions. See further Welling, Smith & Rotman 115; 
Davies & Worthington 65 and Bruner Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political 
Foundations of Shareholder Power 35-36. 
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that in the UK the originating power of the company lies with the shareholders acting in 
general meeting, and not with the directors, and it is, accordingly, a shareholder-centric 
approach.77 The directors are not given managerial powers by the statute but such powers 
must come from the shareholders by way of a delegation of authority.78  The shareholders 
may alter the initial distribution of power which was delegated to the board of directors 
by the articles of association by passing a special resolution to amend the articles of 
association.79 This swings the balance of power in the UK in favour of the shareholders, 
rather than with the board of directors.   
 
The (South African) Companies Act has clearly moved away from the approach adopted 
in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and in the UK regarding the distribution of power to 
the board of directors. It follows the approach adopted in the USA. A long standing 
principle of corporate law in the USA is that the power to manage the company is 
conferred on the board of directors by statute. Section 8-01(b) of the MBCA80 states that 
corporate powers are exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors and 
that the business and affairs of the corporation are managed by or under the direction of 
its board of directors. This approach is director-centric and is known as the division of 
powers model because the statute expressly divides powers between shareholders and 
directors.81 This approach does however retain flexibility in respect of the constitution in 
                                                 
77 Cools “The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of Powers” 738-739; Kershaw Company Law in Context 191; Bruner Corporate Governance 
in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power 32; JS Oosthuizen & Delport 
“Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company and the Oppression Remedy” 232-233.  
 
78 Welling, Smith & Rotman Canadian Corporate Law: Cases, Notes & Materials 114-115; Kershaw 
Company Law in Context 191-192; Bruner Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The 
Political Foundations of Shareholder Power 36. 
 
79 See s 21 of the UK Companies Act of 2006, which states that a company may amend its articles of 
association by special resolution. 
 
80 Refer to para 2.1 of chapter 1 where the “MBCA” is defined. Section 8.01(b) of the MBCA states as 
follows: “Except as may be provided in an agreement authorized under section 7.32, and subject to any 
limitation in the articles of incorporation permitted by section 2.02(b), all corporate powers shall be 
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors, and the business and affairs of the corporation 
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors.”  
 
81 See Welling, Smith & Rotman Canadian Corporate Law: Cases, Notes & Materials 116-117; Bruner 
Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power 36-
65 and Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 59 for a further discussion of 
this model. 
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that default rules may be changed by the company’s constitution.82 Likewise, section 
141(a) of the DGCL83 states that the business and affairs of every corporation shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors (except as otherwise provided 
in its certificate of incorporation).  In Aronson v Lewis84 the Supreme Court of Delaware 
emphasised that a cardinal precept of the DGCL is that directors, rather than shareholders, 
manage the business and affairs of the corporation.  
 
Under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 the management of the business of a 
company is a matter for the company’s directors, and shareholders do not possess the 
power to make management decisions.85 Section 198A(1) of the Australian Corporations 
Act of 2001 states that the “business of a company is to be managed by or under the 
direction of the directors.”86 It should be noted however that section 198A is a replaceable 
rule, meaning that it may be ousted or modified by the constitution of the company.87 In 
                                                 
82 The default rules may be changed in terms of an agreement authorised under s 7.32 of the MBCA or in 
terms of any limitation in the articles of incorporation permitted by s 2.02(b) of the MBCA. Section 7.32 
of the MBCA deals with shareholder agreements and permits such an agreement to restrict the discretion 
or powers of the board of directors. In terms of s 2.02(b)(iii) of the MBCA the articles of incorporation 
may set forth provisions not inconsistent with the law regarding defining, limiting, and regulating the 
powers of the corporation, its board of directors and shareholders.  
 
83 Refer to para 2.1 of chapter 1 where the “DGCL” is defined. Section 141(a) of the DGCL states as 
follows: “The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by 
or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its 
certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers 
and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed 
to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the charter.”  
 
84 473 A.2d 805 (1984) at 811. 
 
85 The Court of Appeals of New South Wales in Massey and Another v Wales and Others (2003) 177 FLR 
1 at 12 proclaimed that where the constitution of a company provides that the business of the company is 
to be managed by the directors, the general meeting generally has no power to make management decisions 
or to control or direct the board of directors in the management of the company. 
 
86 Despite the presence of s 198A(1) in the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, this statute is shareholder-
centric to a large degree, as is the position under the company law in the UK, on which Australian company 
law is historically rooted (for a further discussion of the approach adopted in Australia see Bruner 
Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power 66-
77; Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 1.020 at 1-2 and 
chapter 1, note 57).  
 
87 See s 135 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 on replaceable rules. In terms of s 135(2) a 
provision of a section or subsection that applies to a company as a replaceable rule may be displaced or 
modified by the company’s constitution. A company’s constitution and any replaceable rules that apply to 
the company have effect as a contract between the company and each member, between the company and 
each director and company secretary, and between a member and each other member, under which each 
person agrees to observe and perform the constitution and rules insofar as they apply to that person 
(s 140(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001).  A failure to comply with the replaceable rules as 
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terms of section 198A(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 the powers of the 
directors may be curtailed by the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 or by the 
company’s constitution.88 
 
In accordance with the approach adopted under section 8.01(b) of the MBCA and 
section 198A(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the powers given to directors 
by section 66(1) of the (South African) Companies Act may be curtailed by the 
Companies Act or by the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company. The 
Memorandum of Incorporation may be amended by the shareholders by means of a 
special resolution or by means of any different requirements set out in the Memorandum 
of Incorporation.89 The shareholders are thus not without power but are able to curtail the 
powers of the board of directors in the Memorandum of Incorporation and to amend it by 
means of a special resolution or by complying with any other requirements set out in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation regarding its amendment. There are, however, limitations 
to the exercise of this power by the shareholders in that (i) a special resolution to amend 
the Memorandum of Incorporation must be proposed by shareholders entitled to exercise 
at least ten per cent of the voting rights that may be exercised on the resolution;90 (ii) the 
threshold for passing a special resolution may be increased in terms of section 65(10) of 
the Companies Act;91 and (iii) in terms of section 16(2) of the Companies Act more 
onerous requirements to amend a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may be 
specified in the Memorandum of Incorporation than that specified in section 16(1)(c)(i). 
                                                 
they apply to a company is not of itself a contravention of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 
(s 135(3)). Section 141 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 lists the provisions that apply as 
replaceable rules. 
 
88 Section 198A(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 states as follows: “The directors may 
exercise all the powers of the company except any powers that this Act or the company’s constitution (if 
any) requires the company to exercise in general meeting.”  
 
89 In terms of s 16(1) of the Companies Act a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may be amended 
(i) in compliance with a court order; (ii) in the manner contemplated in s 36(3) and (4) of the Companies 
Act; or (iii) at any other time if a special resolution to amend it is proposed by the board of directors or 
shareholders entitled to exercise at least ten per cent of the voting rights that may be exercised on such a 
resolution. In terms of s 16(2) of the Companies Act a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may 
provide different requirements than those set out in s 16(1)(c)(i) with respect to proposals for amendments. 
  
90 Section 16(1)(c)(i)(bb).  
 
91 Under s 65(10) of the Companies Act a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may permit a different 
percentage of voting rights to approve any special resolution or one or more different percentages of voting 
rights to approve special resolutions concerning one or more particular matters.  
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Thus while the shareholders have the power to curtail the powers of the board of directors 
in the Memorandum of Incorporation and to amend the Memorandum of Incorporation 
in order to do so, there are some limitations to the exercise of this power by the 
shareholders. 
 
To sum up, under the (South African) Companies Act, since the power to manage the 
business and affairs of the company is derived from statute and not from the constitution 
of the company and no longer has to be delegated by the shareholders to the board of 
directors, the power of the directors is subject to shareholder control to a much lesser 
extent than was the case under the Companies Act 61 of 1973.92 The (South African) 
Companies Act has moved away from the contractarian model adopted in the UK to the 
division of power model adopted in the USA and Australia in that the allocation of powers 
is sourced in legislation, save where it is changed by the constitution of the company.93 
It is evident that under the Companies Act the balance of power has shifted away from 
the shareholders and that it now lies in favour of the board of directors. 
 
                                                 
92 FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
507; Havenga “Directors’ Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 
262. 
 
93 Kaimowitz v Delahunt and Others 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) para 13; Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 250(3); MF Cassim “Formation of Companies and the Company Constitution” 
in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 124; Esser & Delport “Shareholder Protection 
Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 9; JS Oosthuizen & Delport “Rectification of the 
Securities Register of a Company and the Oppression Remedy” 244. It is arguable that to some extent the 
Companies Act has adopted a hybrid model in that it does retain certain elements of the contractarian model 
(see JS Oosthuizen & Delport “Rectification of the Securities Register of a Company and the Oppression 
Remedy” 245). For instance, s 15(6) of the Companies Act, which is analogous to s 33(1) of the UK 
Companies Act of 2006, provides that a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation and any rules of the 
company are binding between the company and each shareholder. Section 15(6) of the Companies Act goes 
further than s 33(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 in that it provides that the company’s Memorandum 
of Incorporation is also binding between or among the shareholders of the company, and between the 
company and each director or prescribed officer of the company or any other person serving the company 
as a member of a board committee, in the exercise of their respective functions within the company. The 
fact that the power of the board of directors is now sourced in the Companies Act does not mean that the 
statute does not confer any powers on the shareholders of the company. For example, s 71(1) of the 
Companies Act confers on shareholders the power to remove directors from office by means of an ordinary 
resolution, without cause, and despite anything to the contrary in the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation or any agreement between the company and a director or between any shareholders and a 
director. This power is reflective of the shareholder-oriented governance system of the UK (see Bruner 
Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power 29-
30. For a further discussion on the division of powers between the directors and shareholders under the 
Companies Act see FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 152-168 and Esser & Delport 
“Shareholder Protection Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2016) 79  THRHR 1 at 8-
14).  
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3.  THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL  
 
In many small private companies the directors and the shareholders are often the same 
persons. In larger companies though, as famously documented by Berle and Means in 
their landmark study in 1932,94 ownership and control of companies do not vest in the 
same persons. Berle and  Means argue that ownership and control of a large company are 
split in that the control of a company vests in the hands of the managers of the company, 
being the board of directors, while “ownership” of the company vests in the 
shareholders.95 The effect of the split in ownership and control is that a large body of 
shareholders has been created who exercise virtually no control over the wealth that they 
have contributed to the enterprise, while the ownership interest held by the controlling 
group, being the directors, is only a very small fraction of the total ownership of the 
company.96 
 
It is important to note at the outset that it is misleading to describe the shareholders as the 
“owners” of the corporation. Shareholders do not “own” a company – instead they own 
shares in the company, which provides them with certain legal rights. The property and 
                                                 
94 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
 
95 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 4. The divorce of ownership from control 
is the central theme in this classic work, of Berle and Means. Written in 1932, Berle and Means envisaged 
that over time there would be an increase in the size of the modern corporation and the concentration of the 
economy, leading to an increasing dispersion of share ownership and increasing separation of ownership 
and control. See further Marks “The Separation of Ownership and Control” 692; Hill “Visions and 
Revisions of the Shareholder” 39; Bainbridge Corporate Law 72-75; Mitchell, O’Donnell & Ramsay 
“Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law 
and Labor Law” 425-431; Esser & Havenga “Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance” 74; 
Steyn & Stainbank “Separation of Ownership and Control in South African-Listed Companies” 316; 
French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 433-434; Austin & Ramsay Ford, 
Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.061 at 238 and Davies & Worthington Gower 
Principles of Modern Company Law 412-413. 
 
96 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 5. On the separation of ownership and 
control see generally Sullivan “The Relationship between the Board of Directors and the General Meeting 
in Limited Companies” 579; Fama & Jensen “Separation of Ownership and Control” 301; Pinto “Corporate 
Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations” 317-346; Ferran Company Law 
and Corporate Finance 116-118; Marks “The Separation of Ownership and Control” 692; Hill “Visions 
and Revisions of the Shareholder” 39; Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a 
Fundamental Research Topic in South Africa” 179-186; Bainbridge Corporate Law 72-75; Esser & 
Havenga “Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance” 74; Steyn & Stainbank “Separation of 
Ownership and Control in South African-Listed Companies” 316; Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and 
Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.061 at 238; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & 
Ryan on Company Law 433-434; Hannigan Company Law 183-186 and Esser & Delport “Shareholder 
Protection Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 8-10. 
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assets of the company belong to the company itself and not to the shareholders.97 While 
a shareholder may be financially interested in the success or failure of a company because 
he is entitled to a share in the distribution of the surplus assets when a company is 
liquidated, this does not mean that he has any right or title to any assets of the company.98  
It may be that in small private companies where one shareholder or a very small number 
of shareholders hold the shares in the company, such shareholders would exercise much 
more control over the company compared to a public company where the shareholding is 
widely dispersed. Nonetheless it would be both factually and legally incorrect to refer to 
even these shareholders as “owners of a company”.99 The “shareholder / ownership” 
model was the basis of Berle and Means’ work and much of the work that succeeded it, 
and this model continues to command much support in practice.100 For purposes of this 
thesis the metaphor of shareholders as the “owners” of the company will be used but one 
must bear in mind that the metaphor is not legally or factually accurate because the 
owners of the capital of the company are not the owners of the company itself. 
 
                                                 
97 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 550-551; Macaura v Northern Assurance 
Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL (Ir)); Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd 1962 
(1) SA 458 (A) at 471-472; The Maritime Trader [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 153; Francis George Hill Family 
Trust v South African Reserve Bank 1992 (3) SA 91 (A) at 102; The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v 
Evdomon Corporation 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) at 565-566; Hughes v Ridley 2010 (1) SA 381 (KZP) para 22; 
Prest v Prest and Others [2013] 1 All ER 795 para 101. See further Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the 
Rights of Company Shareholders” 562-564; Sirodoeva-Paxson “Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of 
Directors’ License to Steal or Shareholders’ Freedom to Vote?” 122; Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional 
Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder Governance Protection: Expanding the Pluralist Approach” 9-10; 
Ferber Corporation Law 20; Cox & Hazen Corporations 8; Esser & Havenga “Shareholder Participation 
in Corporate Governance” 75; Dignam Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 100-101; 
Kershaw Company Law in Context 46; Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 53-54; French, Mayson 
& Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 434; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of 
Modern Company Law 35 and Hannigan Company Law 45-46. 
 
98 Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd 1962 (1) SA 458 (A) 471-472. 
 
99 Stout “The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control” 804; Mongalo “The Myth of Director 
Appointment by Shareholders and Shareholder Activism in Listed Companies” 98; Lipton & Savitt “The 
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk” 754. 
 
100 Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 131-132. See generally Stigler & Friedland “The 
Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means” 237; Marks “The Separation of Ownership and 
Control” 692; Hill “Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder” 39; Bratton “Berle and Means Reconsidered 
at the Century’s Turn” 737-741; Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental 
Research Topic in South Africa” 184-186; Esser & Havenga “Shareholder Participation in Corporate 
Governance” 74; Steyn & Stainbank “Separation of Ownership and Control in South African-Listed 
Companies” 316; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 433-434; Austin & 
Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.061 at 239 and Davies & 
Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 412-413. 
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It is important to understand what is meant by “control” in the context of a discussion on 
the “separation of ownership and control”. As Herman notes, control relates to power.101 
Literal control is the power to make the key decisions of a company, while the power to 
constrain is the power to limit certain decision choices.102 The power to constrain may be 
negative in its exercise but it is a form of control because it shapes decisions made by 
restricting the scope of choice.103  
 
There are various categories of “control”. For example, control through almost complete 
ownership of common shares is where a single individual or a small group of associates 
own all or practically all the shares in the company.104 The shareholders in this instance 
have control over the company by virtue of having the legal powers of ownership and by 
the ability to make use of these powers and, in particular, being in a position to elect, 
remove and dominate the management of the company.105 Ownership and control are thus 
combined in the same hands.106 Majority control is another type of control, and it entails 
ownership of a majority of the shares in the company, which gives the individual or small 
group of individuals, substantial legal powers of control.107 Of course, majority control 
may be curbed by the minority shareholding, but where the minority shareholding is 
widely dispersed majority ownership may entail undiminished actual control.108 The 
concentration of control in this instance means that the minority have lost most of the 
powers of control over the company of which they are part owners.109 Management 
control is where ownership of a company is so widely distributed that no individual or 
                                                 
101 Herman Corporate Control, Corporate Power 19. 
 
102 Herman Corporate Control, Corporate Power 19. 
 
103 Herman Corporate Control, Corporate Power 19. 
 
104 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 70. 
 
105 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 70. See further Stigler & Friedland “The 
Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means” 247-248 and French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, 
French & Ryan on Company Law 433-434. 
 
106 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 70. 
 
107 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 70-71. 
 
108 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 71. 
 
109 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 71. 
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small group has even a minority interest which is large enough to dominate the affairs of 
the company.110 Thus no shareholder is in a position by virtue of his shares alone to place 
any pressure upon the management of the company.111 It is clear from the above 
categories of “control” that control is not necessarily a function of ownership and that it 
may be regarded as a separate and separable factor.112 
 
For decades, large public companies have been issuing increasing numbers of shares in 
order to raise capital for growth and expansion, which has had the effect of causing 
fragmentation of share ownership in public companies.113 Shareholders in large public 
companies have also become widely dispersed or geographically scattered.114 In general, 
the larger the company, the greater the probability that its ownership will be diffused 
among a multitude of individuals.115 Thus ownership and wealth have come to lie less 
and less in one person.116  
                                                 
110 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 84; Bratton “Berle and Means 
Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn” 758. 
 
111 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 84. Two other categories of control 
identified by Berle and Means are control through a legal device, and minority control. Berle and Means 
identify the legal device of pyramiding as conferring control, which involves the owning of a majority of 
the shares of one company which in turn holds a majority of the shares of another company. This process 
may be repeated a number of times, and by introducing two or three intermediate companies each of which 
is legally controlled through ownership of a majority of its shares by the company higher in the series, 
complete legal control of a large operating company may be maintained by a very small ownership interest. 
In other words, the owner of a majority of the shares at the apex of the pyramid could have almost as 
complete control of the entire property of the company as a sole owner would have even though his 
ownership interest is less than one per cent of the whole (see Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property 72-73 and Stigler & Friedland “The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and 
Means” 247). Minority control exists when a small group hold a sufficient share interest to be in a position 
to dominate a company through their share interest. The control rests upon the ability of the minority to 
attract from dispersed owners proxies which are sufficient when combined with their substantial minority 
interest to control a majority of the votes at the election of directors (Berle & Means The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property 80; Stigler & Friedland “The Literature of Economics: The Case of 
Berle and Means” 247). 
 
112 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 118. See further on control Stigler & 
Friedland “The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means” 247; Bratton “Berle and Means 
Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn” 758; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company 
Law 433-434; Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.061 at 
238 and Esser & Delport “Shareholder Protection Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 
7-8. 
  
113 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 152. 
 
114 Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South Africa” 
184; FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 152. 
 
115 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 52. 
 
116 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 69. 
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As Berle and Means explain, ownership of wealth without appreciable control, and 
control of wealth without appreciable ownership, appear to be the logical outcome of 
corporate development.117 This has the effect that no single shareholder or group of 
shareholders is able to exercise effective control over the directors. In a large public 
company, and particularly a listed company, each shareholder generally owns only a 
small fraction of the shares in a company, which means that no one shareholder is in a 
position to exert control of the company by way of voting in shareholders’ meetings.118 
Thus the power and responsibility of ownership is in effect transferred to a separate group 
in whose hands lies control.119  
 
A further effect of the large numbers of shareholders in a company, shareholders being 
widely dispersed, and fragmented shareholding, is that the links of the shareholders with 
the management of their companies have become more remote. This had inevitably led 
to passivity on the part of the shareholders.120 In most jurisdictions it is too costly and 
difficult for shareholders to become active in a company.121 The cost to an individual 
shareholder to monitor management would normally exceed the benefit to that 
shareholder, and whilst other shareholders may also benefit from such actions they would 
do so at the expense of the monitoring shareholder (known as the “free-rider” problem).122 
Shareholders often believe that their votes will have little impact on the outcome of the 
                                                 
117 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 69. 
 
118 Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South Africa” 
184. 
 
119 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 68. 
 
120 Mongalo “The Myth of Director Appointment by Shareholders and Shareholder Activism in Listed 
Companies” 98. See further Olson “Professor Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to ‘The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise’” 783-785; Esser & Havenga “Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance” 
74; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 413; Hannigan Company Law 141-
145 and Esser & Delport “Shareholder Protection Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 
24-28. 
 
121 Keay “Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders” 659-660; FHI 
Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 152. 
 
122 In other words, those shareholders who are not involved in actively monitoring the management of the 
company get a “free ride.” See Pinto “Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in 
American Corporations” 326; Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 117; Marks “The Separation 
of Ownership and Control” 69 and Esser & Havenga “Shareholder Participation on Corporate Governance” 
79 on the free-rider concept. 
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vote and they lack an incentive to become active.123 A further implication of fragmented 
shareholding and shareholder apathy is that no one shareholder will be in a position to 
exercise control of the company by way of voting in general meetings because most 
shareholders would be minority shareholders.124 The ultimate effect of shareholder 
apathy is that it undermines appropriate levels of managerial compliance.125 
 
The process of separation of ownership and control has been aptly summed up by 
Herman126 who states as follows: 
  
“With larger corporate size comes a greater dispersion of stock ownership, a steady 
reduction in the power and interest of the shareholder, and gradual enhancement of 
managerial authority, that is, a separation of ownership from control.” 
 
The separation of ownership from control creates a condition where the interest of owners 
and managers may, and often do, diverge.127 The central question, as advocated by Berle 
and Means, is whether we have any justification for assuming that those in control of a 
modern corporation will also choose to operate it in the interests of the owners.128 The 
answer to this question would depend on the degree to which the self-interest of those in 
control may run parallel to the interests of ownership, and, insofar as they differ, the 
checks on the use of power.129 Bebchuk argues that in public companies with dispersed 
ownership the interests of management do not fully overlap with those of shareholders, 
and management cannot be automatically relied on to take actions that would serve 
shareholder interests.130 In such a situation, directors would be able to favour their own 
personal desires even though doing so may conflict with shareholder interests in 
                                                 
123 Olson “Professor Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to ‘The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise’” 
784. 
 
124 Mongalo “The Myth of Director Appointment by Shareholders and Shareholder Activism in Listed 
Companies” 98-99. 
 
125 R Cassim “Corporate Governance” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 498. 
 
126 Herman Corporate Control, Corporate Power 5. 
 
127 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 6; Eisenberg “The Structure of 
Corporation Law” 1471-1472. 
 
128 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 121. 
 
129 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 121. 
 
130 Bebchuk “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power” 850. 
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maximising the economic value of the company.131 Also, directors are relatively 
autonomous with a wide range of discretion to make decisions, which may lead to 
corporate managers having an interest in maintaining and enhancing their positions even 
at the expense of shareholders.132 
 
As a consequence of the separation of ownership and control the directors of a large 
company enjoy managerial autonomy – they have at their disposal substantial sums of 
money invested by shareholders and the manner in which they use that money is for them 
to decide without close scrutiny from the shareholders.133 Separation of ownership and 
control gives the directors scope to use the money invested by the shareholders more for 
their own benefit rather than for the benefit of the shareholders, to neglect giving due 
attention to the management of such sums of money, or to refrain from expending their 
maximum effort on behalf of the shareholders, known as managerial shirking.134 Where 
there are low standards of managerial accountability, abuse of power, mismanagement 
and negligence may prevail over good governance unless mechanisms are devised to 
prevent such conduct from occurring.135 
The separation of ownership and control creates a potential divergence between the 
interests of shareholders and directors and leads to the problem that the directors do not 
necessarily act in the best interests of the shareholders when they manage a company.136 
This goal divergence problem is referred to as the “agency problem” or as “agency 
costs”.137 In large companies the principals are not capable of exercising day-to-day 
                                                 
131 Daniels & Halpern “Too Close for Comfort” 14.  
 
132 Eisenberg “The Structure of Corporation Law” 1471-1472. 
 
133 Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 117. 
 
134 See Eisenberg “The Structure of Corporation Law” 1471-1472; Daniels & Halpern “Too Close for 
Comfort” 14; Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 117; Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional 
Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder Governance Protection: Expanding the Pluralist Approach” 12 and 
Bainbridge “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment” 1740. 
 
135 Mongalo “The Myth of Director Appointment by Shareholders and Shareholder Activism in Listed 
Companies” 98. 
 
136 Esser & Havenga “Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance” 76. 
 
137 From an economic perspective shareholders are regarded as the “principals” and directors are regarded 
as the “agents”. From a legal perspective the relationship of a director to a company is in some respects 
analogous to that of an agent, but this description is not entirely accurate in law. Directors are analogous to 
agents in that they act for the benefit of another person, being the company, and when they contract on 
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control over the affairs of the company. Accordingly they appoint directors to act as their 
agents, but, because the ownership of a company is separated from its control, the 
interests of the principals and the agents are not identical. Conflicts arise between the 
directors and shareholders because a shareholder desires the director to make decisions 
that will increase the share value, but the director would prefer to expand the business of 
the company and his own remuneration, which may not necessarily increase the value of 
the shares. Thus the directors may well pursue activities which benefit themselves rather 
than the shareholders of the company. For instance, in public companies, directors may 
focus on personal gains rather than on shareholder gains, or on short-term goals which 
would be to their advantage rather than on long-term goals which are more likely to be 
to the benefit of shareholders.138 The issue which arises is how to provide the agents, 
being the directors, with incentives to induce behaviour which will be beneficial to the 
principals, being the shareholders.139 
In order to limit the activities of the agent which serve to favour his own interests, the 
principal will establish appropriate incentives for the agent, and incur monitoring costs 
which are aimed at limiting the aberrant activities of the agent.140 Monitoring comprises 
                                                 
behalf of the company they do not incur liability unless they act outside their power or expressly or 
impliedly assume liability. In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 216-
217 the then Appellate Division stated that while it is true that the board of directors is the agent of the 
company to manage its affairs each individual director is not as such an agent of the company (see further 
Ferguson v Wilson (1866) 2 Ch App 77 at 89; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-9 and 
Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 358). Notably under the Companies 
Act directors are given original powers by virtue of s 66(1) (discussed in para 2 above) and this detracts 
from the agency principal analogy.  
 
138 See further on the agency problem Jensen & Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure” 309; Fama & Jensen “Separation of Ownership and Control” 
301; Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 118; Marks “The Separation of Ownership and Control” 
696-698; Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder Governance 
Protection: Expanding the Pluralist Approach” 11; Shields, O’Donnel & O’Brien “The Bucks Stop Here: 
Private Sector Executive Remuneration in Australia” A Report prepared for the Labor Council of New 
South Wales (2003) available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 at 13 (accessed on 5 
April 2016); Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in 
South Africa” 186; Mitchell, O’Donnell & Ramsay “Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: 
Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law” 425-434; Williams 
“Disqualifying Directors: A Remedy Worse than the Disease” 217-220; Esser & Havenga “Shareholder 
Participation in Corporate Governance” Bainbridge Corporate Law 75; Kershaw Company Law in Context 
171-188; Steyn & Stainbank “Separation of Ownership and Control in South African-Listed Companies” 
317; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 432; Austin & Ramsay Ford, 
Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.061 at 239. 
 
139 Marks “The Separation of Ownership and Control” 696.  
 
140 Jensen & Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure” 308. 
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measuring or observing the behaviour of the agent as well as efforts on the part of the 
principal to control the behaviour of the agent.141 For instance, shareholders seek to 
negotiate contracts with the directors which minimise their loss of control and which 
protect the company’s competitive interests.142 Companies may for example make as 
much of the directors’ remuneration contingent on the performance of the company and 
on the dividends given to the shareholders.143 Thus, in an effort to align the interests of 
the directors and shareholders, companies may pay cash bonuses to directors if the share 
price increases, or they may utilise share options which give directors the right to acquire 
shares from the company at a specified price, which would be lower than the market price 
of the shares.144 These monetary incentives are examples of agency costs. The rationale 
of these incentives is that if directors have a direct personal interest in the company being 
profitable their personal interests will be aligned with those of the shareholders and the 
conflict of interest between them will be reduced.145 To put it simply, agency costs in a 
corporate environment are designed to deal with the inevitable conflicts of interests 
between the directors and the shareholders, and comprise the costs of techniques that 
shareholders use to prevent the directors from prioritising their interests over the interests 
of shareholders, as well as the costs incurred in monitoring the performance of the 
directors to prevent the directors putting their own interests above those of the 
shareholders.146 Agency costs are factored into the price that investors in a company are 
                                                 
141 Jensen & Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
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on 5 April 2016). 
 
143 Shields, O’Donnel & O’Brien “The Bucks Stop Here: Private Sector Executive Remuneration in 
Australia” A Report prepared for the Labor Council of New South Wales (2003) available at 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 at 13 (accessed on 5 April 2016). 
 
144 Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 119; Shields, O’Donnel & O’Brien “The Bucks Stop 
Here: Private Sector Executive Remuneration in Australia” A Report prepared for the Labor Council of 
New South Wales (2003) available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242042789 at 13 (accessed 
on 5 April 2016). 
 
145 Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 119-120. 
 
146 Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 14. 
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willing to pay for their shares.147 Thus if the agency costs are lower investors will be 
willing to pay a higher price.148  
The concept of separation of ownership and control as advocated by Berle and Means in 
1932 has been strongly influential in analysing the structure and inner workings of a 
company. However, in modern times certain qualifications may have to be made to this 
concept. For instance, it may be too simplistic to assume that there is necessarily complete 
separation of ownership and control in all large public companies, such as where the 
founders of a company retain a large proportion of the company’s share capital after the 
company has been listed and are thus still able to exercise control over the company in 
their capacity as shareholders.149 Herman argues that Berle and Means overstated the loss 
of power of the shareholders and the separation and discretion of managers.150  
 
A further qualification to Berle and Means’ thesis is the fact that not all shareholders 
today are small private investors. There has been a significant increase in the number of 
institutional investors. “Institutional investors” are defined in the King IV Report on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016 (“King IV Report”)151 as follows: 
 
“Any juristic person or institution referred to in the definition of financial institution 
in section 1 of the Financial Services Board Act, No 97 of 1990,152 to the extent that 
                                                 
147 Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 118. 
 
148 Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 118. 
 
149 Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance 117-118. 
 
150 Herman Corporate Control, Corporate Power 258. 
 
151 King IV Report, Glossary of Terms, at 10. The King IV Report came into effect on 1 November 2016 
and it replaces the King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (“the King III Report”) in its entirety.  
 
152 A “financial institution” is defined in s 1 of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 as meaning the 
following:  
(i) any pension fund organisation registered in terms of the Pension Funds Act 4 of 1956 or any 
person referred to in s 13B of that Act administering the investments of such a pension fund or 
the disposition of benefits provided for in the rules of such a pension fund; 
(ii) any friendly society registered in terms of the Friendly Societies Act 25 of 1956 or any person 
in charge of the management of the affairs of such a society; 
(iii) a collective investment scheme as defined in s 1 of the Collective Investment Schemes Control 
Act 45 of 2002, a manager, trustee, custodian or nominee company registered or approved in 
terms of that Act, and an authorised agent of such a manager; 
(iv) any “external authorised user”, “external central securities depository”, “external clearing 
house”, “external clearing member”, “external exchange”, “external participant” or “external 
trade repository”, or any person referred to in paragraphs (a) to (h) and (j) of the definition of 
“regulated person”, as defined in the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012; 
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these juristic persons or institutions are the holders of beneficial interest in the 
securities of a company. It includes retirement funds and insurance companies as 
well as the custodians, nominees and service providers who act under mandate in 
respect of any investment decisions and investment activities exercised in relation to 
these securities.” 
 
Institutional investors may hold a sufficiently large shareholding in a company to be able 
to influence directors directly, and therefore to have a potentially strong monitoring 
role.153 If institutional investors were to act together and share agency costs they would 
be a powerful monitor of the performance of directors.154 The King IV Report regards 
institutional investors as being highly influential on the basis that the types of investment 
decisions which they make and the manner in which they exercise their rights as 
shareholders either reinforces or weakens good governance in the companies in which 
they invest.155 A further effect of the influence of active institutional investors is that they 
                                                 
(v) any “long-term insurer” as defined in s 1(1) of the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and any 
“short-term insurer” as defined in s 1(1) of the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998; 
(vi) any “independent intermediary” or “representative” contemplated in the Short-term Insurance 
Act 53 of 1998 and the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998; 
(vii) any “Lloyd's underwriter” as defined in s 1(1) of the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 and 
referred to in s 56 of that Act; 
(viii) any “authorised financial services provider” or “representative” as defined in s 1(1) of the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002; 
(ix) any “credit rating agency” as defined in s 1 of the Credit Rating Services Act 24 of 2012; 
(x) a bank as defined in s 1(1) of the Banks Act 94 of 1990, a mutual bank as defined in s 1(1) of 
the Mutual Banks Act 124 of 1993, or a co-operative bank as defined in s 1(1) of the Co-
operative Banks Act 40 of 2007, which deals with trust property as a regular feature of its 
business; 
(xi) any other person who or which deals with trust property as a regular feature of his or its business, 
but who is not registered, licensed, recognised, approved or otherwise authorised to deal so in 
terms of any Act, other than the Companies Act, the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 and the 
Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988; and 
(xii) any person that performs an activity regulated under a law referred to above.  
 
153 Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.061 at 239. See 
generally on institutional investors Pinto “Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in 
American Corporations” 344-345; Pretorius et al Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the Cases 
337; Hill “Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder” 61-78; Karmel “Should a Duty to the Corporation be 
imposed on Institutional Shareholders?” 1; Esser & Havenga “Shareholder Participation in Corporate 
Governance” 74; Kershaw Company Law in Context 180-185; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French 
& Ryan on Company Law 434-435; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 
413 and Esser & Delport “Shareholder Protection Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 
26-28. 
 
154 Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.061 at 239. 
 
155 King IV Report at 32. See further the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa 2011 (“CRISA”), 
which is a voluntary code that applies to institutional investors. It was launched on 19 July 2011. It provides 
guidance to institutional investors on how they should execute investment activities to promote sound 
corporate governance and how they should incorporate environmental, social and governance 
considerations into their investment activities. See further Esser & Delport “Shareholder Protection 
Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 26-28 where CRISA is discussed in detail.  
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mitigate shareholder apathy.156 Nonetheless, institutional investors may not be as 
influential as one might hope because, in an attempt to diversify their share portfolio and 
obtain quick financial gains, institutional shareholders generally own shares in a large 
number of companies and are thus not able to wield real control in any one of the 
companies in which they invest.157  
 
It must be conceded that shareholders in modern times are no longer as powerless as they 
were during the time of Berle and Means. For instance, individual shareholders in the 
1930s did not have an instantaneous means of communication with each other whereas 
today with modern technology shareholders are able to communicate with each other 
faster, easier and with less expense, and consequently to act together to influence boards 
of directors.158 For example, under section 63(2) of the Companies Act, unless prohibited 
by its Memorandum of Incorporation, a company may provide for a shareholders’ 
meeting to be conducted entirely by electronic communication or for one or more 
shareholders or proxies for shareholders to participate by electronic communication in all 
or part of a shareholders’ meeting that is being held in person.159 Under section 61(10) of 
the Companies Act every shareholders’ meeting of a public company must be 
“reasonably accessible” within South Africa for electronic participation by shareholders 
                                                 
156 Sirodoeva-Paxson “Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of Directors’ License to Steal or 
Shareholders’ Freedom to Vote” 14; Mitchell, O’Donnell & Ramsay “Shareholder Value and Employee 
Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law” 452-453; Stout 
“The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control” 807. 
  
157 Mongalo “The Myth of Director Appointment by Shareholders and Shareholder Activism in Listed 
Companies” 99; Keay “Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders” 665. 
Mitchell, O’Donnell & Ramsay argue that patterns of institutional activism vary depending on the size of 
the institutional investor’s shareholding, the size of other non-institutional holdings in the company, the 
size of the company, the resources devoted to monitoring the performance of the directors and the nature 
of the institutional investor’s portfolio (Mitchell, O’Donnell & Ramsay “Shareholder Value and Employee 
Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law” 456-457). 
 
158 Stout “The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control” 807. 
 
159 This is subject to the proviso in s 63(2) that the electronic communication employed ordinarily enables 
all persons participating in that meeting to communicate concurrently with each other without an 
intermediary and to participate reasonably effectively in the meeting. If a company provides for 
participation in a meeting by electronic communication the notice of that meeting must inform shareholders 
of the availability of that form of participation and provide any necessary information to enable 
shareholders or their proxies to access the means of electronic communication (s 63(3)(a) of the Companies 
Act). 
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in the manner contemplated in section 63(2) of the Companies Act, irrespective of 
whether the meeting is held in South Africa or elsewhere.160  
 
The qualifications to the concept of separation of ownership and control as propounded 
by Berle and Means do not detract from the fact that in general, and particularly in large 
companies, there is a separation of ownership and control between directors and 
shareholders. The degree of the separation of the ownership and control between directors 
and shareholders varies from company to company. 
 
4.  SHAREHOLDERS’ POWER TO REMOVE DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE 
 
The Cohen Committee, in 1945, recommended that shareholders be given “greater 
powers to remove directors with whom they are dissatisfied”.161 This recommendation 
formed the underlying rationale of section 184 of the UK Companies Act of 1948.162 The 
purpose of section 184 of the UK Companies Act of 1948 was to strengthen shareholder 
control over management by conferring power on the shareholders to remove a director 
from office by ordinary resolution, notwithstanding any provisions in the constitution of 
the company.163  
                                                 
160 It is not clear what the phrase “reasonably accessible” means in this context and no guidance regarding 
the meaning of this phrase is provided by the legislature (R Cassim “Governance and Shareholders” in FHI 
Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 379). Despite shareholders having the option to participate in 
meetings electronically, they do not necessarily do this. There is still some expense for shareholders to do 
so, particularly since the access to the means of electronic communication is at the expense of the 
shareholder or proxy, unless the company determines otherwise (s 63(3)(b) of the Companies Act). 
 
161 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cohen Report 1945) Cmnd 6659 (June 1945) 
para 130. 
 
162 See Prentice “Removal of Directors from Office” 693. Section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948 
stated as follows: “A company may by ordinary resolution remove a director before the expiration of his 
period of office, notwithstanding anything in its articles or in any agreement between it and him: provided 
that this subsection shall not, in the case of a private company, authorise the removal of a director holding 
office for life on the eighteenth day of July, nineteen hundred and forty-five, whether or not subject to 
retirement under an age limit by virtue of the articles or otherwise.” 
 
163 Hill “The Rising Tension between Shareholder and Director Power in the Common Law World” 354. 
In In re El Sombrero Ltd [1968] Ch 900 the court exercised its discretion to order an annual general meeting 
of the company to be held on the basis that if it did not do so, in the context and specific circumstances of 
this case, this would deprive the applicant, a shareholder of the company, of his statutory right under 
s 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948 to remove the respondents as directors. 
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In a similar vein, in order to promote the policy of giving shareholders a greater say in 
the management of a company, to increase the control which shareholders could exercise 
over directors and to enable shareholders to assert themselves against the directors, 
section 69ter of the (South African) Companies Act 46 of 1926, in 1952, conferred on 
shareholders the power to remove directors from a company.164 Section 69ter of the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926 was based on section 184 of the UK Companies Act of 
1948.165 The Companies Act 61 of 1973, in section 220, likewise conferred on 
shareholders the power to remove directors from a company notwithstanding the 
provisions of the company’s memorandum and articles of association.166  
In line with the recommendation of conferring greater powers on shareholders to remove 
directors with whom they are dissatisfied, the Supreme Court of Delaware in Unocal 
Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co167 asserted that “[i]f the stockholders are displeased with the 
action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their 
disposal to turn the board out.” The Supreme Court of Delaware in Aronson v Lewis168 
likewise asserted that a stockholder is not powerless to challenge director action which 
results in harm to the corporation and that the machinery of corporate democracy is a 
potent tool to redress the conduct of a “torpid or unfaithful management.” 
                                                 
164 Henochsberg Henochsberg on the Companies Act 151; FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of 
Power” 155. Section 69ter of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 was inserted by s 43 of the Companies 
Amendment Act 46 of 1952. Section 69ter (1) stated as follows: “A company may by ordinary resolution 
remove a director before the expiration of office, notwithstanding anything in its articles or in any 
agreement between it and him: Provided that this sub-section shall not, in the case of a private company, 
authorize the removal of a director holding office for life on the thirteenth day of June, 1949.” 
 
165Amoils v Fuel Transport (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 343 (W) at 346-347. 
 
166 Section 220(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provided as follows: “A company may, 
notwithstanding anything in its memorandum or articles or in any agreement between it and any director, 
by resolution remove a director before the expiration of his period of office.” See further on s 220 of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 Stewart v Schwab 1956 (4) SA 791 (T); Swerdlow v Cohen and Others 
1977 (3) SA 1050 (T); Amoils v Fuel Transport (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 343 (W); Barlows Manufacturing 
Co Ltd and Others v RN Barrie (Pty) Ltd and Others 1990 (4) SA 608 (C); James North (Zimbabwe) (Pvt) 
Ltd v Mattinson 1990 (2) SA 229 (ZHC); Beuthin “A Director Firmly in the Saddle” 489; MJ Oosthuizen 
“Swerdlow v Cohen and Others 1977 1 SA 178 (W)” 165; J Du Plessis “Praktiese Aspekte Aangaande die 
Ontslag van Maatskappydirekteure” 511-516; J Du Plessis “Die Nywerheidshof, Werknemers en 
Direkteure” 119-122; Kunst, Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 422(2)-424; Beuthin 
& Luiz Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 209-211; Esser “Company Law and the Spoliated Director” 135 
and Masinire “A Critical Analysis of the Role and Protection of Shareholders in the Removal of Directors 
in the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008” 1988-1990. 
 
167 493 A.2d 946 (Del., 1985) at 959. 
 
168 473 A.2d 805 (1984) at 811. 
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The power of removal of directors by shareholders furthermore enhances the ability of 
shareholders to control the disposition of their investment in the company.169 
Additionally, it serves to enhance the accountability of directors. If shareholders have 
removal rights, directors would know that if they behave in an incompetent manner or 
engage in self-serving opportunistic behaviour, the shareholders may well exercise their 
right to remove them from office.170 Since directors exercise significant discretion over 
the affairs of the company it is important for them to have incentives to serve the interests 
of shareholders.171 The threat of replacement by the shareholders would provide directors 
with such an incentive to serve the interests of the shareholders, and therefore the removal 
power of shareholders gives directors a strong incentive to focus on the interests of the 
shareholders.172  
 
In light of the effects of the separation of power and control in a company, the power 
given to the shareholders to remove directors is a critical tool in the hands of shareholders 
which strikes a balance between the directors’ powers of management on the one hand 
and the shareholders’ powers of control on the other hand.173 If the directors exercise their 
powers of management in the best interests of the company, the shareholders will not 
interfere in the running of the company. But if the shareholders are displeased with the 
manner in which the company is being run, then they have the right to exercise their 
ultimate power of control by removing the directors from office.174 Therefore the power 
of removal of directors conferred on shareholders serves to balance the attenuated power 
of control of shareholders with the power of directors to manage the company, and 
constitutes a form of corporate democracy.175  The conferral of this power is rooted in the 
                                                 
169 Bailey “Shareholder Control over Management” 86. 
 
170 Kershaw Company Law in Context 220. 
 
171 Bebchuk “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise” 680. 
 
172 Bebchuk “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise” 680 and 682. 
 
173 Cartoon “The Removal of Company Directors” 17. 
 
174 Cartoon “The Removal of Company Directors” 18. 
 
175 Sirodoeva-Paxson “Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of Directors’ License to Steal or 
Shareholders’ Freedom to Vote” 11. 
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separation of ownership and control (particularly in public companies), and provided that 
shareholders choose to exercise these powers, they are of fundamental importance in the 
control of a company.176  
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published its 
revised Principles of Corporate Governance in 2015 (“the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance”).177 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are an international 
benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and stakeholders worldwide.178 
They emphasise that the ability to remove directors is one of the fundamental rights of 
shareholders. Chapter II, titled “The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and 
key ownership functions” states as follows:  
 
“Basic shareholder rights should include the right to: 1) secure methods of ownership 
registration; 2) convey or transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant and material information 
on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; 4) participate and vote in general 
shareholder meetings; 5) elect and remove members of the board; and 6) share in the 
profits of the corporation.”179 [Emphasis added] 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that the underpinning philosophy of our corporate 
law regime is that the shareholders’ right to remove directors from office is both 
elementary and necessary, and is a key provision of modern company law.180 Section 
71(1) of the Companies Act confers this right on shareholders by stating that a director 
                                                 
176 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Powers” 154. 
 
177 OECD (2015), G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance were originally developed in 1999 and were updated in 2004 and again in 2015. The updated 
Principles were launched at the meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Ankara 
on 4-5 September 2015. They were subsequently endorsed at the G20 Leaders Summit in Antalya on 15-
16 November 2015. 
 
178 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance at 3. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
have also been adopted as one of the Financial Stability Board’s Key Standards for Sound Financial 
Systems, and form the basis for the World Bank Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes in the 
area of corporate governance (see the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance at 3). The OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, which are non-binding, focus on both financial and non-financial 
publicly traded companies, but are also a useful tool to improve corporate governance in companies whose 
shares are not publicly traded and in smaller and unlisted companies (see the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance at 9). 
 
179 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance at 21. 
 
180 Cartoon “The Removal of Company Directors” 17; FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 
154.  
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may be removed by an ordinary resolution adopted at a shareholders’ meeting by the 
persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director, subject to 
section 71(2). Section 71(2) sets out the procedure that must be followed before the 
shareholders may consider such a resolution. Briefly, the director concerned must be 
given notice of the meeting and a copy of the resolution, which notice must be at least 
equivalent to what which a shareholder is entitled to receive, (irrespective of whether or 
not the director is a shareholder of the company), and the director must be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to make a presentation, in person or through a representative, to 
the meeting, before the resolution is put to the vote. No reasons are required for the 
removal of a director by the shareholders. The power given to shareholders to remove a 
director in section 71(1) applies despite anything to the contrary in a company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, or any agreement between a company and a 
director, or between any shareholders and a director.181  
 
5.  IMPACT OF THE BOARD’S POWER TO REMOVE A DIRECTOR FROM 
OFFICE 
 
The conferral of the removal power on the board of directors has had an impact on the 
shareholders of a company as well as an impact on the board of directors itself. The extent 
of this impact is discussed below. 
 
5.1  Impact on the Shareholders of the Company 
 
Section 71(3) of the Companies Act confers the power of removal on the board of 
directors by providing as follows: 
 
“If a company has more than two directors, and a shareholder or director has alleged 
that a director of the company – 
(a) has become – 
(i) ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69, other than on the 
grounds contemplated in section 69(8)(a); or 
(ii) incapacitated to the extent that the director is unable to perform the 
functions of a director, and is unlikely to regain that capacity 
within a reasonable time; or 
(b) has neglected, or been derelict in the performance of, the functions of  
director,  
                                                 
181 This is evident from the words “Despite anything to the contrary in a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation or rules, or any agreement between a company and a director, or between any shareholders 
and a director” in s 71(1) of the Companies Act. 
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the board, other than the director concerned, must determine the matter by resolution, 
and may remove a director whom it has determined to be ineligible or disqualified, 
incapacitated, or negligent or derelict, as the case may be.”182 
 
Even though the right to remove directors may now no longer be the sole privilege of the 
shareholders of a company under the Companies Act, this does not mean that the right of 
removal has been withdrawn from the shareholders. Section 71(1) of the Companies Act 
preserves the right of shareholders to remove directors from office. Accordingly, under 
the Companies Act, the right of removal of a director belongs to both the shareholders 
and the directors.  This accords with the reasoning in Auer v Dressel,183 where the Court 
of Appeals of New York proclaimed that even if the board of directors of a company is 
authorised to remove any director, this would not be an abdication by the shareholders of 
their inherent right to remove the directors, but rather, it provides an additional method 
of removing the directors. Were this not so, the court explained, the shareholders might 
find themselves without an effective remedy in a case where a majority of the directors 
were accused of wrongdoing and would be unwilling to remove themselves from 
office.184  
 
There is merit in the power of removal not being the sole prerogative of the shareholders. 
A few examples when it may be beneficial for the board of directors to have the power 
of removal, are:  
 
 When the shareholders who wish to remove an incompetent or misbehaving 
director from office do not have sufficient voting power to remove that director 
from office.185  
 
 When the shareholders do not wish to remove a particular director from office 
despite his wrongdoing because they believe he is bringing in profits for the 
                                                 
182 Section 71(3) of the Companies Act is discussed further in chapter 3. 
 
183 118 N.E. 2d 590 (N.Y. 1954) at 593. 
 
184 Auer v Dressel 118 N.E. 2d 590 (N.Y. 1954) at 593. 
 
185 Knight “The Removal of Public Company Directors in Australia: Time for Change” 362. 
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company, when in fact such director is destructive and is exposing the company to 
potential legal action.  
 
 When the shareholders fail to remove a director from office because they are not 
convinced of the legitimate reasons advanced by the board of directors to remove 
the director in question from office.  
 
 When the board of directors suspects that a director is passing on confidential 
information to a competitor, or is engaged in an ethically questionable activity that 
will reflect poorly on the company, and they do not wish to disclose to the 
shareholders some wrongdoing by one of their members for fear that this may 
expose the company to a potential legal action.186 Such matters ought to be 
disclosed to the shareholders but the board may be concerned that if they disclosed 
such information to the shareholders the shareholders would consider instituting 
legal action against the board of directors.187 
 
Now that the right of removal is no longer the sole privilege of the shareholders of a 
company under the Companies Act, there is a shift in the balance of power between the 
directors and the shareholders. Despite the merits in conferring the power of removal on 
the board of directors, the conferment of this power on the board of directors is not 
consistent with the rationale of originally giving shareholders the right to remove 
directors, as discussed earlier,188 that is, to give the shareholders more power over the 
directors because the separation of ownership and control has resulted in attenuated 
shareholder control. As the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Allied Mining & 
Processing Ltd v Boldbow Pty Ltd189 asserted, shareholders must “retain ultimate control 
of the company and the appointment or removal of directors”.190 Section 220 of the 
                                                 
186 McConvill “Removal of Directors of Public Companies takes Centre Stage in Australia” 210. 
 
187 McConvill “Removal of Directors of Public Companies takes Centre Stage in Australia” 210. 
 
188 See para 4 above.  
 
189 FLR 369 (W.A.S.C. 2002) at 379. 
 
190 The court in this case stated that a further reason for giving shareholders the power to remove directors 
is to prevent directors from becoming entrenched in their positions (paras 47 and 52). 
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Companies Act 61 of 1973 gave shareholders the exclusive right of removal and bolstered 
the concept of shareholder democracy and shareholder control,191 but section 71 of the 
Companies Act no longer does this.  
 
As discussed earlier,192 conferring on shareholders the power to remove directors from 
office gives directors a strong incentive to focus on the interests of shareholders. One 
effect of also conferring the power of removal on the board of directors, is that directors 
would be inclined to focus on the interests of the board of directors as well, which may 
have the effect of diluting their incentive to focus only on the interests of the shareholders 
and to follow the line of action preferred by the shareholders.  
 
In terms of section 66(4)(b) of the Companies Act the Memorandum of Incorporation of 
a profit company (other than a state-owned company) must provide for the election by 
shareholders of at least fifty per cent of the directors and fifty per cent of any alternate 
directors. The shareholders therefore have a right to elect at least half of the directors on 
the board. As a general rule, shareholders may vote for a director in their own interests 
and they are not under any obligation to choose the person most suitable to be a 
director.193 This is because it is well established that a shareholder’s right to vote is a 
proprietary right.194 In many instances the directors appointed by the shareholders are the 
                                                 
191 See chapter 1, para 1 on s 220 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
 
192 See para 4 above. 
 
193 Re HR Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62 at 82. In Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees 
Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 (PC) at 221 the Privy Council stated as follows: 
 
 “[I]n the absence of fraud or bad faith . . . a shareholder or other person who controls the 
 appointment of a director owes no duty to creditors of the company to take reasonable 
 care to see that directors so appointed discharge their duties as directors with due 
 diligence and competence.”  
 
In contrast, the power of directors to appoint directors to the board of directors is a fiduciary power and it 
must be exercised in good faith in the interests of the company and for the benefit of the company as a 
whole and not for an improper or collateral purpose (Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 
8-243).  
  
194 Pender v Lushington (1877) 46 ChD 317. As Lord Jessel MR put it (at 321), a shareholder “has a right 
to say, whether I vote with the majority or with the minority, you shall record my vote; that is a right of 
property belonging to my interest in this company, and if you will not, I shall institute legal proceedings to 
compel you. It seems to me that such an action could be maintained, without any technical difficulty.” See 
further Re HR Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62 at 82; Sammel and Others v President Brand Gold Mining 
Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 680; Desai and Others v Greyridge Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 509 
(A) at 519; Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 (PC) at 221; CDH 
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representatives of the shareholders. If the board of directors were to remove from office 
one of the shareholder representatives this would result in the shareholder control over 
the board of directors being attenuated, and would further shift the balance of power 
between the board of directors and the shareholders.  
 
It is submitted that the removal of a shareholder representative from the board of directors 
by the directors would have an effect on the balance of power not only between the board 
of directors and the shareholders, but also amongst the shareholders themselves. For 
instance, if the board of directors removes from office a director who is a representative 
of the minority shareholders, this would shift the equilibrium between the majority and 
minority representatives on the board195 and consequently between the majority and 
minority shareholders.  
 
This power shift is further exacerbated by the fact that directors are empowered to fill 
vacancies on the board of directors.196 If a vacancy arises on the board of directors it must 
be filled by a new appointment if the director had been appointed by a person named in 
or determined in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation,197 or by a new election.198 
The new election must be conducted at the next annual general meeting of the company 
(if applicable), or in any other case, within six months after the vacancy arose, at a 
shareholders’ meeting called for the purpose of electing a director, or by a written polling 
of the shareholders who are entitled to vote in the election of that director.199 In terms of 
section 68(3) of the Companies Act, unless the Memorandum of Incorporation of a profit 
company provides otherwise, the board of directors is empowered to appoint a person 
who satisfies the requirements for election as a director to fill a vacancy on the board and 
                                                 
Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another [2018] 1 All SA 450 (GJ) para 44 and chapter 4, 
para 2. 
 
195 Sirodoeva-Paxson “Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of Directors’ License to Steal or 
Shareholders’ Freedom to Vote” 48. 
 
196 See Sirodoeva-Paxson “Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of Directors’ License to Steal or 
Shareholders’ Freedom to Vote” 48. 
 
197 Section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
198 Section 70(3) of the Companies Act. 
 
199 Section 70(3)(b) of the Companies Act. 
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to serve as a director of the company on a temporary basis until the vacancy has been 
filled by election. During that temporary period the director so appointed to fill the 
vacancy has all of the powers, functions and duties and is subject to all the liabilities of 
any other director of the company.200  
 
The board of directors of a profit company may potentially remove a minority shareholder 
representative on the board and fill the vacancy, albeit on a temporary basis, with a 
director whom they favour. As the court in Bruch v National Guarantee Credit Corp201 
affirmed, the “law does not look with disfavor on the policy of securing to minority 
stockholders a right of representation on the board of directors”. Accordingly, as stated 
above, the power given to directors to fill vacancies on the board of director has an impact 
not only on the balance of power between the directors and the shareholders, but also on 
the balance of power between the majority and minority shareholders. In Loughlin v 
Geer202 the Appellate Court of Illinois warned against the danger of the redistribution of 
powers within a company resulting from the right of removal given to the board of 
directors by stating that: 
 
 “But the board of directors may not nullify the constitutional right of a stockholder 
to choose whomsoever he may think proper to represent him on the board of 
directors. If a board of directors could legally remove a member either with or 
without a by-law . . . a power most dangerous to the minority stockholders would be 
lodged with the majority stockholders which would enable them through the action 
of the directors chosen by them to re-constitute the entire directory of a corporation 
as completely as if they owned every share of stock.”  
 
5.2  Impact on the Board of Directors  
 
It is submitted that the board’s power of removal of directors also has an impact on the 
dynamics of the board of directors. Such power may well have the effect of limiting or 
hindering free and open discussion and debate in board meetings.203 A director may 
hesitate to express a dissenting opinion in a board meeting because of the concern of 
                                                 
200 Section 68(3) of the Companies Act. 
 
201 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922) at 741. 
 
202 121 Ill. App. 534 (1905) at 538-539.  
 
203 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 162. 
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removal by the board of directors204 or a dissident director may simply toe the line in 
order to preserve his position on the board. If directors do not engage in discussion and 
debate in board meetings, or fail to question decisions to be made with regard to the 
company due to a concern of removal, this would impact negatively on the company and 
on the shareholders. A concern of removal may also create an environment where 
directors are so intimidated by the risks of removal that they feel stifled and refrain from 
taking high-risk but potentially profitable decisions, or from making long-term strategic 
decisions that would enhance the value of the company but would not necessarily result 
in an immediate return of profit.205  
 
Directors have a fiduciary duty to observe good faith towards the company, and in 
discharging that duty they must exercise an independent unfettered judgment, and take 
decisions according to the best interests of the company.206 Should directors simply toe 
the line because of a concern of removal and fail to express controversial or dissenting 
opinions they could be in breach of these fiduciary duties.207  
 
Knight argues that while a fear of removal is an important concern, directors are not likely 
to remain on a board without attempting to contribute to board deliberations, on account 
of their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company.208 He contends further 
that there exists little incentive for the directors who form a majority on a particular issue 
                                                 
204 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 162. 
 
205 Olson “Professor Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to ‘The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise’” 
782. 
 
206 Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9 at 23; Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd 
[1942] Ch 304 at 306; Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 
1 All ER 716 (CA) at 723; Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank [1970] Ch 62; Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ 
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B.C.C. 863; Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald (No 2) [1995] 1 BCLC 452 (ChD); 
Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 105; Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v 
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207 The fiduciary duty of directors in removing board members is discussed in chapter 4, para 3.  
 
208 Knight “The Removal of Public Company Directors in Australia: Time for Change” 361. 
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to rid themselves of a minority director when that director is not in a position to obstruct 
the workings of the board nor to frustrate the will of the majority of the directors.209  
 
Nevertheless, in those instances where the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
requires board decisions to be unanimous, the concern of removal may well result in a 
minority director hesitating to express a dissenting or controversial opinion. While it is 
conceded that not all decisions taken by the board of directors would require unanimity 
and that the board of directors is not likely to remove a minority director for expressing 
a dissenting opinion or for voting against the majority view, the concern of dismissal may 
nevertheless result in a minority director hesitating to express a contrary view or failing 
to attempt to convince the majority to change its view in circumstances where he believes 
that the majority view is not in the best interests of the company.  
 
Knight opines further that disagreements in the boardroom would usually be resolved in 
the normal course of events by a board vote with all directors abiding by the result, and 
those directors who do not wish to be associated with the particular course of action 
agreed upon by the board, could simply resign from office.210 It is submitted though, that 
in many instances, for reasons of status, prestige or monetary rewards, a director would 
not be willing to resign from the board of directors if he does not wish to be associated 
with a particular course of action agreed upon by the board of directors. While resignation 
is a difficult step to take for any director, it is a particularly difficult step for an executive 
director to take because an executive director is involved full-time in the day-to-day 
affairs of the company.211 It is accordingly submitted that Knight’s suggestion of 
resignation would not in all instances be either a practical or an attractive one. 
 
The concern of removal from office may further result in a director failing to bring to the 
attention of the board of directors any suspicion or knowledge of wrong doing by fellow 
directors.212 Of concern is that this power may be used by the board of directors 
                                                 
209 Knight “The Removal of Public Company Directors in Australia: Time for Change” 361. 
 
210 Knight “The Removal of Public Company Directors in Australia: Time for Change” 361. 
 
211 See chapter 3, paras 6.2.3 and 6.3.1 and chapter 5, paras 2 and 2.1 for a discussion on executive and 
non-executive directors. 
 
212 R Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies 
Act”138. 
73 
 
subjectively, and not objectively, and with ulterior motives. Both of these concerns are 
illustrated in the UK case of Lee v Chou Wen Hsien.213 The appellant, Lee, had become 
suspicious about certain perceived wrongdoings by the chairperson and managing 
director of the company. His requests for access to various accounts were denied. When 
he requested that a board meeting be convened so that he could discuss his suspicions 
and concerns with the board of directors, he received a notice signed by all his co-
directors requesting him to resign immediately. In terms of the company’s constitution, 
the effect of such a notice was that the office of the director in question had to be vacated 
immediately. The appellant was consequently removed from the board of directors. Even 
though the Privy Council found that the board of directors had acted with ulterior motives 
in removing the appellant from the board of directors, it nevertheless held that the 
removal was valid.214  
 
A further example of the power of removal being used subjectively is where the board of 
directors is required to conduct a performance assessment of a director. Such an 
assessment could be conducted subjectively and with ulterior motives, and the board 
could consequently declare that the director has failed to meet a broadly expressed or 
subjective performance standard,215 which may constitute a ground for his removal from 
office.216 In this vein, David Gonski, the chairman of Coco-Cola Amatil Ltd, asserted 
that: 
 “Judgements on who is or who is not pulling their weight must be made by other 
board members; and I accept that some board members may not use that power 
objectively. That’s human nature and we have to guard against that.”217   
 
                                                 
213 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
214 This case is discussed in more detail in chapter 4, para 4.1. 
 
215 Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.240 at 289. 
 
216 The applicable ground under s 71(3) of the Companies Act would be that the director in question has 
neglected or has been derelict in the performance of the functions of director. This is discussed further in 
chapter 3, para 6.3. 
 
217 Australian Institute of Company Directors “David Gonski – The Role of the Chairman” (1 March 2005) 
available at http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-
Director-magazine/2000-to-2009-back-editions/2005/March/David-Gonski-The-role-of-the-chairman-
Cover-Story (accessed on 8 April 2016).  
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The King IV Report makes some recommendations regarding the performance 
evaluations of directors. Principle 9 of the King IV Report states that the governing body 
(being the board of directors in the case of a company)218 should ensure that the 
performance evaluations of its own performance, its committees, its chair and its 
individual members, support continued improvement in its performance and 
effectiveness. The Report recommends that the governing body should assume 
responsibility for the evaluation of its own performance by determining how the 
evaluation should be approached and conducted.219  
 
The King IV Report recommends further that a description of the performance 
evaluations undertaken during the reporting period be disclosed, including the scope of 
the performance evaluations and whether a formal process or informal process was 
followed.220 In contrast, the King III Report did not require the performance evaluation 
of the board of directors to be disclosed. The requirement of disclosing the performance 
evaluations undertaken would necessitate that companies have in place mechanisms to 
deal with the performance assessment of its directors.221 This is particularly important in 
light of the power conferred on directors to remove directors under the Companies Act. 
There must also be disclosure of the evaluation result, remedial actions taken and whether 
the governing body is satisfied that the evaluation process is improving its performance 
and effectiveness.222 The disclosure requirement in the King IV Report is in harmony 
with the recommendations of the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
                                                 
218 The “governing body” is defined in the King IV Report as meaning the structure that has primary 
accountability for the governance and the performance of the organisation. Depending on the context, it 
includes the board of directors of a company, the board of a retirement fund, the accounting authority of a 
state-owned company and a municipal council (King IV Report, Glossary of Terms, at 12). 
 
219 King IV Report, principle 9, recommended practice 71. 
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Council Principles and Recommendations (“ASX Corporate Governance Principles”)223 
and the UK Corporate Governance Code,224 as discussed below. 
 
The ASX Corporate Governance Principles contains various principles of corporate 
governance and recommendations which elaborate on each of the principles. Listed 
companies are required to comply with the ASX Corporate Governance Principles or 
explain why they failed to so comply. Recommendation 1.6 of the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles states that a listed entity should disclose a process for periodically 
evaluating the performance of the board, its committees and individual directors, and that 
it should disclose, in relation to each reporting period, whether a performance evaluation 
was undertaken in the reporting period in accordance with that process. Australia’s 
corporate regulator, ASIC,225 has urged companies to ensure that, in designing 
mechanisms for assessing the performance of directors, the arrangements, criteria and 
processes are transparent and fully disclosed, and that the arrangements are clear and 
legally enforceable.226   
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code applies to all companies with a premium listing.227 
Such companies are required to comply with its recommendations or explain why they 
                                                 
223 The ASX Corporate Governance Principles were introduced in 2003. A second edition was released in 
2007, and a third edition was released in 2014. The ASX Corporate Governance Principles set out 
recommended corporate governance practices for entities listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
 
224 The first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code was produced in 1992 by the Cadbury 
Committee. The new Corporate Governance Code applies to accounting periods beginning on or after 17 
June 2016 and applies to all companies with a premium listing of equity shares regardless of whether they 
are incorporated in the UK or elsewhere. A premium listing is only available to equity shares issued by 
trading companies and closed and open-ended investment entities, and means that the company is expected 
to meet the UK’s highest standards of regulations and corporate governance. The distinction between a 
standard listing and a premium listing was introduced in the UK in 2010. While the shares listed with a 
standard listing must comply with the minimum standards, shares listed with a premium listing must 
comply with more onerous standards. 
 
225 ASIC is described in chapter 1, note 57. Broadly, the objects and functions of ASIC include maintaining, 
facilitating and improving the performance of the Australian financial system and the entities within that 
system in the interests of commercial certainty, reducing business costs, promoting the efficiency and 
development of the economy and promoting the confident and informed participation of investors and 
consumers in the financial system (s 1 of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act, 2001). 
226 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Information Release IR 04-40 “Removal of 
Directors of Public Companies” (17 August 2004). 
 
227 See note 224 above where premium listings are explained. 
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failed to comply.228 The Code provides in Recommendation B6 that the “board should 
undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its 
committees and individual directors.” Recommendation B.6.1 of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, like the ASX Corporate Governance Principles, states that the “board 
should state in the annual report how performance evaluation of the board, its committees 
and individual directors has been conducted.”  
 
On the question whether the performance evaluations of the directors must be conducted 
in-house or by external persons, the King IV Report recommends that the evaluation 
process may either be externally facilitated or not, but must be conducted in accordance 
with a methodology that is approved by the directors.229 The Report recommends that the 
board of directors should disclose whether the performance evaluation was externally 
facilitated or not.230 It is evident that the Report has left much scope for the performance 
evaluations of directors to be conducted internally, and has placed this decision in the 
hands of the directors themselves.231  
 
In stark contrast, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance strongly recommend 
that, particularly in large companies, the evaluation of board members should be 
supported by external facilitators to increase objectivity.232 Likewise, the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles recommends that the board should consider using external 
facilitators to conduct its performance reviews.233 The UK Corporate Governance Code 
also recommends, in Recommendation B.6.2, that evaluation of the board of FTSE 350 
                                                 
228 UK Corporate Governance Code para 1 at 4. 
 
229 King IV Report, principle 9, recommended practice 73. For a further discussion on the evaluation of the 
performance of directors see Mongalo “Director Inductions and Board Evaluations” in Loubser & Mahony 
Company Secretarial Practice 10-6. 
 
230 King IV Report, principle 9, recommended practice 75(a). 
 
231 With regard to the performance evaluation of the chairperson, the King IV Report recommends that the 
governing body should appoint an independent non-executive member to lead the evaluation (King IV 
Report, principle 9, recommended practice 72). See chapter 3, note 314 for a description of an independent 
non-executive director under the King IV Report. 
  
232 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance at 53. 
 
233 Refer to the Commentary on Recommendation 1.6 of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles. 
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companies234 should be externally facilitated at least every three years. It recommends 
further that the external facilitator should be identified in the annual report, and a 
statement made as to whether such person has any other connection with the company.235 
In its Guidance on Board Effectiveness, the UK’s Financial Reporting Council236 
recommends that the board evaluation process “should aim to be objective and 
rigorous”.237 In light of the power given to directors to remove a director from the board 
of directors, it is submitted that, in order to enhance objectivity and to avoid performance 
evaluations of directors being conducted subjectively, the King IV Report should strongly 
recommend that directors use external independent service providers to conduct 
performance evaluations of board members. This decision should not be left to the board 
of directors of the company. 
 
The legal status of the King IV Report, as is the case with the King III Report, is that of 
a set of voluntary principles and practices.238 If there is a conflict between legislation and 
the King IV Report the legislation would prevail.239 This means that the practices and 
                                                 
234 The FTSE 350 Index is a weighted stock market index based on the market price of the largest 350 
companies which have their primary listing on the London Stock Exchange. It is a combination of the FTSE 
100 Index of the largest 100 companies and the FTSE 250 Index of the next largest 250 companies.  
 
235 Recommendation B.6.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
 
236 The Guidance on Board Effectiveness (March 2011) is one of a series of guidance notes issued by the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to assist companies in the UK to apply the principles of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code.  
 
237 Para 5.1 of the Financial Reporting Council Guidance on Board Effectiveness, available at 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/11f9659a-686e-48f0-bd83-36adab5fe930/Guidance-on-board-
effectiveness-2011.pdf. 
 
238 King IV Report at 35. While the application regime for the King III Report was that of “apply or explain” 
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that demonstrate the application of the relevant principle. The explanation should address the practice 
which has been implemented and how the implementation of such practice gives effect to the relevant 
principle (King IV Report at 37). 
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recommendations of the King IV Report are persuasive and not binding on boards of 
directors,240 save for listed companies.241 Thus while one may attempt to guard against 
board members not using their power of assessing their fellow directors subjectively, as 
recommended by Gonski, it would be challenging to do so effectively. It would also be 
challenging to guard against the performance evaluations of directors being conducted 
subjectively in listed companies since the King IV Report leaves it to the board of 
directors to decide whether the performance evaluations of the directors are to be 
conducted internally or by external facilitators.  
 
It is imperative that the board of directors does not abuse its power to remove a director 
from office. In Bruch v National Guarantee Credit Corp242 the Delaware Court of 
Chancery did not look favourably on granting directors a right to remove a director from 
office. The general manager of the company had complained to the board of directors that 
the director in question had been guilty of embezzlement. Without giving the director in 
question an opportunity to be heard, the board of directors had passed a resolution 
removing him from office. At the trial the director in question denied all charges or 
intimations of embezzlement. The court held that the various powers which a corporation 
may exercise are distributed among the directors, officers and shareholders, and that the 
power to remove a director rests with the shareholders and not the board of directors.243 
In overturning the removal of the director in question, the court stated as follows: 
 
                                                 
240 This does not mean that there are no legal consequences for a failure to comply with the principles and 
recommendations of the King IV Report. For instance, for directors of companies the adoption of good 
corporate governance practices will be important for a court in assessing whether the directors may 
successfully rely on the protection afforded to them by the business judgment rule set out in s 76(4) of the 
Companies Act (King IV Report at 35). 
 
241 See para 7.F.5 of the Listings Requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (“the JSE Listings 
Requirements”) which requires an applicant issuer to implement the King Code through the application of 
the King Code disclosure and application regime. Para 7.F.6 requires applicant issuers to comply with the 
requirements pursuant to para 3.84 concerning corporate governance, and to disclose their compliance 
therewith in their pre-listing statement. Paragraph 8.63(a) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires issuers 
(being a company whose shares have been admitted to listing) to disclose in their annual report their 
implementation of the King Code through the application of the King Code disclosure and application 
regime. The King Code is defined in the JSE Listings Requirements (Definitions) as the King Code on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa, as amended or replaced from time to time.  
 
242 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922). 
 
243 Bruch v National Guarantee Credit Corp 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922) at 741. 
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 “To allow directors to frame charges against one of their fellows and then to try and 
expel him, would open the door to possibilities of fraud which designing men might 
use to wrest control of corporate affairs from the stockholders, or their sympathetic 
representatives on the board, and transfer it to those who might seek to grasp the 
corporation for their own ends.”244 
 
It is clear that there must be effective safeguards against abuse of the power of the board 
of directors to remove a director from office. If effective checks and balances are present 
the potential for abuse of any power of the board of directors to remove one of their fellow 
board members from office may be controllable.  
 
6.  IMPACT OF THE COURT’S POWER TO REMOVE A DIRECTOR FROM 
OFFICE 
 
The Companies Act confers the power of removal of directors on the courts in two 
respects. First, in terms of section 71(6) of the Companies Act, if the board of directors 
has determined that a director is not ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated or has not been 
negligent or derelict (as the case may be) any director who voted otherwise on the 
resolution or any holder of voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that 
director, may apply to court to review the board’s determination.245 The court may 
confirm the determination of the board of directors not to remove the director in question 
from office or it may itself remove the director from office if it is satisfied that the director 
is ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated or has been negligent or derelict.246  
 
A second respect in which a court has the power of removal of a director under the 
Companies Act, is in terms of section 162(5). Under this provision a court must make an 
order declaring a person a delinquent director if any of the grounds set out in that section 
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245 Section 71(6)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
246 Section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act. This is discussed further in chapter 6, para 2.2. In terms of 
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further in chapter 4, para 4.1 and chapter 7, para 2. 
 
80 
 
is applicable, such as that a person served as a director while ineligible or disqualified to 
be a director, or grossly abused his position as a director, or acted in a manner that 
amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust, to name a few 
grounds.247 The effect of an order of delinquency is that a person is disqualified from 
being a director of a company and is thus prohibited from holding that office.248 As the 
court in Kukama v Lobelo249 stated, in view of the effect of an order declaring a director 
delinquent it is not necessary to also order his removal as such due to the automatic 
inherent effect of the order declaring a person to be delinquent in terms of section 162(5) 
of the Companies Act.250 The role of the court in declaring directors delinquent is 
discussed further in chapter 6. 
 
The power granted to courts to remove directors from office usurps the traditional sole 
shareholder prerogative to remove directors. The concept of shareholder democracy, that 
is, the rights shareholders enjoy to appoint and remove directors, conflicts with the power 
given to courts to remove directors.251 In removing directors from office, the courts are in 
effect disregarding the results of the election outcome by which the directors were elected 
by the shareholders. The courts are essentially revoking the shareholders’ representatives 
from the board of directors, and deciding for shareholders what is in the best interests of 
the company. In so doing, the courts deprive shareholders of the opportunity to decide for 
themselves what is in the best interests of the company.252 Such action intrudes on the 
prerogative of shareholders to elect directors. The removal of directors by the judiciary thus 
impacts on the internal structure of the company and alters the composition of the body 
elected by the shareholders to represent their interests.253  
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 As a general principle, the courts are disinclined to interfere in the internal operations of a 
company involving management decisions.254 The courts adopt the policy that they should 
not get involved in situations where the parties are capable of resolving their disputes 
internally.255 The election, retention, dismissal or removal of officers, directors and 
employees are examples of such internal corporate operations, which essentially involve 
management decisions.256 With regard to the removal of directors from office, the courts 
tend to abstain from the substantive review of the merits of decisions made by directors on 
the basis that shareholders have available to them an accountability mechanism, that is, the 
shareholder power to remove directors whose performance they may find to be 
unsatisfactory.257 Shareholders may appoint a director in their own interests, even if their 
interests conflict with those of the company and they are under no obligation to choose the 
person most suitable to be a director.258 It follows that shareholders have no duty to remove 
                                                 
254 See Maynard v Office Appliances (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1927 WLD 290 at 293; Kronenberg v Sullivan County 
Steam Laundry Co. 91 N.Y.S. 2d 144 (1949) para 8; Irvin & Johnson Ltd v Gelcer & Co (Pty) Ltd 1958 
(2) SA 59 (C); Yende v Orlando Coal Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others 1961 (3) SA 314 (W); Breetveldt 
and Others v Van Zyl and Others 1972 (1) SA 304 (T); Wilkes v Springside Nursing Home, Inc. Mass. 353 
N.E.2d 657 (1976) at 662; Makhuva v Lukoto Bus Service (Pty) Ltd and Others 1987 (3) SA 376 (V) at 
393-395; Connolly v Bain 484 N.W.2d 207 (Iowa App. 1992) at 211; Demoulas v Demoulas 1996 WL 
511519 (Mass. Super. Ct. Pct 1, 1996) para 32; Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd 2016 
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255 See Cluver and Another v Robertson Portland Cement and Lime Co Ltd 1925 CPD 45 at 52 where the 
court asserted as follows: “nor should the Court, unless a much stronger case is made out, interfere with 
the domestic forum which has been established for the management of the affairs of a company.” In CDH 
Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another [2018] 1 All SA 450 (GJ) the High Court held 
that conferring on a court the power in terms of s 61(12) of the Companies Act to direct the board of 
directors to call a shareholders’ meeting upon an application by a shareholder, is “company law contra-
intuitive” because courts generally decline to interfere in the management of company affairs (para 81). 
The court stated that the intention of the legislature in enacting s 61(12) of the Companies Act must have 
been to invoke the oversight role of the courts (para 81). It asserted that an applicant for relief under s 61(12) 
of the Companies Act would have to put facts before the court that would justify the interference by the 
court (para 82). 
 
256 Wilkes v Springside Nursing Home, Inc. Mass. 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976) at 662; Connolly v Bain 484 
N.W.2d 207 (Iowa App. 1992) at 211; Demoulas v Demoulas 1996 WL 511519 (Mass. Super. Ct. Pct 1, 
1996) para 32. 
 
257 Bebchuk “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise” 680. 
 
258 Pender v Lushington (1877) 46 ChD 317. See further Re HR Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62 at 82; 
Sammel and Others v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 680; Desai and Others 
v Greyridge Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 509 (A) at 519; Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual 
Life Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 (PC) at 221 and CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
and Another [2018] 1 All SA 450 (GJ) para 44. In Pender v Lushington (1877) 46 ChD 317 Lord Jessel 
MR remarked that if a shareholder votes in such a way that is wholly adverse to the interests of the company 
as a whole, he cannot on that ground be restrained from giving his vote in whatever way he pleases (at 
319). 
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directors who have misconducted themselves and they may endorse a dishonest director 
should they wish to do so. If the courts were to remove a director whom the shareholders 
have decided not to remove from office, this would be an infringement of the principle of 
non-interference in the internal company affairs of a company.  
 
The right given to the judiciary to remove directors from office impacts not only on the 
shareholders, as discussed above, but also on the directors. If the board of directors 
removes a director from office and an application to review the board’s decision is 
instituted under section 71(5) of the Companies Act, a court may decide that the director 
was improperly removed by the board of directors and may reinstate the director. If on 
the other hand the board of directors decides not to remove a director from office and an 
application to court to review the board’s decision is instituted under section 71(6) of the 
Companies Act, a court may itself decide to remove the director from office if it is 
satisfied that valid grounds exist for such removal. If the court does not affirm the board’s 
decision to remove a director or not to remove a director, it would be acting contrary to 
the decision made by the board of directors. This infringes on the principle of non-
interference by courts in the internal affairs of the company.    
 
In Yende v Orlando Coal Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others259 the applicant, a shareholder 
and former director of a company, applied to court under section 62(2) of the Companies 
Act 46 of 1926 for an order authorising him to call a meeting in the name of the company 
for the purpose of deciding on a resolution to remove the directors of the company from 
office. The applicant alleged that there had been numerous irregularities on the part of the 
directors, but the directors denied these allegations and made numerous counter-allegations 
against the applicant. In refusing the relief requested by the applicant, Dowling J 
proclaimed that:  
 
“In general, the policy of the Courts has been not to interfere in the internal 
domestic affairs of a company, where the company ought to be able to adjust its 
affairs itself by appropriate resolutions of a majority of the shareholders. On the 
papers there appears to be nothing to prevent the applicant from requistioning a 
general meeting of the company under the  provisions of sec. 61 or 62 (1) (c) of the 
Companies’ Act. If the applicant can secure the vote of the majority of the 
                                                 
259 1961 (3) SA 314 (W). 
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shareholders, the second respondent and his co-directors may be removed, and 
fresh ones be appointed.”260 
 
Nevertheless, access to a court is an important safety mechanism in instances in which 
traditional internal governance procedures may fail to protect the company from the 
recurring misconduct of a director.261  In such instances the judicial removal of a director 
might be the most appropriate remedy. In the context of deciding whether to grant a judicial 
management order, Barry J, in an oft quoted dictum in Maynard v Office Appliances (S.A.) 
(Pty) Ltd262 stated as follows: 
 
 “. . . if the facts show that there has been mismanagement in the conduct of the 
company's affairs, the Court will not interfere on the application of a shareholder or 
an individual director. And the reason is that the directors can redress the 
mismanagement, or the shareholders can in the general meeting. If a director or 
shareholder is in a minority as regards the domestic policy of the company, a Court 
will not assist him unless he can show something illegal on the part of the company 
or something oppressive or fraudulent on the part of the persons who control the 
company.”263 [Emphasis added] 
 
These grounds of illegality, oppressive conduct and fraud on the part of the persons who 
control the company, advocated by Barry J, are some examples of instances which may 
justify interference by a court in the form of a removal of a director, and where judicial 
removal would be an appropriate remedy.264 Other examples of instances where the judicial 
removal of a director would be the most appropriate or most practical remedy are: 
 
 where the shareholders do not have a sufficient majority to remove a director; 
 
                                                 
260 Yende v Orlando Coal Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others 1961 (3) SA 314 (W) at 316. See further Van 
Zyl v Nuco Chrome Bophuthatswana (Pty) Ltd 2013 JDR 0453 (GSJ) para 33 where the court affirmed that 
the general policy is that courts should be loathe or reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of the 
company, especially in instances where the company ought to be able to regulate its own affairs by 
appropriate resolutions of a majority of shareholders. 
 
261 Cox & Hazen Corporations 171. 
262 1927 WLD 290. The dictum of this case was followed in numerous cases, such as Reich v Hathorn 
Syndicate 1930 NPD 233; Silverman v Doornhoek Mines 1935 TPD 349; In Re Mulvihal's Mineral 
Waterworks (Pty) Ltd 1936 CPD 135; Repp v Ondundu Goldfields Ltd 1937 CPD 375 and Irvin & Johnson 
Ltd v Gelcer & Co (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 59 (C) at 65. 
 
263 Maynard v Office Appliances (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd 1927 WLD 290 at 294. 
 
264 See further Kronenberg v Sullivan County Steam Laundry Co. 91 N.Y.S. 2d 144 (1949) para 8 and 
Demoulas v Demoulas 1996 WL 511519 (Mass. Super. Ct. Pct 1, 1996) para 32. 
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 where the director in question owns or controls sufficient shares to block his removal 
from office;265  
 
 where shareholders refuse to remove a director charged with serious misconduct for 
personal reasons or to protect their own personal interests; 
 
 where a shareholders’ meeting to consider the removal of a misbehaving director 
would entail significant expense and a period of delay that would be contrary to the 
best interests of the company;266 and 
 
 where the board of directors removes a director from office with ulterior motives. 
 
To illustrate by example the point that in certain instances judicial interference in the form 
of removal of a director is justified, in Markovitz v Markovitz267 a young and inexperienced 
director had harassed his colleagues, employees and customers and had abused the 
authority and discretion vested in him as a director to the detriment and harm of the business 
of the company. The shareholders who had the power to remove the director from office 
did not wish to do so because the shareholders who had elected him to office were his 
mother and brother. The majority shareholders instituted proceedings under Article IV, 
section 405C of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1933 requesting the court 
to remove the director from office and to bar him from re-election for a period prescribed 
by the court. Prior to the enactment of the Business Corporation Law in Pennsylvania the 
power to remove a director from office before the expiration of his term could be exercised 
only by the shareholders.268 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the director in 
question was guilty of abuse of authority.269 The court consequently removed the director 
                                                 
265 Ferber Corporation Law 41; Schneeman The Law of Corporations and Other Business Organizations 
262; Model Business Corporation Act with Official Comments and Reporter’s Annotations 8-95. Even 
though these examples are provided in respect of USA law they would apply equally in the South African 
context. The concept of loaded voting rights is discussed in chapter 5, para 3. 
 
266 Ferber Corporation Law 41-2; Schneeman The Law of Corporations and Other Business Organizations 
262; Model Business Corporation Act with Official Comments and Reporter’s Annotations 8-95. 
 
267 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939). 
 
268 Section 405C of the Business Corporation Law empowered shareholders holding at least ten per cent of 
the shares of the company to institute proceedings requesting a court to remove a director in the case of 
fraudulent or dishonest acts, or gross abuse of authority or discretion. 
 
269 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 48. 
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from his directorship position and barred him from re-election as a director for a period of 
two years.270  
  
7.   MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWERS WITH REGARD TO THE 
REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE 
 
It is important to bear in mind the provisions of section 7 of the Companies Act, setting 
out its purposes. Section 5(1) of the Companies Act states that the Companies Act must 
be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 
7. In Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd 
and Others271 Gamble J expressed the view that the effect of section 7 of the Companies 
Act is that courts are now required to adopt a “fresh approach” when assessing the affairs 
of corporate entities in South Africa. The court remarked that the legislature has 
pertinently charged the courts with the duty to interpret the Companies Act such that the 
founding values of the Constitution are respected and advanced, and further, so that the 
spirit and purpose of the Companies Act is given effect to.272 The court stated as follows, 
with regard to the interpretation of the Companies Act:  
 
 “Fundamental to the Act is the promotion and stimulation of the country’s economy 
through, inter alia, the use of the company as a vehicle to achieve economic and 
social wellbeing. This must be done efficiently and in accordance with acceptable 
levels of corporate stewardship, all the while balancing the rights and obligations 
of shareholders and directors in the company, its employees and any outside parties 
with which a company ordinarily interacts on the course of its business.” 
 
As emphasised by the court in Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another 
v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd and Others273 one of the purposes of the Companies Act is to 
balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies. This 
purpose is contained in section 7(i) of the Companies Act. It is patent from the above 
discussion that the conferment of the power of removal of a director on the board of 
                                                 
270 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 48. 
 
271 2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC) para 20. 
 
272 Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (5) 
SA 497 (WCC) para 20. See further Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) 
and Another [2017] 1 All SA 862 (WCC) para 46 where the court endorsed this approach. 
 
273 2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC) para 20. 
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directors by the Companies Act has shifted the balance of powers between the 
shareholders and the directors. The shift in the balance of power between the directors 
and shareholders is more pronounced in light of section 66(1) of the Companies Act, 
which confers original power on the board of directors and results in the board being 
subject to less shareholder control.274 Arguably, from the director’s point of view the 
current position under the Companies Act is a preferable “balance” because the power of 
the directors has been enhanced. This is not necessarily so from the point of view of the 
shareholders because their control over the directors has been reduced. It is important for 
the rights and obligations of the directors and shareholders to be balanced so that directors 
do not abuse their powers and do not neglect the interests of the shareholders. The balance 
of powers between the shareholders and directors is furthermore crucial so that the 
shareholders are able to act as an effective counterbalance to the powerful directors.275  
 
The question arises whether it is possible to maintain the balance of powers between the 
directors and the shareholders. It is submitted that, in light of the redistribution of the 
power between the shareholders and the directors, it is not possible to maintain the power 
between these entities in the manner that had existed prior to the conferment of the power 
of removal on the board of directors. The mere conferral of the power of removal on the 
board of directors, even if such power were not used, impacts on the balance of powers 
between the directors and the shareholders, and on the dynamics between them, because 
the threat of the power of removal being used is persistently present.  
 
Nevertheless, even if the balance of power between the directors and the shareholders 
can no longer be maintained to the same extent that had existed prior to the conferment 
of the power of removal on the board of directors, it is submitted that the proper balance 
sought by section 7(i) of the Companies Act could perhaps be achieved if the board of 
directors gives due consideration to the following factors before deciding whether to 
remove a fellow board member: 
 
 The concept of corporate democracy and the inherent rights of shareholders to 
appoint and remove a director. Before removing a fellow director from office, the 
                                                 
274 Havenga “Directors’ Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 262. 
 
275 Hannigan Company Law 185. 
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board should consider whether the inherent rights of shareholders to remove 
directors should be honoured, or whether they should be disregarded, particularly 
where the director in question was appointed by the shareholders and not by the 
board of directors. 
 
 Whether a fellow director whom the board of directors wishes to remove is a 
representative of the minority shareholders, and if so, the impact of such removal 
on the dynamics between the majority and minority shareholders. 
 
 Whether in removing a director from office the board of directors would be 
breaching its fiduciary duties or acting with ulterior motives. 
 
 Whether the board of directors is acting openly and transparently at all times and 
in the best interests of the company when removing a director from office. 
 
The last two factors stated above would in any event have to be complied with by the 
board of directors in removing a fellow board member from office. Yet, as illustrated in 
the UK case of Lee v Chou Wen Hsien,276 boards of directors do act with ulterior motives 
in removing a director from office and do not necessarily act openly and transparently 
and in the best interests of the company when removing a director from office. It is 
evident from Lee v Chou Wen Hsien277 that even where directors breach their fiduciary 
duties when removing a director and remove a director with ulterior motives, a court may 
nevertheless affirm the board’s decision and not reinstate the improperly removed 
director. 
 
The conferral of the removal power on the judiciary also affects the relationship between 
the shareholders and the judiciary and the relationship between the judiciary and the 
board of directors because it offends the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of the company. In an attempt to minimise the interference of the judiciary in the 
internal affairs of the company, it is submitted that, before the judiciary makes a decision 
whether to remove a director from office or whether to reinstate in office a director who 
                                                 
276 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
277 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. This case is discussed further in chapter 4, para 4.1. 
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has been removed, it should carefully reflect on whether the removal would involve the 
court in an undue interference in internal company disputes which should preferably be 
left to the board of directors and/or the shareholders to resolve. Some considerations 
which the judiciary should bear in mind before exercising its discretion to remove a 
director from office or to reinstate a director in office are the following: 
 
 the circumstances and reasons why the shareholders or the board of directors failed 
to remove the director in question; 
 
 whether the removal of the director in question would be in the best interests of the 
company;278 
 
 the adequacy of any other available remedies;279  
 
 whether, in making its decision to remove a director from office, the board of 
directors has complied with its fiduciary duties in removing the director in question, 
or whether it has acted with ulterior motives; 
 
 whether the board of directors has made an objective, and not a subjective, 
assessment of a fellow director with regard to whether he had neglected his 
functions, or had been derelict in the performance of his functions, should this be 
the reason the board gives for the removal of the director in question; and 
 
 whether the board of directors has acted openly and transparently and in the best 
interests of the company in removing the director in question.280  
 
It is submitted that if these factors were deliberated upon by courts in judicial removal 
proceedings, due consideration would have been given by the courts to the inherent right 
of shareholders to remove directors and to the principle of non-interference in the internal 
                                                 
278 See further chapter 6, para 3.10. 
 
279 See further chapter 6, para 3.10. 
 
280 It should be noted that under s 162(5) of the Companies Act, in declaring a director delinquent, a court 
is obliged to make an order declaring a person a delinquent director if any of the grounds set out in s 162(5) 
are satisfied and that a court does not have any discretion in this regard. This is discussed further in chapter 
6, para 3.9. 
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affairs of the company.  There must be a balance between the courts having a convincing 
reason for the removal of a director and the shareholders’ or board of directors’ privilege 
to remove a director from office. 
 
8.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter examined the underpinning philosophy of the removal of directors from 
office. It explored the reason why shareholders were initially regarded as the supreme 
organ of a company, and how the balance of power has gradually shifted away from the 
shareholders in favour of the directors.281 The division of powers between the directors 
and shareholders was discussed, and it was evident that in terms of section 66(1) of the 
Companies Act the management of a company is vested firmly in the board of directors 
and that directors are now subject to less shareholder control.282 Directors now have 
original powers – their powers no longer have to be delegated to them by the 
shareholders.283 
 
The separation of ownership and control, as famously documented by Berle and 
Means,284 was examined and the consequences of the split between ownership and control 
were canvassed.285 It was seen that the separation of ownership and control has resulted 
in attenuated control by the shareholders, shareholder apathy, a situation where the 
interests of the directors and the shareholders often diverge, and managerial autonomy 
without much control by the shareholders.286 This chapter further discussed some 
qualifications which must be made to the concept of separation of ownership and control 
as documented by Berle and Means in 1932.287 
 
                                                 
281 See para 2 above. 
 
282 See para 2 above. 
 
283 See para 2 above. 
 
284 Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
 
285 See para 3 above. 
 
286 See para 3 above. 
 
287 See para 3 above. 
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This chapter additionally explored the rationale of conferring the power of removal of 
directors on shareholders.288 It found that this power was conferred on shareholders as a 
consequence of the separation of ownership and control, with the expectation that such 
power would make directors accountable to shareholders, and give directors a strong 
inducement to serve the interests of the shareholders.289 It was argued that in light of the 
effects of the separation of power and control in a company, the power conferred on 
shareholders to remove directors strikes a balance between the attenuated power of 
control of shareholders with the power of directors to manage the company.290 It was 
further argued that the shareholders’ power of removal is a critical tool in the hands of 
shareholders, a form of corporate democracy, and a necessary and key provision of 
modern company law.291 
 
While there are advantages to conferring the power of removal of a director on the board 
of directors and on the judiciary, as canvassed in this chapter, it was also argued that the 
conferral of this power of removal has had an impact on the balance of power between the 
shareholders and the board of directors, between the shareholders themselves and between 
the directors themselves.292 It has also impacted on the relationship between the 
shareholders, the directors and the judiciary.293  These arguments are summed up below: 
 
 The balance of power between the shareholders and the directors has shifted on 
account of the power to remove directors no longer being the sole prerogative of 
shareholders.294 The conferment of this power on the board of directors is not 
consistent with the original rationale of giving shareholders the right to remove 
directors. This original rationale was to give shareholders more control over 
directors because the separation of ownership of control resulted in attenuated 
                                                 
288 See para 4 above. 
 
289 See para 4 above. 
 
290 See para 4 above. 
 
291 See para 4 above. 
 
292 See para 5 above. 
 
293 See para 6 above. 
 
294 See para 5.1 above. 
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control by shareholders.295 Additionally, the strong inducement to the directors to 
focus on the interests of shareholders or to follow the line of action preferred by the 
shareholders may be diminished.296  
 
 The balance of power between the shareholders among themselves has shifted in 
view of the fact that the board of directors may well remove from office a director 
representative of the minority shareholders.297 This would have the effect of 
altering the dynamics between the majority and the minority shareholders.298 The 
balance of power between the shareholders is further affected on account of the fact 
that under section 68(3) of the Companies Act (unless the Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise) the board of directors has the power to fill 
vacancies, and may well replace a minority director representative with a director 
whom they favour.299  
 
 The balance of power between the directors among themselves has shifted seeing 
that the board of directors would now have to manage the threat of removal from 
the board of directors.300 Previously this threat emanated from the shareholders 
only.301 What is more, the conferral of the power of removal on the board of 
directors may have the effect of limiting or hindering free and open discussion and 
debate in board meetings, and may result in a dissident director simply toeing the 
line in order to preserve his position on the board of directors.302 It may also stifle 
directors and result in them refraining from taking high-risk but potentially 
profitable decisions.303 It may further result in directors failing to bring to the 
                                                 
295 See paras 4 and 5.1 above. 
 
296 See para 5.1 above. 
 
297 See para 5.1 above. 
 
298 See para 5.1 above. 
 
299 See para 5.1 above. 
 
300 See para 5.2 above. 
 
301 See para 5.2 above. 
 
302 See para 5.2 above. 
 
303 See para 5.2 above. 
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attention of the other board members a suspicion or knowledge of wrong doing by 
fellow directors.304 In addition, the power of removal may be used with ulterior 
motives by directors in order to remove a director whom they do not favour or 
whom they perceive to be a threat.305 
 
 The relationship between the shareholders and the judiciary has changed since the 
judicial power to remove directors usurps the traditional sole shareholder 
prerogative to remove directors.306 By removing from office a director elected by 
the shareholders, the judiciary in effect disregards the election outcome by which 
the directors were elected by the shareholders to the board, and revokes the 
representatives of the shareholders from the board of directors.307 Furthermore, the 
removal of directors by the judiciary has the effect of the judiciary deciding for 
shareholders what is in the best interest of the company, and thus depriving 
shareholders of the opportunity to decide this for themselves.308  
 
 The relationship between the directors and the judiciary has changed because if a 
court reinstates a director whom the board of directors has removed or, 
alternatively, removes from office a director whom the board decided not to 
remove, it contradicts the decision of the board of directors to remove or not to 
remove the director from office.309 The decision of the judiciary furthermore 
involves an interference by the courts with the internal affairs of a company. This 
is contrary to the general policy of the courts not to interfere in the internal affairs 
of a company.310 
                                                 
304 See para 5.2 above. 
 
305 See para 5.2 above. As discussed in para 5.2 above, the fiduciary duties of directors may not necessarily 
address the concerns of the removal power being used with ulterior motives. It is evident from Lee v Chou 
Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202 that even where directors breach their fiduciary duties when removing a 
director a court may nevertheless affirm the board’s decision and not reinstate the director. This case is 
discussed further in chapter 4, para 4.1. 
 
306 See para 6 above. 
 
307 See para 6 above. 
 
308 See para 6 above. 
 
309 See para 6 above. 
 
310 See para 6 above. 
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It was contended in this chapter that the balance of power between the shareholders and 
the directors can no longer be maintained in the manner that had existed prior to the 
conferment of the power of removal on the board of directors and the judiciary.311 In an 
effort to achieve the proper balance sought by section 7(i) of the Companies Act, this 
chapter advocated certain suggestions with regard to containing the redistribution of 
power between the directors and the shareholders.312 Finally, this chapter put forward 
some factors to be deliberated upon by the courts in exercising its removal power so as 
to give due consideration by the courts to the inherent right of shareholders to remove 
directors and to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the company.313   
  
                                                 
311 See para 7 above. 
 
312 See para 7 above. 
 
313 See para 7 above. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS BY THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. THE POWER CONFERRED ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS TO 
REMOVE DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE 
3. DIRECTORS TO WHOM THE BOARD’S POWER OF REMOVAL OF 
DIRECTORS APPLIES  
4. COMPANIES TO WHOM THE BOARD’S POWER OF REMOVAL 
OF DIRECTORS APPLIES 
5. LOCUS STANDI TO INITIATE A BOARD MEETING TO REMOVE A 
DIRECTOR FROM OFFICE 
6. THE GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL OF A DIRECTOR BY THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS  
7. DISCRETION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS TO REMOVE A 
DIRECTOR FROM OFFICE 
8. THE PROCEDURE FOR REMOVAL OF A DIRECTOR BY THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
9. REMOVAL OF A DIRECTOR BY THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL 
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The board of directors is empowered by section 71(3) of the Companies Act to remove a 
director from office. Before the board of directors may validly remove a director from office, 
the procedures set out in section 71(4) of the Companies Act must be meticulously complied 
with. This chapter examines the grounds under which a director may be removed from office 
under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, and the procedural requirements to do so. It 
compares the grounds for removal of a director by the board of directors and the requisite 
procedures with the equivalent provisions in the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK 
Companies Act of 2006, the MBCA, the DGCL1 and the corporations laws of various States in 
the USA, with a view to assessing the extent to which sections 71(3) and (4) of the (South 
                                                 
1 The MBCA and the DGCL are described in chapter 1, para 2.1.  
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African) Companies Act measure up to their equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions 
considered. This chapter also discusses how the provisions of South African company law on 
the removal of directors by the board of directors may be strengthened and improved. The 
removal of directors by the Companies Tribunal under section 71(8) of the Companies Act is 
also discussed in this chapter.  
 
2.  THE POWER CONFERRED ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS TO REMOVE 
DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE 
 
 The power conferred on the board of directors to remove directors from office under the (South 
African) Companies Act is examined, followed by a discussion of this power under the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK Companies Act of 2006, the MBCA, the DGCL 
and the relevant corporate legislation of various States in the USA. 
 
2.1  Power of the Board of Directors to Remove Directors under the Companies Act  
 
The Companies Act contains two main types of provisions. The first one is the unalterable 
provision. An unalterable provision is a provision of the Companies Act that does not expressly 
contemplate that its effect on any particular company may be negated, restricted, limited, 
qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by a company’s Memorandum 
of Incorporation or rules.2 A company may not “contract out” of the unalterable provisions of 
the Companies Act.3 A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may however impose a more 
onerous requirement on the company than that contained by an unalterable provision of the 
Companies Act.4  
 
The second type of provision is the alterable provision, which is a provision of the Companies 
Act in which it is expressly contemplated that its effect on a particular company may be 
negated, restricted, limited, qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by 
                                                 
2 Section 1 of the Companies Act. 
 
3 See the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 5. 
 
4 See s 15(2)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act which provides that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
may impose on the company a higher standard, greater restriction, longer period of time or any similarly more 
onerous requirement than would otherwise apply to the company in terms of an unalterable provision of the 
Companies Act.  
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that company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.5 Most of the alterable provisions of the 
Companies Act are “opt-out” provisions, that is, they will apply to the company unless it opts 
out of them by expressly stipulating so in its Memorandum of Incorporation, as opposed to the 
“opt-in” provisions which do not apply to a company unless it specifically so provides in its 
Memorandum of Incorporation.6  
  
It is submitted that the power conferred by section 71(3) of the Companies Act on the board of 
directors to remove fellow board members is an unalterable provision as it does not expressly 
contemplate that its effect may be negated, restricted, limited, qualified, extended or otherwise 
altered in substance or effect by a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. It follows that 
no Memorandum of Incorporation of a company may negate, restrict, limit, qualify, extend or 
alter the substance or effect of the power conferred by section 71(3) of the Companies Act on 
the board of directors to remove fellow board members. It is evident that under the Companies 
Act the board’s power to remove fellow board members is a mandatory statutory power that 
may not be contracted out of.  
 
Both section 69ter(6) of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 and section 220(7) of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 provided that nothing in those sections should be taken as “derogating from 
any power to remove a director which may exist apart from this section”. This provision made 
it clear that the statutory method of removing a director from office was not the only ground 
on which a director could be removed from office. It also had the effect of exempting a 
company from having to comply with the statutorily prescribed procedures to remove a director 
should such procedures be regulated in the constitution of the company.7 There is no similar 
provision in section 71 of the Companies Act. Now that this provision has been removed from 
the Companies Act it would appear that a director of a company must be removed solely and 
                                                 
5 Section 1 of the Companies Act. These types of provisions usually have the introductory phrase “unless 
prohibited by its Memorandum of Incorporation” or “except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation 
of a company provides otherwise”.  
 
6 MF Cassim “Formation of Companies and the Company Constitution” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 126. For a further discussion on the alterable and unalterable provisions of the Companies Act see 
Delport New Entrepreneurial Law 28-29 and Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 70(1)-78(3).  
  
7 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 128; Van Eck & Lombard “Dismissal of Executive Directors: Comparing 
Principles of Company Law and Labour Law” 28; Esser “Company Law and the Spoliated Director” 144. 
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strictly in terms of the Companies Act and in accordance with the provisions of section 71 of 
the Companies Act.  
 
However, section 71 does not (unlike some other provisions in the Companies Act), explicitly 
exclude any right at common law to remove a director from office.8 It is consequently not clear 
whether section 71 of the Companies Act applies in substitution for any rights at common law 
to remove a director from office, or whether it exists concurrently with the common law rights 
to remove a director. It is submitted that since section 71 is a mandatory provision it impliedly 
repeals any common law principles relating to the removal of directors from office. In any 
event, if the common law were to apply to the removal of directors from office it could defeat 
the purpose of the statutory protection provided to directors under section 71 of the Companies 
Act if such common law procedures did not measure up to the statutory protection provided to 
directors by section 71 of the Companies Act.  
 
In contrast to the Companies Act, the company law statutes of the foreign jurisdictions 
considered do not confer on the board of directors an unalterable statutory power to remove 
fellow board members from office. The conferral of power on the board of directors to remove 
fellow board members in Australia, the UK and the USA is discussed below.  
 
2.2 Power of the Board of Directors to Remove Directors under the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001  
 
The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 makes a clear distinction between public companies 
and private companies with regard to the removal of directors by the board of directors.9 
Directors of public companies in Australia may not remove fellow board members. Section 
203E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 states that a resolution, request or notice of 
any or all of the directors of a public company is void to the extent that it purports to remove a 
director from his office or requires a director to vacate his office. It is thus patently clear that 
                                                 
8 For example, s 165 of the Companies Act, which relates to derivative actions, expressly states that any right at 
common law of a person other than a company to bring or prosecute any legal proceedings on behalf of that 
company is “abolished” and that the rights in s 165 “are in substitution for any such abolished right.” See further 
on this point Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd 2017 (6) SA 409 (SCA) para 6. 
 
9 A distinction is also drawn in the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 between the removal of directors by 
shareholders of private companies (s 203C) and by shareholders of public companies (s 203D). These provisions 
are discussed below and in paras 4.4, 8.2, 8.4 and 8.5 of chapter 3. 
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in Australia the power to remove directors of public companies is a power that may not be 
assumed by the board of directors. The Australian Institute of Company Directors has 
expressed the view that allowing a board of directors to remove a director could potentially 
compromise the essential independence of mind (of the directors comprising the board) that is 
the objective of many corporate governance principles.10 The example given by the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors is that a director who conscientiously challenges a board’s 
thinking may be fulfilling his duties under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.11 Section 
203E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 embodies in public companies the concept of 
shareholder democracy and control,12 that shareholders should ultimately have the power to 
remove directors.13 
 
In 2004 the power to remove directors of public companies was fervently debated in Australia. 
Several public companies had implemented what has been called in Australia “pre-nuptial 
agreements” with incoming directors.14 Pre-nuptial agreements in this context require a director 
to resign if the board resolves to pass a vote of no-confidence in him.15 It has been controversial 
in Australia whether such pre-nuptial agreements are valid, and whether shareholders have an 
exclusive, or merely unerodable, right to remove directors of a public company from office.16 
The prevailing view is that in light of section 203E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 
these pre-nuptial agreements are not valid and that they contravene section 203E of the 
                                                 
10 Australian Institute of Company Directors “Resignations or Removal of Directors” Position Paper No. 6 (May 
2007) at 2. 
 
11 Australian Institute of Company Directors “Resignations or Removal of Directors” Position Paper No. 6 (May 
2007) at 2. 
 
12 See chapter 2, para 4 where the concept of shareholder democracy and control is discussed. 
 
13 McConvill & Holland “‘Pre-nuptial Agreements’ for Removing Directors in Australia – Are they a Valid Part 
of the Marriage between Shareholders and the Board?” 206; Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s 
Principles of Corporations Law para 7.240 at 288-289.  
 
14 See Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.240 at 288; McConvill 
“Removal of Directors of Public Companies takes Centre Stage in Australia” 194 and Knight “The Removal of 
Public Company Directors in Australia: Time for Change?” 352.  
 
15 McConvill “Removal of Directors of Public Companies takes Centre Stage in Australia” 194. 
  
16 See Scottish & Colonial Ltd v Australian Power & Gas Company Ltd [2007] NSWSC 126; Allied Mining and 
Processing v Boldbow Pty Ltd 160 FLR 369 (W.A.S.C. 2002); McConvill “Removal of Directors of Public 
Companies takes Centre Stage in Australia” 200-232; Knight “The Removal of Public Company Directors in 
Australia: Time for Change?” 356-362 and Hill “The Rising Tension between Shareholder and Director Power in 
the Common Law World” 353. 
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Australian Corporations Act of 2001.17 In 2004 ASIC proclaimed in an Information Release 
titled “Removal of Directors of Public Companies” that only the shareholders of a company 
may remove the directors of a public company and that attempts by directors to remove another 
director from office are void.18 ASIC asserted further that an agreement or any other 
arrangement that provides that a director of a public company may be removed from office if 
the other directors so decide, is ineffective.19 In light of ASIC considering the pre-nuptial 
agreements to be ineffective, it appears that in Australia the removal of directors of public 
companies is a matter for the shareholders only, and not a matter for the board of directors.  
 
With regard to private companies, under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the board of 
directors is empowered to remove a director from office if the constitution of the company 
permits this to be done.20 This is, however, not expressly stated in the Australian Corporations 
                                                 
17 See McConvill “Removal of Directors of Public Companies takes Centre Stage in Australia” 232; Hill “The 
Shifting Balance of Power between Shareholders and the Board” 80 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086477 
(accessed on 27 September 2016) and Hill “The Rising Tension between Shareholder and Director Power in the 
Common Law World” 353. 
 
18 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Information Release IR 04-40 “Removal of Directors of 
Public Companies” (17 August 2004). 
  
19 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Information Release IR 04-40 “Removal of Directors of 
Public Companies” (17 August 2004). 
 
20 See Knight “The Removal of Public Company Directors in Australia: Time for Change?” 353; Hill “The 
Shifting Balance of Power between Shareholders and the Board” 77 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086477 
(accessed on 27 September 2016) and Hill “The Rising Tension between Shareholder and Director Power in the 
Common Law World” 353. With regard to the removal of directors by the shareholders, the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 again draws a distinction between private and public companies. Section 203D applies 
to the removal of a director by the shareholders of a public company. Sections 203D(2) to (6) confer on the director 
in question an entitlement to defend himself by putting his case before the shareholders and by sending a written 
statement to all the shareholders. In terms of s 203D(1), the power to remove directors using the process referred 
to in s 203D would apply regardless of any provision in the company’s constitution, any agreement that the 
company may have with the director or any agreement between any or all the shareholders and the director. In 
Scottish & Colonial Ltd v Australian Power & Gas Company Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1266 para 39 the New South 
Wales Supreme Court held that compliance with ss 203D(2) to (6) is mandatory. It stated that the strength of the 
language used in several places in s 203D indicates that the provision was intended to operate whether or not some 
provision in the constitution of the company intended some other procedural course which give directors less or 
no protection (para 39). It placed emphasis on the fact that s 203D is different from its predecessors, which had 
contained a provision to the effect that nothing in the provision would be taken as derogating from any power to 
remove a director (paras 21-23). Thus companies were, prior to the enactment of s 203D, able to remove a director 
either in accordance with the legislation or with any other provisions in their constitution. As is the position under 
the (South African) Companies Act, s 203D no longer contains such a provision. There is however some 
controversy regarding the mandatory nature of s 203D. For instance, in Allied Mining & Processing Ltd v Boldbow 
Pty Ltd 160 FLR 369 (W.A.S.C. 2002) at 378-379 the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that s 203D is 
not mandatory. In Scottish & Colonial Ltd v Australian Power & Gas Company Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1266 para 
37 the New South Wales Supreme Court asserted that it did not agree with this view expressed in Allied Mining 
& Processing Ltd v Boldbow Pty Ltd 160 FLR 369 (W.A.S.C. 2002). See chapter 3 para 8.2 for a further discussion 
of Scottish & Colonial Ltd v Australian Power & Gas Company Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1266 and Austin & Ramsay 
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Act of 2001. In terms of section 203C of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, which is a 
replaceable rule (meaning that it may be ousted or modified by the constitution of the 
company)21 the shareholders of a private company may remove a director by an ordinary 
resolution passed at a general meeting. Since section 203C is a replaceable rule, for private 
companies it is possible to displace this rule with a provision in the constitution of the company 
permitting the board of directors to remove a director from office.22 Thus, with regard to private 
companies in Australia, the board of directors may remove directors from office only if 
empowered to do so by the constitution of the company. Accordingly private companies have 
the flexibility to decide for themselves whether the board of directors may remove fellow board 
members from office.  
 
The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 does not set out any grounds for the removal of a 
director of a private company by the board of directors, nor the procedures to do so. This would 
presumably be regulated by the constitution of a private company that empowers the board of 
directors to remove directors from office.23 This implies that the requirements of removing a 
director from office by the board of directors will vary from private company to private 
company, depending on the provisions of the constitution of each company. 
 
2.3  Power of the Board of Directors to Remove Directors under the UK Companies Act 
of 2006 
 
Unlike the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK Companies Act of 2006 does not 
distinguish between the removal of the directors of public companies and private companies. 
Notably, the UK Companies Act of 2006 does not make any explicit provision for the board of 
                                                 
Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.230 at 284-286 for a discussion on the 
conflicting views regarding the mandatory nature of ss 203D(2) to (6) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
21 The concept of replaceable rules under s 135 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 is discussed in chapter 
2, note 87. 
 
22 See the heading to s 203C which expressly states that it is a replaceable rule; s 135 of the Australian Corporations 
Act of 2001 dealing with replaceable rules; Knight “The Removal of Public Company Directors in Australia: 
Time for Change?” 353; Hill “The Shifting Balance of Power between Shareholders and the Board” 77 available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086477 (accessed on 27 September 2016) and Hill “The Rising Tension between 
Shareholder and Director Power in the Common Law World” 353. 
 
23 The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 only sets out a specific procedure that must be followed if a director 
of a public company is removed by the shareholders in a general meeting (see s 203D of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001). 
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directors to remove a director from office. It empowers only the shareholders to do so. Section 
168(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 provides that a director of a company may be 
removed at any time by an ordinary resolution of shareholders, despite anything contained in 
any agreement between the director and the company.24 In contrast to section 203E of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, there is no provision in the UK Companies Act of 2006 
which specifically prohibits the removal of directors by the board of directors of public 
companies.  
 
Section 168(5)(b) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 (which permits shareholders to remove 
directors by ordinary resolution) states that section 168 is not to be taken as “derogating from 
any power to remove a director that may exist apart from this section.” This has the implication 
that the articles of association of a company may provide additional grounds for the removal 
of directors.25 These grounds will vary from one company’s articles of association to another. 
The most common additional ground is that a director will be removed from office upon a 
request from fellow directors.26 In this manner, if the articles of association of a company 
permit it, directors of both public and private companies in the UK may be removed from office 
                                                 
24 Section 168 does not require that a reason be given by the shareholders to remove the director from office (see 
further Kershaw Company Law in Context 222). The predecessor to s 168, which was s 303 of the UK Companies 
Act of 1985, stated that a company may by ordinary resolution remove a director before the expiration of his 
period in office “notwithstanding anything in its articles or any agreement between it and him.” Section 168(1) of 
the UK Companies Act of 2006 now states that a company may by ordinary resolution at a meeting remove a 
director before the expiration of his period of office “notwithstanding anything in any agreement between it and 
him”. The deletion of the reference to the articles may suggest that the removal right no longer explicitly overrides 
a contrary intention in the articles of association. This interpretation is not however correct because the reason 
why the reference to the articles was deleted was because the Government was of the view that it was not necessary 
to state expressly that the provisions of the UK Companies Act of 2006 have effect notwithstanding anything in 
the company’s articles since, in any case, “the articles may not override the requirements set out in the Bill” (now 
the UK Companies Act of 2006) (see Hansard, May 2006, Volume No. 681, Part No. 142 at column 826, per Lord 
Sainsbury of Turville). See further Kershaw Company Law in Context 223; Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s 
Text, Cases and Materials in Company Law 300 and chapter 5 para 3.3.3 where this is discussed further. 
  
25 Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases and Materials in Company Law 301; Davies & Worthington 
Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 379; Hannigan Company Law 174. It also has the implication that the 
removal of a director by the shareholders may be done without special notice and without permitting the director 
to make representations to the general meeting (Browne and Another v Panga Pty Ltd and Another (1995) 120 
FLR 34; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 447; Worthington Sealy & 
Worthington’s Text, Cases and Materials in Company Law 301). 
 
26 Bourne “The Removal of Directors” 195; Griffin Company Law Fundamental Principles 287; Keay “Company 
Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders” 670; Dignam Hicks & Goo’s Cases and 
Materials on Company Law 332; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 447; 
Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases and Materials in Company Law 300; Davies & Worthington 
Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 379. 
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by the board of directors. This is similar to the prevailing position in Australia with regard to 
the removal of directors by the board of directors of private companies. 
 
An example of the board of directors removing a fellow director from office while acting under 
a power conferred on it by the articles of association is found in the UK case of Lee v Chou 
Wen Hsien.27 Article 73(d) of the company’s articles of association stated that the office of a 
director shall be vacated if “he is requested in writing by all his co-directors to resign”. Lee 
had become suspicious about certain perceived wrongdoings by the chairperson and managing 
director of the company. He requested that a board meeting be convened so that he could 
discuss his concerns with the board of directors. However, he subsequently received a notice 
signed by all his co-directors requesting him to resign immediately. The Privy Council held 
that the power given in article 73(d) of the articles of association of the company to directors 
to expel one of their number from the board was a fiduciary power, in the sense that each 
director concurring in the expulsion had to act in accordance with what he believed to be the 
best interests of the company.28 A director could not properly concur in the expulsion of a 
fellow board member for ulterior reasons of his own.29 But the court stated that it does not 
follow that such a notice will be void and of no effect or that the director sought to be removed 
will remain a director of the board, if one or more of the requesting directors had acted from 
an ulterior motive.30 In other words, bad faith on the part of any one director would not vitiate 
the notice to vacate office and leave in office the director whose removal was sought.31 The 
court reasoned that this was necessary in order to give business sense to article 73(d) of the 
articles of association of the company and to avoid uncertainty in the management of the 
company.32 Thus, even though the Privy Council found that the board of directors had acted 
                                                 
27 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. Section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948 applied at the time of this decision. The 
articles of association of companies could at that time also provide additional grounds for the removal of directors 
(see further chapter 2, para 4 where s 184(1) is discussed and Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern 
Company Law 379).  
 
28 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206. 
 
29 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206. 
 
30 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien (1984) [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206. 
 
31 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien (1984) [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206-1207. 
 
32 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1207. 
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with ulterior motives in removing Lee from the board of directors under article 73(d) of the 
company’s articles of association, it nevertheless held that his removal from office was valid.33  
 
Another example of the board of directors of a UK company removing a fellow director from 
office while acting under a power conferred on them by the articles of association of the 
company, emanates from Bersel Manufacturing Co Ltd and Another v Berry.34 Article 16(H) 
of the articles of association of the company stated that “the permanent life directors shall have 
power to terminate forthwith the directorship of any of the ordinary directors by notice in 
writing”. Berry and his wife were the two permanent life directors of the company. When 
Berry’s wife died the question arose whether this power was still exercisable by Berry on his 
own or whether the power had to be exercised jointly. The House of Lords held that this power 
did not vest in life directors as recipients of a joint confidence,35 and that there was no reason 
why the power of removal should not survive to the other when it is lost by one of two joint 
holders.36 Accordingly Berry was entitled to exercise the power under article 16(H) of the 
company’s articles of association to terminate the directorship of his daughter-in-law, who was 
an ordinary director.  
 
In Jackson v Dear37 article 88(e) of the articles of association of the company had conferred 
the power on all the directors of the company, acting together, to give notice to a director to 
vacate office, whereupon that directors’ office would be vacated. All the directors of the 
company were also shareholders of the company and were also subject to the terms of a 
shareholders’ agreement, in terms of which Jackson was to be appointed as a director of the 
company and over time, would continue to be re-appointed unless and until a termination event 
occurred. The power conferred on the directors by article 88(e) was not affected by any of the 
express terms of the agreement. This power was invoked by the directors of the company and 
a notice under article 88(e) of the articles of association of the company was served on Jackson 
                                                 
33 This case is critically discussed in chapter 4, para 4.1. 
 
34 [1968] 2 All ER 552 HL. The UK Companies Act of 1948 applied at the time of this decision. The articles of 
association of companies could at that time also provide additional grounds for the removal of directors (see 
further Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 379).  
 
35 Bersel Manufacturing Co Ltd and Another v Berry [1968] 2 All ER 552 HL at 554. 
 
36 Bersel Manufacturing Co Ltd and Another v Berry [1968] 2 All ER 552 HL at 555. 
 
37 2013 WL 617163. 
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to vacate office. The question before the court was whether it was an implied term of the 
shareholders’ agreement that Jackson would not be removed as a director. The Chancery 
Division found that such a term should be implied, but this ruling was overturned by the UK 
Court of Appeal. The shareholders’ agreement addressed the appointment and removal of 
directors by the parties to the agreement but it was silent on the parties’ powers under the 
articles of association of the company. The UK Court of Appeal held that in these 
circumstances the shareholders’ agreement did not have any effect on the power of removal 
under article 88(e) of the articles of association and to imply a term that it did would be an 
impermissible re-writing of the parties’ agreement.38 The UK Court of Appeal commented that 
when exercising the power to remove a board member, the directors must exercise this power 
in good faith in the interests of the company and in accordance with all the directors’ fiduciary 
duties to the company.39 
 
As is the case under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK Companies Act of 2006 
does not specify the grounds under which a director may be removed by the board of directors, 
should such a provision to this effect be included in the articles of association of the company. 
The procedures under which this must be done are not specified by the UK Companies Act of 
2006 either. This means that the methods of removing a director from office by the board of 
directors will vary from company to company, depending on the provisions of the constitution 
of each company. In Lee v Chou Wen Hsien40 and Jackson v Dear41 the relevant provision in 
the articles of association required all the directors on the board of directors to give a written 
notice requesting a director to vacate his office, but it seems that there is nothing to prevent a 
company from stating in its articles of association that only a simple majority of directors would 
be required to give such a notice.  
 
It is evident from the above examples in case law that the courts in the UK construe a provision 
in the constitution empowering the board of directors to remove a director from office strictly 
in accordance with its terms, and to treat the office of director as vacated once the event 
                                                 
38 Jackson v Dear 2013 WL 617163 paras 28-30. 
 
39 Jackson v Dear 2013 WL 617163 para 33. 
 
40 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
  
41 2013 WL 617163. 
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specified in the constitution occurs. While the respective courts in Jackson v Dear42 and Lee v 
Chou Wen Hsien43 had emphasised that the power to remove a board member is a fiduciary 
power and must be exercised by the board of directors in good faith in the interests of company, 
the Privy Council in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien44 nevertheless held that the removal of a director 
in circumstances where it was reasonably evident that the board of directors had acted with 
ulterior motives rather than to protect the best interests of the company, was valid.45  
 
2.4  Power of the Board of Directors to Remove Directors under the MBCA, the DGCL 
and Corporate Law Provisions of various USA States  
 
The MBCA does not provide for the board of directors to remove a director from office. It only 
makes provision for the removal of directors from office by the shareholders. In terms of 
section 8.08(a) of the MBCA a director may be removed by the shareholders with or without 
cause unless the articles of incorporation46 provide that directors may only be removed for 
cause. If a director was elected by a voting group of shareholders only the shareholders of that 
voting group may participate in the vote to remove him.47 A voting group of shareholders is a 
group of shareholders who have all agreed, by written agreement, to either appoint one person 
to vote for them as a group or that they will all vote together as one.48 A director may be 
                                                 
42 2013 WL 617163. 
  
43 [1984] 1 WLR 1202.  
 
44 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
  
45 The correctness of this decision is considered in chapter 4, para 4.1. 
 
46 In the USA a distinction is drawn between the articles of incorporation, also known as the certificate of 
incorporation or the charter, and the by-laws. The articles of incorporation is a document filed with the Secretary 
of State by the individuals organising the corporation. The State then issues a certificate of incorporation that 
legally entitles a corporation to operate as a business within the State. The articles of incorporation set out a 
minimal amount of information which concerns primarily the corporation’s external relations with the State. For 
example, it describes the purpose of the corporation, the name and address of the corporation, and the share 
structure of the corporation. It also lists the names of the individuals who are acting as incorporators for the 
corporation, and may list the names of the individuals acting as initial directors for the corporation. The by-laws 
on the other hand contain the actual rules governing the management of the corporation and the internal 
relationships of the shareholders, directors and officers of the corporation. The by-laws are not filed with the 
Secretary of State because they are for the internal use of the corporation only. The certificate of incorporation 
usually identifies whether the directors or the shareholders or both have the competence to change the by-laws 
(Ferber Corporation Law 31-32; Cox & Hazen Corporations 51-60). 
 
47 Section 8.08(b) of the MBCA. 
 
48 Ferber Corporation Law 41. 
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removed by the shareholders only at a meeting called for the purpose of removing that director, 
and the meeting notice must state that removal of the director is a purpose of the meeting.49  
 
Special requirements apply to the removal of directors elected by cumulative voting. 
Cumulative voting as described in section 7.28(c) of the MBCA is where the shareholders are 
entitled to multiply the number of votes they are entitled to cast (based on the number of shares 
held by the shareholders) by the number of directors for whom they are entitled to vote and 
cast the product for a single candidate or distribute the product among two or more candidates. 
By casting all of the shareholder’s votes for a single candidate or a limited number of candidates 
a minority shareholder’s voting power may be enhanced and such shareholder may be able to 
elect one or more directors. For example, if four vacancies have to be filled each share may be 
voted four times for one individual to fill one position instead of casting one vote per share for 
each of the four positions. A person holding one hundred shares may cast four hundred votes 
in favour of one candidate or may distribute the votes in favour of one or more persons for the 
four vacancies.50 By focusing all their votes on one candidate a group of minority shareholders 
would be able to ensure that they are represented on the board. Cumulative voting thus ensures 
minority shareholder representation on the board of directors, and favours minority 
shareholders when all of the minority shareholders agree to vote all of their shares for the same 
director.51 If there is no cumulative voting then there usually will be one vote per share and 
directors will be elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the 
election of the directors.52 Under the MBCA shareholders do not have a right to cumulate their 
                                                 
49 Section 8.08(d) of the MBCA. 
 
50 See Cox & Hazen Corporations 349. 
 
51 Hupp “Corporations: Officers and Directors: Relationship between Cumulative Voting and Removal 
Provisions” 745; Hoffman “Status of Shareholders and Directors under New York’s Business Corporation Law: 
A Comparative View” 520; Burbury “The Role of the Board of Directors in the Closely Held Corporation: A 
Comparative Assessment of Recent Legislation” 65; Dalebout “Cumulative Voting for Corporation Directors: 
Majority Shareholders in the Role of a Fox Guarding a Hen House” 1199; Sirodoeva-Paxson “Judicial Removal 
of Directors: Denial of Directors’ License to Steal or Shareholders’ Freedom to Vote?” 121; Ferber Corporation 
Law 110-111. 
 
52 Section 7.28(a) of the MBCA. The straight voting method permits a shareholder to cast only the number of 
votes he has, as determined by the shares he holds, for each director position to be filled (Striegel “Cumulative 
Voting, Yesterday and Today: The July, 1986 Amendments to Ohio’s General Corporation Law” 1266; Dalebout 
“Cumulative Voting for Corporation Directors: Majority Shareholders in the Role of a Fox Guarding a Hen 
House” 1201-1202). 
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votes for directors unless the articles of incorporation so provide.53 In the leading case of Bruch 
v National Guarantee Credit Corp54 the court asserted as follows: 
 
“The law does not look with disfavor on the policy of securing to minority stockholders 
a right of representation on the board of directors. This is the reason for the provision 
allowing cumulative voting. This policy would be endangered, if directors could pursue 
amotion proceedings55 against a fellow director.” 
 
Under section 8.08(c) of the MBCA, if cumulative voting is not authorised, a director may be 
removed from office by the shareholders if the number of votes cast to remove him exceeds 
the number of votes cast not to remove the director from office, except to the extent that the 
articles of incorporation or by-laws require a greater number. If cumulative voting is authorised 
by the articles of incorporation, a director may not be removed from office if the number of 
votes sufficient to elect him under cumulative voting are voted against his removal. In other 
words, under cumulative voting, a director may be removed from office only if the votes cast 
in favour of retaining the director would not have been sufficient to elect the director pursuant 
to cumulative voting. This provision ensures that the minority shareholders with sufficient 
votes to guarantee the election of a director under cumulative voting will be able to protect that 
director from removal by the remaining shareholders.56  
 
In line with the approach adopted under the MBCA, under the common law of Delaware, 
directors do not have the power to remove a fellow board member.57 Like the MBCA, the 
DGCL does not make any provision for the board of directors to remove a director from office. 
Section 141(k) of the DGCL makes provision for a director or the entire board of directors to 
be removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to 
                                                 
53 Section 7.28(b) of the MBCA. 
 
54 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922) at 741. 
 
55 Under the USA common law “amotion” refers to the act of removing a director from office for cause before the 
expiry of the term for which he was appointed (see Matter of Koch 257 N.Y. 318 (1931) at 321-322). 
 
56 See Model Business Corporation Act with Official Comments and Reporter’s Annotations 8-80. Section 8.08(c) 
of the MBCA essentially acts to prevent the majority shareholders from abusing their power by removing by 
majority vote those directors who were elected by the minority shareholders by means of cumulative voting 
(Dalebout “Cumulative Voting for Corporation Directors: Majority Shareholders in the Role of a Fox Guarding a 
Hen House” 1221-1222). 
 
57 See for example the leading cases of Bruch v National Guarantee Credit Corp 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922); Dillon 
v Berg 326 F Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971) and Kurz v Holbrook 989 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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vote at an election of directors, unless the board of directors is classified or certain directors 
are elected by shareholders using cumulative voting.58  
 
Notably, the DGCL does not expressly prohibit directors from removing other directors. It is 
not clear whether the power to remove directors in Delaware may be conferred on the board of 
directors by the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws of the company,59 as is provided for 
under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 and the UK Companies Act of 2006. In Bruch 
v National Guarantee Credit Corp60 the Delaware Court of Chancery left open the possibility 
that such authority could be inserted into the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws, on the 
basis that this question was not before the court. Nevertheless, the courts in Delaware do not 
look favourably on granting directors the power to remove a director from office and regard 
the right to remove a director to be a “fundamental element of stockholder authority.”61 
 
In Bruch v National Guarantee Credit Corp62 the general manager of the company had 
complained to the board of directors that a particular director had been guilty of embezzlement. 
                                                 
58 Prior to 1974 Delaware law did not expressly deal with the removal of directors at all. With the enactment of 
s 141(k) of the DGCL in 1974 this policy against removing directors from office was modified (see further Collins 
“Choice of Corporate Domicile: California or Delaware?” 137). There are three exceptions to the general rule that 
the board of directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the majority of the shareholders. The first 
exception, in terms of s 141(k)(1) of the DGCL, is that where a corporation has a classified board and the certificate 
of incorporation does not provide otherwise, the shareholders may remove directors only for cause. A board is 
considered to be classified if the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws of the company divide the directors 
into three classes with the term of office of those of the first class to expire at the first annual meeting held after 
such classification becomes effective, the term of office of those of the second class to expire one year thereafter, 
and of the third class to expire two years thereafter (see s 141(d) of the DGCL). A classified board is thus one 
which has multiple classes of directors with staggered terms of service, in contrast to a board having a single class 
of directors with no staggered terms. Accordingly, in a classified board every director would not stand for re-
election every year. If a shareholder wishes to remove a director on a board which is classified, cause for the 
removal must be shown. The second exception to the general rule contained in s 141(k) of the DGCL, is that 
where the certificate of incorporation authorises cumulative voting and less than the entire board is to be removed, 
a director may not be removed without cause if the votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to elect him 
if cumulatively voted at an election of the entire board or at an election of a class of directors which includes him 
(see s 141(k)(2) of the DGCL). The third exception is that where the holders of a class or series of shares are 
entitled by the certificate of incorporation to elect one or more directors, the power to remove without cause a 
director so elected inures to the holders of that class of series only and not to the holders of the outstanding shares 
as a whole (s 141(d)(k) of the DGCL). 
 
59 See Brown “Kurz v Holbrook: Shareholder voting, Omnibus Proxies and the Role of DTC: The Authority of 
the Board to Remove Directors” (2010) available at http://www.theracetothebottom.org/shareholder-rights/kurz-
v-holbrook-shareholder-voting-omnibus-proxies-and-the-r-4.html (accessed on 29 June 2016). 
 
60 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922) at 741. 
 
61 Rohe v Reliance Training Network, Inc. CA No 17992 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2000) para 11.  
 
62 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922). 
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Without giving the director in question an opportunity to be heard, the board of directors passed 
a resolution removing him from office. At the trial, the director denied all charges or 
intimations of embezzlement against him. The Delaware Court of Chancery declared that the 
various powers which a corporation may exercise are distributed among the directors, officers 
and shareholders, but the power to remove a director rests with the shareholders and not the 
board of directors.63 In overturning the decision to remove the director from office, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery proclaimed that:  
 
 “To allow directors to frame charges against one of their fellows and then to try and expel 
him, would open the door to possibilities of fraud which designing men might use to wrest 
control of corporate affairs from the stockholders or their sympathetic representatives on 
the board, and transfer it to those who might seek to grasp the corporation for their own 
ends.”64 
 
In Dillon v Berg65 a director (Berg) had obtained an undated resignation letter from another 
director (Power) as a quid pro quo for allowing Power’s uncontested re-election to the board 
of directors. The undated resignation letter was worded to take effect immediately. Power 
subsequently had second thoughts concerning the undated resignation letter and withdrew that 
letter by means of a written letter sent to Berg and to the other board members. When Berg 
learnt of Power’s wish to withdraw the undated resignation letter, he dated Power’s resignation 
letter to a date prior to Power’s letter withdrawing his resignation letter, and circulated the 
dated resignation letter to the board of directors. The District Court for the District of Delaware 
held that the agreement giving Berg the authority to remove Power at any time without cause 
was void and unenforceable.66 The purported resignation of Power could consequently be given 
no force and effect.67 The court found that an agreement that purported to permit the board of 
directors to remove a director was contrary to public policy.68 The court ruled that to allow the 
                                                 
63 Bruch v National Guarantee Credit Corp 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922) at 741. 
 
64 Bruch v National Guarantee Credit Corp 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922) at 741. 
 
65 326 F Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971). 
 
66 Dillon v Berg 326 F Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971) at 1224. 
 
67 Dillon v Berg 326 F Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971) at 1225. 
 
68 Dillon v Berg 326 F Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971) at 1225. 
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board of directors to remove one of its members at any time without cause would violate 
shareholder rights, Delaware statutes and public policy.69  
 
In Kurz v Holbrook,70 the Delaware Court of Chancery reiterated the rule that in Delaware a 
director may not be removed from office by his fellow directors. In this case the court struck 
down a proposed by-law that attempted to reduce the size of the board on the basis of its 
potential for directors to remove other directors by shrinking the size of the board. The 
Delaware Court of Chancery noted as follows: 
 
 “If a bylaw amendment reducing the size of a board could eliminate sitting directors, then 
directors suddenly would have the power to remove other directors. For 89 years, 
Delaware law has barred directors from removing other directors. Bruch v. Nat'l Guar. 
Credit. Corp., 116 A. 738, 741 (Del.Ch.1922); accord Robert Pennington, Pennington on 
Delaware Corporations 117 (1925) (“A director being an officer chosen by the 
stockholders cannot be removed by his fellow directors.”).  In 1974, when the 
stockholders' power to remove directors was confirmed and addressed through the 
adoption of Section 141(k), two leading authorities on the DGCL wrote that “by negative 
implication intended by the draftsmen, directors do not have the authority to remove other 
directors.” S. Samuel Arsht & Lewis S. Black, The 1974 Amendments To The Delaware 
Corporation Law 378 (1974). I do not believe the DGCL contemplates a bylaw 
amendment could overturn this rule.”71 
 
The approaches in the MBCA and the DGCL represent the most common approaches to the 
removal of directors in the USA. As the Supreme Court of Indiana pointed out in Murray v 
Conseco Inc.72 most USA States reserve the power to remove a member of the board to the 
shareholders who elected the director. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Murray v Conseco Inc73 
found that thirty nine USA States, by its count, made no allowance for board removal of 
directors, with many States having simply adopted verbatim section 8.08 of the MBCA. There 
are differences between the laws of the different States of the USA. Approximately thirteen 
                                                 
69 Dillon v Berg 326 F Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971) at 1225. 
 
70 Kurz v Holbrook 989 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 
71 Kurz v Holbrook 989 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 2010) para 157. 
 
72 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2003) at 456. 
 
73 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) at 46. 
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USA States do empower the board of directors to remove directors from office in certain 
circumstances.74  
 
For instance, section 706(a) of the New York Business Corporation Law75 empowers the board 
of directors to remove fellow board members for cause, but only when the certificate of 
incorporation or a by-law adopted by the shareholders makes provision for the board of 
directors to remove a fellow board member. Section 706(a) of the New York Business 
Corporation Law states as follows:  
 
 “Any or all of the directors may be removed for cause by vote of the shareholders. The 
certificate of incorporation or the specific provisions of a by-law adopted by the 
shareholders may provide for such removal by action of the board, except in the case of 
any director elected by cumulative voting, or by the holders of the shares of any class or 
series, or holders of bonds, voting as a class, when so entitled by the provisions of the 
certificate of incorporation.” 
 
Section 7-1.2-805 of the Rhode Island Business Corporation Act76 emulates section 706(a) of 
the New York Business Corporation Law. Section 14A:6-6(3) of the New Jersey Business 
Corporation Act77 also adopts a similar stance to that of the New York Business Corporation 
Law with regard to the removal of directors by board members. This section provides that the 
certificate of incorporation or a by-law adopted by the shareholders may provide that the board 
shall have the power to remove directors for cause and to suspend directors pending a final 
determination that cause exists for removal. Again, the board of directors may remove fellow 
board members only if the shareholders have empowered the directors to do so. Section 48-18-
108(d) of the Tennessee Business Corporation Act likewise provides that directors may be 
removed for cause by a vote of the entire board of directors if so provided by the charter (which 
is the equivalent of the certificate of incorporation).  
 
                                                 
74 These are Ohio, California, Alaska, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Missouri, Minnesota, North Dakota, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Indiana. 
 
75 The New York Business Corporation Law is the primary corporation statute in the State of New York. 
 
76 This provision is codified in Title 7 (Corporations, Associations and Partnerships), Chapter 7-1.2 (Rhode Island 
Business Corporation Act) of the Rhode Island General Laws. 
 
77 This provision is codified in Title 14A (Corporations, General) of the New Jersey Revised Statutes. 
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While New York, Rhode Island, New Jersey and Tennessee permit the board of directors to 
remove directors from office if empowered to do so by the articles of incorporation or the by-
laws, the Minnesota Business Corporation Act,78 under section 302A.223(2), and the North 
Dakota Business Corporation Act,79 under section 10-19.1-41, empower the board of directors 
to remove fellow board members unless this power is modified by the articles of incorporation, 
the by-laws or a shareholder control agreement. In other words, the board’s power to remove 
directors from office is subject to modification by the articles of incorporation, the by-laws or 
a shareholder control agreement.80 Section 23-1-33-8(a) of the Indiana Business Corporation 
Law81 also empowers the board of directors to remove directors unless the articles of 
incorporation provide otherwise. Likewise, section 1726(b) of the Pennsylvania Business 
Corporation Law82 permits the board of directors to remove directors from office under certain 
specified grounds, unless provided otherwise in a by-law adopted by the shareholders.  These 
grounds are (i) the director has been judicially declared of unsound mind; or (ii) has been 
convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than one year; or (iii) 
for any other proper cause which the by-laws may specify; or (iv) if, within sixty days or such 
other time as the by-laws may specify after notice of his selection, he does not accept the office 
either in writing or by attending a meeting of the board of directors and fulfill such other 
requirements of qualification as the by-laws may specify. 
 
2.5  Evaluation of Section 71(3) of the Companies Act 
 
Section 71(3) of the (South African) Companies Act is unique compared to the equivalent 
provisions in the foreign jurisdictions reviewed in that the board’s power to remove fellow 
board members is an unalterable provision. Most USA States, including the State of Delaware, 
have not conferred on the board of directors the power to remove fellow board members. Of 
                                                 
78 The Minnesota Business Corporation Act is codified in chapter 302A (Business Corporations) of the Minnesota 
Statutes. 
 
79 The North Dakota Business Corporation Act is codified in chapter 10-19.1, Title 10 (Corporations) of the North 
Dakota Century Code. 
 
80 See further Archerd & Scallen “A Comparison of Minnesota and Delaware Business Corporation Statutes” 164. 
 
81 Section 23-1-33-8 is codified in Title 23 (Business and Other Associations) of the Indiana Code, Article 1 
(Indiana Business Corporation Law), Chapter 33 (Board of Directors Generally). 
 
82 This provision is codified in Title 15 (Corporations and Unincorporated Associations), Chapter 17 (Officers, 
Directors and Shareholders) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. 
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those USA States which have conferred on the board of directors the power to remove fellow 
board members, the majority have made such power alterable and not mandatory,83 in that the 
board of directors may remove fellow board members only if the articles of incorporation or 
the by-laws make provision for this to be done, or, alternatively, the board of directors may 
remove fellow board members unless the articles of incorporation or the by-laws provide 
otherwise. The UK Companies Act of 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 have 
adopted similar positions with regard to the removal of directors by the board of directors in 
that the board of directors may remove directors only if empowered to do so by the constitution 
of the company. It is submitted that there is merit in permitting the board of directors to remove 
fellow board members,84 and, provided the board of directors acts openly and there are 
acceptable safeguards against abuse of the power to remove fellow board members, this power 
ought to remain in the (South African) Companies Act. The question, however, arises whether 
this power should be a mandatory power or whether section 71(3) of the Companies Act ought 
                                                 
83 The States of Massachusetts and Missouri are exceptions because they have made the power of removal by the 
board of directors a mandatory power and not an alterable power in that a corporation is not authorised to limit or 
eliminate this power in its articles of incorporation or by-laws. The provisions of these statutes differ from s 71(3) 
of the (South African) Companies Act in substantial respects. In terms of s 8.08(d) of the Massachusetts Business 
Corporation Act Chapter 156D (which Chapter is codified in Part I (Administration of the Government) Title 22 
(Corporations) of the Massachusetts General Laws) directors may be removed for cause by vote of the greater of 
(i) a majority of the directors then in office or (ii) the number of directors required by the articles of organization 
or by-laws to take action under s 8.24 of the Massachusetts Business Corporation Act Chapter 156D (dealing with 
quorum and voting). This provision differs from s 71(3) in that if a director is elected by a voting group of 
shareholders only the directors elected by that voting group may participate in the vote to remove him. In contrast, 
s 71(3) of the Companies Act does not have this safeguard and under s 71(3) of the Companies Act all the directors 
may participate in the vote to remove a fellow board member, regardless of who appointed that director to the 
board of directors. Section 351.317 of the Missouri General Business Corporation Law (which Chapter 351 
(General and Business Corporations) is codified in Title 23 (Corporations Associations and Partnerships) of the 
Missouri Revised Statutes) states that a director of the corporation may be removed for cause by the action of a 
majority of the entire board of directors if at the time of removal the director has failed to meet the qualifications 
stated in the articles of incorporation or by-laws for election as a director or is in breach of any agreement between 
such director and the corporation relating to such director’s services as a director or employee of the corporation. 
This provision also does not authorise corporations to limit or eliminate this power in their articles of incorporation 
or by-laws. It differs from s 71(3) of the Companies Act in that a majority of the entire board of directors is 
required to vote on the removal of the director and not merely a majority of the directors forming a quorum. This 
is discussed further in para 8.1 below. 
  
84 See chapter 2, para 5.1 where this is discussed. 
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to, in line with the foreign jurisdictions considered, make the conferral of power on the board 
of directors to remove fellow board members an alterable power. This is discussed below.  
 
3. DIRECTORS TO WHOM THE BOARD’S POWER OF REMOVAL OF 
DIRECTORS APPLIES  
 
The question arises whether the power conferred on the board of directors by section 71(3) of 
the Companies Act to remove fellow board members enables the board to remove any director 
from office, or whether the board of directors may remove from office only those directors 
whom it has appointed to office. Section 71(3) of the Companies Act does not make any 
distinction regarding whether directors may remove only directors appointed by them or 
whether they may also remove directors appointed by the shareholders. The provision boldly 
states that the board “may remove a director” from office.  It must follow that under section 
71(3) of the Companies Act removal rights do not follow appointment rights and that the board 
of directors is empowered to remove from office any director, regardless of who had appointed 
that director to the board of directors. In contrast, it is debatable whether shareholders may 
remove from office directors who were appointed by the directors or by a person named in, or 
determined in terms of, the Memorandum of Incorporation pursuant to section 66(4)(a)(i) of 
the Companies Act, or whether they may remove only those directors who were appointed by 
them in an election of directors. 85 
 
                                                 
85 Section 71(1) of the Companies Act states that a director may be removed by an ordinary resolution adopted at 
a shareholders’ meeting by the “persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director”. The 
implication of these words is that only the shareholders or persons entitled to vote in an election of a particular 
director are entitled to vote on a shareholders’ resolution to remove that director from office. On a strict literal 
interpretation of these words, if a director were appointed to the board of director by other directors or by a person 
named in the Memorandum of Incorporation, the shareholders would not have the power to remove that director 
from office by an ordinary resolution (see FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 160 and R Cassim 
“Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 442). An alternative 
interpretation of these words is that they do not restrict the power of shareholders to remove directors who are 
appointed by the board of directors or by a person named in the Memorandum of Incorporation because these 
words are intended to be interpreted in a general sense only, so as to refer to persons who would be entitled to 
exercise voting rights if that director were to be elected, in a general election of that director (R Cassim 
“Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 442). It is arguable 
that if the legislature had intended to restrict the power of shareholders to remove only those directors whom they 
have elected it would have stated in s 71(1) of the Companies Act “persons entitled to exercise voting rights in 
the election of that director” (emphasis added), or the legislature would have made it much clearer that directors 
appointed by the board of directors or other persons named in the Memorandum of Incorporation may not be 
removed by the shareholders (R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law 442). For instance, s 8.08(b) of the MBCA provides that if “a director is elected by 
a voting group of shareholders, only the shareholders of that voting group may participate in the vote to remove 
that director.” A voting group of shareholders is a group of shareholders who have all agreed, by written 
agreement, to either appoint one person to vote for them as a group or that they will all vote together as one (Ferber 
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Notably, section 66(4)(a)(i) states that a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may 
provide for the “direct appointment and removal” of one or more directors by any person who 
is named in, or determined in terms of, the Memorandum of Incorporation. Accordingly, the 
Memorandum of Incorporation may provide for the removal of a director by a specific person 
named therein. Nevertheless, since section 71(3) of the Companies Act does not make any 
distinction regarding the director whom the board of directors may remove from office, it 
appears that the board of directors is empowered to remove from office the director so 
appointed by the person named in the Memorandum of Incorporation.  
 
In sharp contrast, those USA States which permit directors to remove fellow board members, 
distinguish between directors who were appointed by the board of directors and those who 
were appointed by the shareholders. Thus, under section 706(a) of the New York Business 
Corporation Law the board of directors may not be empowered by the certificate of 
incorporation or a by-law to remove a director elected by cumulative voting. Furthermore, 
where the certificate of incorporation empowers a director to be elected by the holders of the 
shares of a class or series,86 or holders of bonds voting as a class, the board of directors may 
not be empowered by the certificate of incorporation or a by-law adopted by the shareholders 
to remove fellow board members. These two exceptions are designed to protect minority 
shareholders and director representatives of a specific class of shares. Section 7-1.2-805(a) of 
the Rhode Island Business Corporation Act also protects minority shareholders by not 
                                                 
Corporation Law 41). Here the legislature has made it patently clear that if a director is elected by a specific 
voting group of shareholders who agreed to vote together as one, then only those shareholders, and no other 
shareholders, may remove that director from office. (The MBCA does not empower the board of directors to 
remove fellow board members.) Such clarity is lacking in s 71(1) of the Companies Act, if it is indeed the intention 
of the legislature to restrict the removal of directors by shareholders to those directors who were appointed by 
shareholders in an election of directors. If shareholders were not empowered to remove from office a director 
appointed by the board of directors of whom they disapproved, this would be a gross violation of the right of 
shareholders to remove directors (FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 161). It is furthermore 
arguable that the words “despite anything to the contrary in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, 
or any agreement between a company and a director, or between any shareholder and a director” in s 71(1) of the 
Companies Act indicate that shareholders may remove a director by ordinary resolution despite any provision in 
the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company, such as a provision that only a person named in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation may remove a director (R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in 
FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 443). For these reasons it is submitted that the strict literal 
interpretation of the words “persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director” should not be 
adopted. See Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 38-39 who 
expresses the view that the shareholders’ power to remove directors is restricted to elected directors and Masinire 
“A Critical Analysis of the Role and Protection of Shareholders in the Removal of Directors in the South African 
Companies Act 71 of 2008” 1990-1991 for a discussion of the view expressed by Ncube. The matter must be 
clarified by the legislature or by the courts. 
 
86 Directors appointed by a class or series of shares are referred to as class directors. 
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permitting the board of directors to remove directors who were appointed by cumulative voting 
or by the holders of the shares of any class or series or holders of bonds voting as a class. 
 
Further examples of the USA States that protect minority shareholder representatives on the 
board from removal by the board of directors, are Minnesota and North Dakota. These States 
permit directors to remove from office only those directors who were appointed by the board, 
but not those elected by shareholders. In terms of section 302A.223(2) of the Minnesota 
Business Corporation Act and section 10-19.1-41 of the North Dakota Business Corporation 
Act directors may remove other directors, with or without cause, if the director was appointed 
by the board to fill a vacancy, the shareholders have not elected directors in the interval between 
the time of appointment to fill a vacancy and the time of removal, and a majority of the directors 
approve the removal. Under this provision a director appointed by the shareholders would not 
be subject to removal by the board. The rationale behind this provision is that if a director were 
appointed by the board of directors then his authority as a director flows directly from the other 
directors and those other directors have the power to terminate that authority. The same 
rationale was relied on by the Court of Chancery of Delaware in Bruch v National Guarantee 
Credit Corp87 where the court proclaimed that the power to remove a director must be exercised 
by the power that elected the director.88  
 
The Indiana Business Corporation Law also protects directors from removal by the board of 
directors if they were appointed by a particular group of shareholders. Section 23-1-33-8(a) of 
the Indiana Business Corporation Law states that directors may be removed in any manner 
provided in the articles of incorporation. The provision states further that shareholders or 
directors may remove one or more directors with or without cause unless the articles of 
incorporation provide otherwise. The limitation on the power of the board to remove a fellow 
director is contained in section 23-1-33-8(b) of the Indiana Business Corporation Law which 
provides that if a director is elected by a voting group of shareholders, only the shareholders of 
that voting group may participate in the vote to remove the director.89 Section 23-1-33-8(b) of 
                                                 
87 116 Atl 738 (Ch.1922) at 741. 
 
88 In terms of s 141(k) of the DGCL if shareholders of a particular class are empowered by the certificate of 
incorporation to elect a director, only the shareholders of that class may vote on the resolution to remove that 
director.  
 
89 A voting group of shareholders is a group of shareholders who have all agreed, by written agreement, to either 
appoint one person to vote for them as a group or that they will all vote together as one (Ferber Corporation Law 
41). 
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the Indiana Business Corporation Law would be applicable only where a director is elected by 
a separate voting group of shareholders but has no application to a director elected by all of the 
shareholders.90 Section 23-1-33-8(b) is designed to preserve representation on the board by a 
voting group and protects the rights of minority shareholders to representation on the board of 
directors.91 
 
In Murray v Conseco Inc,92 Murray, a director of Conseco Inc., had been removed by the board 
of directors. The company had one class of common stock and a series of preferred shares that 
had voting rights. Conseco Inc. had no shareholders that were elected by a separate voting 
group. Murray nevertheless reasoned that the shareholders as a body are a voting group who 
elected him as a director, and by reason of section 23-1-33-8(b) of the Indiana Business 
Corporation Law only the shareholders, and not the board of directors, were authorised to 
remove him from office. The Supreme Court of Indiana held that the words “elected by a voting 
group” in section 23-1-33-8(b) refer to groups that elect separate directors, and do not apply to 
directors elected by a voting group consisting of all voting shares voting generally.93 In other 
words, the court held that all the shareholders as such do not constitute a voting group, and that 
the board was accordingly empowered to remove Murray from office. 
 
In many USA States cumulative voting is permissible if so stated in the articles of incorporation 
or the by-laws and in a few USA States cumulative voting is mandatory. Many of the USA 
States which allow the board of directors to remove directors from office have provisions in 
their respective statutes designed to protect directors who were elected by cumulative voting.94 
The (South African) Companies Act on the other hand does not make express provision for 
cumulative voting. Section 68(2)(b) of the Companies Act states that in any election of 
directors, in each vote to fill a vacancy each voting right entitled to be exercised may be 
exercised once. It should be noted, however, that section 68(2)(b) of the Companies Act is an 
                                                 
90 Murray v Conseco Inc. 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2003) at 459. 
 
91 Murray v Conseco Inc. 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2003) at 458-459 and 460. 
 
92 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2003). 
 
93 Murray v Conseco Inc. 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2003) at 459. 
 
94 For instance, as discussed, New York and Rhode Island do not permit the board of directors to remove fellow 
board members where the directors were elected with cumulative voting.   
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alterable provision and that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a profit company may alter 
section 68(2)(b) of the Companies Act. In other words, the Memorandum of Incorporation of 
a profit company may provide that in an election of directors in each vote to fill a vacancy each 
voting right entitled to be exercised may be exercised more than once. In this way, a company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation may amend the default position and expressly make provision 
for cumulative voting. But the Companies Act has not imposed any legal safeguards to ensure 
that directors may not remove from office the director representatives of minority shareholders.  
 
As discussed earlier, several USA States that permit the board of directors to remove directors 
have made the directors’ power to remove directors an alterable power, either by providing that 
the board of directors may remove fellow board members only if empowered to do so by 
articles of incorporation or the by-laws, or by providing that the power of removal applies 
unless altered by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. Under both the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 and the UK Companies Act of 2006 directors may remove fellow 
board members only if empowered to do so by the constitution of the company. Section 71(3) 
of the (South African) Companies Act is unique in that the statutory power of the directors to 
remove directors is mandatory and the section does not distinguish between the directors 
appointed by the directors or by the shareholders, nor does it make any provision to protect the 
shareholder representatives, or the minority shareholder representatives, on the board of 
directors from removal by the board of directors. As discussed in chapter 2, the fact that a 
director is empowered to remove from office a director appointed by the shareholders, 
including a minority shareholder representative on the board, shifts the balance of power 
between the shareholders and the board of directors, and may impact on the dynamics between 
the majority and minority shareholders.95  
 
It is submitted that under the (South African) Companies Act the board of directors should be 
empowered to remove any director from office, including those directors appointed by the 
shareholders or a third party in terms of section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act. An advantage 
of permitting the board of directors to remove any director from office is that if a shareholder-
appointed director or a director appointed by a third party neglects his duty or is derelict in the 
performance of his functions or if any other valid ground for removal referred to in section 
                                                 
95 See chapter 2, para 5.1 where this is discussed. 
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71(3) of the Companies Act exists, the board would be empowered to remove the director in 
question from office, instead of having to rely on the shareholders or a third party, who may be 
reluctant to remove their representative from office, to do so.  
 
However, in order to balance the rights between the directors and shareholders, as required by 
section 7(i) of the Companies Act,96 it is submitted that the power to remove directors in section 
71(3) of the Companies Act should be an alterable power and not an unalterable power. More 
specifically, the provision should be an “opt-out” provision, in that the board’s power to 
remove a director should apply unless the company opts out of it by expressly so stipulating in 
its Memorandum of Incorporation. In other words, the wording of section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act should be preceded by the words “Except to the extent that the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.” The company would then be empowered 
to determine whether it wishes to retain the default provision under the Companies Act 
empowering the board of directors to remove fellow board members or whether to alter this 
default provision to suit its particular needs by negating, restricting, limiting, qualifying, or 
extending the board’s power to remove fellow board members. A company would also be 
empowered to insert in its Memorandum of Incorporation provisions protecting the minority 
shareholder representatives on the board of directors, should this be deemed necessary based 
on the company’s specific needs and requirements. 
 
For example, if the Memorandum of Incorporation under section 68(2)(b) of the Companies 
Act were to give shareholders more than one vote in electing directors so as to protect the 
minority shareholder representatives, then the Memorandum of Incorporation could also 
specifically restrict the power of the board of directors to remove directors elected by such 
shareholders. Another example would be if the Memorandum of Incorporation were to appoint 
a voting group to appoint a director, or a particular person to appoint a director under section 
66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act, under the “opt-out” provision a limitation to the board’s 
power of removal may be provided in that the Memorandum of Incorporation may provide that 
only the voting group or the person who appointed that director may remove him from office.  
 
If section 71(3) of the Companies Act were to be an alterable provision in the Companies Act 
it would bring the provision in line with the equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions 
                                                 
96 Section 7(i) of the Companies Act is discussed in chapter 2, para 7. 
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considered which do not make the board’s power to remove fellow board members 
compulsory, and which incorporate some protection for minority shareholder representatives 
on the board of directors. An alterable power of removal conferred on the board of directors, 
as opposed to a compulsory power of removal would also go some way in satisfying the 
requirement of section 7(i) of the Companies Act of balancing the rights and obligations of 
shareholders and directors within companies.  
 
4. COMPANIES TO WHICH THE BOARD’S POWER OF REMOVAL OF 
DIRECTORS APPLIES 
 
Section 71(3) of the Companies Act applies to companies with “more than two directors”, that 
is, it applies to companies with three or more directors. The types of companies to which section 
71(3) applies are discussed below.  
 
4.1  Private Companies and Personal Liability Companies 
 
The board of directors of a private company and a personal liability company must comprise 
at least one director.97 Under section 66(3) of the Companies Act a company’s Memorandum 
of Incorporation may specify a higher minimum number of directors. Section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act would not apply to private companies or personal liability companies if such 
companies do not have at least three directors on their board of directors. In this event, the 
provisions of section 71(8) of the Companies Act would apply to that company, in terms of 
which the removal of a director must be determined by the Companies Tribunal.  
 
It follows that a private company and a personal liability company would be able to control 
whether the board of directors of that company would be empowered to remove directors from 
office by controlling whether they appoint three or more directors to the board of directors. If 
the company wishes to exclude the provisions of section 71(3) of the Companies Act, it could 
do so by appointing only one or two directors to its board of directors. If it wishes for the 
provisions of section 71(3) to be applicable to the company, it could in that case ensure that at 
least three directors are appointed to the board of directors. It is important for private companies 
and personal liability companies to be aware of the consequences regarding the applicability 
                                                 
97 Section 66(2)(a) of the Companies Act. 
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of section 71(3) of the Companies Act when deciding on the number of directors to appoint to 
the board of directors.  
 
4.2  Non-profit Companies 
 
The board of directors of a non-profit company must comprise at least three directors.98 It 
follows that section 71(3) of the Companies Act applies to the removal of directors of non-
profit companies.  
 
Even though section 71(3) of the Companies Act refers to the term “shareholders” and not 
“members”, it follows from section 10(4) of the Companies Act that the provisions of section 
71(3) apply to the voting members of a non-profit company. Section 10(4) of the Companies 
Act states that in respect of a non-profit company that has voting members, a reference in the 
Companies Act to “a shareholder” is to be regarded as a reference to the voting members of a 
non-profit company. Where a non-profit company does not have members or does not have 
voting members, the provisions of section 71(3) must be read to refer to directors only.  
 
4.3  State-owned Companies 
 
The Companies Act does not specify the minimum number of directors that must comprise the 
board of directors of a state-owned company. However section 9(1) of the Companies Act 
states that any provision of the Companies Act which applies to a public company applies also 
to a state-owned company, except to the extent that the Minister has granted an exemption in 
terms of section 9(3) of the Companies Act. Section 66(2)(b) of the Companies Act provides 
that the board of directors of a public company must comprise at least three directors. From 
this one may deduce that the board of directors of a state-owned company must comprise at 
least three directors (save to the extent that the Minister has granted an exemption to this 
provision).  It follows that the provisions of section 71(3) of the Companies Act apply to the 
removal of directors of state-owned companies.  
 
                                                 
98 Section 66(2)(b) of the Companies Act. The minimum number of directors provided for in s 66(2) are in addition 
to the minimum number of directors that a company must have to satisfy any requirement in terms of the 
Companies Act or the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company to appoint an audit committee or a social 
and ethics committee. 
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It is important to be aware that state-owned companies are often governed by their own specific 
legislation as well as by the Companies Act. For example, the South African Airways SOC 
Limited is governed by the South African Airways Act 5 of 2007, the South African Post Office 
SOC Limited is governed by the South African Post Office SOC Ltd Act 22 of 2011, the 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa SOC Limited (“Armscor”) is governed by the 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited Act 51 of 2003 (“the Armscor Act”) and the 
South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited (“SABC”) is governed by the 
Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 (“the Broadcasting Act”).99 Conflicts over the removal of directors 
under the governing legislation of these state-owned companies and the removal of directors 
under the Companies Act can, and do, arise.  
 
Section 5(4) of the Companies Act states that if there is an inconsistency between a provision 
of the Companies Act and a provision of any other national legislation, the provisions of both 
Acts apply concurrently, to the extent that it is possible to apply and comply with one of the 
inconsistent provisions without contravening the second. To the extent that this is not possible, 
the Companies Act lists certain Acts which will supersede the Companies Act.100 In all other 
instances of conflict, the provisions of the Companies Act will prevail.101  
 
An example where the court managed to read the provisions of the Companies Act concurrently 
with a specific statute which applies to state-owned companies, is found in Minister of Defence 
                                                 
99 Section 1 of the Companies Act defines a “state-owned company” as an enterprise that is registered in terms of 
the Companies Act as a company and either (i) is listed as a public entity in Schedule 2 or 3 of the Public Finance 
Management Act 1 of 1999; or (ii) is owned by a municipality, as contemplated in the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, and is otherwise similar to an enterprise referred to in (i) above. The above-
mentioned entities are listed in Schedule 2 (Major Public Entities) of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 
1999.  
 
100 See s 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. These Acts are the Auditing Profession Act 26 of 2005, the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000, the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, the Securities Services Act 36 of 2000, 
which has since been repealed and replaced by the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, the Banks Act 94 of 1990, 
the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 and s 8 of the National Payment System 
Act 78 of 1998. 
 
101 Section 5(4)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. Two exceptions apply in this regard. The first is that if there is a 
conflict between a provision of Chapter 8 of the Companies Act (Regulatory Agencies and Administration of the 
Companies Act) and a provision of the Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation 103 of 1994) the provisions of the 
latter Act will prevail. The other exception is that if there is a conflict between any provision of Part B of Chapter 
5 (Authority of the Takeover Regulation Panel, Part C of Chapter 5 (Regulation of affected transactions and offers) 
or the Takeover Regulations and any provision of another public regulation, the conflicting provisions apply 
concurrently to the extent that it is possible to apply and comply with one of the inconsistent provisions without 
contravening the second. To the extent that this is not possible, the provisions of the other public regulation will 
prevail (see ss 5(4)(b)(ii), 5(5) and 118(4) of the Companies Act). 
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and Military Veterans v Motau and Others.102  The Armscor Act governs the affairs of 
Armscor, which is a state-owned entity.103 The State is the sole shareholder of Armscor and 
exercises ownership control of Armscor through the Minister of Defence and Military 
Veterans.104 Armscor’s affairs are managed by its board of directors, consisting of nine non-
executive members and two executive members.105 
 
The facts of this case are that the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans terminated the 
membership of two members of the board of directors of Armscor, in terms of section 8(c) of 
the Armscor Act. Section 8(c) of this statute provides that a member of the board must vacate 
office if his services are terminated by the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans on good 
cause shown. The membership of these two board members was terminated after they failed to 
attend various board meetings arranged by the Minister. The two directors who had been 
removed from office applied to the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, to set aside the 
Minister’s decision on the ground that it was unlawful, unconstitutional and invalid, and had 
not complied with the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2008.  The court a quo 
found that the Minister’s dismissal power constituted administrative action, and that she had 
failed to comply with the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2008.106 The court 
consequently granted judgment in favour of the two directors who had been removed from 
office. On appeal by the Minister to the Constitutional Court, the question before the court was 
whether the dismissal power of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans comprised 
administrative action or whether it was executive action. If it comprised executive action, the 
further question before the court was whether the Minister was required to comply with the 
procedures for the removal of directors laid down in sections 71(1) and (2) of the Companies 
Act.  
 
                                                 
102 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC). 
 
103 Armscor was incorporated primarily to provide South Africa’s armed services with military material, 
equipment, facilities and services. It is the armament’s and technology procurement agency of the Department of 
Defence (see Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 3). 
 
104 Section 2(2) of the Armscor Act. 
 
105 Section 6(1) of the Armscor Act. 
 
106 See Motau and Another v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Another, unreported case no 
51258/13, North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, 18 September 2013.  
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The Constitutional Court confirmed that the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans is, for 
the purposes of section 71(1) and (2) of the Companies Act, the shareholder of Armscor.107 On 
the question whether the dismissal decision constituted administrative action or executive 
action, the majority judgment disagreed with the court a quo that the decision comprised 
administrative action. It held that the Minister’s power to dismiss directors was more executive, 
rather than administrative, in nature. This was because it was an adjunct of the power to 
formulate defence policy, it was a high-level power and not a low level bureaucratic power 
involving the application of policy, and the Minister was afforded a broad discretion in 
exercising the power, which indicated that it constituted performance of an executive function 
rather than the implementation of national legislation.108 On this basis the majority of the 
Constitutional Court found that the Minister’s power was not subject to review under the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2008.  
 
On the question whether there were any procedural constraints on the exercise of the Minister’s 
power in terms of section 8(c) of the Armscor Act, the Constitutional Court held that this 
provision must be read concurrently with sections 71(1) and (2) of the Companies Act. The 
court found that these two provisions are “perfectly compatible”109 in that the Armscor Act 
provides the substantive criterion while the Companies Act provides the process by which 
board members of Armscor may be dismissed. In other words, section 71(2) of the Companies 
Act is the prescribed procedure by which the Minister of Defence must exercise her power in 
terms of section 8(c) of the Armscor Act.110 The Constitutional Court accordingly held that the 
failure of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans to comply with the procedural 
requirements of sections 71(1) and (2) of the Companies Act in terminating the membership of 
the board members had rendered her actions unlawful.111  
                                                 
107 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 75. 
  
108 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) paras 47, 49 and 51. The 
minority judgment of the Constitutional Court held that the Minister’s decision in dismissing the three board 
members was administrative action, and not an exercise of executive power. For this reason the minority held that 
it was not necessary to determine whether s 71 of the Companies Act applied to this matter (para 128). An analysis 
whether the Minister’s dismissal power constitutes administrative action or executive action is beyond the scope 
of this study, but see Konstant “Administrative  Action and Procedural Fairness – Minister of Defence and Military 
Veterans v Motau” 492-498 for a discussion of this point. 
 
109 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 76. 
 
110 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 76. 
 
111 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) paras 77 and 80. The 
Constitutional Court did not, however, set aside the Minister’s decision and reinstate the two directors even though 
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In Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others112 the Constitutional Court 
read the Armscor Act and the Companies Act concurrently. It is not, however, always possible 
to read the Companies Act concurrently with a specific statute which regulates the affairs of a 
state-owned company. For example, in early 2015 three SABC board members were removed 
after the board of directors of the SABC had passed a vote of no confidence in them. The 
Minister of Communications subsequently endorsed these removals which had taken place 
under the Companies Act, and not the Broadcasting Act, which governs the affairs of the 
SABC.113 The question arose whether the removal of the three board members in terms of the 
Companies Act was valid, or whether the removal should have taken place under the provisions 
and the terms of the Broadcasting Act. The confusion in this matter arose because the 
Broadcasting Act explicitly regulates the procedural removal of board members of the SABC.   
 
Under section 15(1)(a) of the Broadcasting Act the “appointing body” may remove a “member” 
from office after due inquiry and upon due recommendation by the board of directors if such 
member is found guilty of misconduct or inability to perform his duties efficiently. The 
“appointing body” is the body charged with the appointment of members of the board in terms 
of section 13 of the Broadcasting Act.114 A “member” is defined in section 1 of the 
Broadcasting Act to mean executive and non-executive members of the board. The appointing 
body in terms of section 1 read with section 13 of the Broadcasting Act is the President acting 
on the advice of the National Assembly. The board of directors of the SABC is thus not 
                                                 
it found that the Minister had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Companies Act. The court 
found that in the exceptional circumstances of the case it would not be just and equitable to set aside the Minister’s 
decision and to reinstate the two directors. The court found that the Minister had substantively good and 
compelling reasons for terminating the membership of the two directors, and she had demonstrated good cause 
for the removal of the two directors (para 89). The court ruled that it was sufficient to declare that the Minister’s 
conduct was unlawful and to draw her attention to the proper procedure to be followed in dismissing directors of 
Armscor (para 86). This decision is discussed further in para 8.6 below. See also Wandrag “Governance of State-
owned Companies” in Loubser & Mahony Company Secretarial Practice 29-9-29-10. 
 
112 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC). 
 
113 See Merten “SABC mess now in Parliament’s care. Don’t hold your breath” (14 July 2016) available at 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-07-14-sabc-mess-now-in-parliaments-care.-dont-hold-your-
breath./#.WAYSvfl95hE (accessed on 27 September 2016). The three board members who had been removed 
from the SABC board had been opposed to the controversial permanent appointment of Hlaudi Motsoeneng as 
the chief operations officer of the SABC in July 2014, after the findings of the Public Protector that he had purged 
staff, irregularly boosted his salary and had made misrepresentations about having a matric certificate.  
 
114 Section 1 of the Broadcasting Act. 
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empowered to remove a director on its own, although it may make such a recommendation to 
the President, who has a discretion whether or not to remove the board member from office. 
Under section 15(1)(b) of the Broadcasting Act the appointing body must remove a board 
member after due inquiry by the National Assembly and the adoption of a resolution 
recommending the removal of the director in terms of section 15A of the Broadcasting Act. 
Under section 15A(1)(a) the National Assembly may, after due inquiry and by the adoption of 
a resolution, recommend the removal of a board member on account of misconduct, inability 
to perform the duties of his office efficiently, absence from three consecutive board meetings 
without the permission of the board (except on good cause shown), failure to disclose a conflict 
of interest in terms of section 17, or on the basis of a disqualification as contemplated in section 
16. In essence, a board member may be removed by the President under section 15(1)(a) (on 
the recommendation by the board of directors), but must be removed by the President (on the 
recommendation of a committee of the National Assembly) under section 15(1)(b) read with 
section 15A(1)(a).  
 
A legal opinion was sought from Parliament’s Constitutional and Legal Services division to 
advise the Portfolio Committee on the legality of the decision of the SABC Board. The legal 
opinion found that the Minister of Communications and the board of directors of the SABC 
had erred in law in applying the Companies Act instead of the Broadcasting Act to the removal 
of the directors.115 The legal opinion stated that the Broadcasting Act supersedes the 
Companies Act, and that any removal of an SABC board member that is not effected in line 
with the provisions of the Broadcasting Act is invalid and unlawful.116 The Minister of 
Communications, on the other hand, contended that the Companies Act took precedence over 
the Broadcasting Act when it came to governance matters concerning the SABC.117 The 
Portfolio Committee on Communications initially accepted the legal opinion that the removal 
of the three board members was unlawful. At a later stage however the Portfolio Committee 
                                                 
115 Mjenxane “Legal Opinion on Powers to Remove Board Members of the SABC” (24 March 2015) (reference 
number 31/15) available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/150526legal.pdf (accessed 
on 27 September 2016). 
 
116 Mjenxane “Legal Opinion on Powers to Remove Board Members of the SABC” (24 March 2015) (reference 
number 31/15) available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/150526legal.pdf (accessed 
on 27 September 2016). 
 
117 African News Agency “Muthambi rejects Parly’s legal opinion on SABC board” (23 June 2015) available at 
http://www.enca.com/south-africa/muthambi-rejects-parlys-legal-opinion-sabc-board (accessed on 27 September 
2016). 
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changed its mind and accepted that the removal of the board members under the Companies 
Act had been valid.118 In light of the fact that the three board members who had been removed 
had not lodged a formal dispute and complaint, the Portfolio Committee accepted the 
Minister’s argument and stated that it was satisfied that due process had been followed in 
removing the three directors under the provisions of the Companies Act, and the matter was 
officially closed.119 
 
As mentioned above, section 5(4) of the Companies Act states that if there is an inconsistency 
between a provision of the Companies Act and a provision of any other national legislation, 
the provisions of both Acts apply concurrently, to the extent that it is possible to apply and 
comply with one of the inconsistent provisions without contravening the second. To the extent 
that this is not possible, the Companies Act lists certain Acts the provisions of which override 
those of the Companies Act.120 In all other instances of conflict, the Companies Act would 
prevail.121 Since the provisions of the Broadcasting Act and the Companies Act on the removal 
of directors cannot be read concurrently, it is necessary to ascertain which legislation prevails. 
The Broadcasting Act is not listed in section 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act as one of the Acts 
that takes precedence over the Companies Act. On this basis, the provisions on the removal of 
directors in the Companies Act would prevail over the removal provisions in the Broadcasting 
Act. 
 
The confusion in this matter was ruled on by the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg in SOS 
Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation 
SOC Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South 
African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited and Others.122 The applicants sought a 
declaratory order that members of the SABC board could not be removed from office save in 
                                                 
118 Davis “SABC: ANC U-turn on Legal Opinion Undermines Rule of Law” (23 June 2015) available at 
https://www.da.org.za/2015/06/sabc-anc-u-turn-on-legal-opinion-undermines-rule-of-law/ (accessed on 27 
September 2016). 
 
119 Alan “Committee closes legal opinion on SABC board members” (24 June 2015) available at 
https://mycapetown.co.za/committee-closes-legal-opinion-on-sabc-board-members/ (accessed on 27 September 
2016). 
 
120 See note 100 above. 
 
121 Section 5(4)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
122 (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017). 
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compliance with sections 15(1), (2) and 15A of the Broadcasting Act, and an order setting aside 
the Minister’s removal of the directors from their positions as non-executive directors of the 
SABC. The High Court ruled that the removal provisions contained in section 71 of the 
Companies Act do not apply to the SABC board.123 It found that the removal processes 
prescribed under the Companies Act undermine the independence of the SABC board in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the Constitution.124 The court stated as follows: 
 
“The Broadcasting Act is not listed under section 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act, 
according, [sic] none of the provisions of the Broadcasting Act, is made applicable in the 
event of inconsistency with the Companies Act. This bridges [sic] section 7(2) and 16 of 
the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Companies Act are invalid to this 
extent.”125 
 
The court held that the requirement of an independent SABC is implied in the duty of the State 
under section 7(2) of the Constitution to protect and promote the rights in the Bill of Rights, 
including the right to freedom of expression and a free press, contained in section 16 of the 
Constitution.126 With regard to the infringement of section 16 of the Constitution, it was 
asserted by the court that this provision enshrines the right of the public, being the audience of 
the SABC, to be able to access information and ideas.127 The freedom to receive or impart 
                                                 
123 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 141. 
 
124 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 141. 
 
125 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 145. 
 
126 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 52. Section 7(2) 
of the Constitution requires the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. Section 
16 of the Constitution states that the right to freedom of expression includes the freedom of the press and other 
media; the freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; the freedom of artistic creativity, and academic 
freedom and freedom of scientific research. The court held further that s 39(2) of the Constitution requires it to 
interpret the Broadcasting Act in a manner that promotes the spirit, purpose and objects of the Bill of Rights, and 
to give effect to s 192 of the Constitution (para 137). Section 192 of the Constitution provides that national 
legislation must establish an independent authority to regulate broadcasting in the public interest, and to ensure 
fairness and a diversity of views broadly representing South African society.  
 
127 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 31.  
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information or ideas relates to the right of the SABC to communicate without interference and 
to the right of the public to have access to the broadcast media.128 On the basis that the SABC 
is the medium that should allow the free flow of ideas that is necessary for our democracy to 
function, the court held that the State must ensure that it has the necessary structural and 
operational independence.129 The court observed that the SABC board does not report to the 
Minister of Communications but to the National Assembly.130 The board is consequently meant 
to be strictly independent and is not required to work with other government agencies.131 For 
these reasons, the court found that the removal procedures under the Companies Act deny 
members of the SABC board security of tenure and thus undermine the independence of the 
SABC board in a manner that is inconsistent with the Constitution.132 
 
The court consequently declared that the members of the SABC board could not be removed 
from office save in compliance with sections 15(1), 15(2) and 15A of the Broadcasting Act.133 
It also set aside the removal of the two non-executive directors on the ground that the removals 
had been unlawfully effected under section 71 of the Companies Act, and not in accordance 
with the procedures set out in section 15 of the Broadcasting Act.134   
                                                 
128 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 31. 
 
129 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 52. 
 
130 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 48. 
 
131 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 48. 
 
132 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 141. 
 
133 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 146.  
 
134 SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited and Others (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017) para 146. The court 
did not however reinstate the two non-executive directors to their previous positions on the board, but it did not 
provide any reason for this decision. 
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While the court came to the conclusion that the Broadcasting Act prevails over the Companies 
Act on the basis of the applicability of the Constitution, it could have, in the alternative, reached 
this conclusion on the application of the common law principle of interpretation lex specialis 
derogat legi generali. This common law principle of interpretation states that when two laws 
govern the same factual situation a law governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis) 
supersedes a law which governs general matters only (lex generalis).135 Another way of stating 
this principle of interpretation which the court did not refer to is that general rules do not 
derogate from special ones.136 The rationale of this principle of interpretation is that when the 
legislature has given attention to a specific subject and has made special provisions for it, a 
subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with those special provisions unless 
it manifests that intention clearly.137 In Kent NO v South African Railways and Another138 the 
then Appellate Division formulated this rule of statutory construction by stating that statutes  
 
 “must be read together and the later one must not be so construed as to repeal the 
provisions of an earlier one, or to take away rights conferred by an earlier one unless the 
later Statute expressly alters the provisions of the earlier one in that respect or such 
alteration is a necessary inference from the terms of the later Statute. The inference must 
be a necessary one and not merely a possible one.” 
 
In Khumalo v Director-General of Co-operation and Development and Others139 and Sasol 
Synthetic Fuels (Pty) Ltd and Others v Lambert and Others140 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
approved the above formulation of this rule of statutory construction.141 The presumption falls 
                                                 
135 See R v Gwantshu 1931 EDL 29 at 31; Kent NO v South African Railways and Another 1946 AD 398 at 429-
30; Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 589 (A) at 603; S v Shangase and Others 1972 (2) SA 
410 (N) at 430; S v Hattingh 1978 (2) SA 826 (A) at 829; Consolidated Employers Medical Aid Society and Others 
v Leveton 1999 (2) SA 32 (SCA) at 40-41 and De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 79. 
 
136 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 79. 
 
137 Khumalo v Director-General of Co-operation and Development and Others 1991 (1) SA 158 (A) at 164 and 
Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation of Statutes, Contracts and Wills 369. 
 
138 1946 AD 398 at 405. 
 
139 1991 (1) SA 158 (A) at 164-165. 
 
140 2002 (2) SA 21 (SCA) para 15.  
 
141 This principle of interpreting statutes is also recognised in English law. In the UK case of Corporation of 
Blackpool v Starr Estate Company Limited [1922] 1 AC 27 at 34 Viscount Haldane formulated this principle of 
interpretation as follows: 
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away if there are clear indications that the Legislature intended to repeal the earlier 
enactment.142  
 
On the basis of the principle of interpretation of lex specialis derogat legi generali, it is 
arguable that the provisions on the removal of directors contained in the Broadcasting Act, 
being a specific legislation dealing with the governance of the SABC, must prevail over the 
removal provisions in the Companies Act, being a general legislation dealing with state-owned 
entities. This argument is reinforced by the fact that there are no clear, express or specific 
indications that the legislature intended to repeal the provisions of the Broadcasting Act when 
the Companies Act was promulgated. 
 
Further statutory provisions which cause confusion regarding the issue whether the Companies 
Act or the Broadcasting Act prevails are sections 8A(5) and 8A(6) of the Broadcasting Act. 
Section 8A(5) states that the Companies Act applies to the SABC, save to the extent stipulated 
in the Broadcasting Act. Section 8A(6) of the Broadcasting Act lists those provisions of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 which do not apply to the SABC. The provisions of section 8A(6) 
of the Broadcasting Act have not been amended to reflect the equivalent provisions of the 
Companies Act (71 of 2008). Section 220 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, the predecessor 
to section 71 of the Companies Act (71 of 2008), is not listed in section 8A(6) of the 
Broadcasting Act as one of the provisions that do not apply to the SABC. On a literal 
interpretation, the implication is that the legislature did not intend to exclude the removal 
provisions under section 220 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 from applying to the removal 
of directors of the SABC board. The High Court in SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition 
and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited and Others; SOS Support 
Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC 
Limited and Others143 did not address the further legislative conflict caused by sections 8A(5) 
and 8A(6) of the Broadcasting Act.  
                                                 
 “. . . (W)e are bound . . . to apply a rule of construction which has been repeatedly laid down and 
is firmly established. It is that wherever Parliament in an earlier statute has directed its attention 
to an individual case and has made provision for it unambiguously, there arises a presumption that 
if in a subsequent statute the Legislature lays down a general principle, that general principle is 
not to be taken as meant to rip up what the Legislature had before provided for individually, unless 
an intention to do so is specifically declared.” 
 
142 Khumalo v Director-General of Co-operation and Development and Others 1991 (1) SA 158 (A) at 5. 
 
143 (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017). 
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While the court found that sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act prevailed over section 
71 of the Companies Act the court did not regrettably clarify how the conflict in law between 
the Companies Act and the Broadcasting Act is to be practically resolved. The fact remains 
that the Companies Act has failed to list, in section 5(4)(b)(i), the Broadcasting Act as one of 
the statutes that would prevail in the event of a conflict with the Companies Act. It is submitted 
that section 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act should be amended, by amending legislation, to 
include a reference to the Broadcasting Act as one of the statutes that would prevail in the event 
of a conflict with the Companies Act. Alternatively, it is submitted that the Minister of Trade 
and Industry should be requested, under sections 9(2)(a) and 9(3) of the Companies Act, to 
exempt the SABC from the provisions of section 71 of the Companies Act.144 Since sections 
15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act would regulate the removal of directors of the SABC at 
least as well as the provisions of the Companies Act, it is submitted that the granting of an 
exemption excluding the SABC from the provisions of section 71 of the Companies Act, would 
practically resolve the legislative conflict between sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting 
Act, and section 71 of the Companies Act. It is further submitted that section 8A(6) of the 
Broadcasting Act should specifically include a reference to section 71 of the Companies Act. 
In this way the legislative conflict between the Companies Act and the Broadcasting Act would 
be resolved, and the two statutes would be in harmony.  
 
It is evident from the above discussion that even though section 71 of the Companies Act is 
said to apply to the removal of directors of state-owned companies, there is considerable 
confusion on this issue in circumstances where state-owned companies are governed by 
specific legislation regulating the removal of their directors. Challenges arise from the fact that 
state-owned companies are governed by both the Companies Act and by their own specific 
legislation. It may first have to be determined whether the dismissal power constitutes 
administrative action or executive action, and whether the Companies Act or the Promotion of 
                                                 
144 Under s 9(2) of the Companies Act the member of the Cabinet responsible for state-owned companies may 
request the Minister of Trade and Industry to grant a total, partial or conditional exemption from one or more 
provisions of the Companies Act, applicable to all state-owned companies, any class of state-owned companies 
or to one or more particular state-owned company. In terms of s 9(3) of the Companies Act the Minister may, by 
notice in the Government Gazette after receiving the advice of the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission (“CIPC”), grant an exemption contemplated in s 9(2) only to the extent that the relevant alternative 
regulatory scheme ensures the achievement of the purposes of the Companies Act at least as well as the provisions 
of the Companies Act, and subject to any limits or conditions necessary to ensure the achievement of the purposes 
of the Companies Act. 
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Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2008 must be applied.145 Furthermore, the substantive criteria 
for the removal of directors of the state-owned company may be contained in one statute 
governing the state-owned company, while the procedural criteria may be contained in another 
statute. A careful analysis must be made in each case in order to ascertain whether the 
provisions of the specific statute governing the state-owned company and section 71 of the 
Companies Act may be applied concurrently (as was the case in Minister of Defence and 
Military Veterans v Motau and Others)146 and if not (as was the case in SOS Support Public 
Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited 
and Others; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition and Others v South African 
Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited and Others),147 which statute would prevail. 
4.4  Public Companies 
Since the board of directors of public companies must comprise at least three directors,148 
section 71(3) of the Companies Act will always apply to the removal of directors of public 
companies. In striking contrast, the opposite position prevails in Australia where the board of 
directors of public companies have no power to remove directors from office.149 
It is submitted that there are advantages to the approach under Australian law of confining the 
power to remove directors from office to the board of directors of private companies, and not 
                                                 
145 A further example of confusion arising whether the decision to remove a director of a state-owned entity from 
office was an executive decision or an administrative decision, arose in Steenkamp and Another v Central Energy 
Fund SOC Ltd and Others 2018 (1) SA 311 (WCC). The applicants had been removed as board members of 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation SOC Ltd (“PetroSA”) by its holding company, the Central Energy Fund SOC 
Ltd (“CEF”). The removal took place in terms of s 71(1) of the Companies Act since it was a removal of directors 
by the sole shareholder (CEF) of the company (PetroSA). Both the CEF and PetroSA are state-owned companies. 
One of the questions before the court was whether the removal, by one state-owned entity, of directors serving on 
the board of another state-owned entity was an administrative decision and was subject to the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2008 (para 39). The court stated that the fact that the decision was taken by the 
CEF board which is directly answerable to the executive does not render the power to be of an executive nature 
(para 52). It held further that the fact that the removal of the directors was exercised through ss 71(1) and (2) of 
the Companies Act did not render the decision immune to administrative review (para 53). The court accordingly 
concluded that the decision to remove the directors from office constituted administrative action and that it was 
subject to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2008 (para 59). Based on the facts, the court found 
that, in light of the substantial difficulties in which PetroSA found itself and the strained relationship between the 
PetroSA board and the CEF board, the decision of the CEF to remove the applicants from office had not been 
predetermined, mala fide, unlawful or irrational, as had been contended by the applicants (paras 60-78). 
 
146 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC). 
 
147 (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017). 
 
148 Section 66(2)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
149 Section 203E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. See para 2.2 above where s 203E of the Australian 
Corporations Act is discussed. 
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extending this power to the board of directors of public companies. For instance, it eliminates 
the threat of removal by the board of directors of public companies, and facilitates directors 
being able to openly discuss matters with their fellow board members and freely express 
dissenting views without a concern of dismissal. This is of primary importance in public 
companies in light of the generally large number of shareholders who invest in them. As was 
discussed in chapter 2, the concern of removal from office may create an environment in which 
the directors are intimidated by the risks of dismissal and would consequently refrain from 
taking high-risk but potentially profitable decisions, or from making long-term strategic 
decisions that would enhance the value of the company but would not necessarily result in an 
immediate return of profit.150 This encourages a “short-termism” approach which is not in the 
interests of the company. The taking of high-risk but potentially profitable decisions, is 
especially important in public companies in view of the large number of shareholders who 
invest in such companies. As was also discussed in chapter 2, a viable shareholder power to 
remove directors is necessary to provide directors with a strong incentive to focus on the 
interests of the shareholders.151 When the board is given the power to remove, directors may 
be inclined to also focus on the interests of the board of directors, which may have the effect 
of diminishing their incentive to focus on the interests of the shareholders. Confining the power 
to remove directors of public companies to the shareholders and not extending it to the board 
of directors may therefore have the advantage of strengthening the directors’ incentive to focus 
on the interests of shareholders in public companies.  
 
On the other hand, there are also advantages in conferring the right to remove fellow board 
members on the board of directors of public companies. For instance, if the shareholders wish 
to remove an incompetent or misbehaving director from office and are not able to garner 
sufficient support to do so, the board of directors may still be able to remove that director from 
office.152 Another advantage of conferring on the board of directors the right to remove 
directors of public companies would be where the shareholders are not convinced of the 
legitimate reasons advanced by the board of directors to remove a director from office, or they 
do not wish to remove a particular director from office despite his wrongdoing because they 
                                                 
150 See chapter 2, para 5 and Olson “Professor Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to ‘The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise’” 782. 
 
151 See chapter 2, para 4 and Bebchuk “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise” 682. 
 
152 See chapter 2, para 5.1. 
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believe he is bringing in profits for the company, when in fact that director would be exposing 
the company to a potential legal action.153  
 
It may be particularly time consuming and costly in a public company to convene a 
shareholders’ meeting to remove a director due to the large number of shareholders who would 
need to attend the meeting in order to satisfy the quorum requirements. While the company 
could delay the removal of a director until the next annual general meeting in an effort to save 
on the costs of convening a shareholders’ meeting, the delay may be impractical and may cause 
damage in instances when a director’s actions are detrimental to the company.154 During the 
notice period which must be given to convene a shareholders’ meeting of a public company, 
and which, under section 62(1)(a) of the Companies Act is at least fifteen business days155 there 
is a risk that the public company and its board of directors may suffer reputational risk. This is 
exactly what occurred in Australia as a result of a dispute between members of the board of 
directors of the National Australia Bank Limited (“NAB”). A public boardroom brawl occurred 
following revelations of a foreign exchange trading scandal at NAB. The bank appointed 
PricewaterhouseCoopers to prepare an independent report on the scandal, but one of the bank’s 
non-executive directors, Catherine Walter, challenged the legitimacy of the report on the 
ground that PricewaterhouseCoopers had a conflict of interest as a result of its business 
relationship with NAB. Ms Walter made public attacks against some of the directors on the 
board of directors of NAB. In response, the NAB chairman announced that the board of 
directors would remove Ms Walter from the audit committee (of which she was the chairman 
during the foreign currency scandal) and she was also asked to resign as a director. The board 
of NAB issued a statement explaining that Ms Walter had lost the trust and respect of her fellow 
directors due to her not co-operating with the investigations of PricewaterhouseCoopers, and 
due to her unfounded attacks on the integrity of the PricewaterhouseCoopers report. These 
attacks had also indirectly attacked the integrity of the NAB directors. Upon her refusal to 
resign, the bank took steps to convene a shareholders’ meeting to remove her from office. 
During the two month notice period of the shareholders’ meeting (as required by section 
203D(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001) Ms Walter and her fellow non-executive 
                                                 
153 See chapter 2, para 5.1. 
 
154 McConvill “Removal of Directors of Public Companies takes Centre Stage in Australia” 197. 
 
155 A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may provide for a longer or shorter minimum notice period than 
required by s 62(1) of the Companies Act. 
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directors had a public slanging match which had damaged the reputation of the bank and of the 
board of directors. Eventually Ms Walter agreed to resign from the board of directors in return 
for an undisclosed cash payment, but due to the damage caused by the boardroom battle a 
number of other directors, including the chairman, stepped down.156 The reputation of a public 
company, particularly a listed company, is particularly important in light of the need for the 
company to attract investments.  
 
Company law in the UK and the USA does not distinguish between public companies and 
private companies with regard to the removal of directors from office by the board of directors. 
Despite the advantages of confining the right to remove directors to private companies, it has 
been shown that there are also advantages in conferring the removal power on the board of 
directors of public companies. For this reason it is submitted that directors of public companies 
should not be prevented from removing fellow board members, provided that they act openly 
and transparently and that there are sufficient safeguards against the abuse of the removal 
power. If, as suggested,157 the power conferred on directors to remove directors from office 
were an alterable provision and not a mandatory provision, then a public company would have 
the option of deciding whether it wishes to empower its board of directors to remove directors 
from office. It is submitted that the company itself should be allowed to weigh up the 
advantages and disadvantages of empowering its particular board of directors with the removal 
power and to determine whether or not to limit this power.  
   
5.  LOCUS STANDI TO INITIATE A BOARD MEETING TO REMOVE A DIRECTOR 
FROM OFFICE 
 
 Both a shareholder and a director have locus standi under section 71(3) of the Companies Act 
to allege that any of the grounds listed in that section are applicable to a director. A voting 
member of a non-profit company would also have such locus standi under section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act.158 If a shareholder or a director (or a voting member of a non-profit company) 
                                                 
156 See McConvill “Removal of Directors of Public Companies takes Centre Stage in Australia” at 195-198 and 
Hill “The Rising Tension between Shareholder and Director Power in the Common Law World” 352 for further 
details of the NAB board conflict. 
 
157 See para 3 above. 
 
158 Section 10(4) of the Companies Act states that in respect of a non-profit company that has voting members, a 
reference in the Companies Act to “a shareholder” is to be regarded as a reference to the voting members of a 
non-profit company. 
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makes an allegation under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, the board of directors is obliged 
to consider the allegation and must determine the matter of the removal of the impugned 
director by resolution. This is made clear by the words “must determine the matter by 
resolution” in section 71(3) of the Companies Act.  
 
 Section 71(3) of the Companies Act permits a single shareholder or director to initiate the 
process for a board meeting to be convened to consider the removal of a director from office. 
The legislature did not place a threshold on the shareholding which a shareholder must hold in 
the company before the provisions of section 71(3) of the Companies Act would be triggered. 
This means that a minority shareholder, holding as little as one per cent of the shareholding in 
the company, and regardless of his influence in the company, would be entitled to make an 
allegation under section 71(3) of the Companies Act and require the board of directors to 
convene a meeting to determine the matter of the removal of a director by resolution. There is 
no protection in section 71(3) of the Companies Act against vexatious, frivolous or groundless 
allegations made by a shareholder. While the board of directors has a discretion whether or not 
to remove an impugned director from office, as made clear by the words “may remove a 
director” in section 71(3),159 the fact that the board would be compelled to consider the matter 
by resolution, even if the allegations are without merit, places the impugned director in a 
position where he must defend the allegations made against him.   
 
 It is notable that under section 61(3) of the Companies Act the board of directors is compelled 
to call a shareholders’ meeting if demands for such a meeting are delivered to the company and 
in aggregate the demands are made and signed by the holders of at least ten per cent of the 
voting rights entitled to be exercised in relation to the matter proposed to be considered at the 
meeting.160 Under section 61(5) of the Companies Act a company or any shareholder of the 
company may apply to a court for an order setting aside the demand made in terms of section 
61(3) on the grounds that the demand is frivolous, calls for a meeting for no other purpose than 
to reconsider a matter that has already been decided by the shareholders, or is otherwise 
vexatious.  In contrast, the legislature did not impose any threshold for a shareholder to be able 
to make an allegation against a director under section 71(3), thereby triggering the convention 
                                                 
159 The discretion of the board of directors to remove a director is discussed further in para 7 below. 
 
160 The ten per cent threshold may be lowered in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (s 61(4) of the 
Companies Act). 
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of a board meeting to consider the removal of the director. It is anomalous that the legislature 
did not provide for any precautions under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, to guard against 
such abuse by shareholders, yet provided safeguards to guard against shareholders abusing the 
mechanism of demanding a meeting under section 61(3) of the Companies Act. Convening a 
board meeting whenever an allegation is made by a single shareholder against a director would 
also incur costs for the company. 
 
On the other hand, the power given to a single shareholder to compel the board of directors to 
convene a meeting to consider the allegations made against a director does have the advantage 
of affording substantial protection to minority shareholders who are unable to remove a director 
of a company by means of an ordinary resolution due to a lack of support from the majority 
shareholders.161 If a ten per cent threshold were to be imposed in section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act it would be difficult for a single shareholder to garner the support of ten per 
cent of the voting rights in the company due to the general apathetic nature of shareholders.162 
 
A director would not necessarily be removed from office based on the allegations made against 
him by a single shareholder because, under section 71(4) of the Companies Act, the impugned 
director is given an opportunity to defend himself at the board meeting before the resolution to 
remove him is voted upon. Moreover, at least a majority of the board members must vote in 
favour of the removal of the impugned director in order for the proposed resolution to be 
passed.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2,163 the conferral of power to remove directors has had the effect of 
shifting the balance of power between the board of directors and the shareholders. Permitting 
a single shareholder to trigger a board meeting to consider the allegations against a director 
restores some power to the shareholders, and furthermore affords some protection to a minority 
shareholder. It also encourages the board to ensure that the interests of the shareholders are not 
neglected because a single shareholder is empowered to initiate a board meeting to consider 
the removal of a director. While costs would be incurred in convening such a board meeting, 
                                                 
161 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 43. 
 
162 Refer to chapter 2, para 3 where shareholder passivity is discussed. 
 
163 Refer to chapter 2, para 5.1. 
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these costs may be contained, such as holding meetings electronically, as permitted by section 
73(3) of the Companies Act.164 It is accordingly submitted that, despite the disadvantages, there 
are considerable merits in conferring the power on a single shareholder to request a board 
meeting to consider the removal of a director. The disadvantages of this power can be contained 
or managed. 
 
 Section 71(3) of the Companies Act does not specify whether the allegation by a shareholder 
or a director against another director must be made in writing. It follows that the allegation 
under section 71(3) may be made verbally.165 The allegation could consequently be made at a 
shareholders’ meeting, an annual general meeting or at a board meeting.166 
 
6. THE GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL OF A DIRECTOR BY THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS  
 
Section 71(3) of the Companies Act states as follows: 
 
“If a company has more than two directors, and a shareholder or director has alleged that a 
director of the company – 
(a) has become – 
(i) ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69, other than on the grounds 
contemplated in section 69(8)(a); or 
(ii) incapacitated to the extent that the director is unable to perform the functions 
of a director, and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time; 
or  
(b) has neglected, or been derelict in the performance of, the functions of director, 
the board, other than the director concerned, must determine the matter by resolution, and 
may remove a director whom it has determined to be ineligible or disqualified, 
incapacitated, or negligent or derelict, as the case may be.” 
 
The board of directors may remove a director from office only if one of the grounds mentioned 
in section 71(3) of the Companies Act is applicable to a director. These grounds are discussed 
below.  
                                                 
164 In terms of s 73(3) of the Companies Act, except to the extent that the Companies Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise, board meetings may be conducted by electronic 
communication and one or more directors may participate in a meeting by electronic communication, so long as 
the electronic communication facility employed ordinarily enables all participants to communicate concurrently 
with each other without an intermediary and to participate effectively in the meeting. 
 
165 R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 444. 
 
166 R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 444. 
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6.1  Ineligible or Disqualified  
 
The first ground on which a director may be removed from office, is if a shareholder or a 
director alleges that the director has become ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69 of 
the Companies Act, other than on the grounds contemplated in section 69(8)(a). A person who 
is ineligible or disqualified to serve or act as a director must not act as a director of a company, 
nor be appointed or elected as a director of a company, nor consent to being appointed or 
elected as a director.167 This ground of removal therefore envisages a situation where a director 
was eligible and qualified to be a director at the time that he was appointed or elected as a 
director of the company, but that he has now become ineligible or disqualified to be a director.  
 
In terms of section 69(4) of the Companies Act a person who becomes ineligible or disqualified 
while serving as a director of a company ceases to be entitled to continue to act as a director 
immediately, subject to section 70(2) of the Companies Act.168 In light of section 69(4) of the 
Companies Act, the question arises why formal removal proceedings would be necessary under 
section 71(3) of the Companies Act.169 It is submitted that if a director were to become 
ineligible or disqualified to be a director and his ineligibility or disqualification were not in 
dispute, and he were to voluntarily cease to act as a director, formal removal proceedings under 
section 71(3) of the Companies Act would not be necessary. However in those instances where 
a director disputes that he has become ineligible or disqualified to be a director, formal removal 
proceedings are necessary so that the director is given an opportunity to make a presentation to 
the board of directors regarding his ineligibility or disqualification to be a director. The board 
of directors may then vote on whether to remove the director from office based on the 
allegations of the director’s ineligibility or disqualification to be a director.  
 
Some aspects of this ground of removal of a director by the board of directors are discussed 
below. 
                                                 
167 Section 69(2) of the Companies Act. 
 
168 Section 70(2) of the Companies Act provides that where the board of directors has removed a director a vacancy 
on the board would not arise until the later of the expiry of the time for filing an application for review of the 
decision or the granting of an order by the court on such an application. The director would however be suspended 
from office during that time. 
 
169 This question is raised by Ncube (see Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008” 41-42). See further Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 274(1). 
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6.1.1 Obligation Placed on a Company to Ascertain Ineligibility and Disqualification of 
a Director 
 
Section 69(3) of the Companies Act places an obligation on a company not to “knowingly” 
permit an ineligible or disqualified person to serve or act as a director. The directors or the 
company will be liable if an ineligible or disqualified person were permitted to serve or act as 
a director and either the company suffers any loss, damages or costs, or a third party suffers 
any loss or damage.170  
 
The term “knowingly” is defined in section 1 of the Companies Act as follows:  
 
 “‘knowing’, ‘knowingly’ or ‘knows’, when used with respect to a person, and in relation 
to a particular matter, means that the person either – 
(a) had actual knowledge of the matter; or 
(b) was in a position in which the person reasonably ought to have – 
(i)    had actual knowledge; 
(ii)  investigated the matter to an extent that would have provided the person with 
actual knowledge; or 
(iii) taken other measures which, if taken, would reasonably be expected to have 
provided the person with actual knowledge of the matter”. 
 
If a company has actual knowledge that a person is ineligible or disqualified to be a director it 
would breach section 69(3) of the Companies Act if it permitted such a person to serve or act 
as a director of the company. It is submitted that one instance when a company would be 
deemed to have actual knowledge that a person is disqualified to serve or act as a director of 
that company, would be if the CIPC171 notified the company of an order or conviction under 
section 69(11B) of the Companies Act. Under section 69(11A) of the Companies Act the 
Registrar of the Court must, upon the issue of a sequestration order, the issue of an order for 
the removal of a person from any office of trust on the grounds of misconduct involving 
                                                 
170 Sections 77(2)(b) and 218(2) of the Companies Act. 
 
171 The CIPC is described in note 144 above. The CIPC is established in terms of s 185 of the Companies Act as 
a juristic person to function as an organ of state within the public administration, but as an institution outside the 
public service (s 185(1)). It has jurisdiction throughout South Africa (s 185(2)(a)). It is independent and is subject 
only to the Constitution and the law and any policy statement, directive or request issued to it by the Minister in 
terms of the Companies Act (s 185(2)(b)). It must be impartial and it must perform its functions without fear, 
favour, or prejudice (s 185(2)(c)). The CIPC must exercise the functions assigned to it in the most cost-efficient 
and effective manner and in accordance with the values and principles mentioned in s 195 of the Constitution, 
which sets out the basic values and principles governing public administration. 
 
142 
 
dishonesty,172 or a conviction for an offence referred to in section 69(8)(b)(iv) of the 
Companies Act,173 send a copy of the relevant order or particulars of the conviction to the 
CIPC. The CIPC must in turn in terms of section 69(11B) of the Companies Act notify each 
company which has as a director to whom the order of convictions relates, of the order of 
conviction. If a company were sent such a notice by the CIPC it would arguably be deemed to 
have actual knowledge of the disqualification of the person to serve or act as a director.  
 
Another instance when a company would be deemed to have actual knowledge of the 
ineligibility or disqualification of a person to serve or act as a director, would be where the 
Memorandum of Incorporation of the company, in terms of section 69(6) of the Companies 
Act, sets out additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification of directors or minimum 
qualifications to be met by directors of the company.174 If a company were to permit a person 
to serve or act as a director of the company without verifying whether any additional grounds 
of ineligibility or disqualification or minimum qualifications as set out in its Memorandum of 
Incorporation were satisfied, it would infringe section 69(3) of the Companies Act. 
 
Under the definition of “knowingly”, knowledge will be imputed to a company where the 
company reasonably ought to have investigated the matter to an extent that would have 
provided it with actual knowledge. This would be a situation where a company had a suspicion 
and should have investigated the matter to an extent that would have provided it with actual 
knowledge.175 In terms of section 69(13) of the Companies Act the CIPC is required to establish 
and maintain a public register of persons who are disqualified from serving as a director (or 
who are subject to an order of probation) in terms of an order of a court pursuant to the 
Companies Act or any other law.176 If a company has a suspicion that a director may be 
                                                 
172 This ground of disqualification is covered in s 69(8)(b)(iii) of the Companies Act. 
 
173 These grounds relate to a conviction, in South Africa or elsewhere, and imprisonment without the option of a 
fine, or a fine more than the prescribed amount, for theft, fraud, perjury or various other offences. 
 
174 Section 69(6) of the Companies Act permits the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company to impose 
additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification of directors, as well as minimum qualifications to be met by 
directors of that company. 
 
175 Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 30. 
 
176 In addition to the court orders received from the Registrar of the Court under s 69(11A) of the Companies Act, 
the CIPC may, for purposes of maintaining the register of persons disqualified from serving as directors, obtain 
relevant information from the official records of the clerk of the magistrates’ court, the Master of the High Court, 
the South African police services, any regulatory authority or any institution that regulates any profession in South 
Africa (see regulation 39(3) of the Companies Regulations, 2011 published under GN R351 in GG 34239 of 26 
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disqualified to be a director of a company, the company ought to investigate the matter by 
consulting the CIPC’s public register of disqualified persons. If the company fails to do so, 
knowledge of the disqualification of the director may well be imputed to the company.  
 
6.1.2  Grounds of Ineligibility as Director 
 
The Companies Act lists three grounds of ineligibility to be a director. If any of these grounds 
are applicable, a director may be removed from office by the board of directors under section 
71(3) of the Companies Act. These grounds of ineligibility to be a director are discussed below. 
 
6.1.2.1 Juristic Person 
 
The first ground under which a person would be ineligible to be a director of a company is if 
the person is a juristic person.177 For purposes of the Companies Act a “juristic person” includes 
a foreign company and a trust, irrespective of whether or not it was established within or outside 
South Africa.178 This means that under the Companies Act a director must be a natural person.  
 
In contrast, under section 87(1) of the Companies Act a juristic person or a partnership may be 
appointed to hold the office of company secretary. This appointment is subject to two provisos: 
(i) every employee of that juristic person or partner and employee of that partnership (as the 
case may be) satisfies the requirements contemplated in section 84(5) of the Companies Act;179 
and (ii) at least one employee of that juristic person, or one partner or employee of that 
partnership (as the case may be) satisfies the requirements contemplated in section 86 of the 
Companies Act.180 There is no equivalent provision in the Companies Act with regard to the 
appointment of directors. 
                                                 
April 2011, hereafter referred to as the “Companies Regulations, 2011”). An example of an institution that 
regulates a profession in South Africa would be the Law Society, which regulates the legal profession. 
 
177 Section 69(7)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
178 See the definition of “juristic person” in s 1 of the Companies Act. 
 
179 In terms of s 84(5) of the Companies Act a person who is disqualified in terms of s 69(8) of the Companies 
Act to serve as a director of any particular company may not be appointed or continue to serve that company as a 
company secretary. 
 
180 In terms of s 86(2) of the Companies Act every company secretary must have the requisite knowledge of or 
experience in relevant laws and must be a permanent resident of South Africa and must remain so while serving 
in that capacity. 
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It is notable that in the UK, a juristic person may be a director, and that only one director of a 
company is required to be a natural person. Section 155(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 
states that companies are required to have at least one director who is a natural person. Subject 
to this requirement being satisfied, any legal person, including one that is a company or a firm, 
may be a director but a company cannot be the sole director of another company.181 The 
requirement that the director must be a natural person is met if the director is a corporation 
sole182 or a person appointed on the basis of some other appointment that they hold.183 
 
However, the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015, is expected to repeal 
section 155 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 (from a date to be determined),184 and to insert 
a new section 156A to the UK Companies Act of 2006 which will require all company directors 
to be natural persons, subject to certain specified exceptions.185 The Secretary of State for 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (formerly the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry) is empowered to provide by regulation for cases in which a person who is not a natural 
person may be appointed a director of the company.186 These regulations have not yet been 
                                                 
181 Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act of 2006 para 282, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes (accessed on 23 May 2016). 
 
182 A corporation sole is a legal entity consisting of a single (or sole) incorporated office, occupied by a single (or 
sole) natural person. Most corporations sole are church-related (for example, the Archbishop of Canterbury). 
Some political offices are also corporations sole. For instance, in the UK many of the Secretaries of State are 
corporations sole. 
 
183 See further s 155(2) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 and the Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act of 
2006 para 282, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes (accessed on 23 May 2016). 
 
184 The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015 received Royal Assent on 26 March 2015, but 
its provisions are coming into force in stages. Although its title seems to imply that it will affect small businesses 
only, this Act implements substantial changes to company law which will impact all companies. This Act amends 
the UK Companies Act of 2006, the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the Insolvency Act of 
1986. 
 
185 See s 87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015 and the proposed new s 156B of the 
UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
186 See s 87(4) of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015, and the proposed new s 156B of 
the UK Companies Act of 2006. A corporate director that does not fall within any of the exceptions to be set out 
in regulations under s 156B of the UK Companies Act of 2006, will cease to be a director twelve months after the 
date on which s 156A of the UK Companies Act of 2006 comes into force (s 156C of the UK Companies Act of 
2006). 
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promulgated. Thus, companies in the UK will be permitted to appoint corporate directors in 
certain specified instances only.187  
 
Generally, a corporate director would appoint a number of natural persons to its board of 
directors, and if any documents have to be executed by the underlying company (as it is referred 
to in the UK), one of those individual directors of the corporate director would sign the 
documents.188 There are advantages to appointing a corporate director. For instance, it is not 
necessary to appoint alternate directors for a company, as is the case when natural persons are 
appointed as directors.189 Another advantage of appointing a corporate director is that a change 
in the membership of the company does not constitute a casual vacancy in the office of 
company director. Indeed, with regard to the appointment of a juristic person or partnership as 
a company secretary, section 87(2) of the Companies Act expressly states that a change in the 
membership of the juristic person or partnership that holds office as company secretary does 
not constitute a casual vacancy in the office of company secretary if the juristic person or 
partnership continues to satisfy the requirements of section 87(1) of the Companies Act. 
 
On the other hand, there are also disadvantages to appointing a corporate director to the board 
of directors. One disadvantage is that the appointment of corporate directors may make it 
difficult to determine who controls a company.190 The investigation and prosecution of 
corporate frauds could also be hindered when corporate directors are appointed.191 
Furthermore, it could be difficult to apply meaningful sanctions to corporate directors.192  
 
                                                 
187 This is a strong shift away from the common law regime in the UK which permitted companies to appoint a 
company as their sole director, as established in In re Bulawayo Market and Offices Co Ltd [1907] 2 Ch 458 at 
463-464. 
 
188 AO HALL Advocates “Corporate Company Directors” (3 August 2011) available at 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5d0f4352-83a6-45cb-9054-39c329e35a15 (accessed on 20 May 
2016). 
 
189 See s 66(4)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act on alternate directors. 
 
190 Hannigan Company Law 156. 
 
191 Hannigan Company Law 157. 
 
192 Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Another [2010] UKSC 51 para 
101; Hannigan Company Law 157. 
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The case of Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and 
Another193 provides a useful illustration of some disadvantages of appointing corporate 
directors. In this case a company’s sole director was a corporate director. All of the individual 
director’s acts were done as a director of the corporate director and could be attributed in law 
solely to the activities of the corporate director. The question before the Supreme Court of 
England and Wales was whether the individual director of the corporate director was a de facto 
director of the underlying company, and accordingly liable for a breach of fiduciary duties as 
a de facto director of that underlying company in circumstances where all of his acts could be 
attributed in law solely to the activities of the corporate director.194 The majority of the Supreme 
Court found that the individual director in these circumstances was not the de facto director of 
the corporate director. The Supreme Court reasoned that to impose fiduciary duties on the 
individual in relation to the underlying company in such circumstances would be an 
unjustifiable extension of the scope of a de facto director.195 The court opined that this was a 
matter that was best left to the legislature rather than the court.196  The court found that the 
individual director in this case was doing no more than discharging his duties as a director of 
the corporate director of the underlying company and that everything he had done was done 
under that umbrella.197 The individual director thus escaped personal liability. The dissenting 
minority judgment, on the other hand, pointed out that to attribute everything the individual 
did to his capacity as a director of the corporate director was “the most arid formalism”198 and 
                                                 
193 [2010] UKSC 51. 
 
194 Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Another [2010] UKSC 51 para 53. 
A de facto director is a person who claims to act and purports to act as a director without having been appointed 
as a director either validly or at all, or whose appointment had come to an end but who continued to act as a 
director. There is no single test to determine whether a person is a de facto director and all relevant factors must 
be taken into account in determining whether a person is a de facto director. A de facto director is subject to the 
fiduciary duties of a director and may not escape his duties simply because he was not formally or validly 
appointed as a director (see Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] BCC 161 at 162-163; Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry v Tjolle [1998] BCC 282 at 290; Re Kaytech International plc; Portier v Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry [1999] BCC 390 at 402; Shepherds Investment Ltd v Walters [2007] 2 BCLC 20; Holland v The 
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Another [2010] UKSC 51 paras 39 and 54). 
 
195 Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Another [2010] UKSC 51 para 53. 
 
196 Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Another [2010] UKSC 51 para 54. 
 
197 Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Another [2010] UKSC 51 para 40. 
 
198 Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Another [2010] UKSC 51 para 
115. 
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that it makes it easier for risk-averse individuals to use artificial corporate structures to insulate 
themselves against liability.199 
 
Section 201B(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 does not permit corporate directors 
to be appointed and states that only an individual may be appointed as a director of the 
company. Likewise, section 8.03(a) of the MBCA requires the board of directors to consist of 
one or more individuals. In a similar vein, section 141(b) of the DGCL states that every member 
of the board of directors of a corporation must be a natural person. The trend, accordingly, 
seems to be moving away from permitting corporate directors to be appointed to the board of 
directors and instead requiring directors to be natural persons. 
 
Importantly, section 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act confirms that one of the purposes of the 
Companies Act is to promote the development of the South African economy by encouraging 
transparency and high standards of corporate governance as appropriate, given the significant 
role of enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation. It is submitted that 
permitting corporate directors to be appointed would detract from this purpose of encouraging 
transparency because it would make it difficult to determine who controls a company and may, 
as the minority judgment in Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs and Another200 warned, make it easier for individuals to use artificial corporate 
structures to insulate themselves against liability. It would be useful to see what exceptions are 
promulgated in the UK in due course with regard to the instances when corporate directors may 
be appointed, but it is nonetheless submitted that the Companies Act adopts the commendable 
approach of permitting only natural persons to be appointed as directors of the company. 
 
6.1.2.2  Unemancipated Minor or Persons Under a Similar Legal Disability 
 
6.1.2.2.1  Minor 
 
Under section 69(7)(b) of the Companies Act a person is ineligible to be a director of a 
company if he is an unemancipated minor or is under a similar legal disability. In terms of 
                                                 
199 Holland v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Another [2010] UKSC 51 para 
101. 
 
200 [2010] UKSC 51 para 101. 
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section 17 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 every child, whether male or female, becomes a 
major upon reaching the age of eighteen years.201 This means that a person is not eligible to be 
a director of a company under the Companies Act unless that person has reached the age of 
eighteen years, or alternatively has been emancipated.  
 
In contrast, under the UK Companies Act of 2006, the minimum age at which a person may be 
appointed a director of a company, is sixteen years.202 Appointments made in breach of this 
rule are void.203  This prohibition does not prevent the appointment of a person younger than 
sixteen years of age provided that it is not to take effect until that person is sixteen years old.204  
The rationale behind introducing a minimum age requirement of sixteen in the UK is due to 
evidence that the appointment of young directors was being used to exploit their immunity 
from prosecution, and the reluctance of public authorities to prosecute young persons.205 The 
Secretary of State in the UK may make provision by regulation for cases in which a person 
who is younger than sixteen years may be appointed a director of a company.206  
 
The (South African) Companies Act has not adopted the liberal approach adopted in the UK 
regarding the minimum age of a director. Despite this, the (South African) Companies Act is 
in line with section 201B(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 which states that an 
individual must be at least eighteen years old to be appointed as a director of a company. 
Various USA States also require a director to be at least eighteen years old. For example section 
701 of the New York Business Corporation Law and section 14A:6-1 of the New Jersey 
                                                 
201 Prior to this date, the age of majority in South African law, under the now repealed Age of Majority Act 57 of 
1972, was twenty one years. Section 17 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 came into operation on 1 July 2007. The 
age of majority was changed in 2007 in order to bring it in line with the definition of a “child” in the Constitution. 
Section 28(3) of the Constitution states that a “child” means a person under the age of eighteen years. 
 
202 Section 157(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. The age of majority in the UK is eighteen years (s 105(1) 
of the Children Act 1989). The age of majority does vary in certain circumstances in that it typically ranges from 
between sixteen years of age (in which school no longer becomes compulsory) to eighteen years of age (for voting 
rights and the consumption of alcohol). For a discussion on the age of majority in the UK see Feikert “Children’s 
Rights: United Kingdom (England and Wales)” Law Library of Congress (August 2007) 167-180 available at 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/child-rights/uk.php (accessed on 23 May 2016). 
 
203 Section 157(4) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
204 Section 157(2) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
205 Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 368. 
 
206 Sections 158(1) and 158(2) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
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Business Corporation Act require a director to be at least eighteen years old. Section 10A-2-
8.02 of the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entities Code requires a director to be at least 
nineteen years old.207 
 
If a shareholder or director alleges, in terms of section 71(3) of the Companies Act, that a 
director of the company is ineligible to be a director on the ground that he is an unemancipated 
minor, the board of directors would have to determine the matter by resolution. Should the 
board find that the director in question is indeed an unemancipated minor, the director must be 
removed from office on the basis that he is not eligible to be a director. The question arises 
whether an underage person who purported to act as a director would be liable for breach of 
any of the fiduciary duties of a director, and whether his past acts would remain valid. The 
Companies Act does not address these matters. 
 
In striking contrast, section 157(5) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 clearly states that nothing 
in section 157 affects any liability of a person under any provision of the UK Companies Act 
of 2006 if he purports to act as a director or acts as a shadow director, despite the fact that such 
person could not be validly appointed as a director. In other words, even though in the UK a 
person under the age of sixteen years may not be validly appointed as a director, he will not be 
protected from criminal prosecution or civil liability were he to act as a de facto director or a 
shadow director.208  
 
It is submitted that a similar approach ought to be adopted with regard to underage directors 
under the (South African) Companies Act. This approach is further bolstered by the definition 
of the term “director” in section 1 of the Companies Act, which states that a director means “a 
member of the board of a company, as contemplated in section 66, or an alternate director of a 
company and includes any person occupying the position of a director or alternate director, by 
whatever name designated”. The words “occupying the position of a director” and “by 
                                                 
207 This provision is codified in Title 10A (Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entities Code), Chapter 2 (Business 
Corporations) of the Code of Alabama. 
 
208 See the Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act of 2006 para 284, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes (accessed on 23 May 2016). A shadow director is defined in 
s 251(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 as “a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act”. The difference between a de facto director and a shadow director 
is that a de facto director assumes to act as a director, and claims and purports to be a director, although never 
actually or validly appointed as such, while a shadow director does not claim or purport to act as a director but in 
fact claims not to be a director (see Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] BCC 161 at 163). 
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whatever name designated” make it clear that the definition of a “director” is wide enough to 
include a de facto director209 and a shadow director.210 Accordingly, if an underage director 
were to act as a director, he would be “occupying the position of a director”, regardless of the 
name by which he is designated. In his capacity as a de facto director or a shadow director, he 
ought not to escape liability for his actions.211  
 
In terms of section 161 of the UK Companies Act of 2006, the acts of a person acting as a 
director are valid notwithstanding that it is afterwards discovered that there was a defect in his 
appointment or that he was disqualified from holding office. The Companies Act 61 of 1973 
contained a similar provision which was not retained in the current Companies Act. Section 
214 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provided that the “acts of a director shall be valid 
notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or 
qualification.”  It is submitted that it would be too disruptive to the running of a company’s 
business and its affairs if the past acts of an underage director were not regarded as valid. It is 
submitted that a provision similar to section 214 of the previous Companies Act 61 of 1973 
and section 161 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 should be inserted in the Companies Act. 
                                                 
209 R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 409; 
Delport New Entrepreneurial Law 124. 
 
210 FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 510. 
 
211 Under s 66(7)(b) of the Companies Act a person becomes entitled to serve as a director of a company when 
that person has delivered to the company a written consent to serve as its director. This would obviously not apply 
to de facto and shadow directors (R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law 425.) Generally a minor can incur contractual liability only if he is assisted by his 
guardian when the contract is entered into (Edelstein v Edelstein 1952 (3) SA 1 (A); RA Jordaan & Davel Law of 
Persons Source Book 143; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 178; Schäfer Child Law in South 
Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives 200; Heaton The South African Law of Persons 89). With regard 
to incurring delictual liability, under the common law minors below the age of seven years are not delictually 
liable, while it is rebuttably presumed that minors between the ages of seven years and puberty (being fourteen 
years for boys and twelve years for girls) are not accountable for their delicts (Weber v Santam 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 (1) SA 381 (A) at 399; RA Jordaan & Davel Law of Persons Source Book 
215). Boys between fourteen and eighteen years of age and girls between twelve and eighteen years of age are 
rebuttably presumed to be delictually accountable. Criminal liability of a minor is governed by the Child Justice 
Act 75 of 2008. The minimum age for criminal accountability, in terms of this Act, is ten years (ss 7(1) and 7(3)). 
A child between the age of ten and fourteen years is rebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity (ss 7(2) and 
7(3)). Such a child would have criminal capacity only if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that when the 
crime was committed the minor had the capacity to appreciate the difference between right and wrong and to act 
in accordance with such appreciation (s 11(1)). A minor over the age of fourteen years is criminally accountable 
in the same way as an adult. On the contractual, delictual and criminal accountability of minors see further RA 
Jordaan & Davel Law of Persons Source Book 215; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 174-
188; Snyman Criminal Law 178-181; Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives 
199-205; Heaton The South African Law of Persons 89-103 and 111-112 and Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 
259-262. 
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6.1.2.2.2  Unemancipated  
 
The Companies Act states that an “unemancipated minor” would be ineligible to be a director. 
The use of the word “unemancipated” implies that if the minor were emancipated, he would be 
eligible to be a director. Thus it is possible under the Companies Act to appoint as a director a 
person under the age of eighteen years, provided such person has been emancipated. Since an 
unemanicipated minor is ineligible to be appointed a director of a company and may be 
removed from office by the board of directors under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, it is 
important to understand what is meant by the term “unemancipated minor”. 
 
A minor is emancipated when he has received the express or tacit consent of his parent or 
guardian to participate in commercial dealings as an economically independent person.212 
Either of the minor’s parents may provide the requisite consent for the minor to act 
economically independently, as long as they have guardianship of the minor.213 Roman-Dutch 
law recognised two forms of emancipation, namely express emancipation and tacit 
emancipation. Express emancipation required a declaration by the minor’s guardian before a 
court to the effect that the minor had been emancipated from parental responsibilities and 
rights.214 By the eighteenth century express emancipation had been replaced by the institution 
of venia aetatis.215 This doctrine was subsequently rendered obsolete by the Age of Majority 
Act 57 of 1972, which has now been repealed. Regarding whether tacit emancipation still forms 
part of our law, in Grand Prix Motors WP (Pty) Ltd v Swart216 the court left this question open, 
but in Watson v Koen h/a BMO217 the court assumed, without deciding the issue, that tacit 
                                                 
212 Dickens v Daley 1956 (2) SA 11 (N) at 13; Grand Prix Motors WP (Pty) Ltd v Swart 1976 (3) SA 221 (C) at 
224; Ex parte Botes 1978 (2) SA 400 (O) at 402; RA Jordaan & Davel Law of Persons Source Book 185; Heaton 
The South African Law of Persons 114. 
 
213 Sections 19 and 20 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
 
214 Schäfer “Young Persons” in Clark Family Law Service para E24. 
 
215 Venia aetatis was a common-law institution whereby the head of state could grant majority status to a person 
older than eighteen years (see RA Jordaan & Davel Law of Persons Source Book 216-224; Du Bois et al Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law 190; Boezaart Law of Persons 92; Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic 
and International Perspectives 20-21 and Heaton The South African Law of Persons 113). Venia aetatis was 
granted in the former Province of the Free State only. It was governed by statute (Chapter 89 of the OFS Wetboek 
1901) (Law Book of the Orange River Colony 1901) and granted by the State President by proclamation in 
the Government Gazette after the High Court had considered the desirability of granting it. 
  
216 1976 (3) SA 221 (C). 
 
217 1994 (2) SA 489 (O). 
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emancipation does remain part of South African law. It is generally accepted that tacit 
emancipation persists in South African law.218 
 
The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 does not contain provisions dealing with emancipation of 
minors. Whether a minor has been emancipated or not is a question of fact to be decided from 
the circumstances of each case.219 Tacit emancipation may be effected only by the express or 
implied consent of the minor’s guardian.220 Relevant facts may be that the minor lives on his 
own and manages his own business, the relationship between the minor and his guardian, the 
nature of the minor’s occupation, and the length of time for which the occupation has been 
pursued independently of parental control.221 It is not essential for the minor to live apart from 
his parents, but stronger evidence would be required to prove tacit emancipation where the 
minor lives with his parents.222  
 
The effect of tacit emancipation on the minor’s capacity to act has not been authoritatively 
decided. There is authority for the view that tacit emancipation gives the minor capacity to act 
in respect of all contracts, save that he cannot alienate or encumber his immovable property 
and he cannot enter into a marriage without his guardian’s consent.223 On the other hand there 
is authority to the effect that the minor is only tacitly emancipated in respect of contracts in 
connection with his particular business.224 The effect of tacit emancipation is a matter of 
degree, and is determined by the guardian’s intention, as evidenced by the circumstances of 
each case.225 The general weight of opinion is that tacit emancipation, in modern times, does 
                                                 
218 See Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 473 and Schäfer “Young Persons” in Clark 
Family Law Service para E24. 
 
219 Dama v Bera 1910 TPD 928; Heaton The South African Law of Persons 114. 
 
220 Watson v Koen h/a BMO 1994 (2) SA 489 (O); Sesing v Minister of Police and Another 1978 (4) SA 742 (W).  
 
221 Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 478-479; RA Jordaan & Davel Law of Persons 
Source Book 185-186; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 191; Heaton The South African Law 
of Persons 114-115. 
 
222 Dama v Bera 1910 TPD 928; Heaton The South African Law of Persons 114-115. 
 
223 Dickens v Daley 1956 (2) SA 11 (N); Watson v Koen h/a BMA 1994 (2) SA 489 (O). 
 
224 Ambaker v African Meat Co 1927 CPD 326; Ahmed v Coovadia 1944 TPD 364; Sesing v Minister of Police 
and Another 1978 (4) SA 742 (W). 
 
225 Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 487; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 192. 
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not result in a minor attaining majority status because an emancipated minor is still not 
competent to enter into a marriage without consent or to alienate or encumber immovable 
property.226 
 
The onus of proving that a minor is emancipated rests on the person who alleges this, and it 
must be proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the minor’s guardian emancipated him, and 
not that the minor considered himself to be emancipated.227 It is not settled whether a guardian 
who has emancipated a minor may legally revoke the emancipation, but the preferred view is 
that since emancipation depends on parental consent, it should be revocable.228 
 
In Ex parte Velkes229 a minor of twenty years old, who wished to be appointed a director of a 
company, applied, with the support of his guardian, for an order declaring that he had become 
emancipated, either tacitly or by express consent, from the parental power of his guardian. 
Section 68bis(1)(a) of the then Companies Act 46 of 1926 disqualified a minor from being 
appointed a company director. The court, per Corbett AJ, did not grant the application for 
emancipation because it found that there was no existing and concrete dispute between persons 
and that it had no jurisdiction under section 19(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 to 
make such a declaration of right.230 In passing, the court cast doubt on whether the order sought 
                                                 
226 Sesing v Minister of Police and Another 1978 (4) SA 742 (W) at 746; Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of 
Persons and the Family 474; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 192; Boezaart Law of Persons 
80.  
 
227 Grand Prix Motors WP (Pty) Ltd v Swart 1976 (3) SA 221 (C) at 222; Watson v Koen h/a BMO 1994 (2) SA 
489 (O) at 492-493; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 191. 
 
228 Dickson v Daley 1929 OPD 19; Ahmed v Coovadia 1944 TPD 364 at 366; Ex parte Van den Hever 1969 (3) 
SA 96 (E) at 99; Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 474; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 
of South African Law 192-193; Boezaart Law of Persons 80; Heaton The South African Law of Persons 115. 
 
229 1963 (3) SA 584 (C). 
 
230 Section 19(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 empowered a court “in its discretion, and at the instance 
of any interested person, to enquire into and determine any existing, future or contingent right or obligation, 
notwithstanding that such person cannot claim any relief consequential upon the determination.” This provision 
was interpreted to mean that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it a court will not deal with or 
pronounce on abstract or academic points of law (Ex parte Velkes 1963 (3) SA 584 (C) at 587).  The court asserted 
that there must be an existing and concrete dispute between persons before it will act under s 19(1)(c) of the 
Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 (at 587). In this case there was no such dispute since the court was merely being 
asked to declare that the applicant had become emancipated, and, in the papers before the court there was no 
indication that any party had disputed that the applicant had become emancipated. The court accordingly held that 
if it were to grant the order asked for it would be making a pronouncement upon an academic point which was 
unrelated to any concrete dispute between persons (at 587). The court accordingly declined to make an order on 
the application (at 588). 
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would remove the minor’s disqualification to be a company director.231 It is accordingly an 
open question under the common law whether tacit emancipation would remove a minor’s 
disqualification to be appointed a director. 
 
It is submitted that it must be taken into account that under section 69(7)(b) of the Companies 
Act an “unemancipated” minor is disqualified to be a company director. Notably, at the time 
that Ex parte Velkes232 was decided the Companies Act 46 of 1926 was applicable, and section 
68bis(1)(a)bis of that Act disqualified a “minor or any other person under legal disability” from 
being appointed a director of a company. No mention was made of an “unemancipated minor” 
in the section. Likewise, the Companies Act 61 of 1973 disqualified a “minor” from being a 
director (in section 218(1)(b)) and did not refer to an “unemancipated” minor. For the first time 
in our statutory company law, an “unemancipated minor” has been disqualified from being 
appointed a director of a company. It is submitted that the express inclusion of the word 
“unemancipated” in section 69(7)(b) of the Companies Act implies that an emancipated minor 
may qualify to be a director.  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, there are different degrees of tacit emancipation, and the 
prevailing view is that tacit emancipation does not, in modern times, result in a minor attaining 
majority status.233 The degree of legal independence which a minor has acquired by tacit 
emancipation will depend on the circumstances of each case, and whether the minor has been 
given complete freedom of action with regard to his mode of living and earning his livelihood, 
or whether the minor’s capacity to act has been restricted to matters connected with his 
business.234 It is therefore submitted that, if a minor has been emancipated, whether or not he 
will qualify to be a director of a company, would depend on the extent of his emancipation. It 
would accordingly have to be ascertained on a case by case basis whether the emancipated 
minor in question would be eligible to be a director of a company.  
 
                                                 
231 Ex parte Velkes 1963 (3) SA 584 (C) at 586. 
 
232 1963 (3) SA 584 (C). 
 
233 See Sesing v Minister of Police and Another 1978 (4) SA 742 (W) at 746; Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of 
Persons and the Family 474 and Boezaart Law of Persons 80. 
 
234 Dama v Bera 1910 TPD 928; Sesing v Minister of Police 1978 (4) SA 742 (W); Heaton The South African Law 
of Persons 115. 
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Should a company appoint an emancipated minor to its board of directors, it must take note of 
the fact that emancipation may be revocable, as discussed above.235 Accordingly, if a director 
or a shareholder becomes aware of the revocation of the emancipation of the minor, such 
director or shareholder must bring the loss of the director’s emancipated status to the attention 
of the company under section 71(3) of the Companies Act. Failure to do so would violate 
section 69(3) of the Companies Act, which prohibits a company from knowingly permitting an 
ineligible person to serve or act as a director.236 
 
While emancipation may not necessarily confer majority status on a minor, marriage by a 
minor, with the consent of his parents, guardian or in certain circumstances, a commissioner of 
child welfare, a judge of the High Court of South Africa or the Minister of Home Affairs, would 
result in the minor attaining majority status.237 It is thus possible for a company to appoint to 
its board of directors a person below the age of eighteen years who is not emancipated but who 
is legally married. Even if such marriage is subsequently dissolved by death or divorce before 
either or both parties reach the age of eighteen years, the status of majority acquired by each 
party to the marriage would endure. This is made clear by section 24(2) of the Marriage Act 
25 of 1961, which states that a minor does not include a person who is under the age of twenty 
one years who had previously contracted a valid marriage that has been dissolved by death or 
divorce.238  
                                                 
235 Dickson v Daley 1929 OPD 19; Ahmed v Coovadia 1944 TPD 364 at 366; Ex parte Van den Hever 1969 (3) 
SA 96 (E) at 99; Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 474; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 
of South African Law 192-193; Boezaart Law of Persons 80; Heaton The South African Law of Persons 115. 
  
236 See para 6.1.1 above where the meaning of “knowingly” as defined in s 1 of the Companies Act is discussed.  
 
237 See ss 24, 24A, 25 and 26 of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961; Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Roux 1978 
(2) SA 856 (A) at 864; RA Jordaan & Davel Law of Persons Source Book 225; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 
of South African Law 189; Boezaart Law of Persons 91; Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and 
International Perspectives 18 and Heaton The South African Law of Persons 113. 
 
238 See further Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives 18-19. It should 
however be noted that a void marriage would not confer majority status on the minor spouses (Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law 189).  Examples of when a marriage would be void would be where the 
marriage was concluded by someone who was not appointed as a marriage officer, or a marriage within the 
prohibited degrees of a relationship. In the case of a voidable marriage there is a valid marriage from the date of 
the marriage. A voidable marriage is one that comes into existence but may be set aside by a court as a result of 
non-compliance with a requirement. Examples of a voidable marriage are a marriage by a minor without the 
consent of his parents, or a marriage by reason of fraud or duress (Joubert “Law of Marriage” in Clark Family 
Law Service para A50). A voidable marriage would confer majority status on the spouses (Schäfer “Young 
Persons” in Clark Family Law Service para E22). Significantly, the annulment of a voidable marriage restores the 
minority status of the minor, unless the age of eighteen has been reached (Berning v Berning 1942 1 PH B26 (W)). 
Accordingly, a company that has appointed to its board of directors a person younger than eighteen years old who 
is married, must pay heed to whether, after such appointment, the marriage dissolves, either by death or divorce 
(in which event the minor will still be eligible to be a director) or by annulment (in which case the minor would 
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6.1.2.2.3  Persons Under a Similar Legal Disability  
 
Section 69(7)(b) of the Companies Act states that an unemancipated minor or a person under a 
“similar legal disability” is ineligible to be a director. The meaning of the phrase “legal 
disability” was expounded in Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Jwara239 where the court 
stated:  
 
 “Persons are under legal disability when, by law, their capacity or ability to relate, as 
 legal subjects, to the legal system, is curtailed. Examples are minors and insolvents that 
 are not  permitted (‘regsonbevoeg’) to perform certain juristic acts. In our law, ‘legal 
 disability’ relates to situations where there is an impediment in law (impendimentum 
 iuris) without narrowing or limiting it to specific circumstances.” 
 
Section 218(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 prohibited a minor “or any other person 
under legal disability” from being appointed or acting as a director of a company. In contrast,   
section 69(7)(b) of the Companies Act prohibits an unemancipated minor or a person “under a 
similar legal disability” (emphasis added) from being a director. Consequently, the legal 
disability which makes a person ineligible to be a director, must now be similar to the legal 
disability which is experienced by a minor. 
 
The relevant capacities in our law are legal capacity, capacity to act and capacity to litigate.240 
Legal capacity is the judicial capacity that vests an individual with legal subjectivity and 
enables him to hold offices as a legal subject.241 Every person has legal capacity but in certain 
                                                 
immediately cease to be eligible to be a director). Of course, if the marriage were void to begin with, then majority 
status would not have been conferred on the minor at all, and such minor would not be eligible to be appointed a 
director of a company. It is of interest that a union solemnised in terms of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 would 
not result in a minor acquiring majority status because persons under the age of eighteen are, by definition, not 
legally permitted to form such a union. The term “civil union” is defined in s 1 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
as meaning the “voluntary union of two persons who are both eighteen years of age or older, which is solemnised 
and registered by way of either a marriage or a civil partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in 
this Act, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others”. Section 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 states that the 
legal consequences of a marriage contemplated in the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 apply, with such changes as may 
be required by the context, to a civil union. It may be that s 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 has extended the 
scope of the provisions that permit the marriage of a minor under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 with the appropriate 
permission, but this is not clear (Schäfer “Young Persons” in Clark Family Law Service para E2). 
 
239 2012 JDR 0204 (GSJ) para 5. 
 
240 See Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Jwara 2012 JDR 0204 (GSJ) para 6; Van Heerden et al Boberg’s 
Law of Persons and the Family 746 and Boezaart Law of Persons 7. 
 
241 Boezaart Law of Persons 7. 
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instances legal capacity is limited. A minor’s legal capacity is limited in that a minor under the 
age of puberty cannot marry,242 and a person under the age of sixteen is not competent to make 
a will.243 An example of a person with a “similar legal disability” as a minor in this respect is 
an unrehabilitated insolvent, who cannot be elected or appointed a trustee of an estate under 
sequestration.244 Capacity to act is the judicial capacity to enter into legal transactions.245 A 
minor has limited capacity to act and must be assisted or represented by his natural or legal 
guardian to enter into legal transactions. An example of a person with a “similar legal 
disability” as a minor in this regard would be a mentally ill person. A curator bonis may be 
appointed to represent the mentally ill person and to enter into juristic acts on his behalf. 
Capacity to litigate is the judicial capacity that enables a person to appear in court as a party to 
a law suit.246 A minor has limited capacity to litigate because while he may sue or be sued, the 
assistance of a parent or guardian is required.247 An example of a person with a “similar legal 
disability” to a minor in this regard would be a person with a mental disability or a person who 
has been declared by a court to be incapable of managing his affairs. A curator ad litem may 
be appointed to assist such persons to litigate.  
 
To sum up, an unemancipated minor (being below the age of eighteen years) is ineligible to be 
a company director. Whether a minor has been emancipated or not is a question to be decided 
from the circumstances of each case. A married minor (provided the marriage is not void) 
would not be ineligible to be a director. Any person with a legal disability which is similar to 
the legal disability which is experienced by a minor (such as an unrehabilitated insolvent and 
a person with a mental disability) is also ineligible to be a company director. 
 
6.1.2.3  Failure to Satisfy any Qualification set out in the Memorandum of Incorporation  
 
In terms of section 69(6) of the Companies Act, the Memorandum of Incorporation of a 
company may set out minimum qualifications for directors of the company, as well as 
                                                 
242 See s 26(1) of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and ss 12(2) and 18(3)(c)(i) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
 
243 Section 4 of the Wills Act 7 of 1953.  
 
244 See ss 55(a) and 58(a) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.  
 
245 Boezaart Law of Persons 7. 
 
246 Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Jwara 2012 JDR 0204 (GSJ) para 6. 
 
247 Van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 748.  
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additional grounds of ineligibility and disqualification of directors. Under section 69(7)(c) of 
the Companies Act a person is ineligible to be a director of a company if the person does not 
satisfy any qualification set out in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. 
Consequently, if a director fails to satisfy any of the additional qualification grounds set out in 
the Memorandum of Incorporation, the board of directors of the company may remove him 
from office under section 71(3) of the Companies Act.  
 
An example of a minimum qualification would be that a director must hold shares in the 
company in order to be eligible to be a director of the company. Additional eligibility 
requirements could be those based on experience, expertise, professional qualifications or 
length of service. The additional qualifications in the Memorandum of Incorporation should in 
principle endeavour to enhance the ability of the board of directors to perform its role 
effectively.248 They should not be used for improper purposes, nor should they be unreasonable 
or unlawful. For example, a qualification that a director must be affiliated to a particular 
political party would be unreasonable, or a qualification that a director must be of a certain 
race, would be discriminatory and unlawful.  
 
The Companies Act does not impose any requirement to the effect that any additional grounds 
of eligibility or disqualification or minimum qualifications to be a director must be reasonable 
and lawful. In contrast, section 8.02(a) of the MBCA, which specifies that the articles of 
incorporation or by-laws may prescribe qualifications for directors, states that these 
qualifications must be reasonable as applied to the corporation, and must be lawful. It is 
submitted that if an additional ground of ineligibility or disqualification or minimum 
qualification provided for in a Memorandum of Incorporation were unreasonable or unlawful, 
it could well be challenged. It is further submitted that, in order to avoid any ambiguity 
regarding the type of permissible qualifications that may be inserted in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company, section 69(6) of the Companies Act should be amended to specify, 
as in section 8.02(a) of the MBCA, that any additional minimum qualification requirements or 
additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification specified in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company, must be both reasonable and lawful.  
 
                                                 
248 See Model Business Corporation Act with Official Comments and Reporter’s Annotations 8-28. 
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The question arises how a director is affected by the introduction of a new ground of 
ineligibility or disqualification or minimum qualification in the Memorandum of Incorporation 
of the company during his term of office.249 The Companies Act does not address this matter. 
It would appear that a director may well immediately cease to be eligible to be a director if a 
new ground of ineligibility or disqualification or a new minimum qualification, which would 
make him ineligible to be a director or disqualify him from office, were to be introduced during 
the term of his appointment. The Companies Act does not contain any provision guarding 
against the introduction of qualification requirements being used for improper purposes, such 
as to remove directors. 
 
Section 8.02(e) of the MBCA guards against the misuse of the introduction of new qualification 
requirements, by stating that a qualification for a director prescribed before a director has been 
elected or appointed may apply only at the time an individual becomes a director or may apply 
during a director’s term, but a qualification prescribed after a director has been elected or 
appointed shall not apply to that director before the end of his term. It is submitted that section 
69(6) of the Companies Act should adopt similar provisions as those contained in section 
8.02(e) of the MBCA. This would prevent the new ground of ineligibility or disqualification 
being introduced and abused as a means to remove a director under section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act.  
 
6.1.3 Grounds of Disqualification as Director 
 
Section 69(8) of the Companies Act sets out the grounds of disqualification to be a director of 
a company. If a shareholder or director alleges that a director has become disqualified to be a 
director of the company, that director may be removed from office by the board of directors 
under section 71(3)(a)(i) of the Companies Act. The difference between disqualification and 
ineligibility is that a disqualification is not absolute. A court has a discretion to permit a 
disqualified person to accept an appointment as a director, but an ineligible person is absolutely 
                                                 
249 The Memorandum of Incorporation of a company may be amended at any time by a special resolution of the 
shareholders if such special resolution is proposed by the board of directors or by shareholders entitled to exercise 
at least ten per cent of the voting rights that may be exercised on such a resolution, or in accordance with any 
other requirements imposed by a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (s 16 of the Companies Act).  
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prohibited from being a director.250 The following persons are disqualified by section 69(8) of 
the Companies Act from being a director of a company: 
 
(i) a person prohibited by a court from becoming a director; 
(ii) a person declared to be delinquent by a court in terms of section 162 of the Companies 
Act or section 47 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984; 
(iii) an unrehabilitated insolvent; 
(iv) a person prohibited in terms of any public regulation to be a director of a company; 
(v) a person removed from an office of trust, on the grounds of misconduct involving 
dishonesty; and 
(vi) a person convicted, in South Africa or elsewhere, and imprisoned without the option 
of a fine, or fined more than the prescribed amount,251 for theft, fraud, forgery, perjury 
or an offence – 
 involving fraud, misrepresentation or dishonesty; 
 in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a company, or 
in connection with any act contemplated in subsection (2) or (5); or 
 under the Companies Act, the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, the Close 
Corporations Act 69 of 1984, the Competition Act 89 of 1998; the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012,252 or 
Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 
2004.253  
                                                 
250 See s 69(11) of the Companies Act which makes provision for a court to exempt a person from the application 
of any provision of s 69(8)(b), which section sets out the grounds upon which a director will be disqualified to be 
a director of a company.  
251 The prescribed amount, in terms of regulation 39(4) of the Companies Regulations, 2011 is an amount of one 
thousand Rand. 
 
252 Section 69(8)(b)(iv)(cc)of the Companies Act refers to the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004, but this Act has 
been repealed and replaced by the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
 
253 Section 69(8)(b)(iv)(cc) refers to the “Prevention and Combating of Corruption Activities Act, 2004”. This is 
an error, and should be a reference to the “Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004”. A 
disqualification in terms of grounds (v) and (vi) listed in para 6.1.3 above ends at the later of five years after the 
date of removal from office or the completion of the sentence imposed for the relevant office, as the case may be, 
or at the end of one or more extensions, as determined by a court from time to time, on application by the CIPC. 
At any time before the expiry of a person’s disqualification in terms of grounds (v) and (vi) listed in para 6.1.3 
above, the CIPC may apply to a court for an extension of the period of disqualification. The court may extend the 
disqualification for no more than five years at a time, if the court is satisfied that an extension is necessary to 
protect the public, having regard to the conduct of the disqualified person up to the time of the application (see 
ss 69(9) and 69(10) of the Companies Act). 
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An “insolvent” is a debtor whose estate is under sequestration.254 An unrehabilitated insolvent 
may apply to court to be rehabilitated, in terms of section 124 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
Alternatively, an insolvent who has not been rehabilitated by a court within a period of ten 
years from the date of sequestration of his estate, will be deemed to be rehabilitated after the 
expiry of ten years, unless a court, upon an application by an interested person, orders otherwise 
prior to the expiry of the ten year period.255 One of the effects of the rehabilitation of an 
insolvent is that it relieves the insolvent of every disability resulting from the sequestration.256 
A court may however impose conditions to the rehabilitation of an insolvent.257 It is 
consequently important for directors and shareholders to take note of any conditions that a 
court imposes in this context, and of whether such conditions affect the capacity of the 
rehabilitated insolvent to be appointed a director of a company. 
 
The term “dishonesty” is referred to twice in section 69(8)(b) of the Companies Act. A person 
who has been removed from an office of trust on the grounds of misconduct involving 
dishonesty is disqualified from being a director,258 as is a person convicted of an offence 
involving dishonesty.259 In Ex parte Bennett260 the court found that dishonesty in its ordinary 
meaning denotes a disposition to deceive, defraud or steal.261 The court stated further that an 
“offence involving dishonesty” is one of which dishonesty is an element or ingredient - in the 
case of a common law offence in terms of its definition, and in the case of a statutory offence 
in terms of the statute which created it.262 An example of an offence involving dishonesty 
                                                 
254 Section 1 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. A “sequestration order” is defined in s 1 of the Insolvency Act 24 
of 1936 as meaning any order of court whereby an estate is sequestrated and includes a provisional order, when it 
has not been set aside. 
 
255 Section 127A(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
 
256 Section 129(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.  
 
257 See s 129(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.  
 
258 Section 69(8)(b)(iii). 
 
259 Section 69(8)(b)(iv)(aa). 
 
260 1978 (2) SA 380 (W) at 383-384.  
 
261 See also Nucsa v Da Ponte 1994 (3) SA 251 (BG) at 256. 
 
262 Ex parte Bennett 1978 (2) SA 380 (W) at 384. See further Nucsa v Da Ponte 1994 (3) SA 251 (BG) at 259. 
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emanates from Nucsa v Da Ponte263 where the court held that illicit diamond dealing was an 
offence involving dishonesty, and that a person convicted of illicit diamond dealing was 
disqualified from acting as a director of a company.264  
 
Section 69(8)(b)(iv)(bb) of the Companies Act states that a person is disqualified to be a 
director of a company if the person has been convicted in South Africa or elsewhere of an 
offence in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a company, or in 
connection with any act contemplated in sections 69(2) or 69(5) of the Companies Act. Section 
69(5) of the Companies Act provides that a person who has been placed under probation by a 
court in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act or section 47 of the Close Corporations Act 
69 of 1984 must not serve as a director except to the extent permitted by the order of probation. 
Section 69(2) of the Companies Act provides that a person who is ineligible or disqualified as 
set out in section 69 must not be appointed or elected as a director of a company, consent to 
being appointed or elected as a director, or act as a director of a company. A reference to section 
69(2) in section 69(8)(b)(iv)(bb) seems peculiar because when the two sections are read 
together, as required by section 69(8)(b)(iv)(bb), they provide that a person is disqualified to 
be a director of a company if he has been convicted of an offence in connection with being 
appointed or elected as a director of a company, or consenting to be appointed or elected as a 
director of a company, or acting as a director of a company, while ineligible or disqualified to 
be a director. This seems circular. It is not clear why the legislature would list as a ground of 
disqualification a person who is convicted of an offence of acting as a director whilst 
disqualified, or being appointed or elected as a director or consenting to being appointed or 
elected as a director whilst disqualified, because the person is already disqualified from being 
a director. Clarity on the reason why the legislature referred to section 69(2) of the Companies 
Act in section 69(8)(b)(iv)(bb) is required.   
 
With regard to an offence in connection with the management of a company, referred to in 
section 69(8)(b)(iv)(bb) of the Companies Act, the Companies Act does not define the phrase 
                                                 
263 1994 (3) SA 251 (BG). 
 
264 Another example of an offence involving dishonesty, as illustrated by Marpro Trawling (Pty) Ltd v Cencelli 
1992 (1) SA 407 (C), is that of bilking, which is where a person leaves a hotel without paying his account. This 
was an offence under s 32 of the now repealed Hotels Act 70 of 1965. The court in this case held that a person 
convicted of bilking had committed an offence involving dishonesty and was disqualified, in terms of 
s 47(1)(b)(iii) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, from taking part in the management of the business of a 
close corporation. 
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“management of a company”. In Ex parte Bennett265 Le Grange J asserted that an “offence 
connected with the management of a company” is one committed by a manager of a company, 
in the course of his management of the company, and which relates to his managing of the 
company. The “management of a company” is said to mean the “collective control, regulation, 
conduct or direction of the affairs of the business”,266 and refers to the participation in the 
management of the whole of the affairs of the corporation.267 Section 15(4) of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 sets out a much wider definition of the meaning of being 
involved in the “management of a company”. The section states that a person is involved in the 
management of a company (for the purposes of section 15 of that Act) if he is concerned, 
whether directly or indirectly, or takes part, in the management of the company.268 “Taking 
part in” and “being concerned in” are broad terms and include activities involving some 
responsibility and participation in the decision-making processes of a company, as opposed to 
                                                 
265 1978 (2) SA 380 (W) at 389-390. 
 
266 Ex parte Jacobson 1944 OPD 112 at 117; Ex parte Bennett 1978 (2) SA 380 (W) at 387. 
 
267 Marpro Trawling (Pty) Ltd v Cencelli 1992 (1) SA 407 (C) at 414. A “manager” was defined in s 1 of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 as meaning any person who is a principal executive officer of the company, by 
whatever name he may be designated and whether or not he is a director. In light of this wide definition, it is 
arguable that if a manager were to manage only a part of the company’s affairs, such as a division, and not the 
whole of the affairs of the company, he would nevertheless be participating in the management of the company if 
he exercises the functions of a principal executive officer in relation to such division (Delport Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 266(2)). 
 
268 Under s 15(1) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 a person is personally responsible for 
all the relevant debts of a company if at any time in contravention of a disqualification order or of s 11 of this Act 
he is involved in the management of the company or, as a person who is involved in the management of the 
company he acts or is willing to act on instructions given without the leave of the court by a person whom he 
knows at that time to be the subject of a disqualification order or to be an undischarged bankrupt. Section 11 of 
the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 makes it an offence for a person who is an undischarged 
bankrupt to act as a director of a company, or directly or indirectly to take part in or be concerned in the promotion, 
formation or management of a company, except with the leave of the court. The UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 consolidates various enactments relating to the disqualification of person from being 
directors of company and from being otherwise concerned with a company’s affairs. The Act replaced provisions 
which were previously found in ss 295-299 of the UK Companies Act of 1985 and ss 12 and 13 of the Insolvency 
Act of 1985. The Act empowers a court to make a disqualification order against a director in various instances. 
These instances include committing an indictable offence in connection with the formation or management of a 
company; persistent failure to comply with the disclosure obligations of the company legislation; the commission 
of fraudulent or wrongful trading; insolvency, and conduct that makes the director unfit to be concerned in the 
management of the company. A disqualification order means that for a specified period, a person may not be a 
director of a company, act as a receiver of a company’s property or in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be 
concerned or take part in the promotion, formation or management of a company unless he has the leave of the 
court, and he may not act as an insolvency practitioner either (see s 1 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986). As part of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015 the provisions 
relating to the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 were introduced in 2015. These provisions 
introduce new grounds for the disqualification of directors, make the disqualification regime more efficient and 
update the matters that courts must take into account when considering whether to disqualify a director. The UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is discussed further in chapter 6, para 3.4.11. 
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routine administrative duties which may be associated with management.269 In Cullen v 
Corporate Affairs Commission270 the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that decision-
making power need not be at the highest level before a person will be considered to be involved 
in the management of the company.  
 
In terms of section 69(6)(a) of the Companies Act the Memorandum of Incorporation may 
impose additional grounds of disqualification of directors. As discussed above with regard to 
the additional grounds of ineligibility which may be imposed in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation,271 such additional grounds of disqualification should be both reasonable and 
lawful. As is the position under section 8.02(e) of the MBCA, in order to guard against the 
misuse of the timing of the disqualification requirements, it is submitted that if an additional 
ground of disqualification is introduced during a director’s term of office, such disqualification 
requirement should not apply to that director before the end of his term. 
 
Under section 71(3)(a)(i) of the Companies Act, a shareholder or director may allege that a 
director of the company has become disqualified in terms of section 69 “other than on the 
grounds contemplated in section 69(8)(a)” of the Companies Act. Section 69(8)(a) of the 
Companies Act has been specifically excluded as a ground of removal that may be raised by a 
shareholder or a director under section 71(3) of the Companies Act. Section 69(8)(a) 
disqualifies a person from being a director of a company if a court has prohibited that person 
to be a director or declared the person to be delinquent, either in terms of section 162 of the 
Companies Act or in terms of section 47 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. In Kukama 
v Lobelo272 the court stated that if a person has been declared delinquent by a court, it is not 
necessary to also order his removal as a director of a company because of the “automatic 
inherent effect” of the order declaring a person to be delinquent.273  It is likely for this reason 
that section 69(8)(a) of the Companies Act has been specifically excluded as a ground of 
removal that may be raised by a shareholder or director under section 71(3)(a)(i) of the 
                                                 
269 French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 710. 
270 (1989) 7 ACLC 121 at 126. 
 
271 See para 6.1.2.3 above with regard to the additional grounds of ineligibility in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation. 
 
272 2012 JDR 0062 (GSJ) para 21. 
 
273 See also Msimang NO v Katuliiba 2012 JDR 2391 (GSJ) para 32 where this was affirmed. 
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Companies Act. In terms of section 69(11) of the Companies Act a court may exempt a person 
from any of the grounds of disqualification set out in section 69(8)(b) of the Companies Act, 
but it may not exempt a person from being disqualified from being a director of a company if 
a court has prohibited that person to be a director or if a court has declared that person to be 
delinquent.274   
6.2  Incapacitated  
 
Under section 71(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act a director may be removed from office by the 
board of directors if he is incapacitated. Before a director may be removed from office on this 
ground, the following requirements must be satisfied: 
 the director must be incapacitated; 
 the incapacity must be to the extent that the director is unable to perform the functions of 
a director; and  
 the director must be unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time.  
 
These requirements are discussed below. 
 
6.2.1  The Director must be Incapacitated 
 
The Companies Act does not define or provide any guidance on the meaning of the term 
“incapacitated” in the context of section 71(3)(a)(ii). The Oxford Dictionary of English defines 
                                                 
274 The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 also automatically disqualifies a person from being a director of a 
company in certain instances. A person is automatically disqualified from managing corporations if the person is 
an undischarged bankrupt (s 206B(3)) or is convicted of certain offences set out in s 206B(1). These offences are 
that a person is convicted of an offence that concerns the making or participation in the making of decisions that 
affect the whole or a substantial part of the corporation’s business, or concerns an act that has the capacity to 
significantly affect the corporation’s financial standing, or an offence that involves dishonesty that is punishable 
by imprisonment for at least three months, or an offence that is a contravention of the Australian Corporations 
Act of 2001 and is punishable by imprisonment for longer than twelve months. Automatic disqualification will 
also occur if a person is convicted of an offence against the law of a foreign country that is punishable by 
imprisonment for longer than twelve months. Directors may also be disqualified by a court order (this is discussed 
further in chapter 6, para 3). A court may disqualify a person from managing corporations for breach of a civil 
penalty provision under s 1317E (see s 206C), or because of involvement in two or more failed corporations in 
the previous seven years (see s 206D), or for repeated contraventions of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 
(see s 206E). Civil penalty provisions include certain duties of company directors, contraventions in relation to 
company financial reports, and contraventions of certain requirements regarding share capital transactions. ASIC 
is also empowered to disqualify a person from managing a corporation where the person has been involved in 
several failed companies (see s 206F). These grounds of disqualification apply equally to directors of public 
companies and private companies. The disqualification of directors under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 
is discussed further in chapter 6, paras 3.4.4 and 3.9. 
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the term “incapacity” as the “physical or mental inability to do something or to manage one’s 
affairs”,275 while “incapacitate” is defined as “prevent from functioning in a normal way.”276  
 
Further guidance on the meaning of the term “incapacity” may be gleaned from the LRA.277 
Section 188 of the LRA recognises that incapacity may be a valid reason for dismissal provided 
that the employer is able to show that the dismissal was for a fair reason and that a fair pre-
dismissal procedure was followed. In order to determine whether or not the reason for the 
dismissal was fair or whether or not the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair 
procedure, one must take into account any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of the 
LRA.278 The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal in Schedule 8 of the LRA (hereafter referred 
to as “the LRA Code of Good Practice”) distinguishes between three types of incapacity, 
namely, poor work performance, ill health and injury.279 In the context of employment law, 
incapacity means that, unrelated to any intentional or negligent conduct or performance, the 
employee is not able to meet the standard of performance required by the employer.280 It 
involves a form of behaviour, conduct or inability which is not intentional or negligent, and 
accordingly, a dismissal based on incapacity is known as a “no-fault” dismissal.281  
 
It is submitted that the reference to “incapacitated” in section 71(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies 
Act would not, as is the case under the LRA, include poor work performance, because the 
section states that the director must be “unlikely to regain that capacity” within a reasonable 
                                                 
275 Oxford Dictionary of English 874. 
 
276 Oxford Dictionary of English 874. 
 
277 The LRA is described in chapter 1, para 2.3. 
278 Section 188(2) of the LRA. 
 
279 Items 9 and 10 of the LRA Code of Good Practice. 
 
280 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 135. See further Grogan Workplace Law 309-316 (a new edition of this 
work has been published but it was not available to me at the time of writing this thesis); Du Toit et al Labour 
Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide; Van Niekerk et al Law@work 293-294 and Bendix Labour Relations: 
A Southern African Perspective 311-312 on the meaning of incapacity in the context of employment law. 
Incapacity must be distinguished from misconduct, which involves situations in which the employee is able to 
comply with the standard of performance required by the employer but either deliberately or through neglect and 
carelessness, fails to do so. The employee is therefore “at fault” (B Jordaan & Stander Effective Workplace 
Solutions: Employment Law from a Business Perspective 142).  
 
281 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 135; McGregor et al Labour Law Rules! 176; Bendix Labour Relations: A 
Southern African Perspective 311; B Jordaan & Stander Effective Workplace Solutions: Employment Law from a 
Business Perspective 73. 
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time. This would not be applicable to incapacity based on poor work performance. Incapacity 
in section 71(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act would, it is submitted, as is the case under the 
LRA, comprise ill health and injury, and in accordance with the definition of the term 
“incapacity” in the Oxford Dictionary of English, as discussed above, it would comprise a 
physical or a mental inability to perform the functions of a director, but not poor work 
performance. 
 
6.2.2  The Incapacity must be to the Extent that the Director is Unable to Perform the 
Functions of a Director 
 
This requirement envisages that the board of directors must consider the extent of the 
incapacity of the director, and whether such incapacity prevents the director from performing 
the functions of a director. If the incapacity does not prevent the director from performing the 
functions of a director, he may not be validly removed from office under section 71(3)(a)(ii) 
of the Companies Act. Section 66(1) of the Companies Act states that the business and affairs 
of a company must be managed by or under the direction of the board, which has the authority 
to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company (save to the 
extent that the Companies Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise).282 Accordingly, the functions of a director, broadly, are to manage the business and 
affairs of a company.  
 
Notably, section 71(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act states that the incapacity must prevent a 
director from performing “the functions of a director”. The provision envisages that the 
functions of the director must be objectively ascertained. If the provision had stated that the 
incapacity must prevent the director from performing “his functions” as a director or that the 
incapacity must prevent the director from performing the functions of “the director” this would 
have been a subjective standard. If the incapacitated director is unable to perform the functions 
of a director, objectively ascertained, and he is unlikely to regain that capacity within a 
reasonable time, he may validly be removed from office by the board of directors.283 
 
                                                 
282 Refer to chapter 2, para 2 where s 66(1) of the Companies Act is discussed. 
 
283 The objective assessment of the functions of a director is discussed in para 6.3.1 below.  
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6.2.3  The Director must be Unlikely to Regain that Capacity within a Reasonable Time  
 
Section 71(3)(a)(ii) does not provide any guidance on what a “reasonable time” would be for 
an incapacitated director to regain his capacity. It is submitted that whether the duration of the 
incapacity is reasonable or unreasonable would depend on the circumstances of each case, and 
particularly whether the director is an executive director or a non-executive director. A non-
executive director is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company and 
his duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodic board meetings.284 
Accordingly, a longer duration of incapacity may be reasonable in the case of a non-executive 
director, compared to that which may be acceptable for an executive director.  
 
Item 10 of the LRA Code of Good Practice distinguishes between temporary and permanent 
illness or injury. If the incapacity is temporary, the employer is required, by item 10(1) of the 
LRA Code of Good Practice, to investigate the extent of the incapacity or the injury. If the 
period of incapacity is likely to be unreasonably long, the employer must investigate all the 
possible alternatives, short of dismissal, before considering dismissal itself. When alternatives 
are considered, relevant factors would include the nature of the job, the period of absence, the 
seriousness of the illness or injury and the possibility of securing a temporary replacement for 
the ill or injured employee.285  
 
In the case of a permanent incapacity, different considerations are relevant. Here, the employer 
is required, in terms of item 10(1) of the LRA Code of Good Practice, to ascertain the 
possibility of securing alternative employment for the employee, or adapting the duties or work 
circumstances of the employee in order to accommodate the employee’s disability. Item 10(3) 
of the LRA Code of Good Practice provides further that both the degree of incapacity and the 
cause of the incapacity are relevant to the fairness of any dismissal. For example, in the case 
of alcoholism or drug abuse, counselling and rehabilitation may be appropriate steps for an 
                                                 
284  In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Limited [1925] 1 Ch 407 at 429; Fisheries Development Corporation 
of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 
156 (W) at 165; Howard v Herrigel and Another NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 678; AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells and Others (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 867; Protect a Partner (Pty) Ltd v Laura Machaba-Abiodun 
and Others [2013] JOL 31048 (LC) para 48. For examples of distinguishing features between executive and non-
executive directors see Esser & Havenga “Directors and Other Officers” in Loubser & Mahony Company 
Secretarial Practice 8-7. See further para 6.3.1 below and chapter 5 paras 2 and 2.1 on executive and non-
executive directors.  
 
285 Item 10(1) of the LRA Code of Good Practice. 
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employer to consider instead of dismissal.286 There is an onerous duty on an employer to 
accommodate the incapacity of an employee who is injured at work or who is incapacitated by 
a work-related illness.287 In ascertaining whether a dismissal arising from ill health or injury is 
unfair, one must consider, in terms of item 11 of the LRA Code of Good Practice, whether or 
not the employee is capable of performing the work. If the employee is not so capable, one 
must consider the extent to which the employee is able to perform the work, the extent to which 
his work circumstances might be adapted to accommodate his disability, or where this is not 
possible the extent to which his duties might be adapted, and the availability of any suitable 
alternative work.288  
 
Since dismissal for incapacity is a form of no-fault dismissal under the LRA the process for 
dismissal is more accommodating and collaborative compared to the process for dismissal on 
the basis of misconduct.289 Items 10 and 11 of the LRA Code of Good Practice, dealing with 
incapacity and dismissals arising from incapacity, aim to provide job security in that they 
compel an employer to consider alternatives before dismissal and to obtain input from the 
employee on alternatives before the employee is dismissed.290 The Labour Courts tend to adopt 
an empathetic approach to incapacity arising from ill health.291 Thus in Spero v Elvey 
International (Pty) Ltd292 the medical evidence indicated that if the employee in question, who 
had suffered from depression and stress, were to take his medication correctly he would be able 
to do his work. The court found that the employee’s incapacity was of a temporary nature. It 
held that the dismissal of the employee by the employer because of his depression had been 
unfair.  
                                                 
286 Item 10(3) of the LRA Code of Good Practice; B Jordaan & Stander Effective Workplace Solutions: 
Employment Law from a Business Perspective 168-169. 
 
287 Item 10(4) of the LRA Code of Good Practice. 
 
288 For a detailed discussion of these factors see B Jordaan & Stander Effective Workplace Solutions: Employment 
Law from a Business Perspective 166-169. 
 
289 McGregor et al Labour Law Rules! 177. 
 
290 McGregor et al Labour Law Rules! 178. For a further discussion on dismissals based on incapacity under the 
LRA see Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 461-472; Van Niekerk et al Law@work 
293-310; Bendix Labour Relations: A Southern African Perspective 311-314 and B Jordaan & Stander Effective 
Workplace Solutions: Employment Law from a Business Perspective 164-186. 
 
291 Nehawu & Another v SA Institute for Medical Research [1997] 2 BLLR 146 (IC) at 149. 
 
292 (1995) 16 ILJ 1201 (IC). 
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It was shown above that incapacity in the employment law context is a form of no-fault 
dismissal. It is submitted that a similar approach should be adopted with regard to removing a 
director from office on the basis of incapacity. The board of directors has a discretion whether 
or not to remove a director from office on the basis of his incapacity,293 and accordingly there 
is scope for the board of directors to consider other alternatives before removing an 
incapacitated director from office. According to section 71(5) of the Companies Act, a director 
who has been removed from office by the board of directors in terms of section 71(3) because 
he is incapacitated or a person who appointed that director as contemplated in section 
66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act may apply to a court within twenty business days to review 
the determination of the board of directors.294 Since the board’s decision to remove a director 
from office on the basis of his incapacity is subject to review by a court, it is important to be 
aware of the policy adopted by the courts to dismissal arising from incapacity, albeit with 
regard to matters of labour law. 
 
On this account, some guidance may be obtained under the LRA with regard to removing a 
director of a company on the ground of incapacity. For instance, before the board of directors 
removes a director on the ground of incapacity, it should consider the degree of the incapacity, 
the cause of the incapacity and the possibility of securing a temporary replacement for the ill 
or injured director. A viable alternative to consider, as directed by the LRA Code of Good 
Practice with regard to employees who are likely to be absent for an unreasonably long time, 
is whether an alternative director may be appointed to serve on the board in substitution for the 
particular director, while he recovers from his incapacity. Section 1 of the Companies Act 
defines an “alternate director” as a person elected or appointed to serve, as the occasion 
requires, as a member of the board of a company in substitution for a particular elected or 
appointed director of that company. An alternate director does not serve as an agent of the 
director who appointed him,295 is subject to all the duties a director owes to the company, and 
must exercise and discharge all the powers and functions of a director.296 An alternate director 
                                                 
293 Section 71(3) of the Companies Act states that the board of directors “may” remove a director whom it has 
determined to be incapacitated.  
 
294 Section 71(5) of the Companies Act is discussed further in chapter 4, para 4.1 and chapter 7, para 2. 
 
295 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Doyle [2001] WASC 187. 
 
296 Markwell Bros Pty Ltd v CPN Diesels (Qld) Pty Ltd (1982) 7 ACLR 425 (SC) (Qld) 433. 
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may only be appointed if the Memorandum of Incorporation makes provision for a director to 
nominate an alternate director to act in his stead and he may act as a director only in the absence 
of the director who appointed him.297   
 
In terms of item 10(2) of the LRA Code of Good Practice, the employer must give the employee 
an opportunity to state his case before the employee is dismissed on the ground of incapacity. 
Section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act similarly gives the director an opportunity to make a 
presentation to the meeting before the resolution for his removal is put to the vote.298 The 
presentation could be to dispute an allegation of incapacity against him, or to dispute whether 
the incapacity renders him unable to perform the functions of a director, or whether he is 
unlikely to regain his capacity within a reasonable time. Considering the fact that incapacity is 
largely a question of fact, the opportunity provided to a director by section 71(4)(b) of the 
Companies Act to make a presentation to the board meeting before his removal, is of 
considerable importance. It is here that a director would be able to provide the board of 
directors with any relevant medical information which may assist in preventing his removal 
from office. 
 
6.2.4  Assessment of Incapacity  
 
Under section 71(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act the assessment whether a director is 
incapacitated to the extent that he is unable to perform the functions of a director, is left in the 
hands of the board of directors. Whether or not a director is incapacitated is a question of fact. 
In certain instances, a medical assessment may be necessary to ascertain whether a director is 
physically or mentally incapacitated. It is imperative that the board of directors does not invoke 
this ground malevolently where tension or conflicts arise between the directors.299 Evidence 
must be presented to substantiate an allegation that a director is incapacitated to the extent that 
he is unable to perform the functions of a director and is unlikely to regain that capacity within 
a reasonable time.300 In light of the fact that the board of directors may not be properly qualified 
in all instances to make an assessment regarding whether or not a fellow board member is 
                                                 
297 Section 66(4)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act. 
298 Refer to para 8.4 below where a director’s presentation to the board meeting is discussed. 
 
299 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 42.  
 
300 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 42.  
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indeed incapacitated and whether he is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time, 
it is submitted that it would be preferable for a medical practitioner or for a court to make this 
assessment.  
 
Under Article 18(d) of the UK Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares and 
Article 22(d) of the Model Articles for Public Companies301 a person will cease to be a director 
if a registered medical practitioner who is treating that person gives a written opinion to the 
company stating that the person has become physically or mentally incapable of acting as a 
director and may remain so for more than three months. Article 18(e) of the Model Articles for 
Private Companies Limited by Shares and Article 22(e) of the Model Articles for Public 
Companies state further that a person ceases to be a director if, by reason of that person’s 
mental health, a court makes an order which wholly or partly prevents that person from 
personally exercising any powers or rights which that person would otherwise have. Under 
these provisions, a registered medical practitioner or the court must be involved in ascertaining 
the physical and mental capabilities of the director in question. In the USA, in the States of 
Ohio,302 California,303 Alaska304 and Pennsylvania305 a director may be removed from office 
by the board of directors if by order of court he is found to be of unsound mind. None of the 
above mentioned jurisdictions leave the determination of the incapacity of a director in the 
hands of the board of directors but they involve a medical practitioner or the court in this 
assessment. 
 
It is submitted that the (South African) Companies Act ought also to require the input of a 
registered medical practitioner or a court in assessing whether a director is indeed incapacitated 
                                                 
301 The Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares and the Model Articles for Public Companies 
are found in Schedules 1 and 3 respectively of the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (which came 
into force on 1 October 2009). The Model Articles automatically form the articles of association for companies 
formed under the UK Companies Act of 2006 which, on their formation, either do not register their own articles 
of association with the Registrar of Companies under that Act, or, if articles are registered, they do not exclude or 
modify the Model Articles in whole or in part (see s 20 of the UK Companies Act of 2006). 
 
302 Section 1701.58 of the Ohio Revised Code, codified in Chapter 1701 (General Corporation Law), Title 17 
(Corporations – Partnerships) of the Ohio Revised Code. 
 
303 Section 302 of the California Corporations Code, codified in Chapter 3 (Directors and Management), Title 1 
(Corporations), Division 1 (General Corporation Law) of the California Corporations Code. 
 
304 Section 10.06.458 of the Alaska Corporations Code, codified in Chapter 10.01 (Alaska Corporations Code), 
Title 10 (Corporations and Associations) of the Alaska Statutes. 
 
305 Section 1726(b) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law.  
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and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time. This would guard against this 
ground of removal being improperly applied in instances where the board of directors is not 
properly qualified to make the relevant incapacity assessment. It would also guard against this 
ground of removal being abused where conflicts arise between the directors. Furthermore, it 
would bring section 71(3)(a)(ii) of the (South African) Companies Act in line with the 
equivalent provisions of the foreign jurisdictions considered that have influenced many of the 
provisions of the (South African) Companies Act. It is, however, important to balance the 
company’s interests with those of the director’s since damage may potentially be done to the 
company by the director pending his assessment by a registered medical practitioner or by a 
court. For this reason it is important to take steps to guard against damage being done to the 
company by the director pending this process. 
 
6.3  Neglected, or been Derelict in, the Performance of the Functions of Director 
 
Under section 71(3)(b) of the Companies Act a further ground which may be raised by a 
director or a shareholder of a company, as a basis to remove a director from office, is that the 
director has neglected or has been derelict in the performance of “the functions of director”. 
These requirements are discussed below. 
 
6.3.1  The Functions of Director 
 
In order for this ground of removal to apply, the director must have neglected or have been 
derelict in the performance of “the functions of director”. The phrase “the functions of director” 
indicates that an objective standard of assessment is used, and not a subjective standard. 
Consequently, in order to ascertain whether a director has neglected or has been derelict in the 
performance of the functions of a director, one would have to ascertain whether he has failed 
to fulfil the functions of a director objectively, and not whether he has failed to fulfil his own 
specific functions as a director of the particular company. 
 
The phrases “perform the functions of director” and “performance of the functions of director” 
are also used in sections 76(3) and 76(4) of the Companies Act. Section 76(3) requires a 
director, when acting in that capacity, to exercise the powers and perform “the functions of 
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director” in accordance with the standards set out in section 76(3).306 Section 76(4) provides 
that in respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the performance 
of “the functions of director”, a particular director of a company will be deemed to have acted 
in the best interests of the company and with the necessary degree of care skill and diligence, 
if he meets the requirements set out in that provision.307 Accordingly, a director is required to 
perform the functions of a director in compliance with the standards of directors’ conduct set 
out in section 76(3) of the Companies Act. He will be deemed to have acted in the best interests 
of the company and with the necessary degree of care, skill and diligence if he complies with 
the requirements set out in the business judgment rule in section 76(4) of the Companies Act. 
While these provisions set out how a director must perform his function of managing the 
business and affairs of the company, the question still remains: what are the functions of a 
director?  
 
                                                 
306 Section 76(3) of the Companies Act is a partial codification of the fiduciary duties of directors. It states that a 
director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director 
in good faith and for a proper purpose, in the best interests of the company, and with the degree of skill and 
diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions in relation to the company 
as those carried out by that director and having the general knowledge, skills and experience of that director (see 
Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 74-80; Delport 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 295-298(7); FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of 
Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 523-528 and 554-561; Mongalo “Directors’ 
Standards of Conduct under the South African Companies Act and the Possible Influence of Delaware Law” 1-
16; Esser & Havenga “Directors and Other Officers” in Loubser & Mahony Company Secretarial Practice 8-23-
8-25 and Mupangavanhu BM “Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Care under Companies Act 2008: Does South African 
Law Insist on the Two Duties being kept Separate?” 148-163. 
 
307 Section 76(4) provides that in respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the 
performance of the functions of director, a particular director will have satisfied the obligations of s 76(3)(b) and 
(c) if: (i) the director had taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the matter; (ii) either the 
director had no material personal financial interest in the subject matter of the decision and had no reasonable 
basis to know that any related person had a personal financial interest in the matter, or the director complied with 
the requirements of s 75 with regard to any material personal financial interest; and (iii) the director made a 
decision or supported the decision of a board committee, with regard to the matter, and the director had a rational 
basis for believing and did believe that the decision was in the best interests of the company. This is known as the 
business judgment rule (see Lombard “Importation of a Statutory Business Judgment Rule into South African 
Company Law: Yes or No?”; Havenga M “The Business Judgment Rule — Should we Follow the Australian 
Example?” 25-37; Kennedy-Good & Coetzee “The Business Judgment Rule (Part 1)” 62-74; Kennedy-Good & 
Coetzee “The Business Judgment Rule (Part II)” 277-292; J Du Plessis “A Comparative Analysis of Directors’ 
Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence in South Africa and in Australia” 263-289; Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 298(18)-298(21); FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI 
Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 563-566; Stevens & De Beer “The Duty of Care and Skill, and Reckless 
Trading: Remedies in Flux?” 250-284; Mongalo “Directors’ Standards of Conduct under the South African 
Companies Act and the Possible Influence of Delaware Law” 1-16; Esser & Havenga “Directors and Other 
Officers” in Loubser & Mahony Company Secretarial Practice 8-26 and Mupangavanhu BM “Fiduciary Duty 
and Duty of Care under Companies Act 2008: Does South African Law Insist on the Two Duties being kept 
Separate?” 148-163). 
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In AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Others308 the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales stated that, apart from statutory functions, the board’s functions are said to be 
usually four-fold: (i) to set goals for the corporation; (ii) to appoint the corporation’s chief 
executive; (iii) to oversee the plans of managers for the acquisitions and organisation of 
financial and human resources towards attainment of the corporation’s goals; and (iv) to 
review, at reasonable intervals, the corporation’s progress towards attaining its goals. 
  
While these may be the general broad functions of the board of directors, it is difficult to state 
with accuracy the functions of a specific director of a particular company. There is no 
profession of directors.309 The functions of a director would vary depending on the type of 
company of which he is a director, the type of director he is, and on the nature of the company’s 
business. For instance, the functions of a director of a public company would differ from those 
of a director of a private company. The board of directors of a public company would be unable 
to manage the company’s day-to-day business to the same extent as the board of directors of a 
private company.310 In a public company the board of directors would delegate certain matters 
to the managers and other staff members while in a private company such matters may be 
attended to by the directors themselves.311 It is submitted that this fact is acknowledged by 
                                                 
308 (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 866-867. 
 
309 In Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 146 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal stated that the proposition that a director of companies is an occupation, trade or profession “is 
by no means obvious.” This was stated in the context of the Supreme Court of Appeal ascertaining whether 
s 162(5) of the Companies Act infringes the constitutional right to freely choose a trade, occupation or profession. 
See chapter 6 para 3.9 where this is discussed further. 
 
310 AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Others (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 866.  
 
311 In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Limited [1925] 1 Ch 407 at 426; AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins 
& Sells and Others (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 866. Individual directors only have such authority as the board delegates 
to them, or that are delegated to them by someone authorised to do so (Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Limited 
(08/20980) [2014] ZAGPJHC 135 (1 July 2014) para 166). In Kaimowitz v Delahunt 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) the 
applicant was an executive director of the company but was informed by the board of directors that, as a result of 
the termination of his employment, his status was reduced to that of a non-executive director, that he would no 
longer be entitled to participate in any management meetings and further, that he would no longer be involved in 
the day-to-day management of the company’s business. As a result of his exclusion from the daily management 
of the company’s business, the applicant launched legal proceedings against the company and its directors. The 
Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town was required to determine the extent to which the powers 
of a director include involvement in the day-to-day management of a company’s business. The court held that the 
board of directors is not required to be engaged in the day-to-day management of the company’s affairs but it 
must monitor the management of the company (para 19). It held further that the overall supervision of the 
management of a company resided in its board of directors, as opposed to individual directors, which may delegate 
such management powers to a managing director and/or to a committee of the board (paras 21 and  27). An 
individual director is accordingly not as of right entitled to participate in the day-to-day management of the 
company’s business (paras 21, 26 and 27). In coming to this conclusion the court (see para 19) relied on the 
Australian cases of Daniels (formerly practising as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607 
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section 66(1) of the Companies Act which states that the business and affairs of a company 
must be managed “by or under the direction of its board”.312 In other words, the board may 
manage the business or affairs of the company directly or it may direct how this is to be done. 
Thus the extent to which the board manages the business or affairs of a company would vary 
from company to company. 
 
By the same token, the functions of an executive director would differ from those of a non-
executive director. An executive director, who is a full-time director and an employee of the 
company, would be more involved in the day-to-day running of the business of a company 
compared to a non-executive director, who is a part-time director, is not an employee of the 
company, and is not involved in the management of the company.313 Non-executive directors 
play an important role in providing objective judgment, and independent of management, on 
issues facing the company.314 They are not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of 
                                                 
and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717. In the former case the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal stated that “[d]irectorial management does not require a detailed inspection of day-
to-day activities, but rather a general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies” (at 667). In the latter case the 
Federal Court of Australia endorsed this sentiment and asserted that “[d]irectors are required to take reasonable 
steps to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management of the company” (para 166).  
 
312 Section 66(1) is discussed further in chapter 2 para 2. Section 66(1) of the Companies Act is very similarly 
worded to s 8.01(b) of the MBCA, which states that “the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed 
by or under the direction, [emphasis added] and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors.” Section 8.01(b) 
of the MBCA was amended in 1974 to include the words “or under the direction of” the board of directors. The 
reason for the amendment was due to increasing concern that the traditional words “managed by the board of 
directors” could be interpreted to mean that directors were required to become involved in the detailed day-to-day 
administration of the company’s affairs (see Model Business Corporation Act with Official Comments and 
Reporter’s Annotations 8-9). It was recognised that, at least for public companies, this language did not accurately 
describe the role of directors (see Olson & Briggs “The Model Business Corporation Act and Corporate 
Governance: An Enabling Statutes Moves Towards Normative Standards” 32). In order to eliminate any 
ambiguity as to the director’s role in formulating management policy, as opposed to direct involvement in the 
day-to-day management of companies, the wording was amended to include the words “under the direction of” 
the board of directors.  The MBCA went further in 2005 and inserted the phrase “subject to the oversight” of the 
board of directors in s 8.01(b) of the MBCA. These words were inserted in s 8.01(b) of the MBCA in order to 
reflect a contemporaneous amendment to s 8.30(b) of the MBCA (dealing with the standards of conduct for 
directors) in order to differentiate between the board’s decision-making functions and its oversight functions (see 
Model Business Corporation Act with Official Comments and Reporter’s Annotations 8-10). 
 
313 See Annex 2.2 and 2.3 of the King III Report where the distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors is set out. 
 
314 See Annex 2.3 of the King III Report. According to the King IV Report non-executive directors may be 
categorised by the board as independent if it concludes that there is no interest, position, association or relationship 
which, when judged from the perspective of a reasonable and informed third party, is likely to influence unduly 
or cause bias in decision-making in the best interests of the organisation (King IV Report, principle 7, 
recommended practice 27).  
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the company, and their duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodic board 
meetings and at other meetings which may require their attention.315  
 
In order to ascertain the functions of a director, it is also necessary to consider the nature of the 
company’s business. The example given in In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Limited316 
is that the position of a director carrying on a small retail business would be very different from 
that of a director of a railway company. Likewise, the functions of a director of a bank may 
differ widely from those of a director of an insurance company, and the functions of a director 
of one insurance company may differ from those of a director of another insurance company. 
In In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Limited317 Romer CJ proclaimed that it “is indeed 
impossible to describe the duty of directors in general terms, whether by way of analogy or 
otherwise.”318  
 
Section 71(3)(b) of the Companies Act, in imposing an objective test, and not a subjective one, 
does not distinguish between the functions of a director of a public, private, personal liability, 
non-profit or state-owned company, or between an executive and a non-executive director, and 
furthermore does not require that the nature of the company’s business be considered in 
ascertaining whether the director in question has neglected or has been derelict in the 
performance of the functions of a director. 
 
In striking contrast, a subjective standard has been imposed with regard to ascertaining the 
delinquency of directors. Section 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act provides that a court 
must make an order declaring a person to be a delinquent director if the person, while a director, 
acted in a manner that amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in 
                                                 
315 In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Limited [1925] 1 Ch 407 at 429; Fisheries Development Corporation 
of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 
156 (W) at 165; Howard v Herrigel and Another NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 678; AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells and Others (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 867; Protect a Partner (Pty) Ltd v Laura Machaba-Abiodun 
and Others [2013] JOL 31048 (LC) para 48. For examples of distinguishing features between executive and non-
executive directors see Esser & Havenga “Directors and Other Officers” in Loubser & Mahony Company 
Secretarial Practice 8-7. See further chapter 5 paras 2 and 2.1 on executive and non-executive directors. 
 
316 [1925] 1 Ch 407 at 426. 
 
317 [1925] 1 Ch 407 at 426. 
 
318 See further AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Others (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 866 where the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales agreed with this dictum in In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Limited 
[1925] 1 Ch 407 at 426.  
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relation to the “performance of the director’s functions within, and duties to, the company.” 
This latter standard is a subjective one because it requires one to assess the performance of the 
particular director’s functions within the specific company. It is odd that the legislature 
imposed an objective standard in section 71(3)(b) but imposed a subjective standard in section 
162(5)(c)(iv)(aa), when both provisions require one to assess the director’s performance and 
whether his performance has been deficient.  
 
It is submitted that, in light of the fact that the functions of a director would vary depending on 
the type of company of which he is a director, the type of director he is, and the nature of the 
company’s business, a subjective standard and not an objective standard ought to be imposed 
in section 71(3)(b) of the Companies Act. A subjective standard should also be imposed in 
section 71(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act in assessing the incapacity of a director.319 It is 
accordingly submitted that sections 71(3)(a)(ii) and 71(3)(b) should be amended to read as 
follows:  
 
“If a company has more than two directors, and a shareholder or director has 
       alleged that a director of the company – 
(a) has become – 
(i) ... 
(ii) incapacitated to the extent that the director is unable to perform 
the functions of a directordirector’s functions within the 
company, and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a 
reasonable time; or  
(b) has neglected, or been derelict in the performance of, the functions of 
directorthe director’s functions within the company,”320 
 
The addition of the words “the director’s functions within the company” in sections 71(3)(a)(ii) 
and 71(3)(b) would make the standard of assessment subjective in that they would require one 
to take into account the type of company, the type of director and the nature of the company, 
in assessing whether the director has neglected or has been derelict in the performance of his 
                                                 
319 See chapter 3, para 6.2.2. 
 
320 The recommended insertions to ss 71(3)(a)(ii) and 71(3)(b) of the Companies Act are underlined, while the 
recommended deletion of specific wording is “struck out.” 
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functions, or to ascertain the extent of his incapacity. The suggested amendment would 
furthermore result in there being consistency between sections 71(3)(b) and 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) 
of the Companies Act. It is essential that there be consistency between these two provisions 
since, as affirmed in section 71(10) of the Companies Act, the right of removal of a director is 
in addition to the right of a person to apply to a court in terms of section 162 of the Companies 
Act for an order declaring a director delinquent.  
 
6.3.2  The Meaning of the Terms “Neglected” and “Been Derelict” 
 
The terms “neglected” and “been derelict” have not been defined in the Companies Act in terms 
of the director’s performance. The precise conduct to which “neglect” and “derelict” relate are 
not clear. It is accordingly necessary to consider other authorities which have defined these 
terms, in order to ascertain the type of conduct that would allow section 71(3) of the Companies 
Act to be legitimately relied upon as a ground for the removal of a director by the board of 
directors.  
 
The Oxford Dictionary of English defines “neglect” as meaning “the failure to do something”321 
while Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases defines the term “neglect” as 
meaning the “omission to do some duty which the party is able to do”.322 One may conceivably 
neglect the functions of a director by acting negligently or by acting intentionally. For example, 
a director may fail to attend to some task which the board requested him to do because he 
forgets to attend to it (which would be a negligent neglect of the functions of director) or a 
director may deliberately and consciously decide not to attend to that task (which would be an 
intentional neglect of the functions of director).  
 
What is the difference in meaning between the terms “neglect” and “derelict”, and does the 
fault element of “derelict” encompass a negligent and/or an intentional act?  The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines the word “derelict” as meaning  to “abandon, forsake”, and it 
defines the term “dereliction” as meaning  the “action of leaving or forsaking (with intention 
not to resume); abandonment” and as “implying a morally wrong or reprehensible 
                                                 
321 Oxford Dictionary of English 1177. 
 
322 James Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases 1668. 
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abandonment or neglect; chiefly in the phr. dereliction of duty.”323 The Collins Dictionary 
defines the term “derelict” as meaning “neglectful of duty or obligation; remiss”, while the 
term “dereliction” is defined as the “deliberate, conscious, or wilful neglect (esp in the phrase 
dereliction of duty)”.324 The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary defines the phrase 
“dereliction of duty” as follows: 
 
 “Failure to perform a duty. Dereliction of duty, or to be derelict in one’s duties, is the 
 failure to perform a duty without excuse or justification for the non-performance.”325 
 
In O’Neill v Printing Industry Employees Union of Australia326 the court stated the following 
with regard to the meaning of the term “dereliction”: 
  
 “The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘dereliction’ as ‘a reprehensible 
abandonment or neglect’, and uses the phrase ‘dereliction of duty’ to exemplify its use. 
We think this phrase in this context involves the notion that not only has a duty not been 
performed but that the non-performance is fairly to be regarded as reprehensible, 
blameworthy, or worthy of censure, as opposed to trivial or due to excusable inadvertence 
or some other extenuating factor.” 
 
It is evident from the above definitions that “derelict” is more serious and blameworthy than 
“neglect”, and that, under a “dereliction” of one’s functions, the neglect of such functions must 
be reprehensible, blameworthy and worthy of censure. It must not be trivial.  
 
What is not clear though is whether the term “derelict” as used in section 71(3)(b) of the 
Companies Act would encompass the fault element of negligence and/or intention. As set out 
above, the Collins Dictionary defines the term “dereliction” as the “deliberate, conscious, or 
wilful neglect (esp in the phrase dereliction of duty)”.327 This envisages that the fault element 
must be that of intention. On the other hand, The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary states 
that “dereliction may be either wilful or negligent”.328  
                                                 
323 The Oxford English Dictionary 497. 
 
324 Collins Dictionary 453. 
 
325 The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary 326. 
 
326 (1965) 7 FLR 488 at 492. 
 
327 Collins Dictionary 453. 
 
328 The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary 326. 
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The phrase “derelict in the performance of the functions of director” is similar to the phrase 
“dereliction of duty”, which is frequently used in the labour law context with regard to the 
conduct of employees. In the labour law context, the term “dereliction of duty” is understood 
to mean an intentional or conscious failure of an employee to do his duty.329 In order for an 
employer to bring a charge of dereliction of duty against an employee there must be an element 
of intent or consciousness on the part of the employee in failing to do his duty.  
 
However it appears from case law that courts envisage that a dereliction of duty may also be 
negligent, and not necessarily intentional. For example, one of the issues before the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Universiteit van Stellenbosch v JA Louw (Edms) Bpk en Andere330 was 
whether a building contractor had committed a negligent dereliction of duty by not properly 
supervising a sub-contractor. In Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v X331 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal found that there was a negligent dereliction of duty by a prosecutor 
in failing to put all the relevant information before the court in a bail application.  
 
It is consequently not clear whether the term “derelict” as used in section 71(3)(b) of the 
Companies Act is to be interpreted in the manner in which it is used in the labour law context, 
that is, with the element of fault being intention, or whether, as defined in The Wolters Kluwer 
Bouvier Law Dictionary in the USA context, a director could be found guilty of being derelict 
in the performance of the functions of director if he had acted negligently.  In the absence of 
any guidelines from the Companies Act, and in light of the fact that a negligent dereliction of 
duty is recognised in our case law, it is submitted that, until the courts clarify this matter, a 
negligent dereliction of duty would suffice as a valid ground of removal under section 71(3)(b) 
of the Companies Act, provided that both the elements of “negligence” and “dereliction” are 
clearly present, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. If these elements are not 
clearly present, then a director or a shareholder under section 71(3)(b) of the Companies Act 
                                                 
329 Israelstam “Dereliction of duty charges must be proven” The South African Labour Guide available at 
http://www.labourguide.co.za/discipline-dismissal/244-dereliction-is-a-serious-offence-know-what-it-is 
(accessed on 8 June 2016). 
 
330 1983 (4) SA 321 (A). 
 
331 2015 (1) SA 25 (SCA). 
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should rely on the ground of “neglect” rather than that of “derelict” as a ground for proposing 
the removal of a director from office.  
 
Due to the vagueness and imprecision of the term “derelict”, until the legislature or our courts 
clarify the meaning of this term, it is important to guard against this ground being invoked 
vexatiously by shareholders or by the directors as a ground for the removal of a director in the 
case of conflicts arising between the shareholders and the directors or between the directors 
themselves. It is further important to guard against this ground being used as a “catch-all” 
ground where cases are pushed into the mould of “dereliction of duty” when they do not really 
fit there.  
 
In National Transport Commission and Another v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd332 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, per Holmes JA, laid down as a general principle that “one does not 
readily impute dereliction of duty to a responsible body”. The “responsible body” in this case 
was the National Transport Commission. This general principle has been applied in several 
subsequent cases and to several other “responsible bodies”. For instance, in Bester v Easigas 
(Pty) Ltd and Another333 the court applied this principle in assessing the decision of an 
arbitrator. In Cape Teachers Professional Association and Others v Minister of Education and 
Others334 the court applied this principle with regard to a decision of the Minister of 
Education.335 It is arguable that a board of directors is likewise a “responsible body” because, 
as set out in section 66(1) of the Companies Act, it is responsible for managing the business 
and affairs of a company and has the authority to exercise all the powers and perform any of 
the functions of the company (save to the extent that this may be restricted by the Companies 
Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation). On this basis and on the basis of the 
principle laid down by the Supreme Court of Appeal in National Transport Commission and 
Another v Chetty's Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd336 that one does not readily impute dereliction of 
                                                 
332 1972 (3) SA 726 (A) at 735. 
 
333 1993 (1) SA 30 (C) at 38. 
 
334 1986 (4) SA 412 (C) at 419-420. 
 
335 See further Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board v David Morton Transport (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 
887 (A) at 895 and South African Allied Workers’ Union and Others v De Klerk NO and Others 1990 (3) SA 425 
(E) at 437-438. 
 
336 1972 (3) SA 726 (A) at 735. 
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duty to a responsible body, it is submitted that the imputation of a dereliction of duty should 
not be readily or lightly made against the board of directors or an individual director. There 
must be a clear and strong basis before the board of directors finds that one of its members has 
been derelict in the performance of the functions of director.  
 
6.4  “Negligence” as a Ground for the Removal of a Director 
 
Section 71(3) of the Companies Act states that if an allegation by a shareholder or a director is 
made against another director the board of directors must determine the matter by resolution 
and that it may remove a director whom it has determined to be “ineligible or disqualified, 
incapacitated, or negligent or derelict, as the case may be” (emphasis added). Curiously, it is 
not neglect but negligence that is referred to in section 71(3) of the Companies Act.  
 
Likewise, section 71(5) of the Companies Act states that if the board of a company has 
determined that a director is “ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated, or has been negligent or 
derelict, as the case may be,” (emphasis added) the director concerned or a person who 
appointed that director as contemplated in section 66(4)(a)(i) may apply within twenty business 
days to a court to review the determination of the board. Again, it is the word “negligent” which 
has been provided for in section 71(5) but this ground is not referred to at all in section 71(3)(a) 
or (b) as one of the grounds for the removal of a director.  
 
Section 71(6)(a) of the Companies Act also provides that if the board of a company has 
determined that a director is not “negligent or derelict” a director who voted otherwise on the 
resolution or a shareholder with voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that 
director may apply to a court to review the board’s determination. A further reference to the 
term “negligent” appears in section 71(6)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act, which states that a court 
may, on an application in terms of section 71(6)(a), confirm the determination of the board of 
directors not to remove the director from office or remove the director from office if the court 
is satisfied that the director is “ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, or has been negligent 
or derelict” (emphasis added). 
 
It is odd that the legislature used the term “negligent” in sections 71(3), 71(5), 71(6)(a) and 
71(6)(b)(ii) instead of the term “neglect”, when the term “neglect” is used in section 71(3)(b) 
as a ground for the proposed removal of a director. The terms “neglect” and “negligent” do not 
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have the same meaning. As discussed earlier, “neglect” refers to the failure to do something337 
or the omission to do some duty which the party is able to do.338 While “neglect” is the act, 
negligence is an element of fault.339  
 
On the wording of section 71(3) read with sections 71(5), or 71(6)(a) or 71(6)(b)(ii), it appears 
that in order to determine if a director has neglected the performance of the functions of 
director, one must ascertain whether he has been negligent in the performance of his functions. 
It is submitted that this would be anomalous because a director could conceivably neglect his 
functions by acting negligently or by acting intentionally, as discussed above. Since the terms 
“neglect” and “negligence” have different meanings, the term “negligent” cannot properly be 
substituted for the term “neglect”, as the legislature seems to have done.  
 
It is not clear whether the legislature has confused the terms “neglect” and “negligent” by 
referring to the term “negligent” in sections 71(3), 71(5), 71(6)(a) and 71(6)(b)(ii) and omitting 
to refer to the term “neglect” in these provisions. In light of the fact that “negligence” is not 
listed as one of the grounds in section 71(3) of the Companies Act, one wonders whether the 
legislature intended to use the term “neglectful” in sections 71(3), 71(5), 71(6)(a) and 
71(6)(b)(ii), but inadvertently used the term “negligence” instead. This confusion must be 
clarified by the legislature. Until this perplexity is clarified, it appears that there may well be 
an additional statutory ground which a shareholder or director may invoke for the removal of 
a director, that is, that the director of the company has been negligent.340   
 
                                                 
337 Oxford Dictionary of English 1177. 
 
338 James Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases 1668. 
 
339 See also Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 274(2). 
 
340 The general test for negligence was authoritatively formulated in Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) at 430 
as follows: (i) would a reasonable person, in the same circumstances as the defendant, have foreseen the possibility 
of harm to the plaintiff; (ii) would a reasonable person have taken steps to guard against that possibility; (iii) did 
the defendant fail to take steps which he should have taken to guard against it? If each part is confirmed, then the 
defendant is said to have failed to measure up to the standard of a reasonable person, and is consequently negligent. 
The criterion of the reasonable man embodies an objective standard of care, but the general approach does not 
exclude allowance being made for subjective and personal characteristics in certain cases (Van der Walt & 
Midgley Principles of Delict 166-167). Conduct is accordingly negligent if a reasonable person in the same 
position as the defendant would have foreseen the possibility of harm and would have taken steps to avoid it, and 
the defendant failed to take such steps (see further Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold 
Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 (1) SA 827 (SCA) and MEC for Education: Mpumalanga v Skhosana (523/11) [2012] 
ZASCA 63 para 10). 
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6.5  Additional Grounds for the Removal of a Director 
 
Section 71(3) of the Companies Act does not state whether the grounds for the removal of a 
director by the board of directors are limited to those provided in that section, or whether a 
company may include any additional grounds of removal in its Memorandum of Incorporation. 
The section also does not give any indication whether the grounds set out in it are the sole 
grounds upon which a director or a shareholder may rely to initiate the removal process of a 
director or whether additional grounds may validly be inserted in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company.  
 
It is arguable that additional grounds for the removal of a director may be included in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation in terms of section 15(2)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act.  This 
provision states that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company may impose on the 
company a higher standard, greater restriction, longer period of time or any similarly more 
onerous requirement than would otherwise apply to the company in terms of an unalterable 
provision of the Companies Act. It is a question of statutory interpretation, but it is arguable 
that additional grounds for the removal of a director could well qualify under section 
15(2)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act on the basis that they impose a higher standard than would 
otherwise apply to the company under section 71(3) of the Companies Act.341 
 
As discussed earlier,342 section 69(6)(a) of the Companies Act states that the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company may impose additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification 
of directors. For example, a company may state in its Memorandum of Incorporation that a 
director will be disqualified to be a director of a company if he is, for more than six months, 
absent without consent of the directors from meetings of directors held during that period. 
Should a director be so absent for more than six months, then a director or a shareholder would 
be entitled to invoke section 71(3)(a)(i) of the Companies Act as a ground for the proposed 
removal of that director from office on the basis that he has become disqualified to be a director. 
In Re London and Northern Bank; McConnell’s Claim343 the court held that for companies 
                                                 
341 See also R Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act” 
157. 
  
342 See chapter 3, para 6.1.2.3. 
 
343 [1901] 1 Ch 251 at 253. 
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which have such a provision in their constitutions, the period of six months commences from 
the date of the first meeting from which the director is absent without the permission of the 
other directors.344 
 
Accordingly, additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification may be inserted by a 
company in its Memorandum of Incorporation, and in this way, additional grounds for the 
removal of a director may indirectly be imposed. Whether additional grounds for the removal 
of a director may be directly inserted in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company, is 
not clear. This must be clarified by the legislature or the courts. 
 
In contrast, most States in the USA which permit directors to remove fellow board members 
do not set out specific or limited grounds for the removal, but state that the removal must be 
“for cause”.345 In other words, there must be sufficient cause for the removal of a director. The 
statutes are silent on the meaning of the term “cause”, but the common law in the USA has 
provided some guidelines on the meaning of this term.  
 
“For cause” means that there must be a justifiable reason for the removal, while “without cause” 
means removal for any reason whatsoever.346 As a general proposition, a director must be guilty 
                                                 
344 The court in Re London and Northern Bank; McConnell’s Claim [1901] 1 Ch 251 (at 253) remarked that the 
words “absent himself” imply voluntary or deliberate absence and do not cover cases of involuntary absence such 
as that caused by illness or due to causes beyond his control. 
 
345 A few States in the USA list specific grounds for the removal of a director. For example, under s 1701.58(B)(1) 
of the Ohio Revised Code a director may be removed from office if by order of court he was found to be of 
unsound mind, or if he was adjudicated to be bankrupt. Under s 1701.58(B)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code the 
directors are further empowered to remove directors from office if, within sixty days or within any other time 
period as is prescribed in the articles or regulations, from the date of the director’s election he does not qualify by 
accepting in writing his election to that office or by acting at a meeting of the directors, and by acquiring the 
qualifications specified in the articles or regulations; or if, for such period as is prescribed in the articles or 
regulations, the director ceases to hold the required qualifications. Under s 302 of the California Corporations 
Code a director may be removed from office by the board of directors if by order of court he is found to be of 
unsound mind or if he has been convicted of a felony. The Alaska Corporations Code also makes provision for a 
director to be removed by the board of directors if he has been declared of unsound mind by a court order (see 
s 10.06.458 of the Alaska Corporations Code). Section 1726(b) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law 
permits the board of directors to remove directors from office under certain specified grounds, unless provided 
otherwise in a by-law adopted by the shareholders. These grounds are (i) the director has been judicially declared 
of unsound mind; or (ii) has been convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than 
one year; or (iii) for any other proper cause which the by-laws may specify; or (iv) if, within sixty days or such 
other time as the by-laws may specify after notice of his selection, he does not accept the office either in writing 
or by attending a meeting of the board of directors and fulfill such other requirements of qualification as the by-
laws may specify. 
 
346 Ferber Corporation Law 40-41. To remove a director without cause all that is needed are sufficient votes for 
the removal.  
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of some abuse of trust or malfeasance or nonfeasance347 in office to justify the removal for 
cause.348 In Fox v Cody,349 the New York Supreme Court held that the removal of a director 
may not be based on whim, caprice, mistake or misunderstanding, but must be based on 
substantial grounds showing breach of trust. For instance, cause will lie if a director accepts a 
managerial or executive position with a direct competitor of the corporation,350 or engages in a 
competing business,351 or allows payment of rebates contrary to the board’s decision,352 or 
harasses fellow officers and employees in the transaction of the company’s business.353 On the 
other hand, a desire to change corporate policy or a mere difference of opinion is not sufficient 
cause,354 nor is a desire to take control of the corporation or a failure to co-operate with the 
president of the corporation.355  The fact that a director has been verbally abusive to other 
directors or has used disrespectful and contemptuous language would also not constitute 
sufficient cause for removal.356  
 
                                                 
347 Malfeasance is a term for an act of wrongdoing or unjust action, but is reserved to depict a serious breach of 
obligation. An act of malfeasance must be knowing and deliberate, otherwise it would constitute misfeasance. A 
misfeasance, or improper performance, is an error in the performance of a duty. A misfeasance is an act or conduct 
that is generally allowed under the law but was not performed according to the required criteria and as a result of 
the error caused harm. In other words, a misfeasance is an improper performance of some essentially lawful act. 
Nonfeasance is a failure to perform an act which one is bound by law to do. It is essentially a failure of a duty, 
particularly by a person who holds public office or a position of trust, such as a fiduciary, to act or to perform a 
task that a reasonable person with such a duty would have performed (see Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary 263; 
The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary 423; The Longman Dictionary of Law 304 and 321).  
348 See Petition of Korff 198 App Div 553 (1921) at 559; Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 356; 
Bolling “Removal of Directors in Closely Held Corporations” 234; Cox & Hazen Corporations 168. 
 
349 141 Misc. 552, 252 N.Y.S 395 (Sup. Ct. 1930) at 554. 
 
350 Eckhaus v Ma 635 F.Supp 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) at 874; Fells v Katz 175 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1931). 
 
351 Fells v Katz 175 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1931). 
 
352 Koppitz-Melchers, Inc v Koppitz 24 N.W.2d 220 (Mich. 1946).  
 
353 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 48; Campbell v Loew’s Inc. 134 A.2d 852 (1957) at 860-861. 
 
354 Bolling “Removal of Directors in Closely Held Corporations” 234. 
 
355 Campbell v Loew’s Inc. 134 A.2d 852 (1957) at 860. The Delaware Court of Chancery in this case stated that 
a desire of directors to take over control of the corporation is a perfectly legitimate objective which is a part of the 
very fabric of corporate existence (at 860). 
 
356 Fuller v the Trustees of the Academic School in Plainfield 6 Conn. 532 (1827) at 546. 
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Several cases have held that the failure of a director to attend board meetings is not sufficient 
cause to remove him from office.357 In Halpin v Mutual Brewing Co358 the Appellate Division 
of New York held that mere neglect to attend directors’ meetings for several months does not 
constitute such a long-continued neglect of duty as to justify removal proceedings, while in 
Alliance Co-op. Ins Co. v Gasche359 the court held that an absence from the State and a failure 
to attend some of the board meetings does not show a refusal to accept the office of director so 
as to authorise the removal. In Petition of Korff360 the New York Appellate Division rejected 
an attempted removal of a director which was based on temporary financial difficulties which 
he was experiencing in his own independent business and on the director’s temporary absence 
from the State. The court found that the director had not been guilty of any act of misfeasance 
or nonfeasance which would justify his removal from office.361 The court was influenced by 
the fact that no business of the corporation had arisen during the director’s absence which had 
required his vote and presence or his signature as an officer when the notice of the meeting was 
given or the meeting itself held.362 In Fuller v the Trustees of the Academic School in 
Plainfield363 too the court found that the refusal of a director to attend meetings of the building 
committee, to which he had been appointed by the board, was insufficient grounds for his 
removal.  
 
The Indiana Business Corporation Law goes so far as to permit the removal of directors by the 
board of directors without cause. Section 23-1-33-8(a) of the Indiana Business Corporation 
Law states that directors may be removed in any manner provided in the articles of 
incorporation. The provision states further that shareholders or directors may remove one or 
more directors “with or without cause unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise.”  
                                                 
357 See for instance Fuller v the Trustees of the Academic School in Plainfield 6 Conn. 532 (1827); Halpin v 
Mutual Brewing Co 20 App Div. 583 (1897); Alliance Co-op. Ins Co. v Gasche 142 P.882 (1914) and Petition of 
Korff 198 App Div 553 (1921). See further Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 356 and Travers 
“Removal of the Corporate Director During his Term of Office” 409. 
 
358 20 App Div. 583 (1897). 
  
359 142 P.882 (1914) at 882. 
 
360 198 App Div 553 (1921). 
361 Petition of Korff 198 App Div 553 (1921) at 559. 
 
362 Petition of Korff 198 App Div 553 (1921) at 559. 
 
363 6 Conn. 532 (1827) at 546. 
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This statute treats the removal of directors by shareholders and by the board of directors in the 
same manner, and permits both groups to remove directors without cause. In Murray v Conseco 
Inc.364 the Supreme Court of Indiana commented that section 23-1-33(8)(a) of the Indiana 
Business Corporation Law is “highly unusual, and perhaps unique to Indiana.”  The Indiana 
Court of Appeals in Murray v Conseco Inc.365 remarked that it had reviewed the corporate law 
statutes of the other USA States and that it had not found any provision concerning the removal 
of directors by the board that is worded as broadly as that of Indiana’s provision. The Supreme 
Court of Indiana did not appear to approve of section 23-1-33(8)(a) of the Indiana Business 
Corporation Law but ruled that in the absence of any constitutional challenge, the wisdom of 
the policy in permitting the board of directors to remove one of its members without cause was 
not for it to resolve.366 It is submitted that to permit the board of directors to remove fellow 
board members without cause would permit directors to remove fellow board members 
arbitrarily and would open the door for potential abuse of this power. For instance, if the board 
of directors were unable to garner sufficient support to pass a certain resolution, they could 
simply remove from office a director who was opposed to their proposed resolution, and they 
could do so without cause. Section 23-1-33(8)(a) of the Indiana Business Corporation Law has 
even been described as being “bizarre”.367 
 
Indiana is not the only State in the USA that empowers directors to remove fellow board 
members without cause, as intimated by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Murray v Conseco 
Inc.368 Section 302A.223(2) of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act and section 10-19.1-
41 of the North Dakota Business Corporation Act also empower directors to remove other 
directors with or without cause.369 However, unlike the Indiana Business Corporation Law, 
section 302A.223(2) of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act and section 10-19.1-41 of the 
                                                 
364 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2003) at 456. 
 
365 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) at 44. 
 
366 Murray v Conseco Inc. 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2003) at 457. 
 
367 Gevurtz Corporation Law at 188. 
368 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.2003). 
 
369 This may be done if the director was appointed by the board to fill a vacancy, the shareholders have not elected 
directors in the interval between the time of appointment to fill a vacancy and the time of removal, and a majority 
of the directors approve the removal. 
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North Dakota Business Corporation Act empower the directors to remove only those directors 
whom they have appointed to fill a vacancy. The board may not remove directors who were 
appointed by the shareholders. 
 
Based on the common law meaning of “cause” in the USA, it is arguable that the threshold to 
justify a removal of a director from office by the board of directors under the (South African) 
Companies Act is lower than that required in many USA States. While in those USA States 
that permit the board of directors to remove fellow board members, a director must be guilty 
of some abuse of trust or malfeasance or nonfeasance in office to justify removal for cause, 
under the (South African) Companies Act this is not a requirement. If a director has neglected 
the functions of director, whether or not such neglect amounts to a breach of trust or 
malfeasance or nonfeasance, would not be relevant. The mere neglect or dereliction of the 
functions of a director are sufficient grounds for the removal of a director. Whilst in the USA 
a director may not be removed from office by the board of directors on the basis of a mistake 
made by the director since, as discussed earlier, a mistake is not regarded as being a substantial 
ground showing breach of trust,370 under the (South African) Companies Act if a mistake were 
the reason for a director neglecting his duties, it would be a sufficient ground for his removal 
from office.  
 
While a failure to attend board meetings would not constitute sufficient cause in most USA 
States, as discussed above, under the (South African) Companies Act a failure to attend board 
meetings would arguably justify the removal of a director on the basis that the director in 
question has neglected or has been derelict in the performance of the functions of director. 
Travers has criticised the findings by courts in the USA that the failure to attend board meetings 
would be insufficient cause for the removal of a director.371 The author contends that although 
a tangible injury would be required if it is sought to remove a director from office in the USA, 
the absence of a tangible injury should not be an obstacle to removing a director for cause.372 
Travers argues further that the failure of the director’s inattendance at board meetings to cause 
                                                 
370 See Fox v Cody 141 Misc. 552, 252 N.Y.S 395 (Sup. Ct. 1930) at 554. 
 
371 Travers “Removal of the Corporate Director During his Term of Office” at 411. 
 
372 Travers “Removal of the Corporate Director During his Term of Office” at 411. 
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injury to the corporation should be irrelevant in determining whether cause for removal 
existed.373   
 
It is evident that the threshold for triggering the removal of a director from office by the board 
of directors is lower in South Africa than in the USA, and that the position of a director of a 
corporation in the USA is more entrenched than that of a director of a company in South Africa. 
The exceptions are the States of Indiana, Minnesota and North Dakota, which permit the board 
of directors to remove directors without cause.  
 
On the other hand, the grounds for the removal of a director in the USA States which permit 
directors to remove fellow board members are much wider compared to the grounds under the 
(South African) Companies Act. The term “cause” is a wide catch-all term. There is scope for 
a broad spectrum of grounds for the removal of a director to fall under this term. In contrast, 
under the (South African) Companies Act the grounds for the removal of a director by the 
board of directors are limited to the grounds explicitly specified in section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act or to additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification specified in the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.  Accordingly if there is a valid reason to remove a 
director from office but this reason does not fall within the scope of the grounds listed in section 
71(3) of the Companies Act, the board of directors would not be able validly to remove the 
offending director from office.  
 
 The USA concept of “good cause” for the removal of a member of the board of directors is 
used in the Armscor Act. In terms of section 8(c) of this statute, a member of the board of 
directors of Armscor must vacate his office if his services are terminated by the Minister of 
Defence and Military Veterans on “good cause” shown. Regarding the meaning of the phrase 
“good cause”, in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others374 the 
Constitutional Court defined the concept as follows:   
 
  “Good cause may be defined as a substantial or ‘legally sufficient reason’ for a choice 
made or action taken. Assessing whether there is good cause for a decision is a factual 
determination dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case at hand. It goes 
without saying that what constitutes good cause must be understood in the context of the 
                                                 
373 Travers “Removal of the Corporate Director During his Term of Office” at 411. 
 
374 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 54. This case is discussed in para 4.3 above. 
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Armscor Act as a whole, with a particular focus on the objectives and functions of 
Armscor and the important role played by the members of the board.”  
 
 In Cohen Brothers v Samuels375 Innes CJ stated, on the meaning of “good cause” that “it is 
hardly possible, and certainly undesirable, for the Court to attempt to” define the term “good 
cause”. The learned judge asserted further that “[n]o general rule which the wit of man could 
devise would be likely to cover all the varying circumstances which may arise . . . [w]e can 
only deal with each application on its merits, and decide in each case whether good cause has 
been shown”.376 It is evident from the above dicta that in order to assess cause, one would have 
to make a determination based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The 
applicable relevant legislation must also be considered as a whole in making this determination, 
as well as the role played by the members of the board of directors.   
 
 Travers points out that despite the importance of the concept of cause for removal in USA 
statutes, sophisticated practitioners and legal scholars have suggested that it is not possible to 
give a meaningful comprehensive definition of the concept of “cause”.377 Most writers confine 
their analysis of the meaning of “cause” to cataloguing instances in which a court has made a 
determination whether a particular ground for removal was sufficient.378 This categorisation 
approach has been criticised by Travers on the ground that the categories are too abstract in 
that they summarise in a word or phrase a complete factual situation, but, at the same time, 
they are not abstract enough because they are unrelated to any principle which would enable 
one to predict the result of a case which does not fit any existing precedent.379  
 
                                                 
375 1906 TS 221 at 224.  
 
376 Cohen Brothers v Samuels 1906 TS 221 at 224. The court was dealing with an application for the extension of 
time within which to appeal based on a Rule of Court providing that leave could be granted on good cause shown. 
See further Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 557 for a discussion of this case in the context 
of s 160(2) of the Companies Act. Section 160(1) of the Companies Act deals with disputes concerning the 
reservation or registration of company names. In terms of s 160(2)(b) of the Companies Act an application in 
terms of s 160(1) may be made on good cause shown at any time after the date of the reservation or registration 
of the name that is the subject of the application. 
 
377 Travers “Removal of the Corporate Director During his Term of Office” at 408-409. 
 
378 See Travers “Removal of the Corporate Director During his Term of Office” 409. 
 
379 Travers “Removal of the Corporate Director During his Term of Office” 409. 
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 As pointed out by the Constitutional Court in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v 
Motau and Others380 “cause” entails a factual determination dependent on the particular 
circumstances of the case at hand. It is difficult to apply a particular category to every situation 
as each situation will differ depending on its particular facts. Consequently a certain category 
may constitute cause in one factual situation, but would not constitute cause in another 
situation. For these reasons it is submitted that a general ground permitting directors to be 
removed for “cause” should not be adopted in section 71(3) of the Companies Act. However, 
in order to ensure that directors may be removed from office by the board of directors in 
appropriate circumstances that do not fall under any of the grounds listed in section 71(3) of 
the Companies Act, it is submitted that the Companies Act should explicitly permit companies 
to insert in their Memorandums of Incorporation additional grounds for the removal of directors 
of office over and above the grounds specified in section 71(3) of the Companies Act. In this 
manner, if any particular type of conduct by a director is considered to be a ground for the 
removal of a director, in light of the nature and particular business of the company, the company 
would validly be entitled to list this ground as an additional ground for the removal of a director 
from office by the board of directors. The option of providing additional grounds for the 
removal of a director by the board of directors is particularly important in light of the fact that 
the term “derelict” has not been defined in the Companies Act, and its meaning is not altogether 
clear, as discussed above. Permitting companies to state specific additional grounds for the 
removal of directors from office by the board of directors would moreover introduce a level of 
flexibility in section 71(3) of the Companies Act that is currently lacking compared to the 
equivalent provisions in the UK, Australia381 and the statutes of many USA States which permit 
directors to remove fellow directors from office.  
                                                 
380 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 54. 
 
381 As is the position under s 71 of the (South African) Companies Act, s 203D of the Australian Corporations Act 
of 2001 (removal of directors in public company by shareholders) does not contain a provision to the effect that 
nothing in the provision would be taken as derogating from any power to remove a director. There is controversy 
in Australia regarding the mandatory nature of s 203D. For instance, in Allied Mining & Processing Ltd v Boldbow 
Pty Ltd 160 FLR 369 (W.A.S.C. 2002) at 378-379 the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that s 203D is 
not mandatory. In Scottish & Colonial Ltd v Australian Power & Gas Company Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1266 para 
37 the New South Wales Supreme Court asserted that it did not agree with this view expressed in Allied Mining 
& Processing Ltd v Boldbow Pty Ltd 160 FLR 369 (W.A.S.C. 2002) and that s 203D is mandatory. See chapter 
3, note 20 and Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.230 at 284-
286 for a discussion on the conflicting views regarding the mandatory nature of s 203D of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001. As discussed (see chapter 3, para 2.2) s 203C of the Australian Corporations Act of 
2001 (removal of directors in private company by shareholders) is a replaceable rule. Consequently, for private 
companies it is possible to displace this rule with a provision in the constitution of the company permitting the 
board of directors to remove a director from office. Thus, with regard to private companies in Australia, there is 
flexibility in that the board of directors may remove directors from office if empowered to do so by the constitution 
of the company. 
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 As suggested earlier, section 71(3) of the Companies Act ought to be an alterable and not a 
mandatory provision.382 A company may “extend”, and not only limit, the effect of an alterable 
provision, according to its definition in section 1 of the Companies Act. If section 71(3) were 
to be an alterable provision, a company would then clearly be empowered to insert specific 
additional grounds for the removal of a director in order to suit the particular needs of the 
company. It is accordingly submitted that if the phrase “Except to the extent that the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise” were to precede section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act, as previously submitted,383 it would enable companies to provide for 
additional specific grounds for the removal of directors to suit their particular needs.  
 
7.  DISCRETION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS TO REMOVE A DIRECTOR 
FROM OFFICE  
 
 Section 71(3) of the Companies Act states that the board of directors “may” remove a director 
whom it has determined to be ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, or negligent or derelict. 
Even though the board of directors is not given a choice whether or not to convene a board 
meeting once an allegation is made by a shareholder or a director under section 71(3),384 the 
board is given a discretion whether or not to remove the director from office.  
 
It is, however, questionable whether the board of directors would have a discretion whether or 
not to remove the director in question in all instances. For instance, if the board of directors 
finds that, on the facts, a director has become ineligible or disqualified to be a director, it is 
submitted that it would not have any discretion whether or not to remove the director in 
question from office. Under section 69(4) of the Companies Act a person who becomes 
ineligible or disqualified while serving as a director of a company, ceases to be entitled to 
continue to act as a director immediately, subject to section 70(2) of the Companies Act.385  
                                                 
382 See para 3 above.  
 
383 Refer to chapter 3, para 3. 
 
384 See chapter 3, para 5 where this is discussed. 
 
385 Section 69(4) of the Companies Act. Section 70(2) of the Companies Act provides that where the board of 
directors has removed a director a vacancy on the board would not arise until the later of the expiry of the time 
for filing an application for review of the decision or the granting of an order by the court on such an application. 
The director would, however, be suspended from office during that time. 
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Therefore, despite the fact that section 71(3) of the Companies Act states that the board may 
remove a director whom it has determined to be ineligible or disqualified it is submitted that if 
the board of directors were to choose not to remove a director whom it has factually determined 
to be ineligible of disqualified, the board would infringe section 69(4) of the Companies Act 
as well as section 69(3) which prohibits a company from knowingly permitting an ineligible or 
disqualified person to serve or act as a director.386 
 
The board of directors may have some discretion whether or not to remove a director whom it 
has found to be incapacitated, or who has neglected or has been derelict in the performance of 
his functions, or who has been negligent. Importantly though, if the board of directors were to 
retain in office a director who has been found to have neglected or to have been derelict in the 
performance of the functions of a director, it may run the risk of being in breach of its fiduciary 
duty to act in the best interests of the company.387 If the board were to retain such a director in 
office, it should record and justify its decision and the reasons for it. 
 
8.  THE PROCEDURE FOR REMOVAL OF A DIRECTOR BY THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS  
 
The removal of a director by the board of directors is often a contentious matter. The board of 
directors must therefore ensure that it follows the proper procedures to remove a fellow board 
member from office so as to avoid recourse being taken by the removed director. The procedure 
to remove a director by the board of directors under sections 71(3) and 71(4) of the Companies 
Act is discussed below. 
 
8.1  Board Resolution  
 
 In terms of section 71(3) of the Companies Act if a director or a shareholder alleges that any 
of the grounds set out in sections 71(3)(a) or (b) are applicable, then the board must determine 
the matter by resolution. It may remove a director whom it has determined to be ineligible or 
                                                 
386 See para 6.1.1 above. 
 
387 See s 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act; Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008” 44 and Masinire “A Critical Analysis of the Role and Protection of Shareholders in the Removal 
of Directors in the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008”1994. The fiduciary duties of directors in removing 
fellow board members is discussed further in chapter 4, para 2. 
 
196 
 
disqualified, incapacitated, negligent or derelict, as the case may be. The director against whom 
the allegation has been made would not, in terms of section 71(3), be permitted to participate 
in the vote on the question of his removal. This is logical, because such a director would 
naturally be inclined to vote against his removal.388 
 
 In the Australian decision in Claremont Petroleum NL v Indosuez Nominees Pty Ltd389 the 
shareholders of a public company purported to remove all the directors of a public company 
and to appoint three directors in their place. A public company, in terms of section 219 of the 
Companies (Queensland) Code, had to have at least three directors on its board of directors. 
The appellant contended that a resolution seeking the removal of all the directors at once was 
invalid because if the resolution were passed it would result in a contravention by the company 
of section 219 of the Companies (Queensland) Code because there would be a moment in time 
when there would in fact be no directors of the company. The court held that if the removal of 
the existing directors were to take effect only on the election of their successors, this difficulty 
of the company not having any directors for a period until new directors were elected, would 
be overcome.390 In line with this dictum, it is submitted that if the removal of a director or the 
removal of one or more directors under section 71(3) of the Companies Act would result in the 
company having fewer than the minimum number of directors on its board of directors, at least 
for a short period of time until new directors are elected or appointed, for practical purposes, 
the resolution should be framed so that the removal would take effect only on the election or 
appointment of the successors, or, in the case of a profit company upon the temporary filling 
of the vacancy by the board of directors in terms of section 68(3) of the Companies Act 
                                                 
388 If a shareholders’ resolution for the removal of a director is in issue, and if the director in question is a 
shareholder, he would be entitled to vote on the question of his own removal in his capacity as a shareholder (see 
also R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 445). 
It is of interest that the provisions of s 75 of the Companies Act (Director’s personal financial interest) do not 
apply to a director in respect of a proposal to remove that director from office as contemplated in s 71 of the 
Companies Act (s 75(2)(a)(ii)). In terms of s 75(5)(d) if a director has a personal financial interest in respect of a 
matter to be considered at a board meeting he must disclose the interest to the board before the matter is considered 
at the meeting and he must leave the meeting immediately after making any such disclosure. The provisions of 
s 75(2)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act are sound because a director who is the subject of a proposal to remove him 
from office must be permitted to be present at the meeting and to make a presentation to the meeting in order to 
defend himself against his proposed removal from office, despite the fact that he has a personal financial interest 
in the matter.   
 
389 [1987] 1 Qd R 1. 
 
390 Claremont Petroleum NL v Indosuez Nominees Pty Ltd [1987] 1 Qd R 1 at 3. 
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(provided this is permitted by the Memorandum of Incorporation of a profit company).391 If 
the resolution were to be framed in this way, the director or directors who have been removed 
could be suspended from office until their successors are elected or appointed or the vacancy 
has been temporarily filled by the directors.  
 
 Section 73(5) of the Companies Act states that, except to the extent that the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise, a majority of the votes cast on a resolution 
is sufficient to approve that resolution. Accordingly, directors of each company may 
themselves decide on the level of support that is required in order for a board resolution to be 
passed to remove a fellow board member from office. Section 65(8) of the Companies Act 
specifically prohibits the threshold for an ordinary resolution for the removal of a director by 
the shareholders to be increased to more than fifty one per cent of the voting rights exercised 
on the resolution, but the legislature did not prohibit the threshold for a board resolution to 
remove a director from being higher than fifty one per cent. Instead, the legislature left it to the 
board of directors to determine the relevant threshold for the board resolution to be passed. 
Accordingly, the percentage of support that would be required in order for a board resolution 
to be passed to remove a director from office would depend on the provisions of the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation and may vary from company to company. The board of 
directors could even decide that a board resolution to remove a director from office must be 
unanimously approved. 
 
It is important to note that the vote of the majority of the directors is a vote of the majority of 
the directors forming a quorum for purposes of the board meeting, and not a vote of the majority 
of all the directors on the board of directors. Section 71(3) of the Companies Act does not 
impose any special quorum requirement for a meeting at which the board removes a director. 
The default position with regard to a quorum for directors’ meetings, in terms of section 
73(5)(b) of the Companies Act, is that a majority of the directors must be present at a meeting 
before a vote may be called at a meeting of the directors. Accordingly, unless the Memorandum 
of Incorporation provides otherwise, only a majority of the directors need to be present to vote 
on the resolution to remove a fellow board member. Of the majority of the board members 
                                                 
391 In terms of s 68(3) of the Companies Act, unless the Memorandum of Incorporation of a profit company 
provides otherwise, the board may appoint a person who satisfies the requirements for election as a director to fill 
any vacancy and serve as a director of the company on a temporary basis until the vacancy has been filled by an 
election of the shareholders. During that period the person so appointed has all of the powers, functions and duties 
of any other director of the company and is subject to all of the liabilities of any other director of the company.  
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present, unless the Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise, a majority of the votes 
cast on the resolution to remove a board member would be sufficient to approve that 
resolution.392 To use an example, in a board comprising ten board members, the default position 
is that six board members must be present to form a quorum, and that four board members 
would be required to approve the board resolution to remove a fellow board member. In this 
example, the approval of less than half of the board members is in effect required to remove a 
fellow board member from office.  
 
In sharp contrast, section 351.317 of the Missouri General Business Corporation Law393 states 
that a director of the corporation may be removed for cause by the action of a majority of the 
entire board of directors if at the time of removal the director has failed to meet the 
qualifications stated in the articles of incorporation or by-laws for election as a director or is in 
breach of any agreement between such director and the corporation relating to such director’s 
services as a director or employee of the corporation. Section 48-18-108(d) of the Tennessee 
Business Corporation Act394 likewise states that, if provided by the charter, any or all of the 
directors may be removed for cause by a vote of a majority of the entire board of directors. 
 
In light of the significance and the gravity of the removal of a director by his fellow board 
members, it would be preferable if a majority of the entire board of directors, and not merely a 
majority of the directors forming a quorum, were to vote in favour of the removal of a fellow 
board member before such resolution is validly passed. This would ensure that all the board 
members consider and participate in the proposed resolution to remove a fellow board member. 
Nevertheless, even if directors are given the option of participating in a board meeting by 
electronic communication,395 it may not always be practical for the entire board of directors to 
                                                 
392 Section 73(5)(d) of the Companies Act. 
 
393 Section 351.317 is codified in Chapter 351 (General and Business Corporations) of the Missouri General 
Business Corporations Law, Title 23 (Corporations Associations and Partnerships) of the Missouri Revised 
Statutes. 
  
394 Section 48-18-108 is codified in Chapter 18 (Directors and Offices), Title 48 (Corporations and Associations 
For-Profit Business Corporations) of the Tennessee Code. 
 
395 Under s 73(3), except to the extent that the Companies Act or a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
provides otherwise, board meetings may be conducted by electronic communication and one or more directors 
may participate in a meeting by electronic communication, so long as the electronic communication facility 
employed ordinarily enables all persons participating in that meeting to communicate concurrently with each other 
without an intermediary and to participate effectively in the meeting. 
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timeously meet in order to vote on the removal of the director in question. If there are valid 
grounds to remove a director from office, it is advisable not to delay the board vote on such 
removal lest any actions of the director in question are detrimental to the company pending the 
board meeting to vote on his removal from office. For this reason it is submitted that a majority 
of the quorum should vote in favour of the removal of the director and not a majority of the 
entire board of directors, as is the case under the Missouri General Business Corporation Law 
and the Tennessee Business Corporation Act, as discussed above. However, in the interests of 
good corporate governance, it is submitted that the entire board of directors ought to use its 
best endeavours to be present at the board meeting to vote on the removal of the director in 
question. 
  
When the shareholders of a company remove a director from office in terms of section 71(1) 
of the Companies Act396 they may exercise their vote to do so in any way they please because 
it is well established that their right to vote is a proprietary right, and that they are entitled to 
exercise their right of property in whatever way they desire.397 Accordingly, a resolution by the 
shareholders to remove a director from office may not be impeached on the ground that it was 
not passed in good faith and in the interests of the company.398 In contrast, when the board of 
directors exercises the power to remove a director it must do so bona fide in the best interests 
of the company and not for ulterior motives.399 Directors who exercise their power to remove 
                                                 
396 In terms of s 71(1) of the Companies Act, a director may be removed by an ordinary resolution adopted at a 
shareholders’ meeting by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director, subject to 
s 71(2). Section 71(2) sets out the procedure that must be followed before the shareholders may consider such a 
resolution.  
 
397 Pender v Lushington (1877) 46 ChD 317 at 319. See further Re HR Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62 at 82; 
Sammel and Others v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 680; Desai and Others v 
Greyridge Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 509 (A) at 519; Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 (PC) at 221; CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another 
[2018] 1 All SA 450 (GJ) and chapter 4, para 2 where this is discussed further.  
 
398 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-285. 
 
399 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206. On the fiduciary duties of directors to act in the best 
interests of the company see Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9; Re Smith & 
Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306; Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank [1970] Ch 62; Regentcrest plc 
(in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 105; Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 
598 (ChD) at 618-619; Liwszyc and Another v Smolarek and Others (2005) 55 ACSR 38 at 46-47; Da Silva and 
Others v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA) para 18 and chapter 4, para 3.1. 
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a director for an improper purpose or for ulterior reasons may be held to be in breach of their 
fiduciary duties.400 
 
Finally, it is important to be aware that section 73(5)(c) of the Companies Act gives each 
director one vote on a matter before the board, unless the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise.  In other words, a director may have more than one vote on 
a matter before the board of directors, if this is specifically stated in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company. If a director were to be given more than one vote on a proposed 
resolution to remove a fellow board member, this would confer substantial influence on the 
director with regard to the proposed removal resolution.401 
 
8.2  Notice of the Board Meeting  
  
 Before the board of directors may consider a resolution to remove a fellow board member, the 
director must be given notice of the board meeting, including a copy of the proposed resolution 
to remove him from office.402  
 
 The resolution to remove a director may not be passed by means of a round robin resolution of 
the directors in terms of section 74 of the Companies Act without holding a formal meeting.403 
Doing so would deprive the director of his entitlement to be heard on the proposed resolution 
to remove him from office before the voting takes place.  
 
Section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act does not specify the notice period of the meeting to 
consider the resolution to remove a director from office. A director who is the subject of the 
                                                 
400 See Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 506; Piercy v Mills [1920] 1 Ch 77; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] 
Ch 254; Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC); Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v 
Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 619; Liwszyc and Another v Smolarek and Others (2005) 55 ACSR 38 
at 47 and chapter 4 para 3.2 on the fiduciary duty of directors to exercise their powers for a proper purpose.  
 
401 The topic of loaded voting rights is discussed further in chapter 5, para 3. 
 
402 Section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
403 In terms of s 74 of the Companies Act, except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise, a decision that could be voted on at a board meeting may instead be adopted by written consent of a 
majority of directors, given in person or by electronic communication, provided that each director has received 
notice of the matter to be decided. A resolution to remove a director from office under s 168 of the UK Companies 
Act of 2006 may not be passed as a written resolution either (see s 288(2)(a) of the UK Companies Act of 2006).  
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board resolution ought at least to receive reasonable notice of the meeting,404 in order to give 
him sufficient time to prepare a presentation to be given to the meeting. In South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu and Another405 the South Gauteng High Court stated 
that fair and reasonable notice to attend a directors’ meeting depends on the circumstances and 
on the structure, practice and affairs of the company.  
 
In contrast, with regard to the removal of a director by the shareholders in terms of section 
71(1) of the Companies Act, section 71(2)(a) states clearly that shareholders are required to 
give the director in question notice of the meeting which is at least equivalent to that which a 
shareholder is entitled to receive, irrespective of whether the director is a shareholder of the 
company. It is noteworthy that section 220(2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 required special 
notice to be lodged with the company of any proposed resolution to remove a director by the 
shareholders. Special notice comprised twenty eight days’ notice, and the company was 
required to give not less than twenty one days’ notice of the meeting to its shareholders.406 The 
UK Companies Act of 2006, which makes provision for a director to be removed by 
shareholders only but not by the board of directors, also requires special notice to be given to 
the company (comprising twenty eight days’ notice)407 of a resolution to remove a director.408 
On receipt of an intended resolution to remove a director under section 168 of the UK 
Companies Act of 2006 the company must forthwith send a copy of the notice to the director 
concerned.409  
 
Under section 203D(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, when the shareholders 
purport to remove a director from office, the director must receive at least two months’ prior 
notice of the removal before the shareholders’ meeting.410 In Scottish & Colonial Ltd v 
                                                 
404 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 163. 
 
405 [2009] 4 All SA 69 (GSJ) para 39. 
406 Section 186(3) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. Under s 62(1) of the Companies Act, unless the Memorandum 
of Incorporation provides otherwise, the notice period for a shareholders’ meeting of a public company is fifteen 
business days while the notice period for a shareholders’ meeting of a private company is ten business days. 
 
407 Section 312 of the UK Companies Act of 2006.  
  
408 Section 168(2) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
409 Section 169(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
410 In terms of s 203D(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, if the company calls a meeting after the 
notice of intention to move the resolution is given, the meeting may pass the resolution even though the meeting 
is held less than two months after the notice of intention is given.  
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Australian Power & Gas Co Ltd411 a director of the Australian Power and Gas Co Ltd 
requisitioned a shareholders’ meeting for the purpose of removing some of the directors of the 
company under the constitution of the company. The director had failed to follow the procedure 
set out in section 203D of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 as he had not given the 
requisite two months’ notice to the directors concerned. The New South Wales Supreme Court 
found that the attempt of the director to remove the directors from office was invalid for failure 
to follow the process in section 203D of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.412 It 
consequently granted an order restraining the company from considering the resolution to 
remove the directors from office.413  
 
In the interests of clarity and to avoid any ambiguity or controversy regarding the notice period 
to be given to a director who is to be removed from office, and to ensure that the notice period 
is fair and reasonable, it is submitted that a director ought to receive notice of the meeting 
which is at least equivalent to the notice period of any board meeting. In terms of section 
73(4)(a) of the Companies Act the board of a company may determine the form and time for 
giving notice of its meetings but such determination must comply with any requirements set 
out in the Memorandum of Incorporation or rules of the company. It is  submitted that a 
provision similar to section 71(2)(a) of the Companies Act must be included in section 71(4)(a) 
of the Companies Act in order to ensure that directors are given notice of the meeting which is 
at least equivalent to the notice period of any board meeting.  
 
In order for the CIPC to record the removal of a director of a company by the board of directors, 
Practice Note 40 of 2015 states that when a director is removed by the board on the grounds of 
being ineligible or disqualified, or due to incapacity, neglect or dereliction, the company must 
lodge with the CIPC proof that a notice was sent to the director concerned with the detailed 
information stated in section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act (that is, a copy of the resolution 
                                                 
411 [2007] NSWSC 1266. 
 
412 Scottish & Colonial Ltd v Australian Power & Gas Co Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1266 para 43. 
 
413 Scottish & Colonial Ltd v Australian Power & Gas Co Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1266 para 45. 
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and a statement of the reasons for the proposed resolution).414 A copy of the meeting attendance 
register must also be lodged with the CIPC.415  
 
8.3  Statement of Reasons 
 
Included in the notice of the meeting must be a copy of the proposed resolution to remove the 
director from office, as well as a statement setting out the reasons for the proposed resolution.416 
The statement of reasons must support the allegation or allegations made against the director. 
They must be set out with “sufficient specificity”417 to reasonably permit the director to prepare 
and present a response. The phrase “sufficient specificity” is not defined in the Companies Act, 
and it is not clear how much detail must be provided in the statement of reasons in order to 
meet the “sufficient specificity” standard. 
 
The meaning of the phrase “sufficient specificity” was considered by the Western Cape High 
Court in Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd.418 The facts, briefly, are that the first and second 
applicants were directors and employees of the company, PB Meat (Pty) Ltd. They had 
resigned as employees of the company but had refused to resign as directors, notwithstanding 
repeated requests to do so and a clause to the contrary in their respective service agreements.  
The clause in question required the applicants to resign as directors on termination of their 
employment and on the request of the company.  The applicants contended that this clause had 
been inserted in their service agreements as a result of a common mistake, but this was denied 
by the company. As a consequence of the refusal of the applicants to resign as directors of the 
company, a director on the board of directors had caused letters to be served upon the applicants 
to attend a meeting of the board of directors. This meeting had been convened to consider a 
proposed resolution to remove the applicants as directors on the basis that they had been 
derelict in the performance of the functions of directors. The statement of reasons for the 
                                                 
414 See para 2 of Practice Note 40 of 2015 entitled “Removal of director in terms of s 71 of Companies Act, 71 
of 2008”. 
 
415 Para 2 of Practice Note 40 of 2015 entitled “Removal of director in terms of s 71 of Companies Act, 71 of 
2008.” 
 
416 Section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act. It is noteworthy that shareholders are not required to furnish reasons 
for seeking to remove a director from office in terms of s 71(1) of the Companies Act. 
 
417 Section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
418 [2013] ZAWCHC 89. 
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proposed removal of the applicants stated that the applicants had unlawfully removed certain 
equipment owned by the company from its premises and had installed such equipment at their 
own premises in order to use it for private purposes; that the applicants had unlawfully disposed 
of equipment owned by the company and had retained the proceeds of such disposal instead of 
paying them to the company, and that the applicants unlawfully had made a secret profit from 
the sale of certain products, which profit ought to have accrued to the company. After the 
receipt of the proposed resolution and statement of reasons, the attorney for the applicants 
delivered an eight page “Request for Further Particulars and Specificity in terms of s 71(4)” of 
the Companies Act.  The company had furnished a written response to the request for further 
particulars.  The applicants, in turn, were of the view that these further particulars fell short of 
what was reasonably required to enable them to prepare a response for their presentation at the 
impending board meeting. The applicants also wished to have sight of certain financial and 
commercial records of the company. 
 
The Western Cape High Court in Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd419 per Cloete J, held that the 
phrase “sufficient specificity” meant “sufficiently detailed reasons to mount a response” to the 
case for the proposed removal.420 The court stated that it is inherent in this formulation that 
each case must ultimately depend upon its own particular facts.421 It found that the allegations 
made in the company’s statement of reasons for the applicants’ removal were quite simple and 
uncomplicated and that there was no suggestion by the company that the applicants were 
“guilty of complex commercial fraud”.422  In light of this finding, the court held that access to 
the financial and commercial records of the company, as sought by the applicants, would not 
assist them in any meaningful way in relation to the allegations levelled against them, and their 
application was refused.  According to the court, the applicants effectively were seeking to 
embark on a “full-scale forensic audit”423 of the company — an ordering of the production of 
the documents was likely to escalate the matter into a “full-blown, costly, elaborate and lengthy 
                                                 
419 [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 10.  
 
420 See Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 43. 
 
421 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 10.  
 
422 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 44. 
 
423 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 45. 
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exercise”424 which, the court asserted, is not what was envisaged by section 71(4)(a) of the 
Companies Act.425 Consequently, the court ruled that the company had met the “sufficient 
specificity” requirement in section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act, and that the applicants had 
been given sufficiently detailed reasons to mount a response to the allegations levelled against 
them.   
 
The principle which emerges from Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd426 is that the more 
complicated the case for the removal of a director, the more detailed the reasons, information 
and documentation must be in order to meet the sufficient specificity standard.427 Accordingly 
in a simple case fewer reasons, information and documentation would be required in order to 
meet the “sufficient specificity” standard. Notably, in interpreting the phrase “sufficient 
specificity” the court did not consider the purposes of the Companies Act, as required by 
section 5(1) of the Companies Act. Section 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act states that one of 
the purposes of the Companies Act is to encourage transparency and high standards of 
corporate governance. Another purpose of the Companies Act, as set out in section 7(j), is to 
encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies. Arguably, these two 
purposes require fairly detailed reasons and information to be provided to a director for his 
proposed removal, even when the allegations made against him are simple and 
uncomplicated.428  
 
It is submitted, in agreement with the court in Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd,429 that section 
71(4)(a) of the Companies Act does not envisage a “full-blown, costly, elaborate and lengthy 
exercise”430 but, at the same time, in order to promote transparency and the efficient and 
responsible management of companies, directors ought to be fully informed of the full and 
                                                 
424 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 45. 
 
425 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 45. 
 
426 [2013] ZAWCHC 89. 
 
427 R Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act” 143-
144. 
 
428 R Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act”145. 
 
429 [2013] ZAWCHC 89. 
 
430 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 45. 
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detailed reasons why the board of directors is considering their removal from office. 
Information should not be withheld from directors on the basis that the allegations made against 
them are simple and uncomplicated.431 In considering the level of detail required in order to 
meet the “sufficient specificity” standard in section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act, it is 
submitted that the board of directors must consider whether they are satisfying the above 
purposes of the Companies Act. 
 
The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 does not require a company to provide a statement 
setting out reasons for the proposed resolution to remove a director from office when a director 
of a private company is removed whether by the shareholders or by the directors, nor when a 
director of a public company is removed by the shareholders. The UK Companies Act of 2006 
likewise does not require a director to be given a statement setting out reasons for the proposed 
resolution to remove him from office. The relevant statutes of those USA States which allow 
the board of directors to remove directors similarly do not make provision for a statement of 
reasons to accompany the notice of the board meeting to be sent to the director in question. 
This requirement seems to be quite unique to the (South African) Companies Act. It is 
submitted that it is an innovative and commendable requirement that enables the impugned 
director to prepare a response to the allegations made against him, prior to the proposed board 
meeting to remove him from office.  
 
8.4  Presentation  
 
Section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act requires that a director be given a reasonable 
opportunity to make a presentation, in person or through a representative, to the board meeting 
before the resolution for his removal is voted upon. The director does not have to give the 
presentation himself; he may be represented by any representative of his choice, including a 
legal representative. The purpose of the presentation is to give the director an opportunity to 
state his case and to ensure that a director is not removed from office on an impulsive vote.432  
 
                                                 
431 For an analysis of Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 see R Cassim “Contesting the Removal 
of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act”133-159. 
 
432 Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 381. 
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In Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others433 the Constitutional Court 
stated that the purpose of sections 71(1) and (2) of the Companies Act on the removal of a 
director by the shareholders was not only to ensure that a majority of shareholders assent to a 
decision to dismiss a director, but also to ensure that those whose interests are materially 
affected by the decisions taken are given an opportunity to put forward relevant information, 
and to ensure that the decision-makers are appropriately informed before making a far-reaching 
decision. The Constitutional Court in this case found that the Minister of Defence and Military 
Veterans had failed to observe the procedure prescribed in sections 71(1) and (2) of the 
Companies Act in terminating the membership of two board members of the board of Armscor 
without first affording the board members a reasonable opportunity to make representations.434 
In light of the fact that the procedures set out in section 71(2) of the Companies Act relating to 
the shareholder removal of a director are almost identical435 to those set out in section 71(4) of 
the Companies Act relating to the board removal of a director, the dictum of the Constitutional 
Court relating to the rationale of section 71(2) of the Companies Act would likewise apply to 
the provisions of section 71(4) of the Companies Act. 
 
With regard to the removal of directors by shareholders under section 220(3) of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973,436 a director was entitled to make written representations in response to the 
proposed resolution to remove him from office. He could also request that his written 
                                                 
433 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 79. 
 
434 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 80. This case is 
discussed further in para 4.3 above. 
 
435 A difference in the procedure between the removal of directors by shareholders (in s 71(2) of the Companies 
Act) and the removal of directors by the board of directors (in s 71(4) of the Companies Act) is that with the 
removal of a director by the board of directors the director in question must be given a statement setting out 
reasons for the proposed resolution. This is not a requirement when the shareholders purport to remove a director 
from office. The other difference is that the shareholders must give the director in question notice of the meeting 
which is at least equivalent to that which a shareholder is entitled to receive. While the board of directors must 
give the director in question notice of the meeting, s 71(4) does not specify the duration of the notice period.  
 
436 Section 220(3) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 stated as follows: 
 
  “Where notice is given of a proposed resolution to remove a director under this section, and the 
director concerned makes representations with respect thereto not exceeding a reasonable length in 
writing to the company and requests their notification to members of the company, the company 
shall, unless the representations are received by it too late for it to do so –  
(a) in any notice of the resolution given to members of the company, state that such 
representations have been made; and  
(b) send a copy of the representations to every member of the company to whom notice of the 
meeting is sent, whether such notice is sent before or after receipt of the representations by 
the company.” 
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representations be circulated to the shareholders of the company. In order for the written 
reasons to be circulated to the shareholders, they had to have been received by the company 
timeously, they could not exceed a reasonable length, and they could not be defamatory.437 In 
addition, a director was entitled to be heard at the shareholders’ meeting on the proposed 
resolution to remove him from office.438 A director was thus given an opportunity to make both 
written representations as well as a verbal presentation regarding his removal from office. 
 
Similarly, in terms of section 169(3) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 directors may make 
written representations in their defence to their proposed removal by the shareholders of the 
company. The written representations must be circulated to the shareholders of the company 
as long as they are not received too late.439 If the written representations are not sent out by the 
company because they were received too late or because of the company’s default the director 
may, without prejudice to his right to be heard orally, require that the representations be read 
out at the meeting.440 Copies of the written representations need not be circulated and the 
representations need not be read out at the meeting if, on the application of either the 
company441 or any other person who claims to be aggrieved, the court is satisfied that the rights 
conferred by section 169 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 are being abused.  
 
Section 203D(4)(a) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 likewise entitles a director to 
present his case to the shareholders by submitting to the company a written statement for 
circulation to the shareholders. In terms of section 203D(5) the written statement must be 
circulated to the shareholders by sending a copy to everyone to whom notice of the meeting is 
sent if there is time to do so. If there is no time to do so, then the statement must be read out at 
the meeting before the resolution is voted on. The statement does not have to be circulated to 
the shareholders if it is more than one thousand words or it is defamatory.442  The director in 
                                                 
437 Sections 220(3) and (5) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.  
 
438 Section 220(2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
 
439 Section 169(5) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
440 Section 169(4) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
441 The court may order the company’s costs on such an application to be paid in whole or in part by the director, 
notwithstanding that he is not a party to the application (s 169(6) of the UK Companies Act of 2006). 
 
442 Section 203D(6) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
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question is also entitled to address the meeting on the proposed resolution, whether or not he 
is a shareholder of the company.443 
 
In contrast, the (South African) Companies Act does not make explicit provision for a director 
to make written representations, irrespective of whether he is to be removed by an ordinary 
resolution of the shareholders in terms of section 71(1) of the Companies Act or by the board 
of directors under section 71(3) or by the Companies Tribunal under section 71(8). Section 
71(4)(b) of the Companies Act states that a director must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
make a “presentation” to the board meeting or the Companies Tribunal, in person or through a 
representative, before the resolution is put to a vote. It is not clear whether the reference to a 
“presentation” in section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act would include a written presentation 
or whether it is confined to a verbal presentation. It is noteworthy that section 220(3) of the 
previous Companies Act 61 of 1973 referred to a director making “representations” with 
respect to the proposed resolution to remove him from office, while section 71(4)(b) of the 
Companies Act (71 of 2008) refers to a director making a “presentation” to the meeting, before 
the resolution is put to the vote. Semantically, there is a difference between a “presentation” 
and “representations”. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the term “presentation” as “a 
speech or a talk in which a new product, idea or piece of work is shown and explained to an 
audience”,444 while “representation” is defined as “formal statements made to an authority, 
especially so as to communicate an opinion or register a protest”.445 This adds to the uncertainty 
whether a “presentation” in section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act includes a written 
presentation. It is arguable that under section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act (71 of 2008) a 
director could make a written presentation to the company and request the company to circulate 
the written presentation to the board prior to the board meeting. Nevertheless the company 
could refuse such a request446 on the basis that section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act envisages 
a verbal presentation only. The issue awaits clarification by the courts. 
 
                                                 
443 Section 203D(4)(b) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
444 Oxford Dictionary of English 1391. 
 
445 Oxford Dictionary of English 1494. 
 
446 See Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 39. 
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There are several advantages to permitting a director to make written representations to be 
circulated to the board members prior to the board meeting. The right to circulate written 
representations confers on the board members an opportunity to consider and reflect on the 
director’s defence before the meeting is convened.447 It gives board members an opportunity 
to investigate the impugned director’s defence and to prepare pertinent questions for him at the 
board meeting in order to satisfy themselves on the merits of his defence. In addition, written 
representations may be more effective than a verbal presentation in a meeting that becomes 
disorderly or rowdy.448 While a director must be given a reasonable opportunity, in terms of 
section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act, to make a presentation to the board meeting before the 
board members vote on the proposed resolution, when a board meeting becomes disorderly, 
unruly or hostile, it would be difficult and ineffective for a director to make a comprehensive 
verbal presentation, particularly where he is representing himself and is not represented by a 
representative.  
 
In light of the advantages of a written representation, it is submitted that, in the interests of 
clarity and certainty, section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act should make explicit provision for 
the right of a director to make written representations to the board meeting, which must be 
circulated to the board members prior to the board meeting. In order to ensure that the option 
of circulating written representations is not abused, it is suggested that, in accordance with 
section 203D(6) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the written representations need 
not be circulated if they exceed one thousand words or if they are defamatory. It is submitted 
further that, as was the case under the Companies Act 61 of 1973, in addition to the right to 
make written representations, a director should also be entitled to make a verbal presentation 
to the board meeting, either in person or through a representative, before the resolution is put 
to the vote. Since the written representations would be circulated to the board of directors only 
(and not to the shareholders) the costs thereof could easily be borne by the director concerned.  
 
Whether the opportunity given to a director or his representative to make a presentation is 
“reasonable” would depend on the facts of each case. The director must be given a fair 
opportunity to address the allegations made against him and the reasons set out in the statement 
                                                 
447 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 50; FHI Cassim “The 
Division and Balance of Power” 163.  
 
448 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 50. 
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of reasons in support of such allegation.  If, for instance, the board of directors were to disallow 
a director to complete his presentation, this would arguably be a violation of the director’s right 
to be given a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation to the board of directors.  
 
Since the purpose of the presentation is to give the director an opportunity to state his case and 
to ensure that he is not removed from office on an impulsive vote, it should address the 
allegations made against the director in the statement of reasons provided to him in terms of 
section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act. As discussed,449 the director concerned must be given 
a statement setting out reasons for the proposed resolution with sufficient specificity to 
reasonably permit him to prepare and present a response. If a director has not been presented 
with a statement of reasons with sufficient specificity to reasonably permit him to prepare for 
and present the presentation to which he is entitled, he could request the company to provide 
him with more detailed reasons, provided he complies with the relevant requirements to do so. 
Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd450 is an example of a case where two directors had requested 
further particulars to be provided to them regarding the reasons for their proposed removal by 
the board of directors. The company had furnished a written response to the request for further 
particulars. The directors were of the view that the further particulars fell short of what was 
reasonably required to enable them to prepare a response for their presentation at the board 
meeting. Their attorney subsequently delivered a request for access to records in terms of 
section 53(1) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. Among the documents 
requested by the directors were the company’s financial statements, stock sheets, purchase 
invoices, value-added tax invoices and monthly management accounts of the company.  
 
The Western Cape High Court, Cape Town found that the documents requested by the directors 
did not have to be produced by the company in order to satisfy the sufficient specificity 
requirement of section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act. The court held that the directors were 
not entitled as of right, in their capacities as directors, to the documents requested by them.451 
The court pointed out that section 26 of the Companies Act did not confer on directors a 
statutory right to inspect the records of a company. The applicants consequently relied on 
                                                 
449 See para 8.3 above. 
 
450 [2013] ZAWCHC 89. 
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section 50 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 in order to be allowed to 
inspect the documents and records of the company.  
 
In terms of section 50(1) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, a requester 
must be given access to any record of a private body if (a) that record is required for the exercise 
or protection of any rights; (b) that person complies with the procedural requirements of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 relating to a request for access to that record; 
and (c) access to that record is not refused in terms of any ground for refusal contemplated in 
Chapter 4 of Part 3 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.452 The High Court 
in Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd453 found that the directors had duly stated the right that they 
wished to protect, which was the right to safeguard their removal as directors from the 
company, and that they had duly set out the information which they required. They had 
however failed to show how the information would assist them in protecting that right.454 It 
was not sufficient for the directors to merely show that they had a prima facie right of 
protection, but the directors also had to explain the relevance of each document on which they 
intended to rely.455 This they had failed to do, and for this reason their request for the documents 
and records of the company was denied. The court found further that the production of the 
documents would not in this case assist the directors in a meaningful way in relation to the 
allegations levelled against them or assist them in exercising or protecting their rights.456 The 
court accordingly ruled that the applicants had been provided with sufficiently detailed reasons 
                                                 
452 In Nova Property Group Holdings Ltd and Others v Cobbett and Another 2016 (4) SA 317 (SCA) para 21 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal remarked that the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 is a general statute 
which regulates access to innumerable types of information held by a wide range of bodies, with various different 
types of interests at stake. For this reason, the court stated, Parliament had to lay down general rules to balance 
the competing interests at stake by means of threshold requirements, grounds of refusal and public-interest 
overrides (para 21). 
 
453 [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 33. 
 
454 For a discussion of the requirements to be satisfied under s 50(1) of the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 2 of 2000, see Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 (3) SA 1013 
(SCA) para 28; Clutchco (Pty) Ltd v Davis 2005 (3) SA 486 (SCA); Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk 2006 (4) SA 436 
(SCA) paras 16 and 30; Claase v Information Officer, South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2007 (5) SA 469 (SCA) 
para 8 and Loest v Gendac and Another 2017 (4) SA 187 (GP) paras 26-29. 
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to mount a response to the allegations levelled against them. Their application for access to the 
additional documents was consequently dismissed.457 
 
As may be seen from the application of the requirements of section 50(1) of the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 in Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd458 the requirements to 
access information of a company are specific and must be strictly complied with. Importantly, 
a director must explain the relevance of each document on which he intends to rely, and show 
that the documents requested would assist him in a meaningful way to respond, in his 
presentation to the board of directors, to the allegations levelled against him. 
 
Directors may also have a common law right to inspect the books and records of a company. 
A court has a discretion whether or not to grant the request to inspect the books and records of 
the company.459 Although the court in Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd460 did not discuss in any 
detail the common law right of inspection given to directors, the court appeared to have 
exercised its discretion against the directors’ request for inspection on the basis that their 
request had been made for an improper purpose.461 The common law of right of inspection of 
the books and records of a company enables a director to perform his duties as a director and 
to fulfil his duties for the benefit of the company.462 Since the books and records of a company 
are a primary source of information on the state of affairs of a company, it follows that unless 
a director has access to these sources of information, he would be inhibited in the proper 
performance of his duties.463 These duties include the protection of the interests of the company 
                                                 
457 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 46. For a discussion of this case and the right of 
directors to inspect the books and records of a company see R Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by 
the Board of Directors under the Companies Act” 133-159.  
 
458 [2013] ZAWCHC 89. 
 
459 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-26. 
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461 See Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 27 where the court found that that the directors’ 
request for documentation was not for the purpose of exercising their powers and performing their functions in 
the best interests of the company but was for the purpose of protecting themselves as individual directors. The 
court held that the directors wished to exercise their powers not for the benefit of the company, as they had 
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462 Conway v Petronius Clothing Co Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 185 at 201-202; Wuu Khek Chiang George v ECRC 
Land Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR 65 para 33; Oxford Legal Group Ltd v Sibbasbridge Services Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 
387 para 23. 
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and its shareholders.464 If a director were to invoke the right to inspect the books and records 
of a company for a purpose other than that of carrying out his duties as a director, this would 
constitute an improper purpose.465  
 
With regard to whether a court would exercise its discretion to permit a director who is about 
to be removed from the board of directors, to inspect the books of a company, in Conway v 
Petronius Clothing Co Ltd466 the Chancery Division asserted that where there is no reason to 
suppose that a director is about to be removed from office, the discretion to withhold an order 
for inspection would be exercised very sparingly. In other words, where a director is about to 
be removed from office, a court may exercise its discretion to withhold an order of inspection. 
The court however did not make a prospective vote of removal an absolute bar to an inspection 
order. Each case must depend on its own special facts.467 The court commented further that it 
is conceivable that in particular circumstances, a court may consider it essential for the 
protection of the company or the personal protection of the director that he be allowed to inspect 
the company's books notwithstanding his impending removal from office.468 
 
Prentice has criticised the legal principle laid down by the court in Conway v Petronius 
Clothing Co Ltd469 and has questioned whether a prospective removal of a director should 
indeed be allowed to curtail his right of inspection.470 Prentice contends that a prospective vote 
to remove a director from office should be ignored when a court exercises its discretion whether 
to grant an order for inspection of the company's books because “often[,] it may be nothing 
more than a tactical move by wrongdoers to stifle a conscientious director”.471 Moreover, as 
Prentice points out, it may well be the case that a director would be able to show that the order 
of inspection is necessary for the protection of the company only after he has perused its 
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books.472 It is submitted that in exercising its discretion to grant an order of inspection under 
the common law, a court must carefully consider whether a prospective vote of removal of a 
director is indeed a tactical manoeuvre to stifle a conscientious director.473 A court must not be 
too hasty in refusing access to the company’s records to a director whose removal has been 
proposed by the board of directors.474 
 
8.5  Procedures in Australia, the UK and the USA in Removing Directors  
 
The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 does not address the procedure for the board of 
directors to remove a fellow board member of a private company. As discussed, the board of 
directors of a public company is prohibited from removing fellow board members, while the 
board of directors of a private company may remove a fellow board member only if authorised 
to do by the constitution of a company.475 Section 203D of the Australian Corporations Act of 
2001 sets out the procedure for the removal of a director of a public company by the 
shareholders of the company but does not address the procedure for the shareholders to remove 
a director of a private company nor for the board of directors to remove a fellow board member 
from office. Presumably, the procedure for the board of directors to remove a director of a 
private company would be set out in the constitution of the company. The procedure would 
therefore vary from company to company. 
 
As is the position under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK Companies Act of 
2006 does not deal with the procedure for the board of directors to remove a director from 
office. Section 168 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 only regulates the procedure that must 
be followed if the shareholders are to remove a director from office. As discussed, the UK 
Companies Act of 2006 does not make provision for the board of directors to remove a fellow 
board member from office but the articles of association of both public and private companies 
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in the UK may make provision for the board of directors to remove fellow board members.476 
Presumably, the articles of association of a UK company would address the procedure for the 
board of directors to remove a fellow board member. As is the case in Australia, such 
procedures would vary from company to company. 
 
Some statutes of the States in the USA that permit the board of directors to remove directors 
from office do not prescribe the procedure to do so at all.477 Other statutes do so to a limited 
extent only. For instance, section 351.317 of the Missouri General Business Corporation Law 
states that notice of the proposed removal must be given to all directors of the corporation prior 
to the removal of the director. Section 8.08(e) of the Massachusetts Business Corporation Act 
and section 48-18-108(e) of the Tennessee Business Corporation Act both state that a director 
may be removed by the directors only at a meeting called for the purpose of removing the 
director, and that the notice of the meeting must state that the purpose or one of the purposes 
of the meeting is the removal of a director. These statutes do not deal with other aspects of the 
meeting or whether the impugned director may be given a hearing and an opportunity to make 
oral or written representations to the board before the removal vote is taken. 
 
It seems, however, that under the USA common law due process must nevertheless be 
followed. For example, in Costello v Thomas Cusack478 the New Jersey Court of Chancery 
voided a proposed amendment to the articles of incorporation authorising “immediate” removal 
of a director for cause on the basis that in proceedings to remove a director the board must act 
judicially. The court held that the board is without power to remove a director for cause without 
giving him a hearing with reasonable opportunity to prepare.479 In Bruch v National Guarantee 
Credit Corp480 the Delaware Court of Chancery stated as follows: 
 
“It is contended that under the statute of this state and the articles of incorporation and by-
laws of this defendant corporation, the board of directors have the power to remove a 
                                                 
476 See para 2.3 above where this is discussed. 
 
477 For example, s 706 of the New York Business Corporation Law, s 7-1.2-805 of the Rhode Island Business 
Corporation Act and s 14A:6:6 of the New Jersey Business Corporation Act do not address the procedure to 
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director for cause. If this be conceded, it cannot be successfully contended that such power 
may be exercised in an arbitrary manner. The accused director would be entitled to be heard 
in his own defense. There was no pretence, in this case, of according to Callans an 
opportunity to be heard in opposition to the proposal that he be removed from his office of 
director.” 
 
Generally, in the USA, if the removal of the director is for cause, notice of the charges and an 
opportunity to the director to defend himself must be given.481 In State v Adams482 the Supreme 
Court of Missouri remarked that when the power to remove directors of a corporation is 
exercised the matter must be decided judicially and fairly. The court stated further that it is 
essential that charges be made and that the director to be removed is notified of his proposed 
removal from office and that he is given a full opportunity for defence.483 In Alliance Co-op. 
Ins Co. v Gasche484 the Supreme Court of Kansas likewise stated that a director of a corporation 
could not be removed without notice and an opportunity to be heard, in the absence of a specific 
provision covering the matter.  
 
Section 71(4) of the (South African) Companies Act regulates in more detail the procedures 
for the board of directors to remove a director from office compared to the equivalent 
procedures in the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK Companies Act of 2006 and 
the statutes of the various USA States that permit the board of directors to remove directors. 
The prescribed procedures in the (South African) Companies Act are clear, binding on all 
companies and standardised for all companies (save to the extent that the notice period for 
board meetings varies for each company and to the extent that the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company alters the alterable provisions relating to the threshold for passing 
board resolutions and the quorum for board meetings).   
 
8.6  Failure to Comply with Procedural Requirements to Remove a Director 
 
The question arises whether a director who is removed by the board of directors under 
procedures that are defective is entitled to be reinstated to the board of directors.  The removed 
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director or any person who appointed that director as contemplated in section 66(4)(a)(i) of the 
Companies Act is entitled, in terms of section 71(5) of the Companies Act, to apply to a court, 
within twenty business days of the decision, to review the determination of the board of 
directors.485  
 
It does not follow that a court would inevitably reinstate a director or award compensation in 
instances where the procedures followed to remove a director from office are defective.486 For 
instance, in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others487 even though the 
Constitutional Court found that the actions of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans 
in removing two directors from the board of Armscor had been unlawful because of the failure 
of the Minister to comply with section 71(2) of the Companies Act, it nevertheless ruled that 
the two board members were not to be reinstated to the board of Armscor. The Constitutional 
Court stated that while the setting aside of the Minister’s decision and the reinstatement of the 
directors or an award of compensation would usually follow from a finding that a dismissal 
was procedurally defective, the exceptional circumstances of the case meant that it would not 
be just and equitable for it to award such remedies in this case.488 The court asserted that despite 
the procedural defects of her decision, the Minister had substantively good and compelling 
reasons for terminating the membership of the two board members,489 who were aware of the 
Minister’s dissatisfaction with their conduct.490 It found further that the relationship between 
the Minister and the two board members who had been removed from office had disintegrated 
irreparably.491 The Constitutional Court ruled that a declaration would be sufficient to address 
the flaws in the Minister’s conduct and to draw the attention of the Minister to the importance 
of complying with the Companies Act and of adopting a fair process in making such 
decisions.492  
                                                 
485 Section 71(5) of the Companies Act is discussed further in chapter 4, para 4.1 and chapter 7, para 2. 
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For these reasons, despite the procedural defects in the Minister’s decision in removing the two 
board members from the board of Armscor, the Constitutional Court held that it would be fair 
and just in the circumstances for the two board members not to be reinstated to the Armscor 
board.493 In light of the fact that the procedures set out in section 71(2) of the Companies Act 
are almost identical to those set out in section 71(4) of the Companies Act, the dictum of the 
Constitutional Court with regard to the application of the procedures in section 71(2) of the 
Companies Act would arguably also apply to the application of the procedures in section 71(4) 
of the Companies Act. 
 
Fletcher comments that even though it is said in the USA that in proceedings to remove a 
director the board must act judicially,494 it is well-settled that in proceedings for the removal 
of a director, the directors are not bound to act with the strict regularity required in judicial 
proceedings.495 In State ex rel. Blackwood v Brast496 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia stated as follows: 
 
“It is well settled that corporate bodies, in the proceedings taken for the removal of a director, 
or an officer in a corporation, are not bound to act with strict regularity which obtains in 
judicial proceedings, but that the courts will limit themselves to inquiring whether they have 
acted within their powers after giving notice to the accused and affording him opportunity of 
making his defense, and whether they have exercised their powers fairly and in good faith. 
All questions beyond this are questions of which the courts have no cognizance.” 
 
9.  REMOVAL OF A DIRECTOR BY THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL 
 
If a company has fewer than three directors the board of directors may not remove a director 
from office and section 71(3) of the Companies Act would not apply to that company.497 
Instead, any director or shareholder may apply to the Companies Tribunal for a determination 
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concerning the removal of a director from office.498 Since a public company, a state-owned 
company and a non-profit company must have at least three directors on their board of 
directors,499 the Companies Tribunal would not determine whether a director may be removed 
from office in such companies, unless such companies for some reason fail to have the requisite 
number of directors on their board of directors.500 The removal of directors of private 
companies and personal liability companies which have two directors on their board of 
directors would be determined by the Companies Tribunal. 
 
In any circumstances contemplated in section 71(3) of the Companies Act, that is, where a 
director has become ineligible or disqualified to be a director, incapacitated, has neglected or 
has been derelict in the performance of the functions of a director, or has been negligent, a 
director or a shareholder of the company may apply to the Companies Tribunal for a 
determination whether the director in question should be removed from office.501 Sections 
71(4), 71(5) and 71(6) of the Companies Act, read with the changes required by the context, 
would apply to the determination of this matter by the Companies Tribunal.502 Accordingly, 
the director concerned must receive notice of the meeting, a copy of the proposed removal 
resolution and a statement setting out the reasons for the removal resolution with sufficient 
specificity to reasonably permit him to prepare and present a response. The impugned director 
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation to the Companies Tribunal, 
                                                 
498 Section 71(8)(b) of the Companies Act. The procedure to file an application for the removal of a director from 
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personally or through a representative, before the Companies Tribunal determines the matter.503 
If the Companies Tribunal removes the director from office, the director or a person who 
appointed that director as contemplated in section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act, may apply 
to court within twenty business days to review the decision of the Companies Tribunal.504  
 
If the Companies Tribunal decides not to remove the director from office then a shareholder 
with voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director may apply to court to 
review the decision of the Companies Tribunal.505 On such an application, the court may 
confirm the decision of the Companies Tribunal not to remove the director from office or it 
may decide to remove the director from office if it finds that any of the relevant grounds for 
the removal of a director under section 71(3) are applicable.506  It should be noted that section 
71(6)(a) states that “any director who voted otherwise on the resolution” may apply to court to 
review the determination by the board not to remove the director in office. If this provision 
were applied to the removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal, it becomes unclear 
whether the remaining director in the company (whose removal is not in issue) may apply to 
court to review the determination of the Companies Tribunal, or whether only a shareholder 
may do so.507 This is because the remaining director would not have “voted otherwise on the 
resolution” because the matter would have been determined by the Companies Tribunal and 
not by the directors.  
 
In Talisman Compressed Air (Pty) Ltd v Dykman508 the court affirmed the right of a director or 
a shareholder to apply to the Companies Tribunal to determine whether a director was guilty 
of neglect or dereliction.509 The court stated that this right to apply to the Companies Tribunal 
is “subject to the right of any party, as provided in subsection (6), to review the determination 
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by a court of law.”510 The word “any” may be interpreted to indicate that the remaining director 
of the company may also apply to a court to review the determination of the Companies 
Tribunal by a court of law. It must be conceded though that whether or not the remaining 
director may apply to court to review the determination of the Companies Tribunal was not in 
issue before the court. Undue weight should not therefore be attached to this obiter dicta of the 
court. It is submitted that in light of the fact that section 71(8)(c) of the Companies Act states 
that section 71(6) would apply to the determination of the removal of a director by the 
Companies Tribunal as “read with the changes required by the context” the remaining director 
ought to have the right to apply to court to review the determination of the Companies Tribunal 
in this regard. Clarity is, however, required on this point by either the legislature or the court. 
 
Section 70(2) of the Companies Act states that if the board of a company has removed a director 
in terms of section 71(3) of the Companies Act a vacancy on the board would not arise until 
the later of the expiry of the time for filing an application for a review of the board’s decision 
in terms of section 71(5) of the Companies Act (which time period is twenty business days), or 
the granting of an order by the court on such an application. The director would, however, be 
suspended from office during that time. The legislature did not impose a similar requirement 
with regard to the removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal.511 This may well be an 
oversight.512 In the interests of clarity and consistency and to remove any ambiguity, it is 
submitted that section 70(2) of the Companies Act must be amended to include a reference to 
a removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal in terms of section 71(8) of the Companies 
Act.513 
 
Section 158(b)(i) of the Companies Act requires the Companies Tribunal to promote the “spirit, 
purpose and objects” of the Companies Act when determining any matter brought before it in 
terms of the Companies Act or when making an order contemplated in the Companies Act.514 
                                                 
510 Talisman Compressed Air (Pty) Ltd v Dykman [2016] JOL 36461 (GNP) para 17. 
 
511 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 46. 
 
512 R Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act 154. 
 
513 See further Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 46. 
 
514 Section 158 also applies to a court which determines any matters brought before it in terms of the Companies 
Act. Refer to chapter 7, para 1 where s 158 is discussed further. 
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Some of the relevant purposes of the Companies Act which the Companies Tribunal must 
consider when deciding whether to remove a director from office, as set out in section 7 of the 
Companies Act, are the purposes of promoting compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided 
for in the Constitution, in the application of company law;515 encouraging transparency,516 
encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies,517 balancing the rights 
and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies,518 and providing a predictable 
and effective environment for the efficient regulation of companies.519  While the purposes of 
the Companies Act are set out in section 7 of the Companies Act, the “spirit” and “objects” of 
the Companies Act have not been defined.520 The Memorandum on the Objects of the 
Companies Bill, 2008 may provide some guidance on the objects of the Companies Act. For 
instance, this document sets out specific objectives and goal statements of the Companies Act, 
being simplification, flexibility, corporate efficiency, transparency and predictable 
regulation.521 Two objectives which may be particularly relevant to the removal of directors by 
the Companies Tribunal would be that of corporate efficiency and transparency. On the 
objective of corporate efficiency, the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 
states that there should be clarification of director responsibilities, duties and liabilities, while 
the objective of transparency provides that company law must ensure the proper recognition of 
director accountability.522 These are some of the considerations that must be taken into account 
by the Companies Tribunal when considering an application to remove a director from office.  
 
                                                 
515 Section 7(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
516 Section 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act. 
 
517 Section 7(j) of the Companies Act. 
 
518 Section 7(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
519 Section 7(l) of the Companies Act. 
 
520 Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 550(2). 
 
521 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 1. 
 
522 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 1.2.4(a). 
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10.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Section 71(3) of the Companies Act is unique in that the board’s power to remove fellow board 
members is a mandatory, and not an alterable power.523 In contrast to the Companies Act, the 
MBCA and the DGCL do not make any provision for the board of directors to remove a director 
from office.524 The approaches in the MBCA and the DGCL represent the most common 
approaches to the removal of directors in the USA. Most USA States reserve the power to 
remove a member of the board to the shareholders who elected the director. There are 
approximately thirteen USA States which empower the board of directors to remove directors 
in certain circumstances.525 Of those USA States which have conferred on the board of directors 
the power to remove fellow board members, the majority of them have made this power 
alterable and not mandatory, either by providing that the board of directors may remove fellow 
board members only if empowered to do so by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws, or 
by providing that the board of directors may remove fellow board members unless the articles 
of incorporation or the by-laws provide otherwise.526 Both the UK Companies Act of 2006 and 
the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 have adopted similar positions with regard to the 
removal of directors by the board of directors in that the board of directors may remove 
directors only if empowered to do so by the constitution of the company.527 It is submitted that 
there are merits in permitting the board of directors to remove fellow board members, and, 
provided the board of directors acts transparently and there are acceptable safeguards against 
abuse of the power to remove fellow board members, this power should remain in the 
Companies Act.528  
 
A further notable respect in which section 71(3) of the Companies Act is unique is that with 
regard to the removal of directors by the board of directors, the section does not distinguish 
between the directors appointed by the directors and directors appointed by the shareholders, 
                                                 
523 See paras 2.1 and 2.5 above. 
 
524 See para 2.4 above. 
 
525 See para 2.4 above. 
 
526 See para 2.4 above. 
 
527 See paras 2.2 and 2.3 above. 
 
528 See para 2.5 above. 
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nor does it make any provision to protect the shareholder representatives, or the minority 
shareholder representatives, on the board of directors from removal by the board of directors.529 
Accordingly the board of directors is empowered to remove any director from office, regardless 
of who appointed that director.530 In contrast, the corporation laws of those USA States which 
permit directors to remove fellow board members distinguish between directors who were 
appointed by the board of directors and those who were appointed by the shareholders, and 
contain provisions designed to protect minority shareholder representatives on the board from 
removal by the board of directors.531 
 
It was argued in this chapter that the board of directors should be empowered to remove any 
director from office, including those directors appointed by the shareholders or a third party in 
terms of section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act.532 It was argued further that the power to 
remove directors in section 71(3) of the Companies Act should be an alterable power rather 
than a mandatory power.533 More specifically, the provision should be an “opt-out” provision, 
in that the board’s power to remove a director should apply unless the company opts out of it 
by expressly so stipulating.534 It is submitted that section 71(3) of the Companies Act should 
be preceded by the words “Except to the extent that the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise.”535 The company would then be empowered to determine 
whether it wishes to retain the default provision under the Companies Act empowering the 
board of directors to remove fellow board members or whether to alter this default provision 
to suit its particular needs by negating, restricting, limiting, qualifying, or extending the board’s 
power to remove fellow board members. If section 71(3) of the Companies Act were an 
alterable provision a company would further be empowered to insert in section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act provisions to protect the minority shareholder representatives on the board of 
directors, should this be deemed necessary based on the specific needs and requirements of the 
                                                 
529 See para 3 above. 
 
530 See para 3 above. 
 
531 See para 3 above. 
 
532 See para 3 above. 
 
533 See para 3 above. 
 
534 See para 3 above. 
 
535 See paras 3 and 6.5 above. 
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company.536 It is submitted that if section 71(3) of the Companies Act were an alterable 
provision in the Companies Act it would also bring the provision in line with the equivalent 
provisions in the foreign jurisdictions considered which do not make the board’s power to 
remove fellow board members compulsory, and which incorporate some protection for 
minority shareholder representatives on the board of directors.537 An alterable power of 
removal conferred on the board of directors, as opposed to a compulsory power of removal, 
would also go some way in satisfying the purpose of section 7(i) of the Companies Act of 
balancing the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies.538  
 
Other suggestions to strengthen and improve the provisions on the removal of a director in the 
Companies Act are as follows: 
 Section 69(6) of the Companies Act, which provides that the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company may impose additional grounds of ineligibility or 
disqualification or minimum qualifications to be met by directors of a company, must 
specify that any additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification or additional 
minimum qualifications must be reasonable as applied to the company and must be 
lawful.539 
 
 Section 71(3)(a) of the Companies Act, which provides that a director may be removed 
by the board of directors if he is ineligible or disqualified to be a director, must contain 
provisions guarding against this ground being used for improper purposes, such as a 
means to remove directors from office who do not meet any new ground of ineligibility 
or disqualification or a new qualification requirement which is introduced during their 
term of office. It is submitted that section 69(6) must incorporate a requirement which 
guards against the misuse of the timing of the qualification requirements by providing 
that a new ground of ineligibility or disqualification or a new minimum qualification 
                                                 
536 See para 3 above. 
 
537 See para 3 above. 
 
538 See para 3 above. 
 
539 See para 6.1.2.3 above. 
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prescribed during a director’s term shall not apply to that director before the end of that 
director’s term.540  
 
 It would be too disruptive to the running of a company’s business and its affairs if the 
past acts of an ineligible or disqualified director were not regarded as valid. It is 
submitted that a provision similar to section 214 of the previous Companies Act 61 of 
1973 and section 161 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 should be inserted in the 
Companies Act, to the effect that the acts of a person acting as a director will be valid 
notwithstanding that it is afterwards discovered that there was a defect in his 
appointment or that he was disqualified from holding office. 
 
 The ground of removal of a director on the basis of incapacity, contained in section 
71(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act, must make provision for the input of a registered 
medical practitioner or a court in assessing whether a director is incapacitated to the 
extent that he is unable to perform the functions of a director and whether he is 
incapacitated to the extent that he is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable 
period of time.541 This would guard against this ground of removal being improperly 
applied where the board of directors is not properly qualified to make the relevant 
incapacity assessment.542 It would also guard against this ground of removal being 
abused where conflicts arise between the directors, and, furthermore, would bring 
section 71(3)(a)(ii) in line with the equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions 
considered.543  
 
 In light of the fact that the functions of a director vary depending on the type of 
company of which he is a director, the type of director he is, and the nature of the 
company’s business, a subjective standard of assessment must be imposed in sections 
71(3)(a)(ii) and 71(3)(b) of the Companies Act, instead of an objective standard.544 A 
subjective standard would furthermore result in there being consistency between 
                                                 
540 See para 6.1.2.3 above. 
 
541 See para 6.2.4 above. 
 
542 See para 6.2.4 above. 
 
543 See para 6.2.4 above. 
 
544 See para 6.3.1 above. 
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sections 71(3)(b) and section 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act, which imposes 
a subjective standard in ascertaining whether a director is delinquent.545 It is essential 
that there be consistency between these two provisions since the right of removal of a 
director is in addition to the right of a person to apply to a court in terms of section 162 
for an order declaring a director delinquent.546 It is submitted that sections 71(3)(a)(ii) 
and 71(3)(b) should read as follows:  
 
“If a company has more than two directors, and a shareholder or director has 
       alleged that a director of the company – 
(a) has become – 
(i) ... 
(ii) incapacitated to the extent that the director is unable to perform 
the functions of a directordirector’s functions within the 
company, and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a 
reasonable time, as assessed by a registered medical practitioner 
or by a court; or  
(b) has neglected, or been derelict in the performance of, the functions of 
directorthe director’s functions within the company,”547 
 
 Clarity must be provided on whether the ground of negligence is an additional ground 
for the removal of a director by the board of directors, or whether the legislature 
inadvertently confused the terms “neglect” and “negligent” by referring to the term 
“negligent” in sections 71(3), 71(5), 71(6)(a) and 71(6)(b)(ii) but omitting to refer to 
the term “neglect” in these provisions.548 
 
 Clarity must be provided on whether the grounds for the removal of a director by the 
board of directors are limited to those grounds set out in section 71(3) of the Companies 
Act or whether additional grounds of removal may explicitly be provided by a company 
                                                 
545 See para 6.3.1 above. 
 
546 See para 6.3.1 above. 
 
547 See para 6.3.1 above. 
 
548 See para 6.4 above. 
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in its Memorandum of Incorporation.549 If section 71(3) of the Companies Act were to 
be an alterable provision, as suggested, a company would clearly be entitled to extend 
the grounds for the removal of a director by the board of directors in order to suit its 
particular needs.550 
 
The Companies Act is much clearer with regard to the procedures for the board of directors to 
remove fellow board members than the equivalent procedures in those USA States which 
permit the removal of directors by board members, the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 
and the UK Companies Act of 2006.551 There is nevertheless room to improve the procedures 
for the removal of directors by the board of directors under the Companies Act. The following 
submissions are made in this regard: 
 
 In the interests of clarity and to avoid any ambiguity or controversy regarding the notice 
period to be given to a director who is to be removed from office, and to ensure that the 
notice period is fair and reasonable, it is submitted that section 71(4)(a) of the 
Companies Act should provide that a director must receive notice of the board meeting 
which is at least equivalent to the notice period of any board meeting.552  
 
 It is submitted that, in the interests of both clarity and certainty, section 71(4)(b) of the 
Companies Act should make explicit provision for the right of a director to make 
written representations to the board meeting, which must be circulated to the board 
members prior to the board meeting.553 This would remove any uncertainty whether a 
director is entitled to make written representations to the board meeting or whether the 
“presentation” referred to in section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act is confined to an 
oral presentation.554 In order to ensure that the option of circulating written 
representations is not abused, it is suggested that, in accordance with section 203D(6) 
                                                 
549 See para 6.5 above. 
 
550 See paras 3 and 6.5 above. 
 
551 See para 8.5 above. 
 
552 See para 8.2 above. 
 
553 See para 8.4 above. 
 
554 See para 8.4 above. 
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of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the written representations need not be 
circulated if they exceed one thousand words or if they are defamatory. It is submitted 
further that, as was the case under the Companies Act 61 of 1973, in addition to the 
right to make written representations, a director should also be entitled to make a verbal 
presentation to the board meeting, in person or through a representative, before the 
resolution is put to the vote. Since the written representations would be circulated to 
the board of directors only (and not to the shareholders) the costs thereof could easily 
be borne by the director concerned.  
A challenge a director may face with regard to the presentation is that he would not be entitled 
to receive detailed reasons for his proposed removal if the allegations made against him are 
simple and uncomplicated.555 This may make it difficult for him to respond in detail, in his 
presentation, to the statement of reasons for his proposed removal, which the board of directors 
must give to him in terms of section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act. A director moreover does 
not have a statutory right to access the books and records of a company.556 Such access would 
assist a director in his presentation to respond to the statement of reasons provided to him for 
his proposed removal from office.557 In order to access such books and records a director would 
have to rely on the common law or on section 50 of the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 2 of 2000, which has specific and stringent requirements that must be satisfied.558  
 
It is noteworthy that the Companies Act does not specify whether the removal of a director by 
a person named in or determined in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation, pursuant to 
section 66(4)(a)(i), must be carried out in accordance with the procedures specified in section 
71(2) applicable to the removal of directors by the shareholders or in accordance with the 
procedures specified in section 71(4) applicable to the removal of a director by the directors. 
In fact, it does not specify whether any procedural requirements are statutorily required to be 
complied with if a person named in or determined in terms of the Memorandum of 
Incorporation removes a director from office. Presumably the Memorandum of Incorporation 
of a company which empowers a specific person to appoint and remove a director would set 
                                                 
555 See para 8.3 above.  
 
556 See para 8.4 above. 
 
557 See para 8.4 above. 
 
558 See para 8.4 above where these requirements are discussed.  
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out fair procedural requirements to remove such a director, but there is nothing compelling a 
company to make provision for such procedures in its Memorandum of Incorporation.  
 
In the interests of clarity and certainty, it is submitted that the Companies Act must clearly state 
that the removal of a director by a person named in or determined in terms of the Memorandum 
of Incorporation, pursuant to section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act, must follow a fair 
procedure. These procedural requirements would presumably differ from those set out in 
sections 71(2) and 71(4) of the Companies Act because an ordinary resolution or a board 
resolution for the removal of a director would not be applicable since the director would have 
been appointed by the specific person named in the Memorandum of Incorporation. 
Nevertheless it is submitted that the director in question must at least be provided with the 
reasons for his removal from office by the person who appointed him, as well as a reasonable 
opportunity to make a presentation to such person before the decision to remove him is taken. 
 
Regarding the removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal in circumstances where a 
company has two directors, it must be clarified whether the remaining director may apply to 
court to review the determination of the Companies Tribunal where the Companies Tribunal 
has decided not to remove the impugned director from office, or whether only a shareholder 
may do so.559  It is further suggested that, in the interests of clarity and consistency and to 
remove any ambiguity, section 70(2) of the Companies Act must be amended to include a 
reference to a removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal in terms of section 71(8) of the 
Companies Act.560 This amendment would have the effect that if the Companies Tribunal has 
removed a director from office in terms of section 71(8) of the Companies Act, a vacancy on 
the board would not arise until the later of the expiry of the time for filing an application for a 
review of the decision of the Companies Tribunal, or the granting of an order by the court on 
such an application, and that the director in question would be suspended from office during 
that time.561 
 
                                                 
559 See para 9 above. 
 
560 See para 9 above. 
 
561 See para 9 above. 
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CHAPTER 4 DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE REMOVAL OF 
DIRECTORS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE REMOVAL OF 
DIRECTORS BY SHAREHOLDERS AND BY THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 
3. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS WHEN REMOVING A 
DIRECTOR FROM OFFICE  
4. CONSEQUENCES OF A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN 
REMOVING A DIRECTOR FROM OFFICE 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between a director and his company is one of the well-established examples 
of commercial fiduciary relationships accepted in South African law.1 The fiduciary duties of 
directors are derived from the Companies Act as well as the common law. Section 76 of the 
Companies Act, which partially codifies the fiduciary duties of directors, does not exclude the 
common law. Accordingly, the common law fiduciary duties of directors that are not expressly 
amended by section 76 of the Companies Act or those that are not in conflict with section 76 
of the Companies Act are still applicable.2 This chapter examines the fiduciary duties of 
directors which apply when the board removes a director from office under section 71(3) of 
the Companies Act. The discussion of directors’ fiduciary duties in this chapter is restricted to 
                                                 
1 See Havenga “Breach of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Liability on what Basis” 366; Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168; S v De Jager and Another 1965 (2) SA 616 (A); S v Hepker 1973 (1) 
SA 472 (W) at 475; Bellairs v Hodnett and Another 1978 (1) SA 1109 (A); Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v 
Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd and Others 1981 (2) SA 173 (T); Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC 
& Others 1988 (2) SA 54 (T); Howard v Herrigel & Another NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 678; Da Silva and 
Others v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA); Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) paras 59-61; Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum and Oil Corporation of 
South Africa (SOC) Ltd and Another 2015 (6) SA 338 (WCC). 
 
2 Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum and Oil Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Ltd and Another 2015 (6) SA 338 
(WCC) para 61; Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) 
para 61; CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another [2018] 1 All SA 450 (GJ) para 61; 
Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 295; FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of 
Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 547; Havenga “Directors’ Exploitation of Corporate 
Opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 262;  Delport New Entrepreneurial Law 145; Esser & Havenga 
“Directors and Other Officers” in Loubser & Mahony Company Secretarial Practice 8-19 and 8-21. 
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the application of the principles in situations where directors are removed from office. The 
consequences of directors breaching their fiduciary duties in removing a director from office 
under section 71(3) of the Companies Act are also considered. 
 
2. APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS 
BY SHAREHOLDERS AND BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
 
The right of shareholders to vote is a proprietary right.3 As Lord Jessel MR in Pender v 
Lushington4 expressed it, a shareholder “has a right to say, whether I vote with the majority or 
with the minority, you shall record my vote; that is a right of property belonging to my interest 
in this company, and if you will not, I shall institute legal proceedings to compel you.  It seems 
to me that such an action could be maintained, without any technical difficulty.”  It follows, 
the court proclaimed, that if a shareholder votes in a manner that is adverse to the interests of 
the company as a whole, he cannot on that ground be restrained from giving his vote in 
whatever way he pleases.5  
 
The difference between voting by shareholders and voting by directors was concisely 
enunciated by Walton J in Northern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeple Ltd6 as 
follows:  
 
 “When a director votes as a director for or against any particular resolution in a directors’ 
meeting, he is voting as a person under a fiduciary duty to the company for the proposition 
that the company should take a certain course of action. When a shareholder is voting for 
or against a particular resolution he is voting as a person owing no fiduciary duty to the 
company who is exercising his own right of property to vote as he thinks fit. The fact that 
the result of the voting at the meeting (or a subsequent poll) will bind the company cannot 
affect the position that in voting he is voting simply as an exercise of his own property 
rights. Perhaps another (and simpler) way of putting the matter is that a director is an agent, 
who casts his vote to decide in what manner his principal shall act through the collective 
                                                 
3 Pender v Lushington (1877) 46 ChD 317 at 321; Re HR Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62 at 82; Sammel and Others 
v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 680; Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 (PC) at 221. In Desai and Others v Greyridge Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 
509 (A) at 519 the Appellate Division emphasised that a shareholder’s right to vote, being a proprietary right of 
his shareholding, can ordinarily be exercised by him in any way he pleases. 
 
4 (1877) 46 ChD 317 at 321. 
 
5 Pender v Lushington (1877) 46 ChD 317 at 319. See also Sammel and Others v President Brand Gold Mining 
Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 680 and CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another [2018] 1 
All SA 450 (GJ) para 44. 
 
6 [1974] 2 All ER 625 at 635. 
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agency of the board of directors; a shareholder who casts his vote in general meeting is not 
casting it as an agent of the company in any shape or form. His act, therefore, in voting as 
he pleases cannot in any way be regarded as an act of the company.” 
 
It follows that when the shareholders of a company vote to remove a director from office under 
section 71(1) of the Companies Act, they may exercise their vote in any way they please. A 
resolution by the shareholders to remove a director from office may not be impeached on the 
ground that it was not passed in good faith or in the interests of the company.7  In contrast, 
when the board of directors exercises the power to remove a director from office it must not 
breach its fiduciary duties to the company.8  In Murray v Conseco Inc9 the Supreme Court of 
Indiana differentiated between the removal of directors by the shareholders, and the removal 
of directors by the board of directors by proclaiming that shareholders may validly remove a 
director for any reason or for no reason at all or for a reason grounded solely in their own 
perceived interests, but removal by directors “is another story”.  
 
3. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS WHEN REMOVING A DIRECTOR FROM 
OFFICE 
 
 The specific fiduciary duties which apply to the removal of a director by the board of directors 
are discussed below. 
 
3.1 The Duty to Act in Good Faith and the Duty to Act in the Best Interests of the 
Company   
 
Under section 76(3)(a) of the Companies Act directors must exercise their powers and perform 
their functions as directors in good faith. Section 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act provides that 
directors have a duty to exercise their powers and perform their functions in the best interests 
of the company. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Da Silva and Others v CH 
                                                 
7 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-285. 
 
8 Murray v Conseco Inc. 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind. 2003) at 461; Liwszyc & Anor v Smolarek & Ors [2005] ACSR 38 
at 47; Jackson v Dear 2013 WL 617163 para 3.  
 
9 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind. 2003) at 461. 
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Chemicals (Pty) Ltd10 that the duty of directors to exercise their powers in good faith and in 
the best interests of the company is a well-established duty under the common law. This is the 
overarching and paramount fiduciary duty of directors from which all the other fiduciary duties 
flow.11 Directors owe the duty to act in the best interests of the company to the company as a 
whole, being the collective body of shareholders, and not to individual shareholders.12  In 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd13 the court lucidly 
enunciated this duty as follows: 
 
“At all material times the second to fifth respondents [the directors] were under a duty to 
act bona fide in the interests of the first respondent [the company]. This is the fundamental 
duty which qualifies the exercise of any powers which the directors in fact have. The 
‘interests’ in this context, are only those of the company itself as a corporate entity and 
those of its members as a body.” 
 
The duty of good faith is a subjective duty.14 As laid down in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd15 
directors are bound to exercise the powers conferred upon them bona fide in what they, and not 
what a court may, consider is in the interests of the company.16  It is not for the courts to review 
the merits of a decision that the directors arrived at in honesty.17 While the test for good faith 
is subjective, and not objective, there must nevertheless be reasonable grounds for the directors’ 
                                                 
10 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA) para 18. For a discussion of this decision see MF Cassim “Da Silva v Ch Chemicals 
(Pty) Ltd: Fiduciary Duties of Resigning Directors” 61-70 and R Cassim “Post-Resignation Duties of Directors: 
The Application of the Fiduciary Duty not to Misappropriate Corporate Opportunities” 731-753. 
11 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v 
AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) at 163; Liwszyc and Another v Smolarek and Others (2005) 55 
ACSR 38 at 46; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 
80; CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another [2018] 1 All SA 450 (GJ) para 47; Havenga 
Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific Regard to Corporate Opportunities (Unpublished LLD 
Thesis) 332; Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties under our Future Company-Law Regime” 311-312; FHI 
Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 523. 
 
12 Parke v The Daily News Ltd and Others [1962] 2 All ER 929 at 948; South African Fabrics Ltd v 
Millman NO and Another 1972 (4) SA 592 (A); Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining 
Co Ltd 2006 (5) SA 333 (W) para 16.6. 
 
13 2006 (5) SA 333 (W) para 16.6. 
 
14 Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9; Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 
at 306; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254; Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 
105; Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 618-619; Liwszyc and Another 
v Smolarek and Others (2005) 55 ACSR 38 at 46-47; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 74. 
 
15 [1942] Ch 304 at 306. 
 
16 See also Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 105. 
 
17 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254. 
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belief that they were acting in the best interests of the company.18 These duties are owed to the 
company by both executive and non-executive directors.19 
 
In Murray v Conseco Inc.20 the Supreme Court of Indiana proclaimed that by empowering 
directors to remove board members, the Indiana Business Corporation Law did not exempt 
directors from the standards applicable to them in the action they take, and that directors are 
indeed obliged to act in the interests of the corporation in removing a board member from 
office. In Liwszyc & Anor v Smolarek & Ors21 the Supreme Court of Western Australia likewise 
held that in appointing directors and removing them from office, the directors must exercise 
their powers as directors in good faith and in accordance with their fiduciary responsibilities. 
In a similar vein in Jackson v Dear22 the UK Court of Appeal remarked that when exercising 
the power to remove a board member from office the directors must act in good faith in the 
interests of the company, and in accordance with all the directors’ fiduciary duties to the 
company. 
 
Based on the above, one may state that when the board of directors votes to remove a director 
from office under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, it must do so in good faith and in the 
best interests of the company. Even though the test for good faith may be subjective, there must 
be reasonable grounds for a director’s belief that in voting to remove another director from 
office, he is acting in the best interests of the company. In the assessment of the duty to exercise 
their powers bona fide in the best interests of the company, a court will determine the propriety 
of the motive upon which the directors acted.23 Therefore if a director removes a fellow board 
member under section 71(3) of the Companies Act with ulterior motives he will be in breach 
of his fiduciary duty to the company to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company.  
                                                 
18 Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9; Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v Cohen 
[2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 105; Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 618-619; 
Liwszyc and Another v Smolarek and Others (2005) 55 ACSR 38 at 46-47; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 74. 
 
19 Howard v Herrigel NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 678. 
 
20 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind. 2003) at 461. 
 
21 [2005] ACSR 38 at 47.  
 
22 2013 WL 617163 para 33. The facts of this case are discussed in chapter 3, para 2.3.  
 
23 Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific Regard to Corporate Opportunities 
(Unpublished LLD Thesis) 333. 
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3.2  The Duty to Exercise Powers for a Proper Purpose 
 
Section 76(3)(a) of the Companies Act not only states that directors must act in good faith, but 
also that they must exercise their powers and perform their functions for a proper purpose. This 
duty is also a common law duty. “Proper purpose” has not been defined in the Companies Act 
but at common law it is taken to mean that directors must exercise their powers for the objective 
purpose for which the power was given to them, and not for a collateral or ulterior purpose.24 
While the duty of good faith is subjective,25 the test for proper purpose is objective.26  
 
Where there are dual purposes for the exercise of a power, the court must determine what the 
dominant or primary purpose was. If the dominant purpose is found to be improper, the exercise 
of the power will be in breach of the fiduciary duty to act with a proper purpose, and will be 
regarded as voidable.27 Directors breach the duty to act for a proper purpose when their 
dominant or primary purpose is not to further the interests of the company.28 Where a director’s 
dominant or primary purpose was improper, he will have acted in breach of his fiduciary duty 
notwithstanding that he acted also for other purposes which were proper.29  
  
In Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood30 the Chancery Division laid down the 
following four-part test to be applied by a court in ascertaining whether directors had acted for 
a proper purpose: 
 
                                                 
24 See FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
525. 
 
25 Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9; Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 
at 306; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254; Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 
105; Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 618-619; Liwszyc and Another 
v Smolarek and Others (2005) 55 ACSR 38 at 46-47; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 74. 
 
26 Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 619; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v 
Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 80. 
 
27Mills and Others v Mills and Others (1938) CLR 150 (HC of A) at 165 and 186; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] 
Ch 254; Lindgren and Others v L&P Estates Ltd [1968] Ch 572 (CA); Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd 
[1974] AC 821 (PC) at 835; Whitehouse and Another v Carlton Hotel Proprietary Limited (1987) 162 CLR 285. 
 
28 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-66. 
 
29 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 25; Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC). 
 
30 [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 619. 
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 The court must identify the power the exercise of which is in question; 
 The court must identify the proper purpose for which the power was delegated to the 
directors; 
 The court must identify the substantial purpose for which the power was in fact 
exercised; and 
 The court must decide whether the purpose was proper.  
 
In Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others31 the Western Cape 
Division, Cape Town appears to have adopted this test to some extent, by stating that in 
applying the test to ascertain whether directors had acted for a proper purpose, once one has 
ascertained the actual purpose for which the power was exercised, it must be determined 
whether the actual purpose falls within the purpose for which the power was conferred.32  
 
In Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood33 the Chancery Division noted that the third 
stage of the proper purpose test involves a question of fact, and turns on the motives of the 
directors at the time. Directors’ powers may not be exercised for an ulterior or improper 
                                                 
31 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 80. The facts of this case are that Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd sought to transfer its 
shares in Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd to Mouton Sitrus. The board of Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd refused to 
approve the transfer. Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd consequently approached the High Court for an order amending the 
provisions of the Memorandum of Incorporation of Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd which permitted the board to 
decline to register a transfer of shares without giving any reasons. Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd furthermore sought an 
order compelling Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd to register the transfer of shares in terms of s 163 of the Companies 
Act. It argued that the refusal of the board to do so without any cogent reason constituted oppressive and unfairly 
prejudicial conduct (para 29). It based its claim under s 163 on the alleged breach by the directors of Goede Hoop 
Sitrus (Pty) Ltd of its fiduciary duties under s 76 of the Companies Act of acting for a proper purpose and in the 
best interests of the company (para 52). The Western Cape Division, Cape Town held that the restrictions in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation of Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd on the transfer of shares were common restrictions 
and were not prohibited by the Companies Act (paras 44 and 48). It found that the directors of Goede Hoop Sitrus 
(Pty) Ltd had acted in the best interests of the company by refusing to register the transfer of shares (para 82) and 
had acted for a proper purpose (para 84). Its actual purpose in refusing the transfer of the shares had been to 
prevent Mouton Sitrus increasing its shareholding (to above ten per cent) on the ground that this was against the 
best interests of the company (para 82). On the basis that the directors had complied with their fiduciary duties 
the court ruled that the refusal to approve the transfer of shares was not unlawful (para 95). The court held further 
that the refusal was not unfairly prejudicial to Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd under s 163 of the Companies Act since it 
had not established an informal arrangement which invariably allowed shareholders to transfer their shares to 
other shareholders, nor had it proven a legitimate expectation that the directors of Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd 
would not exercise their power to refuse a transfer of shares (para 96). Moreover, the court held, there was no 
authority of a shareholder obtaining relief under an oppression or unfair prejudice remedy in circumstances where 
the directors had exercised their power to refuse a transfer of shares in accordance with their fiduciary duties (para 
96). The application was consequently dismissed. 
 
32 See further Cook: Geoffrey v Hesber Impala (Pty) Ltd and Others (2014/45832) [2016] ZAGPJHC 23 (19 
February 2016) paras 47-48 where the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg agreed with and applied this test. 
 
33 [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (ChD) at 619. 
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purpose or motive, even if such act falls within the scope of the directors’ powers.34 As the 
High Court of Australia in Whitehouse and Another v Carlton Hotel Proprietary Limited35 
proclaimed, “the exercise of a power for an ulterior or impermissible purpose is bad 
notwithstanding that the motives of the donee of the power in so exercising it are substantially 
altruistic.”36 
 
It is submitted that the purpose of the power given to directors under section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act to remove a director from office is to empower the board of directors to remove 
from office a director whom it has determined to be ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated, 
neglectful, negligent37 or derelict. It follows that a director must vote for or against the removal 
of a director for this purpose only, and not for an ulterior purpose. In voting on a removal 
resolution a director must consider whether, objectively, the impugned director has 
contravened any of the grounds stipulated in section 71(3) of the Companies Act. If a director 
has more than one purpose in voting in favour of the removal of a director, he will have 
breached his fiduciary duty if the dominant or substantial purpose is improper, even if his other 
purposes were proper. 
 
                                                 
34 Piercy v Mills [1920] 1 Ch 77; Mears v African Platinum Mines 1922 WLD 57 at 61; S v Berliner 1966 (4) SA 
535 (W) at 536; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254 at 268-269; Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company 
Directors with Specific Regard to Corporate Opportunities (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 341. 
 
35 (1987) 162 CLR 285 para 9. 
 
36 An example in this regard given by the court in Whitehouse and Another v Carlton Hotel Proprietary Limited 
(1987) 162 CLR 285 (para 9) emanates from the case of Fraser v Whalley (1864) 2 Hem & M 10, where the 
directors had allotted shares for the purpose of diluting the voting power of a contractor whom they believed to 
have conflicting interests in other companies. The court held that the directors’ belief that they were acting in the 
interests of the company did not serve to overcome the invalidity of the allotment. 
  
37 As discussed in chapter 3, para 6.4 “negligence” has not been listed as a ground for the removal of a director in 
s 71(3) of the Companies Act. It is not clear whether “negligence” is an additional statutory ground which a 
shareholder or director may invoke for the removal of a director, or whether the legislature confused the terms 
“neglect” and “negligent” and intended to use the term “neglectful” in ss 71(3), 71(5), 71(6)(a) and 71(6)(b)(ii) 
of the Companies Act instead of the term “negligence”. For the purposes of this thesis “negligence” is treated as 
an additional statutory ground which a shareholder or a director may invoke for the removal of a director. Refer 
to the discussion in chapter 3, para 6.4 on this point. 
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3.3  The Duty to Exercise an Unfettered Discretion 
 
A further fiduciary duty of directors under the common law is to exercise an unfettered 
discretion, or conversely, a duty to exercise an independent judgment.38 This duty, as a general 
rule, prohibits directors from contracting, undertaking or otherwise agreeing in advance to 
exercise their discretionary powers in a particular way.39 This duty is not explicitly referred to 
in the Companies Act. It is regarded as being an aspect of the duty of a director to act in the 
best interests of the company.40 In contrast, section 173(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 
states expressly, as a separate duty, that a “director of a company must exercise an independent 
judgment.”  
 
In deciding what is in the best interests of the company, directors have a duty to consider the 
affairs of the company in an unbiased and objective manner, and to exercise an independent 
and unfettered discretion.41 The duty to exercise an unfettered discretion is a critical element 
in the proper and effective discharge of a director’s functions generally.42 In fettering their 
discretion, directors might in effect be preventing themselves from ensuring that they act bona 
fide in the best interests of the company.43 As was mentioned above,44 in the assessment of the 
duty to exercise their powers bona fide in the best interests of the company a court will 
                                                 
 38 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v 
AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) at 163; Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum and Oil Corporation of 
South Africa (SOC) Ltd and Another 2015 (6) SA 338 (WCC) at 340. 
 
39Kregor v Hollins (1913) 109 LT 225 (CA); Boulting and Another v Association of Cinematography, Television 
and Allied Technicians [1963] 1 All ER 716; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) at 163; John Crowther 
Group plc v Carpets International plc [1990] BCLC 460; Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates Plc [1992] 
B.C.C. 863; Regentcrest plc (in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80. See further Keay “The Duty of Directors 
to Exercise Independent Judgment” 290-296 and Courtney “Fettering Director’s Discretion” 227-236. 
 
40 FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 529 
and 532. See also Keay “The Duty of Directors to Exercise Independent Judgment” 290; Kershaw Company Law 
in Context 356 and Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 610. 
 
41 Kregor v Hollins (1913) 109 LT 225 (CA); Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific 
Regard to Corporate Opportunities (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 334; FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of 
Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 528. 
 
42 Keay “The Duty of Directors to Exercise Independent Judgment” 293. 
 
43 Keay “The Duty of Directors to Exercise Independent Judgment” 292. 
 
44 See para 3.1 above.  
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determine the propriety of the motive upon which the directors acted.45 It consequently is 
imperative that directors consider the proposed removal of a director in an unbiased manner, 
and that they exercise an independent and unfettered discretion in voting on the resolution to 
remove a director from office. 
 
To sum up, when the board of directors votes to remove a director from office under section 
71(3) of the Companies Act, it must do so in good faith and for a proper purpose, and in the 
best interests of the company. Each director on the board must consider the proposed removal 
of a director in an unbiased manner, and must exercise an independent unfettered discretion in 
voting on the board resolution to remove a director.  
 
3.4  Application of Fiduciary Duties in Voting Against the Removal of a Director from 
Office 
 
It is submitted that the duty of a director to comply with his fiduciary duties when voting in 
favour of a resolution to remove a director also applies when the director votes against the 
resolution to remove a director. As discussed in chapter 3,46 in light of the words “may remove 
a director” in section 71(3) of the Companies Act, the board of directors has a discretion 
whether or not to remove a director whom it has found to be incapacitated, or who has neglected 
or has been derelict in the performance of his functions, or who has been negligent. If the board 
of directors decides not to remove such a director from office, the board runs the risk of being 
in breach of its fiduciary duty to take decisions in the best interests of the company.  
 
If a board member were to take steps to obstruct the removal of a director who has breached 
the provisions of section 71(3) of the Companies Act, the board member would be in breach of 
his fiduciary duties to act in good faith and for a proper purpose and to act in the best interests 
of the company. An obligation which seeks to fetter the exercise by directors of their fiduciary 
duties in the future is unenforceable as a matter of law.47 It follows that an agreement amongst 
two directors to vote in a particular way in the future would not be enforced by a court because 
                                                 
45 Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific Regard to Corporate Opportunities 
(Unpublished LLD Thesis) 333. 
 
46 See chapter 3, para 7. 
 
47 Courtney “Fettering Director’s Discretion” 233. 
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such an agreement would infringe the fiduciary duty of directors to exercise an independent 
judgment and not to fetter their discretion.48 This is so even if there is no improper motive or 
personal advantage gained by the directors under the agreement.49 Accordingly, an agreement 
under which two or more directors undertake to vote against the removal of the other director 
so as to frustrate a threshold for the removal resolution, would not be valid or enforceable. The 
effect of such a voting agreement would be that the directors concerned would be disabling 
themselves from acting honestly in what they believe to be in the best interests of the 
company.50 
                                                 
48 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v 
AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) at 163. 
 
49 Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 499. 
 
50 FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 529.  
It should be noted however that when the entire board of directors enters into an agreement binding itself on how 
to vote in the future such an agreement may be acceptable. For instance, in the leading UK case Fulham Football 
Club Ltd v Cabra Estates Plc [1992] B.C.C. 863 a football club and its directors leased a football ground, and, in 
return for a considerable payment they contracted with the landlords of the ground that they would not oppose 
any future application to the planning authorities which the landlords may make for its development for residential 
purposes. At a later stage as a result of changed circumstances, the directors wished to renege on this agreement. 
The landlords argued that the directors were still bound to support their application. The directors contended that 
the undertakings given by them were an unlawful fetter on their ability to act in the best interests of the company 
in the future. The UK Court of Appeal rejected the contention that the board of directors (as a whole) may never 
bind themselves as to the future exercise of their fiduciary powers (at 876). The board of directors was binding 
itself under a commercial contract which had conferred benefits on the company and which at the time the board 
had honestly believed to be in the best interests of the company. The UK Court of Appeal stated (at 875) as 
follows: 
 
 “It is trite law that directors are under a duty to act bona fide in the interest of their company. 
However, it does not follow from that proposition that directors can never make a contract by 
which they bind themselves to the future exercise of their powers in a particular manner, even 
though the contract taken as a whole is manifestly for the benefit of the company. Such a rule 
could well prevent companies from entering into contracts which were commercially beneficial to 
them.” 
 
In making this finding, the UK Court of Appeal in Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates Plc [1992] B.C.C. 
863 relied heavily on and drew support from the decision of the Australian High Court in Thorby v Goldberg 
(1964) 112 CLR 597. In this case it was contended that an agreement was illegal or otherwise void because it 
purported to bind the directors of a company with regard to the exercise of their powers and duties in the future. 
Kitto J proclaimed that if at the time when a transaction is being entered into the directors are bona fide of the 
opinion that it is in the interests of the company that the transaction should be entered into and carried into effect, 
there is no reason in law why the directors should not bind themselves to do whatever under the transaction is to 
be done by the board (at 605-606). It is therefore important to distinguish between agreements entered into by an 
individual director from agreements entered into by the board of directors as a whole. When the board of directors 
enters into an agreement for consideration it may be presumed that the company may legitimately fetter its future 
conduct in return for whatever contractual benefit it is entitled to receive (Courtney “Fettering Directors’ 
Discretion” 228. See further Griffiths “The Best Interests of Fulham F.C.: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in Giving 
Contractual Undertakings” 576-585). The legal principle laid down in Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates 
Plc [1992] B.C.C. 863 is now encapsulated in s 173(2)(a) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 which expressly 
provides that the duty to exercise an independent judgment is not infringed by a director acting “in accordance 
with an agreement duly entered into by the company that restricts the future exercise of discretion by its directors.”  
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4.  CONSEQUENCES OF A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN REMOVING A 
DIRECTOR FROM OFFICE 
 
4.1  Reinstatement of the Improperly Removed Director  
 
An important question that arises when directors remove a fellow board member in breach of 
their fiduciary duties, is whether a court may reinstate the improperly removed director to the 
board of directors.  
 
In the pivotal UK case of Lee v Chou Wen Hsien51 the court did not reinstate a director who 
had been wrongly removed by the board of directors in breach of their fiduciary duties. The 
Privy Council ruled that while each director that concurs in the removal of a director must act 
in accordance with what he believes to be in the best interests of the company, it does not 
follow that a director sought to be removed would continue to remain a director simply because 
one or more of the directors had acted from an ulterior motive in removing that director.52 
Surprisingly, even though the Privy Council found that the board of directors had acted with 
ulterior motives in removing the appellant from the board of directors, and had not acted to 
protect the best interests of the company, it nevertheless held that the removal from office of 
the director was valid. The Privy Council proclaimed as follows: 
  
 “To hold that bad faith on the part of any one director vitiates the notice to resign and 
leaves in office the director whose resignation is sought, would introduce into the 
management of the company a source of uncertainty which their Lordships consider is 
unlikely to have been intended by the signatories to the articles and by others becoming 
shareholders in the company. In order to give business sense to article 73(d),53 it is 
necessary to construe the article strictly in accordance with its terms without any 
qualification, and to treat the office of director as vacated if the specified event occurs. If 
this were not the case, and the expelled director challenged the bona fides of all or any of 
his co-directors, the management of the company’s business might be at a standstill 
pending the resolution of the dispute by one means or another, in consequence of the 
doubt whether the expelled director ought or ought not properly to be treated as a member 
of the board.”54 
                                                 
51 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
52 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206. 
 
53 Article 73(d) of the company’s articles of association stated that the office of a director shall be vacated if he 
is requested in writing by all his co-directors to resign. 
 
54 Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1206-1207. 
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In essence, the Privy Council reasoned that, in order to avoid uncertainty in the management 
of the company pending the resolution of the dispute, it was necessary to hold that bad faith on 
the part of any one director in removing a fellow board member would not vitiate the removal 
and would not leave in office the director whose removal was sought.  
 
In Murray v Conseco Inc55 Murray, a director who had been removed from office, contended 
that the board’s action in removing him from office was grounded in improper motives. Murray 
contended that his removal from the board of directors had come about because he had wanted 
to pursue litigation, contrary to the views of the board of directors, against certain third parties 
whom he claimed were responsible for the company’s well-publicised financial difficulties. 
The Court of Appeals of Indiana asserted that Murray’s argument that he may have been 
removed from the board for an improper reason was irrelevant for purposes of determining 
whether he had been properly removed, and did not create a material issue of fact in the case.56 
The Court of Appeals accordingly held that Murray did not have any cause of action to be 
reinstated on the board of directors.57 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in affirming 
the decision of the Court of Appeals not to reinstate Murray to the board of directors, found 
that Murray had not presented any claims that the board of directors had not acted in good faith 
in removing him from office or that the board had acted other than in the exercise of its 
judgment as to the corporation’s interests.58 This resulted in rendering as obiter dictum the 
decision of the court a quo. 
 
Section 5(2) of the (South African) Companies Act provides that a court interpreting or 
applying the Companies Act may consider foreign law to the extent that this is appropriate. On 
the basis of section 5(2) the dicta in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien59 and Murray v Conseco Inc60 may 
have persuasive authority in South African company law. This implies that a director who has 
                                                 
55 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 
56 Murray v Conseco Inc 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) at 46. 
 
57 Murray v Conseco Inc 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) at 46. 
 
58 Murray v Conseco Inc. 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind. 2003) at 461. 
 
59 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
60 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
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been removed from office by the board of directors in breach of its fiduciary duties would not 
necessarily or automatically be reinstated to the board of directors.   
 
It is, however, submitted that the circumstances of the removal of the director in Lee v Chou 
Wen Hsien61 and Murray v Conseco Inc62 may be distinguished from the circumstances of the 
removal of directors in terms of section 71(3) of the (South African) Companies Act in two 
respects.  The first is that removal of a director by the board of directors in these cases did not 
have to be for cause.63 In Lee v Chou Wen Hsien64 the director was removed from office by the 
board of directors under article 73(d) of the company’s articles of association which stated that 
the office of a director shall be vacated if “he is requested in writing by all his co-directors to 
resign”. It was clear from this article that the board did not have to give any reason for removing 
a director. A director could simply have been removed from office without cause. Similarly, in 
Murray v Conseco Inc65 the relevant provision under which Murray had been removed, section 
23-1-33-8(a) of the Indiana Business Corporation Law, permitted directors to remove one or 
more directors without cause, unless the articles of incorporation provided otherwise. In sharp 
contrast, under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, the board of directors may not remove 
directors without cause, but may do so only under one of the grounds stipulated in the section. 
It is submitted that if a director may be removed by the board of directors without cause, the 
motives for the removal would not be as pertinent compared to the case where a director must 
be removed for cause. In circumstances where a director must be removed for cause, the 
motives for his removal become crucial in determining whether the board of directors had 
complied with its fiduciary duties in removing the director from office.  
 
The second distinction is that under section 71(3) of the Companies Act a challenge by a 
director to his removal would not result in the management of the company coming to a 
standstill, which was of significant concern to the Privy Council in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien.66 
                                                 
61 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
62 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 
63 The concept of “cause” in the context of the removal of a director from office is discussed in chapter 3, para 
6.5. 
 
64 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
65 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 
66 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
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As discussed, in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien67 the Privy Council reasoned that it was necessary to 
hold that bad faith on the part of any one director would not vitiate the notice to vacate office 
and to leave in office the director whose removal was sought, in order to avoid uncertainty in 
the management of the company pending the resolution of the dispute “in consequence of the 
doubt whether the expelled director ought or ought not properly to be treated as a member of 
the board.” In contrast, it is submitted that under the (South African) Companies Act this 
concern is overcome by the provisions of sections 71(5) and 70(2) of the Companies Act, 
discussed below. 
 
Section 71(5) of the Companies Act provides that if a director has been removed from office 
by the board of directors he may within twenty business days apply to a court to review the 
board’s determination.68 The period of twenty business days places a cap on the amount of time 
given to a director to contend that he had been removed from office by the board of directors 
in breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties. In order to overcome the uncertainty whether the 
expelled director is to be treated as a board member during the period of twenty business days 
following his removal or pending the resolution of the dispute by the court, section 70(2) of 
the Companies Act states that if the board of directors has removed a director under section 
71(3) of the Companies Act a vacancy on the board would not arise until the later of the expiry 
of the time for filing an application for review in terms of section 71(5) (that is, twenty business 
days) or the granting of an order by the court on such an application, but the director would be 
suspended from office during this time. If the director were suspended during the applicable 
twenty business day period and during the time taken by a court to rule on an application for 
review in terms of section 71(5) of the Companies Act, the director would clearly not be 
regarded as being a board member pending the resolution of the dispute. Accordingly the 
management of the company would not be at a standstill pending the resolution of the dispute. 
There would not be any doubt whether the expelled director is to be treated as a member of the 
board of directors. 
 
                                                 
67 [1984] 1 WLR 1202 at 1207. 
 
68 Alternatively, in terms of s 71(5) of the Companies Act, a person who appointed that director in terms of 
s 66(4)(a)(i) may apply to a court within twenty business days to review the determination of the board. If the 
board of directors has removed a director from office in breach of its fiduciary duties, this would be a relevant 
factor that a court would likely consider under a review in terms of s 71(5) of the Companies Act. The provisions 
of s 71(5) of the Companies Act are discussed further in chapter 7, para 2.  
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It is consequently submitted that the concern in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien69 that the management 
of the company would come to a standstill if the ulterior motives of the board of directors in 
removing a fellow board member were to be taken into account, is not a concern with regard 
to the removal of a director under South African law. On this basis and on the basis that the 
director’s removal under section 71(3) of the Companies Act must be for cause, it is submitted 
that, contrary to the decision of the respective courts in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien,70 and Murray 
v Conseco Inc,71 a decision to remove a director under section 71(3) of the Companies Act in 
breach of the fiduciary duties of the directors must be set aside by a court, and the improperly 
removed director must be reinstated to the board of directors, if it is appropriate to do so in the 
circumstances. 
 
It must be stressed that in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others72 the 
Constitutional Court did not order the reinstatement of the two directors who had been removed 
by the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans from the board of directors in circumstances 
where the removal by the Minister had been procedurally defective. However, the 
circumstances surrounding the removal of the directors in this case are distinguishable from 
the removal of a director by the board of directors which is in breach of its fiduciary duties. As 
discussed earlier,73 the Constitutional Court in this case proclaimed that while the setting aside 
of the Minister’s decision and the reinstatement of the directors or an award of compensation 
would usually follow from a finding that a dismissal of directors was procedurally defective, 
the exceptional circumstances of the case meant that it would not be just and equitable for it to 
award such remedies in this case.74 The court found that the relationship between the Minister 
and the two board members in question had disintegrated irreparably, and that there had been 
substantively good and compelling reasons for the Minister to remove the two directors from 
office.75 It is submitted that the vital difference between removing a director without following 
                                                 
69 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
70 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
71 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 
72 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC). 
 
73 See chapter 3, paras 4.3 and 8.6 for a discussion of this case. 
 
74 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 86. 
 
75 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) para 89. 
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the proper procedures to do so, and removing a director from office in breach of the fiduciary 
duties of the directors, is that in the former case there may well be valid substantive reasons to 
remove the director (as was the case in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and 
Others)76 while in the latter case the director may be removed without there being any 
substantive basis for his removal. As was stated above,77 section 71(3) of the Companies Act 
requires a director to be removed from office on the basis of one of the grounds set out in that 
section. If the board of directors removes a director from office in breach of its fiduciary duties, 
without one of these grounds being applicable, it would be very difficult to justify not 
reinstating the improperly removed director.  
 
As discussed above,78 the duty of directors to comply with their fiduciary obligations when 
removing a director from office would also apply when the board of directors decides not to 
remove a director from office. If the board of directors, in breach of its fiduciary duties, voted 
not to remove from office a director who has contravened one of the grounds set out in section 
71(3) of the Companies Act, any director who voted in favour of the removal or any holder of 
voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director, may apply to court to 
review the board’s determination.79 The court may either confirm the determination of the 
board not to remove the director from office or it may itself remove the director from office if 
it is satisfied that the director is ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, or has been negligent 
or derelict.80 Notably, section 71(6) of the Companies Act does not impose a time limit within 
which a director or a shareholder may apply to court to review the board’s determination not 
to remove a fellow board member. Even though there would be no uncertainty whether the 
director in question were a board member because the board would simply regard him as being 
a member since it did not remove him from office, it is submitted that there must nevertheless 
be a time bar within which a director or a shareholder may apply to court to review the board’s 
determination not to remove the director from office, so as to bring the matter to a finality. For 
                                                 
76 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC). 
 
77 See chapter 3, para 6 for a discussion of the grounds for the removal of a director by the board of directors under 
s 71(3) of the Companies Act. 
 
78 See para 3.4 above. 
 
79 Section 71(6) of the Companies Act.  
 
80 Section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act. An applicant in terms of s 71(6) must compensate the company and any 
other party for costs incurred in relation to the application unless the court reverses the decision of the board of 
directors (s 71(7) of the Companies Act). Sections 71(6) and 71(7) are discussed in chapter 6, para 2. 
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the sake of consistency with section 71(5) of the Companies Act, it is submitted that a time 
limit of twenty business days should be imposed in section 71(6) within which a director or a 
shareholder may apply to court to review the board’s determination not to remove a director 
from office.81 
 
4.2  Liability Under Section 77(2) of the Companies Act  
 
A further consequence of removing a director from office (or in not removing a director from 
office) in breach of the fiduciary duties of directors is that under section 77(2) of the Companies 
Act a director on the board of directors may be held liable in accordance with the principles of 
the common law relating to a breach of a fiduciary duty for any loss, damages or costs sustained 
by the company as a consequence of the breach by the director of a duty contemplated in 
sections 76(3)(a) (the duty to act in good faith and for a proper purpose) or 76(3)(b) (the duty 
to act in the best interests of the company). Notably, section 77(2)(a) of the Companies Act 
explicitly preserves the common law principles with regard to establishing the liability of 
directors for a breach of their fiduciary duties. Section 77(2) of the Companies Act applies to 
alternate directors as well.82  
 
The duties referred to in section 77(2) are owed to the company, and consequently it is the 
company that must proceed against the offending directors.83 It is accordingly important to note 
that section 77(2) of the Companies Act applies to any loss, damages or costs sustained by the 
company as a consequence of any breach by the director of a duty contemplated in section 76, 
and not to any loss, damages or costs sustained by the improperly removed director or by a 
third party.84  
 
A director who removes a fellow board member in breach of his fiduciary duties contained in 
sections 76(3)(a) or 76(3)(b) would not be able to escape liability under section 77(2) of the 
                                                 
81 This is discussed further in chapter 6, para 2.3. 
 
82 See s 77(1) of the Companies Act. An alternate director is a person elected or appointed to serve, as the occasion 
requires, as a member of the board of a company in substitution for a particular elected or appointed director of 
that company (s 1 of the Companies Act). 
 
83 FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 584. 
 
84 See also Sanlam Capital Markets (Pty) Ltd v Mettle Manco (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] 3 All SA 454 (GJ) para 
41 and Blue Farm Fashion Limited v Rapitrade 6 (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] JOL 35613 (WCC) paras 11-12. 
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Companies Act. This is because section 78(2) of the Companies Act renders void any provision 
in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules or in any agreement or resolution of a 
company (whether express or implied) to the extent that it directly or indirectly purports to 
relieve a director of a duty contemplated in section 76 of the Companies Act or a liability 
contemplated in section 77 of the Companies Act.  
 
In terms of section 77(9) of the Companies Act, in any proceedings against a director, other 
than for wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust, a court may relieve the director, either 
wholly or partly, from any liability set out in section 77 of the Companies Act, on any terms it 
considers just if it appears to the court that the director is or may be liable, but acted honestly 
and reasonably, or, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it would be fair to excuse 
the director. A director who has reason to think that a claim may be made alleging that he is 
liable, other than for wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust, may apply to a court for relief 
in terms of section 77(10) of the Companies Act and the court may grant relief to the director 
on the same grounds as if the matter had come before the court in terms of section 77(9) of the 
Companies Act.85  
 
It is not clear whether section 77(9) applies only to proceedings between the company and 
directors or whether it also applies to proceedings between a director and a third party. In Ex 
parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd86 the court held that section 248 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973,87 the predecessor to section 77(9) of the Companies Act, did not empower a 
                                                 
85 In AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Others (1992) 7 ACSR 759 the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales stated that s 1318 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, which is the equivalent provision to s 
77(9) of the Companies Act, is designed to protect honest directors and ought not to be construed in a narrow 
sense (at 855). For this reason, the court held that a court may grant relief from liability for damages for breach 
of contract under this provision. 
 
86 1989 (3) SA 71 (T) at 107. 
 
87 Section 248 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 empowered a court to excuse a director being sued for negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust from liability where he had acted honestly and reasonably, and having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case, he ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default, breach of 
duty or breach of trust. There are some differences between s 248 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and s 77(9) 
of the Companies Act. One difference is that under s 248 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 it had to be proved 
that a director had acted honestly and reasonably, and that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he 
ought fairly to be excused, whereas under s 77(9) of the Companies Act only one of these requirements needs to 
be fulfilled. FHI Cassim contends that s 77(9) of the Companies Act ought preferably to be read in the same way 
as s 248 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 so that a court should refuse to grant relief where, even though the 
director has acted honestly and reasonably, the circumstances are such that he ought not to be excused (see FHI 
Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 579).  
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court to grant relief to a director against a claim by a third party such as a creditor of the 
company, and that the provision applied only to proceedings between the company and its 
directors. This was the approach adopted in the UK case of Customs and Excise Commissioners 
v Hedon Alpha Ltd and Others88 on which the court relied. On the one hand section 77(9) of 
the Companies Act does not qualify the word “proceedings” and it applies in “any proceedings” 
against a director.89 On the other hand, section 77(9) of the Companies Act enables a court to 
relieve a director from “any liability set out in this section”, namely section 77 of the 
Companies Act.90 In this regard, it appears that section 77(9) would apply only to proceedings 
between the company and its directors.91 In this event, section 77(9) of the Companies Act 
would be of no comfort to a director when faced with a claim made against him personally by 
a third party. The only relief a director may obtain is relief from liability to the company itself.92  
 
In order to rely on sections 77(9) or 77(10) of the Companies Act, a director who has removed 
a fellow board member in breach of his fiduciary duties would first have to overcome the hurdle 
of showing that his actions did not constitute wilful misconduct or a wilful breach of trust. 
Removing a fellow board member in breach of the applicable fiduciary duties and with ulterior 
motives is dishonest, and may negate any reliance on the provisions of sections 77(9) and 
77(10) of the Companies Act. Even if the hurdle of proving that his actions did not constitute 
wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust were overcome, a director would either have to 
demonstrate that he had acted honestly and reasonably, or that having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case, it would be fair to excuse him. In Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 12)93 with regard to the meaning of the term 
“honestly” in section 1318 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001,94 which is the 
                                                 
88 [1981] 2 All ER 697 (CA). Section 248 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was worded in exactly the same terms 
as s 448 of the UK Companies Act of 1948, which was the applicable provision in issue in Customs and Excise 
Commissioners v Hedon Alpha Ltd and Others [1981] 2 All ER 697 (CA). 
 
89 Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 308. 
 
90 FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 580. 
 
91 FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 580. 
 
92 Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 (3) SA 71 (T) at 107. 
 
93 [2009] NSWSC 714. 
 
94 Section 1318 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 provides as follows: “If, in any civil proceeding against 
a person to whom this section applies for negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty in a capacity as 
such a person, it appears to the court before which the proceedings are taken that the person is or may be liable in 
respect of the negligence, default or breach but that the person has acted honestly and that, having regard to all 
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equivalent provision to section 77(9) of the Companies Act, the New South Wales Supreme 
Court stated as follows: 
 
 “In my view a person acts honestly for the purposes of . . . Section 1318(1), in the ordinary meaning 
of that term, if that person's conduct is without moral turpitude in the sense that it is without deceit 
or conscious impropriety, without intent to gain improper benefit or advantage and without 
carelessness or imprudence at a level that negates the performance of the duty in question. That 
conclusion may be drawn from evidence of the person's subjective intent. But a lack of such 
subjective intent will not lead the Court to conclude that a person has acted honestly if a reasonable 
person in that position would regard the conduct as exhibiting moral turpitude.”95 
 
In light of the meaning of the term “honestly” as enunciated in Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 12),96 it is submitted that if a director were to 
remove a fellow board member in breach of his fiduciary duties, his conduct would not be 
“without moral turpitude” and it would be difficult for him to prove that his actions were honest 
and reasonable, or even that it would be fair for a court to excuse him for a breach of his 
fiduciary duties. A court nevertheless has a discretion to grant relief to a director, and may 
relieve him wholly or partly on any terms the court considers just.  
 
The liability under section 77(2) of the Companies Act is joint and several with that of any 
other person who is also liable for the same act.97 Proceedings to recover any loss, damages or 
costs for which a person may be liable under section 77 of the Companies Act may not be 
commenced more than three years after the act or omission that gave rise to that liability.98  
 
                                                 
the circumstances of the case, including those connected with the person’s appointment, the person ought fairly 
to be excused for the negligence, default or breach, the court may relieve the person either wholly or partly from 
liability on such terms as the court thinks fit.” 
 
95 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 12) [2009] NSWSC 714 para 22. 
 
96 [2009] NSWSC 714. 
  
97 Section 77(6) of the Companies Act. 
 
98 Section 77(7) of the Companies Act. The three-year prescription period under s 77(7) of the Companies Act 
commences with the act or omission that gave rise to the liability. In contrast, s 12(3) of the Prescription Act 68 
of 1969 provides that a three-year prescription period for the extinction of a debt shall begin to run as soon as the 
debt is due but that a debt shall not be deemed to be due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the 
debtor and of the facts from which the debt arises. The commencement date of the prescription period in s 77(7) 
of the Companies Act and the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 are quite different, and it is not clear which would 
prevail in the event of such a conflict (see Jooste “Corporate Finance” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company 
Law 334.) For a further discussion of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 see chapter 6, notes 498-501 and 507. 
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4.3  Liability Under Section 218(2) of the Companies Act  
 
Under section 218(2) of the Companies Act, “any person” who contravenes any provision of 
the Companies Act is liable to any other person for any loss or damage suffered by that person 
as a result of that contravention. Section 218(2) of the Companies Act imposes strict liability 
and applies even if the defendant had innocently contravened the Companies Act, as long as 
the plaintiff suffered damages or loss as a result of the contravention.99 The reference to “any 
person” in section 218(2) of the Companies Act would include a director of a company.100 As 
affirmed by the respective courts in Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala101 and Sanlam Capital 
Markets (Pty) Ltd v Mettle Manco (Pty) Ltd and Others,102 a director who does not comply 
with the standards of directors’ conduct as set out in section 76 of the Companies Act would 
be liable under section 218(2) of the Companies Act to any person who has suffered a loss in 
consequence thereof.103  
Consequently, a director who has breached sections 76(3)(a) or 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act 
in removing a fellow board member from office may incur liability to that director, or to any 
other person, under section 218(2) of the Companies Act, for any loss or damage suffered by 
the director or third person as a result of the contravention. A third person may be a shareholder 
or even a creditor who has suffered loss as a result of the contravention.104 As emphasised by 
the court in Rabinowitz v Van Graan and Others105 a director may only be held liable under 
section 218(2) of the Companies Act for loss or damage suffered as a result of a contravention 
of the Companies Act. It follows that section 218(2) of the Companies Act would not be 
applicable to a breach of a common law fiduciary duty. However, as discussed earlier, the 
common law fiduciary duty of exercising an unfettered discretion or an independent judgment, 
which may be breached if a director were removed from office by the board of directors with 
                                                 
99 MF Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 832-
833; MM Botha “Responsibilities of Companies towards Employees” 26. 
 
100 Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 104. 
 
101 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 104. 
 
102 [2014] 3 All SA 454 (GJ) para 42. 
 
103 See also Blue Farm Fashion Limited v Rapitrade 6 (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] JOL 35613 (WCC) para 12 
and MM Botha “Responsibilities of Companies towards Employees” 26. 
 
104 Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 639. 
 
105 2013 (5) SA 315 (GSJ) para 9. 
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ulterior motives, is regarded as being an aspect of the duty to act in the best interests of the 
company, as contained in section 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act.106 Accordingly, it is 
submitted that if the board of directors breached its fiduciary duty of exercising an unfettered 
discretion or independent judgment in removing a director from office, the improperly removed 
director may nevertheless rely on section 218(2) of the Companies Act by relying on a breach 
of the duty to act in the best interests of the company as contained in section 76(3)(b) of the 
Companies Act. 
The plaintiff under a section 218(2) claim must specify which contraventions are attributed to 
the defendant as well as the exact loss or damage sustained as a result of such contravention.107 
Accordingly, a director who has been improperly removed from office by the board of directors 
in breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties under sections 76(3)(a) or 76(3)(b) of the Companies 
Act, may have a claim under section 218(2) for any loss or damage suffered by him as a result 
of this contravention, but he would have to specify the exact loss or damage sustained as a 
result of his removal in breach of these provisions. In Burco Civils CC v Stolz and Another108 
the High Court opined that to succeed on the basis of section 218(2), it must not only be shown 
that a person contravened any provision(s) of the Companies Act, and that another person 
suffered damage, but it must also be shown that the damage suffered was as a result of that 
contravention. In other words, there must be proof of a causal link or connection between the 
contravention of the Companies Act, and the debts and liabilities for which the person may be 
held liable.109 The three-year prescription period referred to in section 77(7) of the Companies 
Act does not apply to section 218(2) of the Companies Act. Accordingly prescription under 
section 218(2) of the Companies Act would be governed by the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.110 
                                                 
106 See FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
529 and 532; Keay “The Duty of Directors to Exercise Independent Judgment” 290; Kershaw Company Law in 
Context 356 and Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 610. 
 
107 Rabinowitz v Van Graan and Others 2013 (5) SA 315 (GSJ) para 11. 
 
108 [2017] JOL 39331 (GP) para 47. 
 
109 Burco Civils CC v Stolz and Another [2017] JOL 39331 (GP) para 47. See also Motor Industry Bargaining 
Council v Botha and Another (34198/2013) [2016] ZAGPPHC 615 (10 June 2016) para 61 where the High Court 
stated that the element of causation is required in s 218(2) of the Companies Act. 
 
110 Jooste “Corporate Finance” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 349. The prescription period 
under the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 for the prescription under s 218(2) of the Companies Act is also three years. 
The three-year prescription period under the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 begins to run as soon as the debt is due, 
but a debt is not deemed to be due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the debtor and of the facts 
from which the debt arises (s 12(3) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969). For a further discussion of the Prescription 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
When the board of directors exercises the power to remove a director from office it must 
comply with its fiduciary duties to the company.111 In particular, in accordance with sections 
76(3)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act, directors have a duty to act in good faith and for a 
proper purpose, and in the best interests of the company.112 Directors must exercise their power 
to remove a fellow board member under section 71(3) of the Companies Act for the proper 
purpose for which the power was given to them, and not for a collateral or ulterior purpose.113 
In addition, directors must exercise an unfettered discretion and an independent judgment when 
removing directors from office.114 They must consider the proposed resolution to remove a 
fellow board matter in an unbiased and objective manner.115 The duty of directors to comply 
with their fiduciary duties when removing a director from office would also apply when the 
board of directors decides not to remove a director from office.116  
 
It was submitted that, contrary to the dicta in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien117 and Murray v Conseco 
Inc,118 if the directors remove a fellow director from office under section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act in breach of their fiduciary duties, the decision must be set aside by a court, 
and the improperly removed director must be reinstated to the board of directors, if it is 
appropriate to do so in the circumstances.119 It was argued that the removal of directors under 
section 71(3) of the Companies Act is distinguishable from the removal of directors in the 
                                                 
Act 68 of 1969 see chapter 6, notes 498–501 and 507. See further chapter 6, para 3.3.1.2 for a discussion on 
s 218(2) of the Companies Act. 
 
111 See para 2 above. 
 
112 See para 3.1 above. 
 
113 See para 3.2 above. 
 
114 See para 3.3 above. 
 
115 See para 3.3 above. 
 
116 See para 3.4 above. 
 
117 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
118 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 
119 See para 4.1 above. 
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circumstances that applied in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien120 and Murray v Conseco Inc,121 in two 
respects.122 First, the removals of the directors in these cases did not have to be for cause, and 
were in fact without cause, whereas the removal of a director under section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act must be for cause.123 It follows that under section 71(3) of the Companies Act 
the fiduciary duties and any ulterior motives of the board of directors in removing a fellow 
board member are of fundamental importance in assessing the propriety of the removal in order 
to determine if the removal was indeed for cause.124 Secondly, it was argued that if a removal 
of a director by the board of directors in breach of their fiduciary duties were to be challenged 
by a director, this would not bring the management of a company to a standstill, which was the 
concern of the Privy Council in Lee v Chou Wen Hsien.125 It was contended that sections 71(5) 
and 70(2) of the Companies Act overcome this concern because section 71(5) places a limit of 
twenty business days in which the challenge to the improper removal must be raised, while 
section 70(2) suspends the removed director from office pending the filing of an application 
for review or the granting of an order by the court on such an application, whichever is the 
later.126 
It was submitted that a further consequence of removing a director from office in breach of the 
fiduciary duties of directors (or in not removing that director from office) is that under section 
77(2) of the Companies Act a director may be held liable in accordance with the principles of 
the common law relating to a breach of a fiduciary duty for any loss, damages or costs sustained 
by the company as a consequence of the breach by the director of a duty contemplated in 
sections 76(3)(a) (the duty to act in good faith and for a proper purpose) and 76(3)(b) (the duty 
to act in the best interests of the company).127 Liability under section 77(2) of the Companies 
Act is joint and several with that of any other person who is also liable for the same act.128 
                                                 
120 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
 
121 766 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 
122 See para 4.1 above. 
 
123 See para 4.1 above. 
 
124 See para 4.1 above. 
 
125 [1984] 1 WLR 1202. See para 4.1 above. 
 
126 See para 4.1 above. 
 
127 See para 4.2 above. 
 
128 See para 4.2 above. 
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Finally, it was contended that a director who has contravened sections 76(3)(a) or (b) of the 
Companies Act in removing a fellow board member from office would incur liability to that 
director, or to any other person, under section 218(2) of the Companies Act, for any loss or 
damage suffered by the improperly removed director or third person as a result of the 
contravention.129 
 
                                                 
129 See para 4.3 above. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS HOLDING MULTIPLE 
POSITIONS IN A COMPANY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. THE REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS WHO ARE EMPLOYEES 
3. THE REMOVAL OF SHAREHOLDING-DIRECTORS HOLDING 
LOADED VOTING RIGHTS  
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When a director is involved with a company in more than one capacity, such as an 
employee and a shareholder, the relationship between the director and the company 
becomes complicated.1 The complexity of this relationship may impose additional 
considerations regarding the removal of the director from the company. Before a director 
is removed from office, cognisance must be taken of any other capacities in which the 
director is involved with the company, so that the consequences of such appointment may 
be considered prior to removing the director from office.  
                                                 
 1 For example, in Greaves and Others v Barnard 2007 (2) SA 593 (C) the question arose whether a director 
was entitled to a spoliation remedy where the company had prevented him from entering its premises and 
accessing his office. A spoliation remedy (also known as a mandament van spolie) is a common law 
possessory remedy used by a person who has been dispossessed of goods without due legal procedure 
having been followed. In order to obtain a spoliation order the onus is on the applicant to prove the required 
possession, and that he was unlawfully deprived of such possession (see Yeko v Qana 1973 (4) SA 735 (A) 
at 739). In Greaves and Others v Barnard 2007 (2) SA 593 (C) para 10 the Cape Provincial Division 
affirmed that a spoliation order may be granted if the applicant was in possession of property with the 
intention of securing a benefit for himself. (See further on the spoliation remedy Mpunga v Malaba 1959 
(1) SA 853 (W); Yeko v Qana 1973 (4) SA 735 (A) and Dlamini and Another v Mavi and Others 1982 (2) 
SA 490 (W)). The director in question in Greaves and Others v Barnard 2007 (2) SA 593 (C) not only 
occupied the office of director, but was also an employee of the company and a shareholder. Moreover, the 
shareholders' agreement stated that the relationship between shareholders was to be regarded as that of 
quasi-partners. In deciding whether the director was entitled to institute spoliation proceedings, the Cape 
Provincial Division considered the director’s position as a director, as an employee and as a shareholder. 
The court held that the director was entitled to a spoliation order on the basis that he had been in possession 
of the premises in his capacity as a director and a shareholder of the company, and therefore his interest in 
possession of the premises transcended those of a mere employee (para 21). The court remarked that by 
virtue of his employment, shareholding and directorship in the company, in occupying his office the 
director was carrying out his functions as employee and director and at the same time, advancing his own 
interests as a shareholder (para 17). It found that the director had an interest in the company over and above 
that of a mere employee. He had performed his work and occupied his office with the intention of securing 
some benefit for himself and not for another (para 21). On this basis the court held that the director was 
entitled to a spoliation order. This case illustrates the complexity of the relationship between a company 
and a director who is involved in the company in more than one capacity.  For a discussion of this case see 
Esser “Company Law and the Spoliated Director” 135-145. 
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This chapter examines two such circumstances. The first is the board removal of a 
director who is also an employee of the company. The LRA2 will in this case apply and 
its effect on the removal of directors must be considered. This chapter also investigates 
the validity of an automatic termination clause in the service contract of a director. Such 
a clause typically states that termination of board membership results in the automatic 
and simultaneous termination of a director’s employment by the company. In addition, 
this chapter examines the validity of a “reverse automatic termination” provision, which 
typically states that the termination of employment leads to the automatic and 
simultaneous termination of the directorship in the company.  
 
The second consideration regarding the removal of a director from the company is the 
removal by shareholders of directors who are also shareholders in the company but who 
have loaded voting rights. This chapter appraises whether a shareholding-director who 
holds shares with loaded votes is validly able to prevent his removal from office. In this 
regard the leading UK case of Bushell v Faith3 is critically evaluated in this chapter.  
 
2.  THE REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS WHO ARE EMPLOYEES  
 
Executive directors are full-time employees of the company while non-executive 
directors occupy the office of director but are not employees of the company.4 Since 
executive directors are also employees of the company, it is important to examine the role 
and relevance of the LRA in the removal of an executive director from office. It is also 
                                                 
2 The LRA is described in chapter 1, para 2.3. 
 
3 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
4 In Protect a Partner (Pty) Ltd v Laura Machaba-Abiodun and Others [2013] JOL 31048 (LC) para 48 
the Labour Court remarked that executive directors of a company are also referred to as “inside directors”. 
The court stated that executive directors represent the interest of the entity’s stakeholders and often have 
special knowledge of its inner workings, its financial or market position, and its vision and mission. A non-
executive director, the court observed, is not employed by the entity and does not generally represent any 
of its stakeholders. A typical example of a non-executive director, the court remarked, is a director who is 
the president of a firm or entity in a different industry. See further chapter 3, paras 6.2.3 and 6.3.1 and para 
2.1 below for a further discussion of the distinction between executive and non-executive directors; Annex 
2.2 and 2.3 of the King III Report; In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Limited [1925] 1 Ch 407 at 429; 
Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd 
v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) at 165; Howard v Herrigel and Another NNO 1991 (2) 
SA 660 (A) at 678; AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Others (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 867 
and Esser & Havenga “Directors and Other Officers” in Loubser & Mahony Company Secretarial Practice 
8-7. 
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necessary to examine whether executive directors may rely on remedies under the LRA 
if they are unfairly dismissed as employees of the company. The discussion in this chapter 
is confined to the removal of executive directors from office. It does not extend to the 
removal of non-executive directors from office as they are not employees.  
 
2.1  The Role and Relevance of the LRA in the Removal from Office of an Executive 
Director 
 
It is trite that the fact that a person is a director of a company does not mean that he cannot 
also be an employee of the company.5 Whether a person is an employee depends on 
whether or not he falls within the definition of the term “employee” in section 213 of the 
LRA.6 In PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others7 the Labour Court found that the 
definition of an “employee” in section 213 of the LRA is wide enough to include most, 
if not all, directors. Section 213 of the LRA defines an “employee” as follows: 
 
 “‘employee’ means – 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor who works for another person 
or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; 
and  
(b) any other person who in any matter assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer, 
and ‘employed’ and ‘employment’ have meanings corresponding to that of 
‘employee’” 
 
                                                 
5 Stevenson v Sterns Jewellers (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 ILJ 318 (IC); Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics & 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd (1987) 8 ILJ 356 (IC) at 362; Oak Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v John NO and Another 
1987 (4) SA 702 (N) at 704; Long & Another v Chemical Specialities Tvl (Pty) Ltd (1987) 8 ILJ 523 (IC) 
at 531-532; PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) para 31; Greaves and 
Others v Barnard 2007 (2) 593 (C) at 598; Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull 2008 JOL 
22089 (LAC) para 15; Mpofu v South African Broadcasting Corp Limited (SABC) and Others (2008/18386) 
[2008] ZAGPHC 413 (16 September 2008) para 23; Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 
24; Protect a Partner (Pty) Ltd v Laura Machaba-Abiodun and Others [2013] JOL 31048 (LC) para 46; 
Kaimowitz v Delahunt and Others 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) para 19; Larkin “Distinctions and Differences: 
A Company Lawyer looks at Executive Dismissals” 248; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 166; Delport 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 274(2)-274(3); Van Eck & Lombard “Dismissal of 
Executive Directors: Comparing Principles of Company Law and Labour Law” 25-27; Esser “Company 
Law and the Spoliated Director” 142; Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” 2367-2370; Van Eck 
“Are Senior Managerial Employees Prescribed Officers in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and are 
they treated the same as Executive Directors?” 791-792.  
 
6 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber [2005] 9 BLLR 849 (LAC) para 25; MM Botha “The Different Worlds of 
Labour and Company Law: Truth or Myth?” 2053-2055. 
 
7 [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) para 24.  
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In Oak Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v John NO and Another8 the High Court held that a 
managing director was an employee as he was a person who had assisted in “carrying on 
or conducting the business” of the employer, as defined in section 213 of the LRA.9  
 
The Labour Court in PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others10 stated that the 
argument that the LRA does not apply to directors is largely premised on the argument 
that employment is characterised by an imbalance in bargaining power or 
insubordination, and that this characterisation is not applicable to financial directors, 
managing directors or ordinary directors. The Labour Court rejected this argument on the 
basis that this imbalance is not capable of being described in such precise terms as to 
particularly exclude directors from the definition of “employees” in section 213 of the 
LRA, and proclaimed that company law too is concerned with the disparity in power 
between ownership and control.11  
 
In Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics & Engineering (Pty) Ltd12 the former Industrial 
Court13 opined that it could not have been the intention of the legislature that the behests 
                                                 
8 1987 (4) SA 702 (N) at 705-706.  
 
9 This case was decided under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, but the reasoning of the court would 
still apply to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 because the definition of “employee” and “employer” in 
both statutes are essentially the same with minor differences. The definition of an “employee” under the 
Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 read as follows:  
 
 “‘Employee’ means any person who is employed by or working for any employer and receiving 
or entitled to receive any remuneration, and, subject to ss (3), any other person whomsoever 
who in any manner assists in the carrying on or conducting of the business of an employer; and 
‘employed’ and ‘employment’ have corresponding meanings.” 
 
See further on the dual status of a managing director of a company Mpofu v South African Broadcasting 
Corp Limited (SABC) and Others (2008/18386) [2008] ZAGPHC 413 (16 September 2008) para 23 and 
SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2009] 8 BLLR 792 (LC) para 21. 
 
10 [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) para 28. 
 
11 PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) para 28. See further Larkin 
“Distinctions and Differences: A Company Lawyer looks at Executive Dismissals” 252-253 where this 
argument was canvassed. The disparity in power between ownership and control in companies is discussed 
in chapter 2, paras 2 and 3. 
 
12 (1987) 8 ILJ 356 (IC) at 362. 
 
13 The former Industrial Court was established under the now repealed Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
In an attempt to address the uncertainty of the statutes of the Industrial Court, the Labour Court was 
established as a superior court with the status and standing of a High Court and as a court of law and equity, 
in terms of s 151 of the LRA (see Landman “The New Labour Court of South Africa” 29). It replaced the 
Industrial Court (refer to item 22 of Schedule 7 of the LRA which deals with the transition of matters which 
262 
 
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 could have curtailed any rights of employees covered 
by the LRA. In a similar vein, in PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others14 the court 
remarked that neither the LRA nor the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (which was in force at 
the time of this decision) specifically preclude a director from the protection of the LRA. 
The current Companies Act likewise does not preclude a director from the protection of 
the LRA. Accordingly, when a director holds a dual position as a director and employee, 
his rights as an employee are not affected by the fact that he also holds the office of a 
director in the company.15  
 
Executive directors generally conclude contracts of employment with the company.16 The 
contracts of employment create a range of rights and obligations that do not exist in the 
case of non-executive directors.17 If an employment contract is concluded the same rules 
would apply with regard to the termination of the director’s contract of employment that 
apply to other employees.18 Where a person accepts the office of an executive director 
but a contract of employment has not been expressly concluded, a contract of employment 
between the director and the company will be implied.19  
 
Section 15(6)(c) of the Companies Act provides that the Memorandum of Incorporation 
of a company is binding between the company and each director of the company in the 
exercise of their respective functions within the company. It should be noted that this 
provision binds directors in the exercise of their functions as directors and not in any 
                                                 
were pending before the former Industrial Court when the LRA came into force in 1995). Only labour law 
matters may be referred to the Labour Court. 
 
14 [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) para 29. 
 
15 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 28. 
 
16 PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) paras 26-27; Mpofu v South African 
Broadcasting Corp Limited (SABC) and Others (2008/18386) [2008] ZAGPHC 413 (16 September 2008) 
para 23. For examples of distinguishing features between executive and non-executive directors see Esser 
& Havenga “Directors and Other Officers” in Loubser & Mahony Company Secretarial Practice 8-7. See 
further para 2 above and chapter 3, paras 6.2.3 and 6.3.1 on executive and non-executive directors. 
 
17 Mpofu v South African Broadcasting Corp Limited (SABC) and Others (2008/18386) [2008] ZAGPHC 
413 (16 September 2008) para 23. 
 
18 Van Eck “Are Senior Managerial Employees Prescribed Officers in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 and are they Treated the same as Executive Directors?” 796. 
 
19 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull 2008 JOL 22089 (LAC) para 12. 
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other capacity. If the Memorandum of Incorporation confers rights or imposes obligations 
on a director in some other capacity (for instance, in a capacity as an attorney of the 
company) the director may not enforce those terms against the company on the basis of 
section 15(6) of the Companies Act.20 It follows that a director may rely on the 
Memorandum of Incorporation of the company in respect of his position as a director but 
not in respect of his position as an employee of the company.  
 
A person simultaneously employed as an executive director and a board member holds 
two distinct positions.21 Since executive directors enjoy a dual status as directors and 
employees of the company they enjoy the protection of both the Companies Act and the 
LRA.22 As directors they are governed by the provisions of the Companies Act, and as 
employees they are governed by the provisions of the LRA.23 Consequently, when an 
executive director is removed from office, the provisions of both the Companies Act and 
the LRA must be considered in the removal process.24 A distinction must therefore be 
drawn between the removal of a director from his office as a director of the company, 
and the removal of a director from his position as an employee of the company. Notably, 
employees who are also directors of companies would be entitled to rely on the remedies 
under the LRA if they are unfairly dismissed as employees.25 
 
The fact that a chief executive officer of a company is suspended as an employee does 
not necessarily mean that he is also suspended or removed as a director of a company 
                                                 
20 MF Cassim “Formation of Companies and the Company Constitution” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 147-148. 
 
21 Kaimowitz v Delahunt and Others 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) para 19. 
 
22 PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) para 29; Amazwi Power Products 
(Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull 2008 JOL 22089 (LAC) para 15; Mpofu v South African Broadcasting Corp 
Limited (SABC) and Others (2008/18386) [2008] ZAGPHC 413 (16 September 2008) para 23 and SA Post 
Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC) para 21. 
 
23 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 24. 
 
24 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC) para 15; Mpofu v South 
African Broadcasting Corp Limited (SABC) and Others (2008/18386) [2008] ZAGPHC 413 (16 September 
2008); Wicks v SA Independent Services (Pty) Ltd and Another [2010] JOL 25715 (WCC); Chillibush v 
Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC); SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC); Van 
Eck & Lombard  “Dismissal of Executive Directors: Comparing Principles of Company Law and Labour 
Law” 20.  
 
25 See para 2.2 below where these remedies are discussed. 
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(assuming that he is a director of the company).26 In Maqubela v South African Graduates 
Development Association and Others27 the applicant was employed as the chief executive 
officer of the first respondent. By virtue of this position, he was also an executive director 
on the board of directors of the first respondent. The applicant was suspended as the chief 
executive officer of the first respondent on the ground that he had unlawfully authorised 
certain payments to himself. He challenged his suspension on various grounds, one of 
them being that by virtue of his position as the chief executive officer of the company, 
the suspension had also translated into his suspension as the executive director of the first 
respondent’s board. To this end he argued that the board resolution taken to suspend him 
as the chief executive officer of the company was contrary to the provisions of section 71 
of the Companies Act in that he had not been given notice of the meeting or a copy of the 
proposed resolution, nor had he been afforded an opportunity to make representations to 
the board of directors. The Labour Court stressed that the suspension of the applicant as 
the chief executive officer of the company did not mean that he was also removed as a 
member of the board.28 The court found that the applicant had incorrectly assumed that 
by virtue of his suspension as the chief executive officer of the company he was thereby 
removed as a member of the board of directors.29  The Labour Court held that since the 
board of directors had not taken a resolution to remove the applicant from the board of 
directors, the applicant could not rely on the Companies Act to challenge his suspension 
as the chief executive officer of the company.30  
 
                                                 
26 The chief executive officer of a company is usually a director of the company, but he need not necessarily 
be appointed as such. He may be a prescribed officer of a company, if he exercises general executive control 
over and management of the business and activities of the company or regularly participates to a material 
degree in the exercise of general executive control over and management of the business and activities of 
the company (see the definition of a “prescribed officer” in s 1 of the Companies Act and regulation 38(1) 
of the Companies Regulations, 2011). The King IV Report defines the “CEO” as “the chief executive 
officer or the highest ranking employee in an organisation regardless of naming convention” (King IV 
Report, Glossary of Terms, at 10). 
 
27 [2014] 6 BLLR 582 (LC).  
 
28 Maqubela v South African Graduates Development Association and Others [2014] 6 BLLR 582 (LC) 
para 18. 
 
29 Maqubela v South African Graduates Development Association and Others [2014] 6 BLLR 582 (LC) 
para 18. 
 
30 Maqubela v South African Graduates Development Association and Others [2014] 6 BLLR 582 (LC) 
para 18. 
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Conversely, the fact that an executive director resigns as a director or is removed from 
office as a director does not mean that he has also resigned or has been removed as an 
employee of the company. In Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull31 the 
respondent was employed by the appellant, a company, as an internal accountant and was, 
at a later stage, also appointed to the board of directors as its financial director. 
Approximately a year after her appointment to the board of directors she tendered her 
resignation as a director, but undertook at the same time to continue her employment as 
the internal accountant of the appellant. She subsequently received a letter from the 
appellant accepting her resignation from its employment.  She objected to this letter on 
the ground that she had resigned only as a director and not as an employee of the 
appellant. The Labour Appeal Court affirmed that the LRA does indeed afford protection 
to a director who is dismissed by a company.32 The court observed that while a director 
is not necessarily an employee of a company, he may be an employee in addition to 
holding the independent office as a director.33 It ruled that to be legally effective, a notice 
of intention to resign from employment and to terminate such employment must be clear 
and unequivocal.34 It found that the respondent had made it clear that she did not intend 
to resign from her employment relationship with the appellant.35 The Labour Appeal 
Court consequently held that the appellant’s attempt to use the respondent’s resignation 
letter as a director as a basis to terminate her employment as an accountant, was 
“opportunistic”.36 The court accordingly found that the dismissal of the respondent as an 
employee of the appellant was substantively unfair.37  
 
                                                 
31 [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC). 
 
32 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC) para 15.  
 
33 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC) para 12. 
 
34 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC) para 16. 
 
35 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC) para 20. 
 
36 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC) para 21. 
 
37 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC) para 21. 
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The decisions in Maqubela v South African Graduates Development Association and 
Others38 and Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Shelly Turnbull39 both illustrate that a 
director’s position as a director is independent from his position as an employee.40 These 
cases also make it clear that it is possible for an executive director to be suspended from, 
resign from or to be removed from the one position while still maintaining the other 
position.41  As evidenced by these two cases, the removal of a person as a director of a 
company and the removal of an employee of a company are two separate processes in 
law and must be treated as such.  
 
In Chillibush v Johnston42 the Labour Court observed that labour law and company law 
essentially operate in their own spheres but at certain times they impact on one another.  
The court opined that the most striking example of this is the fact that the rules relating 
to the dismissal of an employee under the LRA and the removal of a director under the 
Companies Act are not the same.43 For instance, the procedures to remove a director 
under the Companies Act are not as comprehensive as those set out in the LRA with 
regard to the dismissal of an employee.44 A further distinction between company law and 
labour law is that when the shareholders remove a director from office under the 
                                                 
38 [2014] 6 BLLR 582 (LC).  
 
39 [2008] JOL 22089 (LAC). 
 
40 See further Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 166 and Esser “Company Law and the Spoliated Director” 
142. 
 
41 See further Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” 2371. 
 
42 [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 42. 
 
43 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 42. 
 
44 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 42. The LRA Code of Good Practice (refer to 
chapter 3, para 6.2.1 where the LRA Code of Good Practice is described) sets out guidelines on the 
procedures to be followed when dismissing an employee for reasons related to conduct and capacity. Item 
2(1) of the LRA Code of Good Practice states that a dismissal is unfair if it is not effected for a fair reason 
and in accordance with a fair procedure. Item 4 of the LRA Code of Good Practice sets out general 
guidelines on what constitutes a fair procedure to dismiss an employee. In terms of item 4, the employer 
should conduct an investigation to determine whether there are grounds for dismissal, but this does not 
need to be a formal enquiry. The employer should notify the employee of the allegations using a form and 
language that the employee can reasonably understand. The employee should be allowed an opportunity to 
state a case in response to the allegations. In addition, the employee should be entitled to a reasonable time 
to prepare the response, and to the assistance of a trade union representative or fellow employee. After the 
enquiry, the employer should communicate the decision taken, and preferably furnish the employee with 
written notification of that decision. Only in exceptional circumstances, if the employer cannot reasonably 
be expected to comply with these guidelines, may he dispense with these pre-dismissal procedures. 
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Companies Act their discretion is unfettered and they require no reason to do so.45 While 
a director is entitled to make a presentation to the shareholders before a vote on his 
proposed removal takes place, the shareholders are not required to take into account the 
director’s submissions, nor are they required to take into account any considerations of 
fairness when voting on his removal.46 In contrast, when dismissing an employee in terms 
of the LRA the discretion in labour law is not as unfettered as it is when the shareholders 
remove a director from office.47 Another difference between company law and labour 
law is that in the field of labour law the overriding principle is fairness, and not 
lawfulness, which is the overriding principle in company law.48 In SA Post Office Ltd v 
Mampeule49 the Labour Appeal Court asserted that in labour law jurisprudence 
lawfulness cannot be equated with fairness. The fact that an executive director has been 
lawfully removed as a director does not mean that this would also result in a fair dismissal 
as an employee.50 Whether or not the dismissal of the executive director as an employee 
is fair, is a matter that is subject to scrutiny in terms of labour law, by either the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”) or the Labour 
Court.51 It is submitted that the notion that the overriding principle in labour law is 
fairness, is buttressed by item 1(3) of the LRA Code of Good Practice, which states as 
follows: 
 
“The key principle in this Code is that employers and employees should treat one 
another with mutual respect. A premium is placed on both employment justice and 
the efficient operation of business. While employees should be protected from 
arbitrary action, employers are entitled to satisfactory conduct and work 
performance from their employees.” 
 
                                                 
45 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 42. See chapter 4, para 2 where this is discussed 
further. 
 
46 Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” 2373. 
 
47 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 42. 
 
48 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 42. 
 
49 [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC) para 21. 
 
50 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 42. See further SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule 
[2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC) para 21. In Numsa v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd & Others [1996] 6 BLLR 697 
(AD) at 709 the then Appellate Division stated that there is no sure correspondence between lawfulness 
and fairness. The court stated further that while an unlawful dismissal would probably always be regarded 
as unfair, a lawful dismissal will not for that reason alone be fair (at 709). 
 
51 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 42.  
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If a conflict arises between the LRA and the Companies Act, the provisions of the LRA 
will prevail. This is affirmed by section 5(4)(b) of the Companies Act which states that 
if there is an inconsistency between  the Companies Act and the LRA, to the extent that 
it is impossible to apply or comply with one of the inconsistent provisions without 
contravening the second, the applicable provisions of the LRA will prevail. Section 210 
of the LRA similarly provides that if there is a conflict relating to the matters dealt with 
in the LRA and the provisions of any other law save for the Constitution or an Act 
expressly amending the LRA, the provisions of the LRA will prevail.52   
 
2.2  Automatic Termination Clauses  
 
An automatic termination clause is a provision which provides for the automatic 
termination of employment of an employee upon the occurrence of an event. It is intended 
to operate as a mechanism by which an employment relationship may be terminated. For 
example, in SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule53 the respondent was appointed for five years 
as the chief executive officer of the applicant as well as a member of its board of directors. 
His employment contract stated that membership of the board of directors was a 
prerequisite for appointment as the chief executive officer, and that termination of board 
membership would lead to the termination of the appointment as the chief executive 
officer. This amounts to an automatic termination clause since it provides that the 
occurrence of a certain event (the termination of board membership) leads to the 
automatic termination of employment (as the chief executive officer) with the company.  
The Labour Court in SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule54 was required to determine whether 
the above automatic termination clause was valid. The respondent’s employment contract 
had provided further that the appointment of the chief executive officer could be 
terminated on the grounds of incapacity, misconduct or operational requirements. Prior 
to the expiry of the respondent’s five-year contract term, the board of directors of the 
appellant, the South African Post Office SOC Limited, had approved a motion by the 
Minister of Communications (who represented the State as the sole shareholder of the 
                                                 
52 See further Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) (para 29) where the Labour Court affirmed 
that if there is a conflict between company law and labour law, labour law will prevail.  
 
53 [2009] 8 BLLR 792 (LC). 
 
54 [2009] 8 BLLR 792 (LC). 
 
269 
 
appellant) that the respondent be removed from office as a director of the appellant. The 
respondent was then informed that his employment as the chief executive officer of the 
appellant had ceased. He instituted legal proceedings in the Labour Court for breach of 
contract and for unfair dismissal.  
 
The Labour Court found that the automatic termination clause on which the appellant had 
relied to dismiss the respondent as the chief executive officer was not valid on the ground 
that it was in conflict with the respondent’s right under the LRA not to be unfairly 
dismissed.55 This was upheld by the Labour Appeal Court on appeal.56 The Labour 
Appeal Court held that by acknowledging that the chief executive officer could be 
dismissed for incapacity, misconduct or operational requirements, the appellant had 
recognised that the chief executive officer had enjoyed the full range of employee rights, 
including the right not to be unfairly dismissed from office.57 The court found that the 
appellant’s conduct had been designed to avoid its obligations under the LRA.58 It held 
further that parties to an employment contract may not contract out of the protection 
against unfair dismissal afforded to an employee whether through the mechanism of 
automatic termination provisions, or otherwise, because the LRA had been promulgated 
not only to cater for an individual’s interest but for the public’s interest as well.59  Even 
if an employee might be deemed to have waived his rights under the LRA, such a waiver 
is not valid or enforceable. 
 
In Mahlamu v CCMA & Others60 the Labour Court had to decide whether it is permissible 
for an employee to contract out of the right not to be unfairly dismissed as enshrined in 
the LRA. The Labour Court held that this depends on whether the subject of the right is 
                                                 
55 SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2009] 8 BLLR 792 (LC) para 45. The right not to be unfairly dismissed 
is enshrined in s 185 of the LRA. 
 
56 SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC) paras 22-23. See further Du Toit et al 
Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide at 86 and 223 and Van Niekerk et al Law@work 223 for 
a discussion of this case. 
 
57 SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC) para 21. 
 
58 SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC) para 24. 
 
59 SA Post Office Ltd v Mampeule [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC) para 23. 
 
60 [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC). 
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intended to be its sole beneficiary.61 If other persons have an interest in the existence of 
the right or if the interests of the public were served by the conferment of the right, the 
right could not legally be waived.62 
 
It is a well-established legal principle that a statutory provision that is enacted for the 
special benefit of any individual or body may be waived by that individual or body 
provided that no public interests are involved.63 In Bafana Finance Mabopane v 
Makwakwa & Another64 the Supreme Court of Appeal proclaimed that an agreement 
whereby a party purports to waive the benefits conferred upon him by statute will be 
contra bonos mores and is accordingly unenforceable if it can be shown that such an 
agreement would deprive the party of protection that the legislature considered should, 
as a matter of policy, be afforded by law. In Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes65 the then Appellate 
Division held that an agreement is contrary to public policy if it is opposed to the interests 
of the State, or of justice or of the public.  
 
                                                 
61 Mahlamu v CCMA & Others [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) para 19. 
 
62 Mahlamu v CCMA & Others [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) para 19. The applicant was employed as a security 
guard. His employment contract stipulated that it would expire automatically on termination of the contract 
between the employer and its client or if the client no longer required the applicant’s service for any reason. 
When the client cancelled the security contact, the employer informed the applicant that his services were 
no longer required. The CCMA found that the employment contract had terminated automatically since the 
client no longer required the applicant’s services, and that the applicant had failed to prove that he had been 
dismissed. The Labour Court held that the commissioner had committed a material error of law and set 
aside his award (para 25). It held that employers and employees may not contract out of the protection 
against unfair dismissal, and that contracting out of the right not to be unfairly dismissed is not permitted 
by the LRA (para 22). Since the applicant’s dismissal was patently for the employer’s operational 
requirements the applicant was granted leave to refer the matter to the Labour Court (para 25). 
 
63 Ritch and Bhyat v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1912 AD 719 at 734-735; Bezuidenhout v AA 
Mutual Insurance Association Ltd 1978 (1) SA 703 (A) at 710; Govender v Sona Development Co (Pty) 
Ltd 1980 (1) SA 602 (D) at 604-605; SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Bavuma 1985 (3) SA 42 (A) at 49; 
Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C) at 711-712; South African Co-operative Citrus Exchange Ltd v 
Director-General Trade and Industry and Another 1997 (3) SA 236 (SCA) at 242-243; Bafana Finance 
Mabopane v Makwakwa & Another 2006 (4) S 581 (SCA) para 9; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 763; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 166-168; Bradfield Christie’s Law of 
Contract in South Africa 392 and 518. 
 
64 2006 (4) S 581 (SCA) para 10. 
 
65 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) at 8. See further Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 763; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 167 and Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 
401-407. 
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In Chillibush v Johnston66 the Labour Court affirmed that an employer and an employee 
may not contractually agree in a contract of employment or in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company of which the employee is also a director, that the employment 
relationship will automatically terminate if the employee’s directorship is terminated. A 
shareholders’ agreement may also not limit the statutory rights against unfair dismissal 
which an employee enjoys in terms of the LRA because a shareholders’ agreement does 
not generally supersede a contract of employment.67 The court held that an automatic 
termination clause falls foul of the constitutional right of every employee to fair labour 
practices, enshrined in section 23(1) of the Constitution.68  
 
A further reason given by the Labour Court in Chillibush v Johnston69 for not condoning 
automatic termination provisions is that such clauses contravene sections 5(2)(b)70 and 
5(4)71 of the LRA. These provisions prohibit an employer and an employee from agreeing 
                                                 
66 [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC). 
 
67 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 38. 
 
68 Chillibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) paras 38 and 39. Section 23(1) of the Constitution states 
that “[e]veryone has the right to fair labour practices.” The LRA gives effect to s 23(1) of the Constitution 
by recognising the right not to be unfairly dismissed in s 185 of the LRA. See Nehawu v University of Cape 
Town & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC) para 42 where the Constitutional Court affirmed that s 185 of the 
LRA is an extension of the constitutional right to fair labour practices. Section 185 of the LRA states as 
follows:  
  
 “Every employee has the right not to be- 
(a) unfairly dismissed; and 
(b) subjected to unfair labour practice.” 
 
Section 1(a) of the LRA gives further effect to s 23(1) of the Constitution by stating that the one of the 
primary objects of the LRA is to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by s 23 of the 
Constitution (see further Van Niekerk et al Law@work 43-44 and 51-52 for a discussion of the fairness 
component of s 23(1) of the Constitution). 
 
69 [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC) para 38. 
 
70 Section 5(2)(b) of the LRA states as follows: 
 
 “5  Protection of employees and persons seeking employment 
(1) No person may discriminate against an employee for exercising any right conferred by     
       this Act.  
(2) Without limiting the general protection conferred by subsection (1), no person may do, 
or threaten  to do, any of the following- 
     (a)  . . . 
(b)  prevent an employee or a person seeking employment from exercising any right 
conferred  by this Act or from participating in any proceedings in terms of this 
Act;” 
 
71 Section 5(4) of the LRA states as follows: 
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to limit an employee’s statutory rights. In Mahlamu v CCMA & Others72 the Labour Court 
stressed that the LRA must be purposively construed in order to give effect to the 
Constitution.73 It follows that section 5 of the LRA must be interpreted in favour of 
protecting employees against unfair dismissal, since this is one of the objects of the 
Constitution.74 The Labour Court in Mahlamu v CCMA & Others75 consequently 
affirmed that an automatic termination provision falls foul of section 5(2)(b) of the LRA, 
because an employee is denied the right to challenge the fairness of the dismissal in terms 
of section 188 of the LRA. 
 
Section 5(4) of the LRA contains an exception that provides that a provision in a contract 
that directly or indirectly contradicts or limits section 5 is invalid “unless the contractual 
provision is permitted” by the LRA. In order to fall within the scope of the exception in 
section 5(4) of the LRA the employer must prove that the automatic termination clause 
which contradicts or limits section 5 of the LRA is permitted by the LRA.76 In Mahlamu 
v CCMA & Others77 the Labour Court stated that what this boils down to in the labour 
law context is whether it is permissible to contract out of the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed in the LRA. The court held that an automatic termination clause does not fall 
within the exception in section 5(4) of the LRA because contracting out of the right not 
to be unfairly dismissed is not permitted by the LRA.78 The Labour Court accordingly 
affirmed that parties to an employment contract may not contract out of the protection 
                                                 
“A provision in any contract, whether entered into before or after the commencement of this 
Act, that directly or indirectly contradicts or limits any provision of section 4, [Employees’ 
right to freedom of association] or this section, is invalid, unless the contractual provision 
is permitted by this Act.” 
 
72 [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) para 12.  
 
73 Section 3(b) of the LRA states that the LRA must be interpreted in compliance with the Constitution. 
 
74 Mahlamu v CCMA & Others [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) para 12. 
 
75 [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) paras 19 and 22. 
 
76 Mahlamu v CCMA & Others [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) para 19. 
 
77 [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) para 19. 
 
78 Mahlamu v CCMA & Others [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) para 22. 
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against unfair dismissal afforded to an employee, whether through the mechanism of 
automatic termination provisions or otherwise.79  
 
In Mwelase and Others v Enforce Security Group and Others80 the Labour Court was 
again faced with the question whether it is permissible to contract out of the right not to 
be unfairly dismissed. The employer was a private security service provider. It had 
entered into contracts with various clients and had employed security officers to work for 
its clients on a temporary basis. A clause in the employment contract of each security 
officer required each employee to agree that the termination of the contract between the 
employer and its client would automatically terminate the employee’s employment 
contract, and further that such termination would not be construed as a retrenchment but 
as a completion of the contract. When the client subsequently terminated its contract with 
the employer, the employer enforced this clause. In legal proceedings by the employee’s 
trade union, the Labour Court had to decide whether the automatic termination clause 
was valid and whether it was permissible to contract out of the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed. The employees had been employed as security officers. The Labour Court 
found that as security officers they were lay persons and were unacquainted with the 
interpretation of legislation.81 They were therefore regarded as incapable of defending 
themselves without legal representation.82 For this reason the court held that the public 
had an interest in ensuring that the applicants were not exploited and as such, their right 
not to be unfairly dismissed could not be contracted out of.83 The court found that the 
automatic termination clause was not valid; it had the effect of denying the employees 
the right to challenge the fairness of the employer’s conduct, and of enforcing their rights 
                                                 
79 Mahlamu v CCMA & Others [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) para 21.  
 
80 (D358/12) [2015] ZALCD 46 (21 May 2016) para 6. 
 
81 Mwelase and Others v Enforce Security Group and Others (D358/12) [2015] ZALCD 46 (21 May 2016) 
para 9. 
 
82 Mwelase and Others v Enforce Security Group and Others (D358/12) [2015] ZALCD 46 (21 May 2016) 
para 9. 
 
83 Mwelase and Others v Enforce Security Group and Others (D358/12) [2015] ZALCD 46 (21 May 2016) 
para 9. 
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in terms of section 189 of the LRA, dealing with dismissals based on operational 
requirements and the payment of severance pay.84  
 
In Pecton Outsourcing Solutions CC v Pillemer and Others85 the Labour Court again 
found that an automatic termination clause in a fixed term employment contract was an 
attempt to contract out of the mandatory provisions of section 189 of the LRA.86 The 
Labour Court held that the automatic termination clause left the employee’s security of 
employment entirely dependent on the will and the whim of the client.87 The court, 
however, acknowledged that automatic termination clauses in fixed term contracts based 
on an event such as a permanent employee returning to work after an absence, are 
legitimate.88 This is because there is no mischief by a client exercising its will against the 
employee whose fixed term contract is terminated.89 This means that automatic 
termination clauses in fixed terms contracts that rely on happenings other than the 
unilateral exercise of a party’s will are generally enforceable.90 However, where an 
automatic termination clause is used in order to circumvent an employee’s right to 
challenge the fairness of his dismissal, it will not be enforceable. 
                                                 
84 Under s 189(2) of the LRA (Dismissals based on operational requirements) an employer is required to 
engage in a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process with the relevant trade union or the affected 
employees. The parties must attempt to reach consensus on appropriate measures to avoid the dismissal, to 
minimise the number of dismissals, to change the timing of the dismissals, to mitigate the adverse effect of 
the dismissals, the method of selecting the employees to be dismissed, and the severance pay for dismissed 
employees. Section 189A of the LRA deals with dismissals based on operational requirements by 
employers with more than fifty employees. For a further discussion on dismissals for operational 
requirements see Grogan Workplace Law 317-345; Van Niekerk et al Law@work 313-333; Du Toit et al 
Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 472-498; Bendix Labour Relations: A Southern African 
Perspective 317-347 and B Jordaan & Stander Effective Workplace Solutions: Employment Law from a 
Business Perspective 194-204. 
 
85 [2016] 2 BLLR 186 (LC). 
 
86 The Labour Court in Pecton Outsourcing Solutions CC v Pillemer and Others [2016] 2 BLLR 186 (LC) 
held that Pecton, a labour broker, could not rely on a clause in a fixed-term agreement which stated that the 
employment contract would automatically terminate if its client terminated its service contract with Pecton. 
See further on automatic termination clauses in fixed-term contracts Grogan Workplace Law 170-171 and 
Van Niekerk et al Law@work 71-72. 
 
87 Pecton Outsourcing Solutions CC v Pillemer and Others [2016] 2 BLLR 186 (LC) para 33. 
 
88 Pecton Outsourcing Solutions CC v Pillemer and Others [2016] 2 BLLR 186 (LC) para 46. 
 
89 Pecton Outsourcing Solutions CC v Pillemer and Others [2016] 2 BLLR 186 (LC) para 46. 
 
90 See further South African Transport and Allied Workers Union obo Dube and Others v Fidelity 
Supercare Cleaning Services Group (Pty) Ltd [2015] JOL 33144 (LC) paras 29-30 where the Labour Court 
also remarked that to the extent that the termination of employment is triggered by an event and is not 
based on the employer’s own decision, there is no dismissal.  
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It is clear from the cases discussed above that reliance on an automatic termination 
provision to automatically bring an employment relationship to end when an individual 
is removed from office as a director is not permissible.91 If an executive director is 
removed from office by the board of directors or by the shareholders, the proper 
procedures under the LRA must be followed to dismiss the director as an employee. The 
company may not contract out of complying with these procedures by the mechanism of 
automatic termination clauses. A waiver by an executive director of his right to be fairly 
dismissed as an employee is against public policy and unenforceable. In light of the fact 
that automatic termination clauses may not be used to terminate the employment of an 
executive director, before a company terminates a director’s services in his capacity as 
an employee, it must have a valid substantive ground to do so.  
 
The grounds for a fair dismissal of an employee recognised by section 188(1)(a) of the 
LRA read with item 2(1) of the LRA Code of Good Practice are misconduct, poor work 
performance, ill health, injury and operational requirements.92 When the board of 
directors purports to remove a director from office under section 71(3) of the Companies 
Act it may do so if the director has become ineligible or disqualified to be a director, 
incapacitated, neglectful, derelict and negligent.93 There is some overlap between the 
grounds listed in section 188(1)(a) of the LRA and section 71(3) of the LRA. For 
example, the grounds of ill health and injury in section 188(1)(a) of the LRA may overlap 
                                                 
91 See further National Union of Mineworkers obo Milisa and Others v WBHO Construction (Pty) Ltd 
[2016] 6 BLLR 642 (LC) where the Labour Court assessed the validity of an automatic termination clause 
which stated that an employment contract would endure for the duration of “the skills requirements of the 
project”. The Labour Court held that the automatic termination clause was not valid because it granted the 
employer an unfettered and subjective discretion to decide when the employee’s skills were no longer 
required (para 7). It therefore violated the provisions of the LRA which protect employees against unfair 
dismissals (para 8). The court found further that the employees had in fact been dismissed for operational 
requirements but the employee had failed to comply with the provisions of s 189 of the LRA to dismiss 
them (para 8). 
 
92 Section 188(2) of the LRA provides that in considering whether or not the reason for the dismissal is a 
fair reason or whether the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure any relevant code of 
good practice issued in terms of the LRA must be taken into account. See further on the grounds for a fair 
dismissal Grogan Workplace Law 189-190; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 
439-536; Van Niekerk et al Law@work 271-333; Bendix Labour Relations: A Southern African 
Perspective 252 and B Jordaan & Stander Effective Workplace Solutions: Employment Law from a Business 
Perspective 72-75. 
  
93 Section 71(3) of the Companies Act. These provisions are discussed in chapter 3, para 6.  
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with that of incapacity in section 71(3) of the LRA. Likewise, the ground of misconduct94 
in section 188(1)(a) of the LRA may overlap with that of being neglectful, derelict or 
negligent in section 71(3) of the Companies Act. It follows that if there is a valid ground 
to remove a director from office under section 71(3) of the Companies Act the company 
may well have a valid substantive ground to fairly dismiss the director as an employee 
under the LRA.  
 
If the company does not have a valid substantive ground on which to dismiss a director 
in his capacity as an employee, it would have to accommodate the former executive 
director as an employee in the company. If such an employment position is not feasible, 
the company would have to accommodate the former executive director in a new 
employee capacity.95 If an appropriate vacancy does not exist in the company, the 
company would then have to comply with the procedures for dismissal based on 
operational requirements, as contained in section 189 of the LRA, and retrench the 
former-director employee.96 Smaller companies in particular may be faced with having 
to comply with the procedures to retrench the former director as an employee if they do 
not have the capacity or the resources to accommodate the former executive director in a 
new employee capacity in the company.97  
 
If the company dismisses a former executive director as an employee and his dismissal is 
found to be unfair under the LRA, he would be entitled to rely on the remedies provided 
for by the LRA. He would be entitled to claim reinstatement, re-employment or 
compensation for the unfair dismissal.98 The LRA does not explain the difference 
between reinstatement and re-employment. A reinstatement order restores the contractual 
                                                 
94 Misconduct in s 188(a) of the LRA means behaviour for which the employee may be held accountable 
or blameworthy, and which the employee could have avoided (see Grogan Workplace Law 190). For a 
discussion on the specific acts of misconduct justifying dismissal see Van Niekerk et al Law@work 274-
281. 
 
95 Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” 2371. 
  
96 Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” 2371; FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 
168. Refer to note 84 above for the procedures to retrench an employee under s 189 of the LRA. 
 
97 Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” 2377. 
 
98 Section 193(1) of the LRA. See further on these remedies Van Eck & Lombard “Dismissal of Executive 
Directors: Comparing Principles of Company Law and Labour Law” 33; Grogan Workplace Law 198-206 
and Van Niekerk et al Law@work 243-248. 
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position between the employer and the employee as if it was never broken, and it implies 
a continuity of the employment relationship as if it had not ended.99 If employees are 
reinstated they resume their employment on the same terms and conditions that had 
prevailed at the time of their dismissal.100 A court or an arbitrator may order the employer 
to re-instate the employee from any date not earlier than the date of dismissal.101 In Equity 
Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
and Others102 the Constitutional Court explained the meaning of “reinstatement” as 
follows: 
 
“The ordinary meaning of the word ‘reinstate’ is to put the employee back into the 
same job or position he or she occupied before the dismissal, on the same terms and 
conditions. Reinstatement is the primary statutory remedy in unfair dismissal 
disputes. It is aimed at placing an employee in the position he or she would have 
been but for the unfair dismissal. It safeguards workers’ employment by restoring 
the employment contract. Differently put, if employees are reinstated they resume 
employment on the same terms and conditions that prevailed at the time of their 
dismissal.”103 
 
Re-employment on the other hand means that the employment contract ended at the date 
of dismissal and resumed on the re-employment.104 The new employment contract which 
is created may be created on different terms.105 A court or an arbitrator may order the 
employer to re-employ the employee either in the work in which the employee had been 
                                                 
99 Grogan Workplace Law 199; Van Niekerk et al Law@work 245; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A 
Comprehensive Guide 525. 
 
100 Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation Ltd v President of the Industrial Court and Others; 
Consolidated Woolwashing and Processing Mills Ltd v President of the Industrial Court and Others 1986 
(3) SA 786 (A) at 798; Grogan Workplace Law 199; Van Niekerk et al Law@work 245. 
 
101 Section 193(1)(a) of the LRA. A court or an arbitrator has a discretion to decide on the date from which 
the reinstatement will run, provided the reinstatement is not ordered from a date earlier than the date of the 
dismissal (Numsa and Others v Fibre Flair CC t/a Kango Canopies [2006] 6 BLLR 631 (LAC) at 633; 
Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others 
2009 (1) SA 390 (CC) para 36).  
 
102 2009 (1) SA 390 (CC) para 36. 
 
103 See further Nel v Oudtshoorn Municipality (247/2012) [2013] ZASCA 37 (28 March 2013) para 10 
where the Supreme Court of Appeal explained that by reinstating a dismissed employee the employer does 
not purport to conclude a fresh contract of employment, but merely restores the position to what it was 
before the dismissal.  
 
104 Grogan Workplace Law 199; Van Niekerk et al Law@work 245; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: 
A Comprehensive Guide 525. Re-employment is generally ordered where the employee’s former post no 
longer exists, or where the employment is of a seasonal nature (Grogan Workplace Law 202).  
 
105 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 525. 
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employed before the dismissal or in other reasonably suitable work on any terms and 
from any date not earlier than the date of dismissal.106 
 
Section 193(2) of the LRA obliges the court or arbitrator to reinstate or re-employ an 
unfairly dismissed employee, unless the following applies: (i) the employee does not wish 
to be reinstated or re-employed; (ii) the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such 
that a continued employment relationship would be intolerable; (iii) it is not reasonably 
practicable for the employer to reinstate or re-employ the employee; or (iv) the dismissal 
is unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair procedure.  In PG Group (Pty) 
Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others107 the Labour Court cast doubt on whether an executive 
director is entitled to reinstatement because of the dual capacities in which he holds 
office. While reinstatement may be more difficult with regard to executive directors, this 
does not mean that a court would not in appropriate circumstances order the reinstatement 
of an unfairly dismissed director in his capacity as an employee. 
  
For instance, in Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics & Engineering (Pty) Ltd108 the former 
Industrial Court reinstated as an employee a financial director of a company on the ground 
that his dismissal as an employee had been substantively and procedurally unfair.109 The 
court found that the financial director’s position in his capacity as an employee could be 
distinguished from his capacity as a director.110 It consequently reinstated the employee, 
retrospectively, on terms and conditions not less favourable to him than those which had 
governed his employment prior to his termination.111 In Oak Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
John NO and Another112 in an application for a review of a decision of the Industrial 
Court, the High Court found that a managing director of the company was an employee 
                                                 
106 Section 193(1)(b) of the LRA. 
 
107 [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) para 29.   
 
108 (1987) 8 ILJ 356 (IC). 
 
109 The financial director was dismissed on the basis of misconduct and incompetence. The Industrial Court 
found that these allegations were unfounded and his dismissal was therefore substantively unfair. He had 
also not been given an opportunity to present his side of the case at a hearing, and for this reason the 
dismissal was also found to be procedurally unfair.  
 
110 Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics & Engineering (Pty) Ltd (1987) 8 ILJ 356 (IC) at 362. 
 
111 Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics & Engineering (Pty) Ltd (1987) 8 ILJ 356 (IC) at 365. 
 
112 1987 (4) SA 702 (N) at 704. 
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of the company who had been unfairly dismissed. The court upheld the reinstatement of 
the unfairly dismissed managing director to his employment position with the company. 
The former managing director was reinstated only to his position of employment but not 
to his position as a director of the company.113 Even though it may be complicated to 
reinstate executive directors in the company because of the dual capacities in which they 
hold office, as demonstrated by the above cases, the courts may nevertheless reinstate 
executive directors as employees if they have been unfairly dismissed as employees. 
Their capacities as employees must be capable of being separated from their capacities 
as directors.  
 
If an employee is not re-instated or re-employed he may claim compensation from the 
employer for unfair dismissal under section 193 of the LRA. The compensation must be 
just and equitable but it may not be more than the equivalent of twelve months’ 
remuneration calculated at the employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of 
dismissal.114 In Fedlife Insurance Ltd v Wolfaardt115 the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that section 195 of the LRA confers an additional remedy of compensation on employees 
over and above full performance of an employer’s contractual obligations.116 Therefore 
the right to claim compensation in terms of section 193 of the LRA does not deprive an 
employee from claiming common-law damages over and above the compensation.117 The 
court based its finding on section 195 of the LRA which states that an award for 
compensation under the LRA is “in addition to, and not a substitute for, any other amount 
to which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of 
employment.”118 
                                                 
113 Oak Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v John NO and Another 1987 (4) SA 702 (N) at 703. 
 
114 Section 194(1) of the LRA. There is no definition in the LRA of what would constitute “just and 
equitable” compensation. Commissioners and judges have a discretion as to the amount of compensation 
which is to be awarded and their discretion must be exercised judicially (see further Van Niekerk et al 
Law@work 245-248 and Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 528-530 for a 
discussion on the compensation payable to employees whose dismissal is found to be unfair). 
 
115 2002 (1) SA 49 (SCA). 
 
116 Fedlife Insurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 (1) SA 49 (SCA) paras 22 and 24. 
 
117 Fedlife Insurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 (1) SA 49 (SCA) paras 19 and 22. 
 
118 Fedlife Insurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 (1) SA 49 (SCA) para 19. The Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that the LRA does not expressly abrogate an employee’s common law entitlement to enforce contractual 
rights, and that there are clear indications in the LRA that the legislature had no intention of doing so (para 
17). See further on this judgment Van Eck & Lombard “Dismissal of Executive Directors: Comparing 
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It is evident from the above discussion that the consequences of failing to terminate the 
employment of an executive director in a substantially and procedurally fair manner are 
severe for a company. The onus rests on the employer to prove that the dismissal was 
fair.119 In sum, if the dismissal is found to be unfair, the company may be ordered to re-
instate or re-employ the unfairly dismissed employee, or to pay just and equitable 
compensation to the executive director, which may be up to the equivalent of twelve 
months’ remuneration. In addition, the former executive director may, in his capacity as 
an employee, claim common-law damages for a breach of contract over and above the 
compensation claimable under the LRA. It consequently is imperative that a company 
takes cognisance of the applicable labour law principles and that it adheres to such 
principles when removing an executive director from office.   
 
It is not always practical to strictly separate the two positions held by an executive 
director, or to consistently apply a strict separation of such positions.120 It may be that the 
positions of director and employee are so interlinked that the person’s capacity as a 
director cannot logically be separated from his capacity as an employee.121 For instance, 
in a large company with a number of non-executive directors who do not occupy offices 
on the company’s premises but which company has a smaller number of executive 
directors who are employed by the company and have offices on the company’s premises, 
one can generally separate the position of a director from that of an employee.122 In 
contrast, in a company where all the directors are actively involved in managing the 
company’s affairs on a daily basis, it is more difficult to separate their employee status 
from their official capacity as directors.123  
 
                                                 
Principles of Company Law and Labour Law” 33; Van Niekerk et al Law@work 97 and Du Toit et al 
Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 533. 
 
119 Section 192(2) of the LRA. 
 
120 Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” 2371; FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 
168. 
 
121 Van Eck & Lombard “Dismissal of Executive Directors: Comparing Principles of Company Law and 
Labour Law” 35. 
 
122 Esser “Company Law and the Spoliated Director” 142. 
 
123 Esser “Company Law and the Spoliated Director” 142. 
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Prior to removing an executive director from the board of directors, the board must take 
heed of the role which the director plays in the company as an employee, whether his 
position as an employee and as a director may strictly be separated and the consequences 
for the company if the director is removed from office as a director but not as an 
employee. The board must also bear in mind whether it will be practical to retain the 
former director as an employee, particularly if there has been a breakdown in the 
relationship between the director and the company. The board must further take into 
account the fact that the processes under the LRA to dismiss an executive director as an 
employee may be complicated and lengthy.124 
 
2.3  Reverse Automatic Termination Provisions  
 
A provision which provides for the automatic termination of a directorship (as opposed 
to employment) upon the occurrence of an event, hereby termed a “reverse automatic 
termination” provision (or a self-executing rule),125 may be valid in certain instances. An 
automatic termination clause (as discussed in paragraph 2.2 above) generally provides 
that if a person ceases to be a director of a company, he automatically ceases to be an 
employee. A reverse automatic termination provision states that if a director ceases to be 
an employee of a company, he automatically ceases to be a director of the company. Two 
examples of valid reverse automatic termination provisions are discussed below. 
 
2.3.1  Additional Ground of Ineligibility or Disqualification to be a Director  
 
In Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd126 two directors had resigned as employees. A clause in 
their service agreements had provided that in the event of termination of their 
employment, they would be required also to resign as directors on request by the 
company. It is submitted that this was a reverse automatic termination provision because 
it in effect provided that if the directors ceased to be employees of the company they 
would automatically cease to be directors of the company. Despite repeated requests by 
                                                 
124 Esser & Delport “Shareholder Protection Philosophy in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 14. 
 
125 Removal provisions drafted in this way may also be termed “self-executing rules” because they make it 
clear that when specific criteria are met removal follows without any act of the board being required (see 
Knight “Breaking Up is Hard to Do – Dealing with the Removal of Directors from the Board” 486). 
 
126 [2013] ZAWCHC 89. 
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the company, the applicants refused to resign as directors notwithstanding this provision 
in their service agreements. The applicants alleged that this provision had been included 
in their service agreements as a result of a common mistake, which the company 
denied.127 The Cape Provincial Division did not address the question whether the reverse 
automatic termination provision was valid.  
 
It is submitted that the above reverse automatic termination provision is valid under the 
Companies Act on the basis that section 69(6)(a) of the Companies Act states that the 
Memorandum of Incorporation of a company may impose additional grounds of 
ineligibility or disqualification of directors.128 Section 71(3) states that if a shareholder 
or a director alleges that a director “has become ineligible or disqualified in terms of 
section 69”, the board must determine the matter by resolution.  Accordingly, in instances 
where the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company provides that if a director ceases 
to be an employee of the company he automatically ceases to be a director of the 
company, the requirement to be an employee may be construed to be an additional ground 
of ineligibility or disqualification to be a director. It follows that if the director were to 
resign as an employee or were to be validly dismissed as an employee, he would be 
ineligible or disqualified to be a director,129 and would automatically cease to be a director 
of the company. 
 
The requirement that one must be an employee in order to be appointed a director of a 
company, may be inserted in the Memorandum of an Incorporation of a company either 
as an additional ground of ineligibility, or as an additional ground of disqualification. If 
it is inserted as an additional ground of ineligibility, then a person may not be appointed 
as a director unless he is first appointed as an employee of the company. If it is inserted 
in the Memorandum of Incorporation as an additional ground of disqualification, then a 
                                                 
127 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 3. As a consequence of the refusal of the 
applicants to resign as directors of the company, a director of the company had caused letters to be served 
upon the applicants to attend a meeting of the board of directors. The meeting was convened to consider a 
proposed resolution to remove the applicants as directors in terms of s 71(3) of the Companies Act on the 
basis that they had been derelict in the performance of the functions of directors. The facts and decision of 
Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 are discussed in chapter 3, paras 8.3 and 8.4. 
 
128 See chapter 3, para 6.5 where the additional grounds for removal of a director are discussed. 
  
129 R Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act” 
157. 
283 
 
person who is appointed as a director would be disqualified from continuing to act as 
director if he ceases to be an employee. Section 69(7)(c) of the Companies Act is a useful 
provision under which to incorporate the requirement that a person must be an employee 
in order to be a director of a company. The provision states that a person is ineligible to 
be a director of a company if he does not satisfy any qualification set out in the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation. It would be feasible to regard the requirement that a 
person be an employee in order to be a director of a company, as an additional 
qualification to be appointed a director, under section 69(7)(c) of the Companies Act. 
 
It is submitted that a reverse automatic termination provision would not empower the 
board of directors to bypass the procedures set out in section 71(4) of the Companies Act 
to remove the director from office. In terms of section 71(3) of the Companies Act, if a 
shareholder or a director alleges that a director of the company has become ineligible or 
disqualified in terms of section 69 of the Companies Act, the board of directors must 
determine the matter by resolution. Section 71(4) of the Companies Act sets out the 
procedures to be followed before the board of directors may consider a resolution 
contemplated in section 71(3) of the Companies Act. Therefore, even if a director ceases 
to be an employee, and automatically ceases to be a director by virtue of a reverse 
automatic termination provision disqualifying him from being a director, if he does not 
voluntarily step down as a director of the company, the board of directors would have to 
follow the procedures in section 71(4) of the Companies Act to remove him from 
office.130 The (former) director would also not be deprived of his statutory right under the 
Companies Act to be provided with a notice of the meeting, a statement setting out the 
reasons for the proposed resolution to remove him from office, and a reasonable 
opportunity to make a presentation to the meeting before the resolution is put to a vote.131  
 
Despite the validity of a reverse automatic termination provision which disqualifies a 
person from being a director of the company if he ceases to be an employee of the 
company, it is not advisable for companies to insert such a provision in their 
Memorandums of Incorporation. If every director of a company were required to be an 
                                                 
130 See chapter 3, para 6.1 where the necessity of formal removal proceedings in instances of the ineligibility 
and disqualification of a director are discussed further. 
 
131 See s 71(3) of the Companies Act and chapter 3, para 8 where these procedures are discussed. 
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employee of the company in order to be a director in the company, this would mean that 
all the directors in the company would have to be executive directors. This is contrary to 
the recommendation of the King IV Report that the board of directors should comprise a 
majority of non-executive directors, most of whom should be independent.132 If a 
company were to incorporate such a reverse automatic termination provision in its 
Memorandum of Incorporation, this provision should not be applicable to all its directors 
on the board of directors. 
 
2.3.2  The Removal of Ex Officio Directors 
 
An “ex officio director” is defined in section 1 of the Companies Act as a person who 
holds office as a director of a particular company solely as a consequence of that person 
holding some other office, title, designation or similar status specified in the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation. He serves on the board for this reason and not as a result 
of an election or appointment to the board of directors. Section 66(4)(a)(ii) of the 
Companies Act states that a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may provide for 
a person to be an ex officio director of the company as a consequence of the person 
holding some other office, title, designation or similar status. For example, the 
Memorandum of Incorporation may provide that the chief executive officer of the 
company will serve on the board ex officio. In this event the position of the director is 
tied to the office of the chief executive officer and not to the individual.133  
 
The appointment of an ex officio director is subject to section 66(5)(a) of the Companies 
Act which provides that an ex officio director may not serve or continue to serve as such 
if that person is or becomes ineligible or disqualified to be a director in terms of section 
69 of the Companies Act. In other words, even if a person holds a particular office, title, 
designation or similar status, if he is ineligible or disqualified to be a director, he may not 
serve as an ex officio director.  
                                                 
132 King IV Report, principle 7, recommended practice 8. See chapter 3, note 314 for a description of an 
independent non-executive director under the King IV Report. 
 
133 A person does not necessarily have to be an employee of the company in order to be an ex officio 
director. This is indicated by the words “title, designation or similar status” used in the definition of an ex 
officio director in s 1 of the Companies Act. For instance, the secretary of a trade union or the chairperson 
of a certain society may be an ex officio director of a company. An ex officio director must deliver to the 
company a written consent to serve as its director (s 66(7)(b) of the Companies Act). 
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As discussed in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 above, a dismissal in the capacity as an employee 
of a company does not translate into an automatic dismissal as a director of the company. 
However this is not the legal position with respect to ex officio directors. In terms of 
section 70(1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act if an ex officio director ceases to hold the office, 
title, designation or similar status that entitles him to be an ex officio director, a vacancy 
will arise on the board of a company. It is submitted that this has the same effect as a 
reverse automatic termination provision because if the director ceases to hold a particular 
office, title, designation or similar status, he automatically ceases to hold the office of 
director in the company. 
It appears from section 70(1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act that the vacancy on the board 
of directors will arise automatically, without the company or the board of directors having 
to take any further steps. To use the example of a chief executive officer who serves a 
board ex officio, if such person resigns as the chief executive officer of the company or 
is removed as the chief executive officer of the company in his capacity as an employee, 
his position as a director on the board of director automatically and simultaneously 
terminates, and the new chief executive officer of the company automatically assumes 
his (former) position on the board of directors. The chief executive officer must have 
been dismissed in accordance with the proper procedures under the LRA before he will 
automatically cease to be a director of the company.134 This provides some protection to 
ex officio directors from arbitrary removal as employees and as directors of the 
company.135  
 
3. THE REMOVAL OF SHAREHOLDING-DIRECTORS HOLDING LOADED 
VOTING RIGHTS 
 
Not only may a director be involved in a company in the capacity as a director and an 
employee, but he may also be involved in a company in the capacity as a shareholder. 
Directors can and do wear different hats. In his capacity as a shareholder, a director may 
hold voting rights in the company. A director who is also a shareholder with voting rights, 
is in his capacity as a shareholder, entitled to vote on the resolution proposed for this own 
                                                 
134 Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” at 2376. 
 
135 Stoop “The Company Director as Employee” at 2377. 
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removal as a director.136 The threshold for passing a shareholders’ resolution to remove 
a director is more than fifty per cent of the voting rights exercised on the resolution.137 
This threshold may not be increased in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.138 It 
follows that a director who holds more than fifty per cent of the voting rights in a company 
would always be empowered to prevent his own removal from office by voting against 
the ordinary resolution in his capacity as a shareholder.  
 
If a director is not a majority shareholder in a company, a shareholders’ resolution may 
be successfully passed to remove him from office. Before this is done, however, 
consideration must be given to whether the director, in his capacity as a shareholder, 
holds loaded voting rights in the company.  
 
The expression “loaded voting rights” or “weighted votes” is used to describe the device 
whereby certain shares are given additional voting strength above that enjoyed by other 
shares which, in every other respect, are identical to their participation in the company.139 
In essence, loaded voting rights or weighted votes are voting rights that are 
disproportionate to shareholdings.140 Loaded voting rights may apply generally to all 
resolutions or they may be confined to resolutions on specific matters.141 Loaded votes 
would be exercisable when voting takes place on a poll, and not where voting takes place 
                                                 
136 R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
445. 
 
137 In terms of s 71(1) of the Companies Act a director may be removed by an ordinary resolution adopted 
at a shareholders’ meeting by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director. 
Section 1 of the Companies Act defines an “ordinary resolution” as meaning a resolution adopted with the 
support of more than fifty per cent of the voting rights exercised on the resolution, or a higher percentage 
as contemplated in s 65(8).  
 
138 Section 65(8) of the Companies Act prohibits the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company from 
increasing the threshold to pass an ordinary resolution for the removal of a director under s 71 of the 
Companies Act.  
 
139 Anon “‘Weighted’ or ‘Loaded’ Votes in Private Companies” D5. 
 
140 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 164. See further on loaded voting rights Kershaw 
Company Law in Context 713; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 95-96; 
Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 380 and Hannigan Company Law 96-
97. 
 
141 Anon “‘Weighted’ or ‘Loaded’ Votes in Private Companies” D5.  
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on a show of hands.142 The removal of shareholding-directors who hold loaded voting 
rights in a company is examined below. 
  
3.1  The Conferral of Loaded Voting Rights on Directors in their Capacity as 
Directors 
 
Unless the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company provides otherwise, each 
director has one vote on a matter before the board.143 It follows that a director may have 
more than one vote on a matter before the board of directors if this is specifically stated 
in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company. For instance, the Memorandum of 
Incorporation may provide that the chairman of the board of directors will have two votes 
on any resolution to remove a fellow board member from office.  
 
It is important to note that loaded voting rights which are conferred on a director in his 
capacity as a director do not confer on him any power to influence a proposed resolution 
to remove himself from office. Section 71(3) of the Companies Act explicitly states that 
the board “other than the director concerned” must determine the matter of the director’s 
removal by resolution. Thus a director who is the subject of a removal resolution may 
not, in his capacity as a director, vote on his own removal from office. This is logical 
because a director who is the subject of a removal resolution would naturally be inclined 
to vote against his own removal. It follows that a provision in a company’s Memorandum 
of Incorporation which confers loaded votes on a director in his capacity as a director 
with regard to a proposed resolution to remove himself from office would be void,144 and 
that such loaded votes would not be exercisable by the director.  
                                                 
142 Under s 63(5) of the Companies Act if voting is by a show of hands a shareholder or proxy for a 
shareholder has one vote, irrespective of the number of voting rights that person would otherwise be entitled 
to exercise. If voting on a particular matter is by polling, a shareholder or proxy for a shareholder has the 
number of votes determined in accordance with the voting rights associated with the securities held by that 
shareholder (see s 63(6) of the Companies Act). In terms of s 63(7) of the Companies Act a polled vote 
must be held on a particular matter if a demand for such a vote is made by at least five persons having the 
right to vote on that matter, or by a person or persons who together are entitled to exercise at least ten per 
cent of the voting rights entitled to be voted on that matter. 
 
143 Section 73(5)(c) of the Companies Act. 
 
144 See ss 15(1)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act which essentially provide that each provision in a 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation must be consistent with the Companies Act and is void to the 
extent that it contravenes, or is inconsistent with the Companies Act, subject to s 6(15). Section 6(15) of 
the Companies Act provides that to the extent that the specific content or particular effect of any provision 
288 
 
It is important to be aware of the capacity in which a director is voting on a proposed 
removal resolution. Even though the issue of a director holding loaded voting rights in 
his capacity as a shareholder would arise only when the shareholders purport to remove 
such director from office and not when the board of directors purports to remove the 
director from office, the board of directors must take cognisance of whether a 
shareholding-director holds loaded voting rights in his capacity as a shareholder since 
this may present an obstacle to the removal of the director by the shareholders (as 
discussed below). In such event, the board of directors would have to take the necessary 
steps to remove the shareholding-director from office, provided there are valid grounds 
to do so. 
In small private companies where the directors may also be shareholders it is particularly 
important to be aware of the capacity in which a director is voting on a proposed removal 
resolution. Errors in the voting capacity of the directors may easily be made in such 
companies. Such an error occurred in the USA decision of Iwasaki v Iwasaki Bros Inc145 
where a director in a small private family-owned company was removed from the board 
of directors by a three-to-two vote of the board, rather than by a vote of the shareholders. 
All of the directors were also shareholders. Two of the directors voting for the removal 
held two-thirds of the company’s shares. The director in question had the right to vote on 
his own removal in his capacity as a shareholder, but had abstained from voting. Although 
it was improper for the board of directors to vote on the removal resolution since it was 
contrary to the applicable statute, the Oregon Court of Appeals nevertheless did not 
invalidate the removal of the director from office on the ground that the outcome of the 
vote would have been the same if the vote had been exercised at a shareholders’ 
meeting.146 Under the (South African) Companies Act it would be improper and invalid 
for a director to vote on a board resolution to remove himself from office since this is 
expressly prohibited by section 71(3) of the Companies Act. For this reason it is important 
                                                 
of a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation is required of the company in terms of any applicable public 
regulation or by the listings requirements of an exchange which has the effect of negating, restricting, 
limiting, qualifying, extending or otherwise altering the substance or effect of an unalterable provision of 
the Companies Act, that provision must not be construed as being contrary to s 15(1)(a) of the Companies 
Act.  
 
145 Or. App. 649 P.2d 598. 
 
146 Iwasaki v Iwasaki Bros Inc Or. App. 649 P.2d 598 at 601. 
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to be mindful of the capacity in which directors who are also shareholders vote on 
removal resolutions. 
 
3.2  The Conferral of Loaded Voting Rights on Shareholders 
 
Loaded votes are often used to protect minority shareholders.147 Through the use of 
loaded voting rights persons with relatively small financial contributions to a company 
may have a relatively large voting power conferred on them.148  
 
According to section 37(2) of the Companies Act, each issued share of a company, 
regardless of its class, has one general voting right associated with it,149 except to the 
extent provided otherwise by (i) the Companies Act; or (ii) the preferences, rights, 
limitations and other terms determined by the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
in accordance with section 36 of the Companies Act. It follows that the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company may depart from the default rule of each share having one 
general voting right.  
 
In terms of section 36(1)(b) of the Companies Act a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation must set out with respect to each class of shares, the preferences, rights, 
limitations and other terms associated with that class, subject to section 36(1)(d) of the 
Companies Act. Under section 36(1)(d) of the Companies Act a company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation may set out a class of shares (i) without specifying the 
associated preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of that class; (ii) for which the 
board of directors must determine the associated preferences, rights, limitations or other 
terms; and (iii) which must not be issued until the board of the company has determined 
the associated preferences, rights, limitations or other terms. Sections 36(1)(b) and 
36(1)(d) authorise the board of directors to determine the preferences, rights, limitations 
                                                 
147 Anon “‘Weighted’ or ‘Loaded’ Votes in Private Companies” D5. 
 
148 Model Business Corporation Act with Official Comments and Reporter’s Annotations 7-115. 
 
149 A “voting right” is defined in s 1 of the Companies Act as meaning, with respect to any matter to be 
decided by a company, the rights of any holder of the company’s securities to vote in connection with that 
matter (in the case of a profit-company) or the rights of a member to vote in connection with the matter (in 
the case of a non-profit company). “Voting power” is the voting rights that may be exercised by a particular 
person in connection with a matter to be decided by a company, as a percentage of all such voting rights 
(s 1 of the Companies Act). 
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and other terms of a particular class of shares. A further notable provision of the 
Companies Act is section 37(5)(a) which permits a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation, subject to any other law, to establish for any particular class of shares, 
preferences, rights, limitations or other terms that confer special, conditional or limited 
voting rights. Sections 36(1), 37(2) and 37(5)(a) of the Companies Act authorise a 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation to confer more than one voting right on some 
classes of shares.  
 
The approach adopted to loaded voting rights under the Companies Act is consistent with 
the approach adopted in the USA under the MBCA. Section 7.21(a) of the MBCA states 
that each share is entitled to one vote unless otherwise provided in the articles of 
incorporation. Thus companies may depart from the default rule of giving each share one 
vote by appropriate provisions in their articles of incorporation. Under section 250E(1) 
of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 loaded voting rights are also permissible.150 
In Amalgamated Pest Control Pty Ltd and Another v McCarron and Others151 the 
Supreme Court of Queensland held that it is permissible for a company’s constitution to 
confer a voting right or voting privilege which is disproportionate to the size of the 
shareholding of the member. Section 284 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 confers on 
a shareholder one vote on a resolution on a show of hands and one vote in respect of each 
share where voting takes place on a poll, but it permits the articles of association of a 
                                                 
150 Section 250E(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 provides that, subject to any rights or 
restrictions attached to any class of shares, at a meeting of members of a company with a share capital, on 
a show of hands each member has one vote, and on a poll each member has one vote for each share they 
hold. It follows that a particular class of shares may have attached to it any specific rights, such as loaded 
voting rights. Section 231 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 defines a “member” as meaning a 
member of the company on its registration; or a person who agrees to become a member of the company 
after its registration and their name is entered on the register of members; or a person who becomes a 
member of the company under s 167 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 (membership arising from 
the conversion of a company from one limited by guarantee to one limited by shares). 
 
151 (1994) 13 ACSR 42 at 45-46. This case concerned the validity of a provision in the plaintiff’s articles 
of association. Article 27D provided that the permanent governing director was entitled to a weighted vote 
at any general meeting which was equivalent to twenty six per cent of the total votes available, whether or 
not he was a member of the company. The Supreme Court of Queensland held that Article 27D was valid 
save for the part which permitted a weighted vote “whether or not” the governing director was a member 
(at 45). The court severed this part of the Article 27D and held that, provided that it is associated with 
membership, a voting privilege unrelated to the size of the shareholding of the member was valid (at 45-
46). The court thus recognised the freedom given to shareholders to contract with each other, in terms of 
the constitution of the company, to determine their respective rights and responsibilities (Armstrong 
“Australia: Company Law: Weighted Voting Rights” 96-97.) The only limit expressed by the court on this 
right is that the articles of association must provide that the individual in question is a shareholder of the 
company (see further Armstrong “Australia: Company Law: Weighted Voting Rights” 96-97). 
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company to alter the voting rights of shareholders.152 Accordingly, in the UK loaded 
voting rights are also permissible if the articles of association so provide. 
Under the (South African) Companies Act loaded voting rights are permissible with 
regard to both public and private companies. In contrast, under section 195(1) of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 public companies were not permitted to issue shares with 
loaded voting rights - only private companies were permitted to do so.153 The Companies 
Act does not make any distinction between the types of company which may make 
provision for loaded voting rights in its Memorandum of Incorporation. While public 
companies are entitled to issue shares with loaded voting rights, public companies listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are prohibited from doing so.154 Listed companies 
in Australia are also prevented from issuing shares with loaded voting rights.155 The same 
approach has been adopted in the UK, which recently tightened up its listing principles 
and requirements to prevent listed companies from issuing shares with loaded voting 
rights.156 
                                                 
152 See s 284(4) of the UK Companies Act of 2006, which provides that the provisions of s 284 are subject 
to any provision of the company’s articles of association. 
 
153 Section 195(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 stated as follows: “(1) A member of a public company 
having a share capital shall–(a) if the share capital is divided into shares of par value, be entitled to that 
proportion of the total votes in the company which the aggregate amount of the nominal value of the shares 
held by him bears to the aggregate amount of the nominal value of all the shares issued by the company; 
(b) if the share capital is divided into shares of no par value, be entitled to one vote in respect of each share 
he holds.” 
 
154 Paragraph 3.29 of the JSE Listings Requirements provides that securities in each class for which listing 
is applied must rank pari passu in respect of all rights. According to para 3.29(c) of the JSE Listings 
Requirements this means that the securities must carry the same rights as to unrestricted transfer, attendance 
and voting at general and annual general meetings and in all other respects. Paragraph 4.18 of the JSE 
Listings Requirements states that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange will not grant a listing to a company 
with low or high voting securities or allow an existing listed company to issue low or high voting securities. 
A low voting security is one that confers on its holder reduced voting rights in comparison with the voting 
rights conferred on the holders of equity securities of the issuer already listed (para 4.19 of the JSE Listings 
Requirements). A high voting security is one that confers on its holder enhanced voting rights in 
comparison with the voting rights conferred on the holders of equity securities of the issuer already listed 
(para 4.20 of the JSE Listings Requirements). 
 
155 ASX Listing Rule 6.8 provides that on a resolution to be decided on a show of hands each holder of an 
ordinary security and a preference security who has a right to vote must be entitled to one vote. ASX Listing 
Rule 6.9 provides that on a resolution to be decided on a poll each holder of an ordinary security and a 
preference security who has a right to vote must be entitled to one vote for each fully paid security and a 
fraction of a vote for each partly paid security. The ASX Listing Rules are enforceable against listed entities 
under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 (see ss 793C and 1101B). 
 
156 Premium Listing Principle 3 of Listing Rule 7.2.1A contained in Chapter 7 of the UK Listing Rules 
requires equity shares admitted to a premium listing to carry an equal number of votes on any shareholder 
vote. This rule came into force on 16 May 2014. See chapter 2, note 224 where premium listings are 
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3.3  The Removal of Shareholding-Directors with Loaded Voting Rights 
 
An important question which arises is whether a director who holds loaded voting shares 
in a company would validly be able to use his loaded voting rights to defeat a 
shareholders’ resolution to remove him as a director from office. This question was the 
crux of the controversial landmark UK case of Bushell v Faith,157 which is discussed 
below.  
 
3.3.1  Bushell v Faith 
 
In Bushell v Faith158 the company had an issued share capital of three hundred shares. 
The shares were divided equally between the appellant Mrs Bushell, her sister Dr Bayne 
and their brother, the respondent, Mr Faith. Each shareholder held one hundred shares. 
Mrs Bushell and Mr Faith were the company’s sole directors.  Article 9 of the articles of 
the company, which was a small private company, stated as follows:  
 
 “In the event of a resolution being proposed at any general meeting of the company 
 for the removal from office of any director, any shares held by that director shall 
 on a poll in respect of such resolution carry the right to three votes per share 
 and regulation 62 of Part 1 of Table A shall be construed accordingly.”159 
 [Emphasis added] 
 
The two sisters were unhappy with their brother’s conduct as a director and purported to 
remove him from office. On a show of hands the resolution was successfully passed 
because the two sisters voted in favour of the resolution. Faith demanded that voting take 
place on a poll. On a poll, both sisters voted in favour of the removal of Faith, while Faith 
voted, in his capacity as a shareholder, against the purported resolution to remove him 
from office. A dispute arose regarding whether the resolution had been passed or not. 
                                                 
discussed. The UK Listing Rules are a set of regulations which apply to a company listed on a UK stock 
exchange and are subject to the oversight of the UK Listing Authority. 
 
157 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
158 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
159 Regulation 62 of Part 1 of Table A provided as follows: “Subject to any rights or restrictions for the 
time being attached to any class or classes of shares, on a show of hands every member present in person 
shall have one vote, and on a poll every member shall have one vote for each share of which he is the 
holder.” 
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Bushell contended that the resolution had been passed by two hundred votes to one 
hundred. Faith argued that, in accordance with article 9 of the articles of association of 
the company, his one hundred shares carried three hundred votes, and that therefore the 
resolution had been defeated by three hundred votes to two hundred. The question before 
the court was whether article 9 was valid and applicable, or whether it was to be treated 
as overridden by section 184 of the UK Companies Act of 1948 (which was the equivalent 
of section 168 of the UK Companies Act of 2006),160 and therefore void. Section 184 of 
the UK Companies Act of 1948 enabled a company to remove a director, by ordinary 
resolution, before the expiration of his period of office “notwithstanding anything in the 
articles.”   
 
The court a quo found in favour of Bushell, on the basis that article 9 of the articles of 
association of the company was invalid because it infringed section 184(1) of the UK 
Companies Act of 1948. Ungoed-Thomas J expressed the view that it would “make a 
mockery of the law” to uphold article 9 of the constitution of the company.161 Faith 
appealed and the UK Court of Appeal unanimously reversed the decision of the court a 
quo. In finding in favour of Faith, the UK Court of Appeal was of the view that the object 
of section 184 of the UK Companies Act of 1948 was to increase the powers of the 
shareholders in general meeting by providing that “nothing higher than a simple majority 
of votes was required”162 to remove a director from office. The UK Court of Appeal 
remarked further that section 184 of the UK Companies Act of 1948 did “nothing to 
restrict a company’s ability to allocate voting rights to shares in varying degrees and 
circumstances”.163 On a further appeal, by Bushell, the House of Lords, by a majority of 
four to one, upheld the decision of the UK Court of Appeal and found in favour of Faith.  
 
                                                 
160 See chapter 3, para 2.3 where s 168 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 is discussed. 
 
161 This decision of Ungoed-Thomas J, dated 3 December 1968, does not appear to have been reported. 
This quote is taken from the judgment of Harman LJ in the judgment of the UK Court of Appeal in Bushell 
v Faith and Another [1969] 1 All ER 1002 at 1004 and from the judgment of Lord Upjohn in the House of 
Lords in Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1107-1108. 
 
162 Bushell v Faith and Another [1969] 1 All ER 1002 at 1003, per Harman LJ. 
 
163 Bushell v Faith and Another [1969] 1 All ER 1002 at 1006, per Russell LJ. 
 
294 
 
The House of Lords held that article 9 was valid and enforceable, and that it was not in 
conflict with section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948 since that Act did not 
prevent special voting rights being attached to special circumstances and particular types 
of resolutions.164 The court found that the practice of loaded voting rights was valid and 
recognised and that Parliament had not sought to fetter the right of the company to issue 
shares with such loaded voting rights165 but had, instead, left to companies the “liberty to 
allocate voting rights as they pleased.”166 Lord Upjohn described the distinction between 
voting rights attached to shares and the policy of the UK Companies Act of 1948 as 
follows: 
 
 “Parliament has never sought to fetter the right of the company to issue a share with such 
rights or restrictions as it may think fit. There is no fetter which compels the company to 
make the voting rights or restrictions of general application and it seems to me clear that 
such rights or restrictions can be attached to special circumstances and to particular types 
of resolution. This makes no mockery of section 184; all that Parliament was seeking to do 
thereby was to make an ordinary resolution sufficient to remove a director. Had Parliament 
desired to go further and enact that every share entitled to vote should be deprived of its 
special rights under the articles it should have said so in plain terms by making the vote on 
a poll one vote one share.”167 
 
With regard to the words “notwithstanding anything in its articles” contained in section 
184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948, Lord Upjohn of the House of Lords remarked 
that the reason why Parliament had included these words in section 184(1) was to ensure 
that a director would be removable by virtue of an ordinary resolution instead of an 
extraordinary resolution168 (that is, by a seventy five per cent majority). The UK Court of 
Appeal in Bushell v Faith and Another169 also found that the words “notwithstanding 
anything in its articles” in section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948 simply 
ensured that a requirement that a greater majority than a simple majority for passing the 
removal resolution, would be of no effect. 
                                                 
164 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1109, per Lord Upjohn. 
 
165 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1109, per Lord Upjohn. 
 
166 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1110, per Lord Donovan. 
 
167 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1109, per Lord Upjohn. 
 
168 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1108.  
 
169 [1969] 1 All ER 1002 at 1004, per Russell LJ. 
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Lord Reid of the House of Lords accepted that the extra voting power conferred by article 
9 of the articles of association on a director whose removal is proposed would make it 
impossible for any resolution for the removal to be passed if that director voted against 
the resolution.170 The learned judge admitted that article 9 of the articles of association 
was “obviously designed”171 to evade section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948. 
Despite the admission that article 9 of the articles of association of the company was 
designed to make the director irremovable, Lord Reid agreed with the majority decision 
of the House of Lords that article 9 was valid. It appears though that he had difficulty 
with his decision because he commented that his agreement with the majority decision 
was “with some reluctance.”172  
The minority judgment in Bushell v Faith,173 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, the sole 
dissentient, accepted that some shares may carry a greater voting power than others, but 
proclaimed that this does not warrant a “device”174 such as that introduced by article 9 of 
the articles of association. The learned judge held that the “unconcealed effect” of article 
9 was “to make a director irremovable.”175 He stated further as follows: 
 
“If the question is posed whether the shares of the respondent possess any added 
voting weight the answer must be that they possess none whatsoever beyond, if valid, 
an ad hoc weight for the special purpose of circumventing section 184. If article 9 
were writ large it would set out that a director is not to be removed against his will 
and that in order to achieve this and to thwart the express provision of section 184 
the voting power of any director threatened with removal is to be deemed to be 
greater than it actually is. The learned judge176 thought that to sanction this would be 
to make a mockery of the law. I think so also.”177 
 
                                                 
170 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1105, per Lord Reid. 
 
171 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1105. 
 
172 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1105, per Lord Reid. 
 
173 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
174 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1106. 
 
175 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1106. 
 
176 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest was here referring to the judgment of the court a quo, per Ungoed-Thomas 
J, which had found in favour of Bushell. 
 
177 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1106. 
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3.3.2  Evaluation of Bushell v Faith 
 
The majority judgment in Bushell v Faith178 adopted a literal and narrow approach to 
interpreting article 9 and section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948,179 and not a 
purposive approach. The House of Lords interpreted section 184(1) of the UK Companies 
Act of 1948 strictly according to the words of the section as enacted by Parliament. 
Bushell v Faith180 is a controversial decision, and commentators have been divided on 
the merit and validity of the judgment, with some commentators expounding the 
correctness of the decision, while others strongly criticising it. 
 
In defence of the majority judgment in Bushell v Faith181 Cartoon contends that if the 
shareholders of the company had specifically, deliberately and intentionally, included in 
the constitution of the company a provision which had the effect of excluding the benefits 
of section 184 of the UK Companies Act of 1948, they had only themselves to blame 
when Faith exercised his three votes against the removal resolution, and so defeated it.182 
Beuthin supports the UK Court of Appeal decision in Bushell v Faith183 and remarks that 
it may be highly desirable for directors to be safeguarded in directorships by means of 
special voting rights.184 Hahlo assumes that the UK Court of Appeal decision in Bushell 
v Faith185 is good law and accepts that it is possible to give a shareholder or group of 
shareholders multiple voting rights on a resolution for the removal of a director with the 
consequence that the removal of a director may be prevented.186  
 
                                                 
178 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
179 See Muir v Lampl and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 338 at 345; Boros “Virtual Shareholder Meetings: 
Who Decides how Companies make Decisions?” 283 and Dignam Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on 
Company Law 334. 
 
180 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
181 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
182 Cartoon “The Removal of Company Directors” 19-20. 
 
183 [1969] 1 All ER 1002. 
 
184 Beuthin “A Director Firmly in the Saddle” 489. 
 
185 [1969] 1 All ER 1002. 
 
186 Hahlo “Restrictions on the Alteration of Articles” 351. 
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In Muir v Lampl and Another187 the High Court of Hong Kong accepted the majority 
judgment in Bushell v Faith188 as being correct. The court distinguished between an 
unqualified provision that prohibits the shareholders from removing a particular person 
as a director, and one that confers weighted voting rights on a shareholder. The court 
asserted that the first type of agreement constitutes an unlawful fetter on the statutory 
power conferred by section 157B of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32) (the equivalent 
provision to section 71(1) of the Companies Act).189 The court commented that, bearing 
in mind the background leading to the enactment of section 157B of the Companies 
Ordinance and its equivalent provision in the UK, these statutory provisions are intended 
to be strong provisions safeguarding shareholders’ residual indirect control in the 
management of the company.190 They provide an important underpinning for the checks 
and balances in the distribution of power between the shareholders and directors.191 For 
these reasons the court questioned whether absolute immunity from removal could ever 
be justified.192 It was, however, asserted by the court that there is a conceptual difference 
between weighted voting rights and an absolute agreement prohibiting the removal of a 
director.193 In the former case, the court stated, the result of the vote is dictated by the 
vote cast by the shareholder with weighted votes, whereas in the latter, the result is 
dictated by the terms of the shareholders’ agreement prohibiting the removal of a director 
and is more acute and direct.194 Based on this reasoning, the court accepted that the 
                                                 
187 [2005] 1 HKLRD 338. 
188 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
189 Muir v Lampl and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 338 at 346, per Lam J. Section 157B of the Companies 
Ordinance (Cap. 32) provided as follows: “A company may by ordinary resolution remove a director before 
the expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in its memorandum or articles or in any 
agreement between it and him: Provided that this subsection shall not, in the case of a private company, 
authorize the removal of a director holding office for life on the commencement of the Companies 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1984 (6 of 1984).” 
 
190 Muir v Lampl and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 338 at 346. 
 
191 Muir v Lampl and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 338 at 347. 
 
192 Muir v Lampl and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 338 at 347. 
 
193 Muir v Lampl and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 338 at 347. 
 
194 Muir v Lampl and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 338 at 347. 
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weighted voting rights could be exercised in a manner which would result in the defeat 
of a shareholders’ resolution to remove a director.195 
 
Lord Donovan of the House of Lords justified the decision of the majority judgment in 
Bushell v Faith196 by stating that article 9 was needed to protect shareholders who were 
directors in small companies. He reasoned that provisions such as article 9 were a 
safeguard against family quarrels in small family companies running a family business 
having their repercussions in the boardroom.197 In light of this rationalisation of the 
majority judgment, Davies and Worthington suggest that the decision of the majority 
judgment may be justified in small private companies, which are in effect an incorporated 
partnership or a quasi-partnership, where it is not unreasonable for each “partner” to be 
entitled (as under partnership law) to participate in the management of the firm in the 
absence of his agreement to the contrary and to protect himself against removal by his 
fellow partners.198 Rutabanzibwa argues that weighted voting rights are in fact useful in 
protecting the interests in small private companies which are established on the basis of 
mutual confidence and trust.199 Birds et al200 also express the view that the ratio of Bushell 
v Faith201 may be legitimate in the context of small private companies. On the basis of 
the above reasoning and justification it is arguable that the ratio of Bushell v Faith202 must 
be confined to private companies only, and that it does not apply to public companies.203  
 
                                                 
195 Muir v Lampl and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 338 at 344 and 347. 
 
196 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
197 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1110-1111, per Lord Donovan. 
 
198 Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 380. See chapter 7, note 132 for a 
description of a quasi-partnership. 
 
199 Rutabanzibwa “What is Golden in the Golden Share? Company Law Implications of Privatisation” 43. 
 
200 Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 563. 
 
201 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
202 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
  
203 See further D Botha “Some Aspects Concerning the Removal of Directors” 467; Beuthin & Luiz 
Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 210-211; Keay “Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options 
for Shareholders” 672-673; Kershaw Company Law in Context 227 and French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, 
French & Ryan on Company Law 446. 
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On the other hand, other commentators have argued that the decision in Bushell v Faith204 
runs contrary to the spirit of section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948. Article 9 
of the articles of the company in effect enabled a director of the company to prevent a 
resolution being passed for his removal from office since he could out-vote the other two 
shareholders.205 This meant that directors of the company were irremovable and were 
effectively entrenched in office.206 Collier remarks that the minority judgment of Lord 
Morris of Borth-y-Gest is more in consonance with the spirit and intendment of the 
law.207 Schmitthoff also opines that the decision of the House of Lord “contravenes the 
spirit, if not the letter, of section 184,”208 and remarks further that the decision of the 
House of Lords will go down in legal history as one of the most remarkable instances of 
judicial interpretation defeating the clear intention of the legislator.209 Prentice expresses 
the view that the decision of the UK Court of Appeal, which was affirmed by the House 
of Lords, “reduced section 184 to an empty rhetorical gesture.”210 Kaye remarks that the 
majority judgment of the House of Lords in Bushell v Faith211 sanctioned a scheme which 
succeeds in making “a mockery of the law”.212 Griffin agrees with the minority judgment 
that the acceptance of a weighted voting clause made a mockery of the law because it 
nullifies the existence of the statutory power to remove a director.213 
                                                 
204 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
205 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 164. 
 
206 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 164. 
 
207 Collier “Company - Power to Remove Director by Ordinary Resolution - Weighted Voting - Whether 
Ordinary Resolution” 42. 
 
208 Schmitthoff “House of Lords Sanctions Evasion of Companies Act” 2. 
 
209 Schmitthoff “House of Lords Sanctions Evasion of Companies Act” 1. 
 
210 Prentice “Removal of Directors from Office” 696. 
 
211 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
212 Kaye “A Mockery of the Law?” 66. 
 
213 Griffin Company Law Fundamental Principles 288. For a further discussion of Bushell v Faith [1970] 
AC 1099 (HL) see Baker “Editorial Notes” 155-157; D Botha “Some Aspects Concerning the Removal of 
Directors” 467; Anon “‘Weighted’ or ‘Loaded’ Votes in Private Companies” D5-D-16; Anon “‘Weighted’ 
Votes Again” D17-D20; Rutabanzibwa “What is Golden in the Golden Share? Company Law Implications 
of Privatisation” 42-43; Beuthin & Luiz Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 210-211; Boros “Virtual 
Shareholder Meetings: Who Decides how Companies make Decisions?” 282-284; Griffin Company Law 
Fundamental Principles 54; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 274; R Cassim 
“Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 447-448; 
Kershaw Company Law in Context 223-228; FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 164-165; 
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In Swerdlow v Cohen and Others214  Botha J expressed the view that the majority decision 
in Bushell v Faith215 was incorrect. He agreed with the minority judgment written by Lord 
Morris of Borth-y-Gest which he stated was “unanswerable”.216 This view is however 
only an obiter dictum because the facts in Swerdlow v Cohen and Others217 are 
distinguishable from those in Bushell v Faith.218 In Swerdlow v Cohen and Others219 the 
directors had a right to veto a resolution.220 While in a sense the power to veto a resolution 
may be regarded as a special voting right, it is not a species of a loaded or weighted voting 
right that must be taken into account in counting the votes in order to determine whether 
an ordinary resolution has been passed.221 Botha J held that the power of veto was invalid 
when invoked to defeat a resolution to remove certain directors under section 220 of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973.222 On appeal, Margo J confirmed the dictum of Botha J in 
the court a quo, but found that it was unnecessary to examine the validity of the decision 
in Bushell v Faith223 or to express an opinion on the main issue in Bushell v Faith224 on 
                                                 
Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 562-563; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law 95-96 and 446; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 380 and 
Hannigan Company Law 174. 
 
214 1977 (1) SA 178 (W) at 184-185. 
 
215 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
216 Swerdlow v Cohen and Others 1977 (1) SA 178 (W) at 184-185. 
 
217 1977 (1) SA 178 (W). 
 
218 [1970] AC 1099 (HL).  
 
219 1977 (1) SA 178 (W). 
 
220 In Swerdlow v Cohen and Others 1977 (1 ) SA 178 (W) article 42(3) of the then articles of association 
of the company had stated as follows: “Subject always to the provisions of sec. 64 of the Companies Act, 
1926, as amended, questions arising at any meeting of members shall be decided by a majority of votes, 
provided that if and for so long as Arnold Swerdlow, Ernest Cohen and Karl Bähr or any of them shall be 
members no resolution shall be of any force or effect unless they or those of them who are members of the 
company are in favour of the resolution, provided further, however, that if only one of them is against the 
resolution the other or others may require the resolution to be submitted to arbitration in terms of the 
Arbitration Act, 1965, and the decision in the arbitration shall then be deemed to be the decision of the 
members and shall be entered as such in the minute book of the company.” 
 
221 Swerdlow v Cohen and Others 1977 (1) SA 178 (W) at 188. 
 
222 Swerdlow v Cohen and Others 1977 (1) SA 178 (W) at 188-189. 
 
223 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
224 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
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the basis that the facts in the case before him were distinguishable from those in Bushell 
v Faith.225 
 
3.3.3  The Application of Bushell v Faith in South African Law 
 
It is an open question whether the majority judgment of Bushell v Faith226 would be 
followed by a South African court. There is no difference in general principle between 
the UK law which applied in Bushell v Faith227 with regard to loaded voting rights and 
section 37(2) of the (South African) Companies Act, which permits loaded voting rights 
to be conferred on shareholders. Section 5(2) of the Companies Act permits a court 
whenever appropriate to consider foreign law. On this basis the dictum of the majority 
judgment of Bushell v Faith228 would have persuasive authority in South African law.229  
 
A further reason why Bushell v Faith230 would have persuasive authority in South African 
law is that section 71(1) of the Companies Act contains similar wording to that used in 
section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948. Section 71(1) of the Companies Act 
states that a director may be removed from office “[d]espite anything to the contrary in a 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, or any agreement between a company 
and a director, or between any shareholders and a director”. As discussed above, with 
regard to the words “notwithstanding anything in its articles” contained in section 184(1) 
of the UK Companies Act of 1948, the House of Lords asserted that the reason why 
Parliament had included these words in section 184(1) was to ensure that a director would 
be removable by virtue of an ordinary resolution instead of an extraordinary resolution.231 
                                                 
225 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). Swerdlow v Cohen 1977 (3) SA 1050 (T) at 1056. See further MJ Oosthuizen 
“Swerdlow v Cohen and Others 1977 1 SA 178 (W)” 165-169 and Anon “‘Weighted’ or ‘Loaded’ Votes 
in Private Companies” D-5-D-7 for a discussion of Swerdlow v Cohen and Others 1977 (1) SA 178 (W) 
and Anon “‘Weighted’ Votes Again” D17-D20 for a discussion of the appeal decision reported in Swerdlow 
v Cohen 1977 (3) SA 1050 (T).  
 
226 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
227 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
228 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
229 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 165. 
 
230 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
231 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) at 1108, per Lord Upjohn. See para 3.3.1 above where this is 
discussed. 
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The UK Court of Appeal in Bushell v Faith and Another232 also found that the words 
“notwithstanding anything in its articles” in section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 
1948 simply acted to ensure that a requirement that a greater majority than a simple 
majority for passing the removal resolution would be of no effect.  
 
The UK Companies Act of 2006 did not undo the effect of Bushell v Faith.233 The 
majority judgment is still applicable in the UK, save for listed companies.234 This means 
that loaded voting rights remain a valid method of entrenchment for directors in the UK, 
and a court will enforce loaded voting rights conferred on a shareholding-director even if 
the loaded voting rights are exercised in a manner which thwarts a shareholders’ 
resolution to remove a director. Griffin asserts that the continued acceptance and validity 
of weighted voting clauses in the UK is indicative of the view that statutory powers, 
whilst workable in theory, can in specified circumstances be manipulated to such an 
extent whereby they are of little practical worth.235 Section 168 of the UK Companies 
Act of 2006 states that a company may by ordinary resolution at a meeting remove a 
director before the expiration of his period of office “notwithstanding anything in any 
agreement between it and him”, deviating from the wording of its predecessor, section 
184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948, “notwithstanding anything in its articles”. In 
light of this change in wording Dignam remarks that Bushell v Faith236 is no longer of 
direct authority in the UK in this area of the law.237 It is submitted, however, that since 
the House of Lords in Bushell v Faith238 found that the words “notwithstanding anything 
in its articles” in section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948 did no more than 
                                                 
232 [1969] 1 All ER 1002 at 1004, per Russell LJ. 
 
233 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). See Griffin Company Law Fundamental Principles 288; Keay “Company 
Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders” 672-673; Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ 
Company Law 563 and Hannigan Company Law 174. 
 
234 As discussed in para 3.2 above, listed companies in the UK may not issue shares with loaded voting 
rights. See Premium Listing Principle 3 of Listing Rule 7.2.1A contained in Chapter 7 of the UK Listing 
Rules, which requires equity shares admitted to a premium listing to carry an equal number of votes on any 
shareholder vote. 
 
235 Griffin Company Law Fundamental Principles 288. 
 
236 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
237 Dignam Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 334. 
 
238 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
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ensure that a director is removable by an ordinary resolution instead of by a special 
resolution and that these words did not prevent loaded voting rights being used to prevent 
the removal of a shareholding-director, the omission of these words from section 168(1) 
of the UK Companies Act of 2006 would not alter the effect of Bushell v Faith239 on the 
removal of directors by loaded voting rights. Section 303 of the UK Companies Act of 
1985, the predecessor to section 168 of the UK Companies Act of 2006, stated that a 
company may by ordinary resolution remove a director before the expiration of his period 
in office “notwithstanding anything in its articles or in any agreement between it and 
him.” The Government remarked that the reason for the reference to the “articles” in 
section 168 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 being deleted was that it was not necessary 
to include a reference to the articles since the articles may not in any case override the 
requirements set out in the UK Companies Act of 2006.240 
 
While Bushell v Faith241 may have persuasive authority in South African law, it is 
submitted that the House of Lords adopted a limited interpretation of the words 
“notwithstanding anything in its articles” in section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 
1948. The wide wording of section 184(1) of the UK Companies Act of 1948 indicates 
that the section was aimed at preventing any form of entrenchment of directors by 
whatever means possible.242  In a similar vein it is arguable that giving the words “despite 
anything to the contrary” in section 71(1) of the (South African) Companies Act their 
ordinary meaning indicates that the legislature intended to override any methods, whether 
direct or indirect, designed to ensure that a director is not removed from office,243 and not 
just to ensure that a director is removed from office by an ordinary resolution. 
Accordingly if an article in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company confers 
loaded voting rights on a particular class of shares which has the effect of defeating an 
                                                 
239 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
240 Hansard, May 2006, Volume No. 681, Part No. 142 at column 826, per Lord Sainsbury of Turville. See 
further Kershaw Company Law in Context 223; Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases and 
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243 See Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 274 and R Cassim “Governance and the 
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ordinary resolution to remove a director, it is submitted that such an article would be an 
indirect method of entrenching a director in office and that it would be in breach of section 
71(1) of the Companies Act. 
 
A critical provision of the (South African) Companies Act is the anti-avoidance provision 
contained in section 6(1). This provision must be considered in evaluating the weight of 
the majority judgment in Bushell v Faith244 in South African law. This provision 
empowers a court, on application by the CIPC, the Takeover Regulation Panel or an 
exchange in respect of a company listed on an exchange, to declare any agreement, 
transaction, arrangement, resolution or provision of a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation or rules: 
 
 “(a)  to be primarily or substantially intended to defeat or reduce the effect of a 
prohibition or requirement established by or in terms of an unalterable 
provision of this Act; and 
(b)  void to the extent that it defeats or reduces the effect of a prohibition or 
requirement established by or in terms of an unalterable provision of this Act.” 
 
A court would have to examine the substance of a provision to ascertain whether it is 
primarily or substantially intended to circumvent an unalterable provision in the 
Companies Act.245 The test for “primarily” is a subjective test and requires that one’s 
state of mind be directed at defeating or reducing the effect of a prohibition or 
requirement established by or in terms of an unalterable provision of the Companies 
Act.246 “Substantially” is aimed at the effect of the provision rather than the intention.247 
Accordingly if the primary intention of a provision is not to defeat the effect of a 
prohibition or a requirement in the Companies Act but objectively it has the effect that it 
has been defeated, then that provision would fall foul of section 6(1) of the Companies 
Act.248 
                                                 
244 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
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Section 71(1) of the Companies Act is an unalterable provision of the Companies Act as 
it does not expressly contemplate that its effect may be negated, restricted, limited, 
qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by a company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation.249 It follows that no Memorandum of Incorporation of a 
company may negate, restrict, limit, qualify, extend or alter the substance or effect of the 
power conferred by section 71(1) of the Companies Act on the shareholders to remove 
directors. It is arguable that if the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company contains 
a provision conferring loaded voting rights on certain shares with the intention of 
defeating a resolution to remove a director from office, such a provision may be declared 
void under section 6(1) of the Companies Act on the basis that it is primarily intended to 
defeat section 71(1) of the Companies Act.250 It is submitted that if a provision in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation were to confer loaded voting rights on shareholders with 
regard to voting generally on ordinary resolutions, and not specifically with regard to 
voting on an ordinary resolution to remove a director, but the substantial effect of the 
exercise of the loaded voting rights on a removal resolution is that the effect of section 
71(1) of the Companies Act is defeated, such a provision would also fall foul of section 
6(1) of the Companies Act. A loaded voting rights clause which has the practical effect 
of thwarting the removal of a director would clearly defeat the intention behind section 
71(1) of the Companies Act and render the statutory provision of little practical worth. It 
is accordingly submitted that under the Companies Act a provision in the Memorandum 
of Incorporation conferring loaded voting rights may be declared void under section 6(1) 
of the Companies Act to the extent that it defeats section 71(1) of the Companies Act. 
 
It is noteworthy that the legislature stated in section 65(8) of the Companies Act that 
while the threshold for the passing of an ordinary resolution may be increased, this may 
not be done with regard to an ordinary resolution for the removal of a director.251 
                                                 
249 Refer to chapter 3, para 2.1 for a discussion on alterable and unalterable provisions of the Companies 
Act. 
 
250 See further FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 165.  
 
251 Section 65(8) of the Companies Act states as follows: 
 
 “Except for any ordinary resolution for the removal of a director under s 71, a company’s   
 Memorandum of Incorporation may require –  
(a) a higher percentage of voting rights to approve an ordinary resolution; or 
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Presumably the legislature enacted this restriction in order to prevent a company, in its 
Memorandum of Incorporation, from increasing the threshold to pass an ordinary 
resolution with the intention of making it difficult or impossible to remove a director from 
office. It is submitted that since loaded voting rights may have the effect of making it 
difficult or impossible to remove a shareholding-director from office, in light of section 
6(1) of the Companies Act, a similar exception should be carved out in section 37(2) of 
the Companies Act to the effect that a company may not permit shares to have more than 
one vote per share where this will have the effect of defeating section 71(1) of the 
Companies Act. It is accordingly submitted that section 37(2) must be tightened up by 
the legislature in order to prevent an evasion of section 71(1) of the Companies Act by 
the device of loading of voting rights. The following amendment to section 37(2) of the 
Companies Act is proposed: 
 
 “(2) Each issued share of a company, regardless of its class, has associated   
with it one general voting right, except to the extent provided otherwise 
by- 
(a) this Act; or 
(b) the preferences, rights, limitations and other terms determined by 
or in terms of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation in 
accordance with section 36., 
provided that the Memorandum of Incorporation may not make provision 
for an issued share of a company to have associated with it more than one 
general voting right in circumstances where this will have the effect of 
primarily or substantially defeating section 71(1) of this Act.”252 
 
                                                 
(b) one or more higher percentages of voting rights to approve ordinary resolutions 
concerning one or more particular matters, respectively,  
 provided that there must at all times be a margin of at least 10 percentage points between 
 the highest established requirement for approval of an ordinary resolution on any matter, 
 and the lowest established requirement for approval of a special resolution on any 
 matter.”  
 
See chapter 5, para 3 where s 65(8) of the Companies Act is discussed. 
 
252 The recommended insertions to s 37(2) of the Companies Act are underlined, while the recommended 
deletion is “struck out.” 
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Until a South African court authoritatively decides on the impact of Bushell v Faith253 on 
our law or the legislature clarifies the legal position in this regard, it remains an open 
question whether Bushell v Faith254 would be followed in our law, and whether loaded 
voting rights attaching to a director’s shares may be used as a device to defeat a 
shareholders’ resolution for his removal. The exercise of loaded voting rights are a 
consideration which must be taken into account with regard to the removal of a 
shareholding-director from office. For this reason it is imperative that, where a director 
is also a shareholder, before initiating proceedings to remove a director from office, 
cognisance is taken whether the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company permits 
loaded voting rights to be exercised by the shareholding-director, and whether a director 
would validly be able to use his loaded voting rights to block his removal from office.  
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter discussed two considerations regarding the removal of a director by the 
board of directors in circumstances where the director holds multiple positions or 
capacities in relation to the company. The first consideration is where a director is both a 
director and an employee of the company.255 In this event the executive director enjoys 
the protection of both the Companies Act and the LRA.256 Accordingly when an executive 
director is removed from office, the provisions of both the Companies Act and the LRA 
must be considered.257 A distinction must be drawn between the removal of a director 
from his office as a director of the company, and the removal of a director from his 
position as an employee of the company.258  
 
Reliance on an automatic termination provision to automatically bring an employment 
relationship to an end once an individual is removed from office as a director is not 
                                                 
253 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
254 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
255 See paras 2 and 2.1 above. 
 
256 See para 2.1 above. 
 
257 See para 2.1 above. 
 
258 See para 2.1 above. 
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permissible.259 If an executive director is removed from office by the board of directors 
or by the shareholders the proper procedures under the LRA must be followed to also 
dismiss the former director as an employee.260 A company may not contract out of 
complying with these procedures by the mechanism of automatic termination clauses.261 
Even if an executive director purported to waive his right to be fairly dismissed as an 
employee, the waiver would be against public policy and unenforceable.262 If a company 
does not have a valid ground to fairly dismiss the director as an employee, it may have to 
accommodate the former director in another capacity.263 If an appropriate vacancy does 
not exist in the company the company would have to follow the procedures for dismissal 
based on operational requirements under section 189 of the LRA and retrench the former-
director employee.264 
 
While automatic termination clauses are not valid, this chapter discussed two instances 
when reverse automatic termination provisions may be valid.265 The first instance is 
where the Memorandum of Incorporation imposes an additional ground of ineligibility 
or disqualification of directors under section 69(6) of the Companies Act to the effect that 
a director will be ineligible or disqualified to be a director if he is not an employee of the 
company.266 The second instance when reverse automatic termination provisions may be 
valid is where an ex officio director ceases to hold the office, title, designation or similar 
status that entitled him to be an ex officio director.267 In this event he will automatically 
cease to be a director of the company.268 
                                                 
259 See para 2.2 above. 
 
260 See para 2.2 above. 
 
261 See para 2.2 above. 
 
262 See para 2.2 above. 
 
263 See para 2.2 above. 
 
264 See para 2.2 above. 
 
265 See para 2.3 above. 
 
266 See para 2.3.1 above. 
 
267 See para 2.3.2 above. 
 
268 See para 2.3.2 above. 
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If the dismissal of the executive director as an employee is found to be unfair, the unfairly 
dismissed director-employee will be entitled to use the remedies for unfair dismissal 
provided for by the LRA and to claim reinstatement, re-employment or compensation for 
the unfair dismissal.269 The consequences of not terminating the employment of an 
executive director in a substantially and procedurally fair manner are severe for a 
company.270 A company must consider whether it will be feasible to retain the former 
director as an employee, particularly if there has been a breakdown in the relationship 
between the director and the company.271 It is not always practical to strictly separate the 
two positions held by an executive director, or to consistently apply a strict separation of 
such positions.272 These are some limitations which the board of directors must take into 
account prior to taking steps under the Companies Act and the LRA to remove an 
executive director from office.   
 
The second consideration which must be taken into account before removing a director 
from office is whether the director is a shareholder of the company and holds loaded 
voting rights in the company.273 This chapter discussed and evaluated the leading UK 
case of Bushell v Faith,274 in which a shareholding-director prevented his removal from 
office by the exercise of his loaded voting rights.275 This decision is a controversial one.276 
The extent of the persuasive force in South African law of the majority and minority 
judgment in this case was considered.277 It is not clear whether the majority judgment of 
                                                 
269 See para 2.2 above. 
 
270 See para 2.2 above. 
 
271 See para 2.2 above. 
 
272 See para 2.2 above. 
 
273 See paras 3 and 3.2 above. 
 
274 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
275 See paras 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above. 
 
276 See para 3.3.2 above. 
 
277 See para 3.3.3 above. 
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Bushell v Faith278 would be followed by a South African court.279 While the majority 
decision may have persuasive authority in South African law, at the same time a provision 
in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company that confers loaded voting rights on 
a particular class of shares and has the effect of defeating an ordinary resolution to remove 
a director, would be an indirect method of entrenching a director in office.280 Such a 
provision may contravene section 71(1) of the Companies Act, and may also fall foul of 
the anti-avoidance provision contained in section 6(1) of the Companies Act.281 
 
It was suggested that section 37(2) of the Companies Act, which permits loaded voting 
rights to be issued, must be tightened up by the legislature in order to prevent an evasion 
of section 71(1) of the Companies Act by the loading of voting rights.282 An amendment 
to section 37(2) of the Companies Act was proposed.283 
Until the courts authoritatively decide on the impact of the ratio of Bushell v Faith284 on 
South African law or the legislature clarifies the legal position in this regard, it remains 
an open question whether Bushell v Faith285 would be followed in our law, and whether 
loaded voting rights attaching to a director’s shares may be used as a device to defeat a 
shareholders’ resolution for his removal.286 Both public and private companies (but not 
listed companies) must carefully consider whether their Memorandum of Incorporation 
permits loaded voting rights to be exercised by a shareholding-director, and whether the 
shareholding-director would be able to effectively use his loaded voting rights to block 
his removal from office.287  
                                                 
278 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
279 See para 3.3.3 above. 
 
280 See para 3.3.3 above. 
 
281 See para 3.3.3 above. 
 
282 See para 3.3.3 above. 
 
283 See para 3.3.3 above. 
 
284 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
285 [1970] AC 1099 (HL). 
 
286 See para 3.3.3 above. 
 
287 See para 3.3.3 above. 
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 CHAPTER 6 THE JUDICIAL REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. SECTION 71(6) OF THE COMPANIES ACT  
3. SECTION 162 OF THE COMPANIES ACT  
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Sections 71(6) and 162 of the Companies Act enable an appropriate court to remove a director 
from office. This chapter examines the removal of directors under these sections. It also 
examines the judicial removal of directors under the UK Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986, the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and the relevant 
legislation of various USA States with a view to comparing sections 71(6) and 162 with the 
equivalent legislation in these jurisdictions. Based on the comparative research some 
recommendations are proposed to improve and enhance the provisions of sections 71(6) and 
162 of the Companies Act. 
 
In terms of section 71(5) of the Companies Act a director who has been removed by the board 
of directors, or any person who appointed that director as contemplated in section 66(4)(a)(i) 
of the Companies Act,1 may apply to court to review the determination of the board within 
twenty business days.2 Under section 71(5) of the Companies Act a court does not itself remove 
a director from office. Instead, a court is empowered to confirm the board’s decision to remove 
a director from office, or, alternatively, to overturn the board’s decision to remove a director 
from office. While section 71(5) empowers the courts to assess and evaluate the board’s 
decision to remove a director, and to confirm or overturn that decision, the provision would be 
invoked by a director who has already been removed from office by the board of directors. 
Strictly speaking therefore, section 71(5) of the Companies Act does not constitute a judicial 
power to remove a director from office since the director would already have been removed 
from office by the board of directors. Section 71(5) of the Companies Act is discussed in 
                                                 
1 Section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act makes provision for a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation to 
provide for the direct appointment and removal of one or more directors by any person who is named in or 
determined in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation. 
 
2 Section 71(5) is discussed further in chapter 4, para 4.1 and chapter 7, para 2.  
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chapter 7 as one of the remedies which are available to a director who has been removed from 
office by the board of directors. 
 
2.  SECTION 71(6) OF THE COMPANIES ACT  
  
In terms of section 71(6) of the Companies Act, if the board of directors has determined that a 
director is not ineligible, disqualified or incapacitated or has not been negligent or derelict (as 
the case may be), any director who voted otherwise on the resolution or any holder of voting 
rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director, may apply to court to review the 
board’s determination.3 For instance, if the applicant is of the view that the board of directors 
favoured the impugned director or breached its fiduciary duty in failing to remove the impugned 
director from office, the applicant may apply to court to review the board’s decision not to 
remove the director from office.  
 
A court may either confirm the decision of the board of directors not to remove the director in 
question from office or it may itself “remove the director from office, if the court is satisfied 
that the director is ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, or has been negligent or derelict.”4 
Section 71(6) of the Companies Act thus confers on a court a direct power to remove a director 
from office.5 In terms of section 70(1)(b)(vi)(cc), if a director is removed from office by an 
order of the court in terms of section 71(6) of the Companies Act, the person removed from 
office ceases to be a director and a vacancy arises on the board of the company. 
 
                                                 
3 Section 71(6)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
4 Section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act.  
 
5 A court also has a direct power to remove a director from office under s 137(5) of the Companies Act (see chapter 
1, para 1). In terms of this provision a business rescue practitioner may, at any time during the business rescue 
proceedings, apply to court for an order removing a director from office. The grounds under which such an 
application may be instituted are that the director in question has failed to comply with a requirement of Chapter 
6 (Business rescue and compromise with creditors) of the Companies Act, or by an act or omission has impeded 
or is impeding the business rescue practitioner in the performance of his powers and functions, the management 
of the company by the practitioner, or the development or the implementation of a business rescue plan. The 
removal of a director from office by a business rescue practitioner is beyond the scope of this thesis and is not 
addressed in this study. For a discussion on the removal of a director by a court on the application of a business 
rescue practitioner see Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law 
(Unpublished LLD Thesis) 112-113; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 482(56)-482(57); 
FHI Cassim “Business Rescue and Compromises” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 887 and FHI 
Cassim “Business Rescue and Compromises” in Loubser & Mahony Company Secretarial Practice 26-27. 
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Section 71(6) of the Companies Act also applies to decisions of the Companies Tribunal not to 
remove a director from office.6 Therefore a decision of the Companies Tribunal not to remove 
a director from office is also subject to a review in terms of section 71(6) of the Companies 
Act. The application of section 71(6) to the removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal is 
discussed in chapter 3.7  
 
2.1  Locus Standi to Apply to Court to Review the Board’s Decision 
 
Section 71(6)(a) of the Companies Act confers locus standi on only two persons to apply to 
court for a review of the board’s decision not to remove a director from office. These two 
persons are a director who voted in favour of the removal resolution, and a holder of voting 
rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director. It should be noted that section 
71(3) of the Companies Act empowers a “shareholder” to allege that a director has become 
ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated, neglectful or negligent, while section 71(6)(a) empowers 
“any holder of voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director” to apply to 
court to review the board’s decision.  
 
A “shareholder” may not necessarily be a “holder of voting rights entitled to be exercised in 
the election of that director.”  A shareholder is defined in section 1 of the Companies Act as 
meaning, subject to section 57(1) of the Companies Act, the holder of a share issued by the 
company and whose name is entered as such in the securities register. In terms of section 57(1) 
of the Companies Act, for the purposes of Part F (Governance of companies) “shareholder” has 
the meaning set out in section 1 of the Companies Act but also includes a person who is entitled 
to exercise any voting rights in relation to a company, irrespective of the form, title or nature 
of the securities to which those voting rights are attached.8 A particular shareholder may not 
necessarily have voting rights to elect to office the director who is the subject of a removal 
                                                 
6 See s 71(8)(c) of the Companies Act which provides that s 71(6), read with the changes required by the context, 
applies to the determination of the matter by the Companies Tribunal. As discussed in chapter 3, para 9 if a 
company has fewer than three directors s 71(3) of the Companies Act does not apply to the removal of a director 
but a director or a shareholder may apply to the Companies Tribunal to determine the matter of the director’s 
removal from office. 
  
7 See chapter 3, para 9 for a discussion on the removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal. 
 
8 In respect of a profit company “voting rights” are the rights of any holder of the company’s securities to vote in 
connection with a matter to be decided by a company. In respect of a non-profit company voting rights are the 
rights of a member to vote in connection with the matter (see s 1 of the Companies Act). 
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resolution. In this event the shareholder would not be empowered under section 71(6) of the 
Companies Act to apply to court to review the board’s decision not to remove the director from 
office. This means that a shareholder who does not have voting rights to elect a particular 
director to office, may make an allegation against a director under section 71(3), but, if the 
board does not remove the particular director from office, that shareholder will not have a 
remedy under section 71(6) of the Companies Act to apply to court to review the board’s 
decision.  
 
It seems anomalous to provide a shareholder with the right to make an allegation against a 
director under section 71(3) but not to provide him with a remedy to apply to court to review 
the board’s decision not to remove the director from office. Notably under section 71(6) “any” 
holder of voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director may apply to court 
to review the board’s determination not to remove the director from office, regardless of 
whether or not such person made an allegation against the director under section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act.  
 
2.2  The Powers Conferred on a Court under a Section 71(6) Review Application 
 
Section 71(6)(a) of the Companies Act states that the decision of the board of directors not to 
remove a director from office may be taken on “review.” A distinction is drawn in South 
African law between an appeal and a review.9 In the strict traditional sense a review involves 
an enquiry into the procedural aspects of a decision.10 In contrast, an appeal is a reconsideration 
                                                 
9 The distinction between an appeal and a review stems from the doctrine of separation of powers. This doctrine 
holds that it would not be acceptable for judges to pronounce on the merits of administrative decisions because 
the judiciary would be usurping the functions entrusted by the Constitution and by Parliament to the executive 
branch of government. The administration forms part of the executive branch of government. The court’s role in 
administrative law is therefore restricted to ensuring that the administration keeps within its mandate and exercises 
its function in a manner that complies with all law. See Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and Others 1999 (3) 
SA 304 (LAC) para 34; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another; In Re: Ex Parte 
Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 45; Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 46; 
Hoexter “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” 490; Hoexter, Lyster & Currie 
The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 65; Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 111; Corder 
“The Development of Administrative Law in South Africa” in Quinot et al Administrative Justice in South Africa: 
An Introduction 13-14 and Quinot “Regulating Administrative Action” in Quinot et al Administrative Justice in 
South Africa: An Introduction 107. For a general discussion on the separation of powers doctrine see Maree 
“Administrative Authorities in Legal Context” in Quinot et al Administrative Justice in South Africa: An 
Introduction 34-40. 
 
10 See Tikly and Others v Johannes NO and Others 1963 (2) SA 588 (T) at 590-591 where the difference between 
an appeal and a review is discussed. See further on the distinction between an appeal and a review Minister of 
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of, and a fresh determination on the merits of the matter, but it is limited to the evidence or 
information on which the original decision was given.11 Since an appeal is concerned with the 
merits of the matter, the question in an appeal is whether the decision was right or wrong.12  The 
question in a review is not whether the decision was wrong or right, but whether the manner in 
which the decision was reached is acceptable.13 As expressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration14 in a review the “focus is on the process and on the way in which 
the decision-maker came to the challenged conclusion”.  Therefore in a review a court is not 
entitled to consider the merits of the decision.15 Instead, the focus in a review is whether the 
procedure adopted was formally correct or whether there were irregularities in the proceedings 
which may show that there has been “a failure of justice”.16  
 
In practice, however, the distinction between questions of procedure and merits is not always 
clear.17 It may be that the term “appeal” or “review” is used in legislation when the intention 
of the legislature is in substance to confer a narrower or a wider power on the courts.18 In some 
instances it may be impossible to separate the merits of the decision from the decision-making 
                                                 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism and Others v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA) para 52. 
  
 11 There is a distinction between an appeal in the ordinary strict sense and an appeal in the wide sense. An appeal 
in the ordinary strict sense is a re-hearing on the merits but is limited to the evidence or information on which the 
decision under appeal was given, and in which the only determination is whether that decision was right or wrong. 
An appeal in the wide sense is a complete re-hearing of and a fresh determination on the merits of the matter with 
or without additional evidence or information. See Tikly and Others v Johannes NO and Others 1963 (2) SA 588 
(T) at 590–591; Health Professions Council of SA v De Bruin [2004] 4 All SA 392 (SCA) para 23; Samancor 
Group Pension Fund v Samancor Chrome 2010 (4) SA 540 (SCA) para 15 and Hoexter Administrative Law in 
South Africa 68.  
 
12 Tikly v Johannes NO 1963 (2) SA 588 (T) at 590; Thuketana v Health Professions Council of South Africa 2003 
(2) SA 628 (T) at 634–635; Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) para 30; L Baxter Administrative Law 256; Hoexter, Lyster & 
Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 64; Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 108. 
 
13 Hoexter, Lyster & Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative Law at 64; Hoexter Administrative Law 
in South Africa 65. 
 
14 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) para 31.  
 
15 Hoexter, Lyster & Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 64 and 110. 
 
16 Davies v Chairman, Committee of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1991 (4) SA 43 (W) at 48. 
  
17 L Baxter Administrative Law 255; Hoexter, Lyster & Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 
65. 
 
18 L Baxter Administrative Law 255; Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 65 and 68-69. 
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process since a court is not able to effectively assess the legality of the decision without 
considering its merits as well.19 Accordingly, the focus of a review may in some instances fall 
on the merits of the decision, instead of the decision-making process.20 In Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration21 
the Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged that the line between review and appeal may be 
“notoriously difficult to draw.” The Supreme Court of Appeal explained that this is “partly 
because process-related scrutiny can never blind itself to the substantive merits of the 
outcome.”22 Nevertheless, the distinction between appeal and review is steadfastly upheld in 
our courts.23  
 
Section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act provides that a court may either (i) confirm the 
determination of the board of directors not to remove the director from office, or (ii) it may 
itself remove the director from office, if it is “satisfied” that the director is ineligible, 
disqualified, incapacitated, or has been negligent or derelict. The word “satisfied” indicates 
that, in reviewing the board’s decision not to remove a director, a court is empowered to 
                                                 
19 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 110; Quinot “Regulating Administrative Action” in Quinot et al 
Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction 108. For instance, review on the ground of reasonableness 
applies to the process followed in taking the action but also necessitates some degree of consideration of the merits 
since the reasonableness of the consequences of the action taken also falls to be reviewed (Corder “The 
Development of Administrative Law in South Africa” in Quinot et al Administrative Justice in South Africa: An 
Introduction 14). Corder describes review on the ground of reasonableness, which contains a merits-based 
substantive element, as not an appeal nor a mere procedural review, but as a “substantive” or “wide” review 
(Corder “Without Deference, With Respect: A Response to Justice O’Regan” 443-444). 
 
20 Hoexter, Lyster & Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 65. 
 
21 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) para 31. 
  
22 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) para 31. The remarks of the Supreme Court of Appeal were made in the 
specific context of review for rationality, which is an element of reasonableness. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 45, the Constitutional Court, per O’Regan J, also 
noted that review on the ground of reasonableness gives administrative law review a substantive element. See 
further Corder “Without Deference, With Respect: A Response to Justice O’Regan”. Hoexter opines that it is 
difficult to draw the line clearly between review and appeal with regard to any ground of review (and not only that 
of rationality) that gives some scope for judicial choice, and that courts can avoid scrutiny of the merits only in 
cases decided on the narrowest or most technical grounds (Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 110 and 
351-352; Hoexter “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” 491). 
  
23 See for instance Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) para 45 where the Constitutional Court, per O’Regan J, emphasised that the distinction between appeals and 
reviews continues to be significant. Likewise, in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration 2009 (3) SA 493 (SCA) para 28 the Supreme Court of Appeal remarked that “whilst at 
times it may be difficult to draw the line [between appeal and review], the distinction must not be blurred.” See 
further Quinot “Regulating Administrative Action” in Quinot et al Administrative Justice in South Africa: An 
Introduction 108. 
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consider the substance of the decision or the merits of the matter, and not merely the procedural 
aspects of the decision.24 It appears that the court’s review powers under section 71(6) of the 
Companies Act are not confined to reviewing the manner in which the decision was reached 
but extend to considering the merits of the decision. Accordingly the term “review” is not used 
in section 71(6) of the Companies Act in the traditional sense because the focus of the review 
may fall on the decision itself instead of the decision-making process. Section 71(6) is therefore 
an example of the lines between an appeal and a review being blurred. It is submitted that the 
“review” in section 71(6) of the Companies Act may be described as a “substantive” or a “wide 
review.”25  
 
It is submitted that the review power conferred on courts in section 71(6) of the Companies Act 
may also be construed to be a special statutory power of review. In Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council26 Innes CJ distinguished three types of judicial 
review in the South African system: a review of the decisions of the inferior courts, a common-
law (inherent) review of decisions of administrative authorities, and a wider form of statutory 
review.27 The special statutory review is one where the legislature confers on the courts a 
statutory power of review.28 With reference to this type of review, Innes CJ stated that a court 
could: 
                                                 
24 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 47. 
 
25 See note 19 above and Corder “Without Deference, With Respect: A Response to Justice O’Regan” at 443-444 
where he describes review on the ground of reasonableness, which contains a merits-based substantive element, 
as not an appeal nor a mere procedural review, but as a “substantive” or a “wide” review. 
 
26 1903 TS 111 at 115-117.  
 
27 These three forms of review still exist today but other forms of review have since developed. For instance, 
another type of review is judicial review in the constitutional sense where courts have the power to declare 
unconstitutional any type of legislation that infringes on rights in the Bill of Rights or which offends against 
provisions of the Constitution. A further type of review is automatic review. Certain statutes make provision for 
the decisions of magistrates or other judicial officers to be reviewed automatically by judges, without an 
application for review being initiated. What used to be common-law review in administrative law has now 
predominantly been constitutionalised by s 33 of the Constitution and by the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2008 (see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another; In Re: Ex Parte 
Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) paras 44-45 and 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) 
para 22). Section 33 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.  It states further that national legislation must be enacted to give effect to these 
rights. This national legislation is the Promotion of Administrative Justice 3 of 2008. On the various forms of 
review see L Baxter Administrative Law 707; Hoexter, Lyster & Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative 
Law 66-67; Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa at 112-113 and Quinot “Regulating Administrative 
Action” in Quinot et al Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction 107-111. 
 
28 Nel and Another NNO v The Master (Absa Bank and Others Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 22; 
Twala v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape and Others 2016 (2) SA 425 (ECB) para 11. 
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 “. . . enter upon and decide the matter de novo. It possesses not only the powers of a court 
of review in the legal sense, but it has the functions of a court of appeal with the additional 
privileges of being able, after setting aside the decision arrived at . . . to deal with the whole 
matter upon fresh evidence as a court of first instance.”29 
 
In Nel and Another NNO v The Master (Absa Bank Ltd and Others Intervening)30 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, per Van Heerden AJA, approved the above dictum of Innes CJ. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal affirmed that a statutory power of review confers on the court powers of both 
appeal and review with the additional power, if required, of receiving new evidence and of 
entering into and deciding the whole matter afresh.31 The court’s powers under a statutory 
power of review are not however unlimited or unrestricted.32 The extent of any statutory review 
type power depends on the particular statutory provision concerned and on the nature and extent 
of the functions entrusted to the person or body making the decision under review.33 A statutory 
power of review may be wider than a judicial review of administrative action since it combines 
aspects of both a review and an appeal, but it may also be narrower if the court is confined to 
particular grounds of review or particular remedies.34 
 
                                                 
29 Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS 111 at 117.  
 
30 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 22. 
 
31 Nel and Another NNO v The Master (Absa Bank Ltd and Others Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 23. 
See further Simelane v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (5) SA 485 (C) para 10; Al-
Kharafi & Sons v Pema and Others NNO 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) paras 22-23; Tongaat Paper Co (Pty) Ltd v The 
Master and Others 2011 (2) SA 17 (KZP) para 27 and Van Zyl and Others NNO v The Master, Western Cape 
High Court and Another 2013 (5) SA 71 (WCC) para 19.  
 
32 Nel and Another NNO v The Master (Absa Bank Ltd and Others Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 23. 
 
33 Nel and Another NNO v The Master (Absa Bank Ltd and Others Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 23. 
See further Twala v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape and Others 2016 (2) SA 425 (ECB) para 11 and L Baxter 
Administrative Law 707. 
 
34 Nel and Another NNO v The Master (Absa Bank Ltd and Others Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 23. 
See further on the special statutory review Simelane v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 
(5) SA 485 (C) para 10; Al-Kharafi & Sons v Pema and Others NNO 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) paras 22-23; Tongaat 
Paper Co (Pty) Ltd v The Master and Others 2011 (2) SA 17 (KZP) para 27; Van Zyl and Others NNO v The 
Master, Western Cape High Court and Another 2013 (5) SA 71 (WCC) para 19; Twala v MEC for Education, 
Eastern Cape and Others 2016 (2) SA 425 (ECB) para 11; L Baxter Administrative Law 707; Hoexter, Lyster & 
Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 67 and Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 112-
114. Examples of a statutory power of review are the review of a decision, ruling, order or taxation of the Master 
of the High Court in terms of s 151 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; a review to the Labour Court of arbitration 
awards made by the CCMA (see s 145 of the LRA); a review of decisions made in terms of the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 which takes place on grounds to be gleaned from this Act (see ss 74-82) and 
a review of private arbitration in terms of s 33(1) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.  
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It is submitted that the power given to the courts under a section 71(6) review is wider than a 
mere review. It combines aspects of both a review and an appeal since the court is empowered 
to consider the substance of the decision of the board of directors not to remove the director 
from office, and not merely the procedural aspects of the decision. For this reason it is submitted 
that the power conferred on courts in section 71(6) of the Companies Act may be construed as 
a special statutory power of review. The court’s remedies are, however, limited by section 
71(6)(b) of the Companies Act to confirming the determination of the board of directors not to 
remove the director from office, or removing the director from office. It does not appear from 
the wording of section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act that the court is empowered to grant any 
other remedy under its statutory review power (save for making a costs order).35  
 
If a court is satisfied that the director concerned is ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated, or has 
been negligent or derelict it may itself remove the director from office - it is not required to 
remit the matter to the board of directors so that the board may reconsider the matter and make 
a new decision. In other words, a court may substitute its own decision for that of the board of 
directors. The courts’ respect for the distinction between appeal and review has traditionally 
made them reluctant to usurp the decision-making powers that the legislature has delegated to 
the administration.36 For this reason, substitution is regarded as an extraordinary remedy in 
judicial review.37 In Gauteng Gambling Board v Silverstar Development Ltd and Others38 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal reasoned that remittance is most always the prudent and proper 
course since the administrator is generally best equipped by the variety of its composition, 
experience and access to sources of relevant information and expertise to make the right 
decision. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the remedy of substitution is to be exercised 
in exceptional circumstances, and only when a court is persuaded that a decision to exercise a 
                                                 
35 The court may make a costs order requiring the applicant to compensate the company and any other party for 
costs incurred in relation to the application, unless the court reverses the board’s decision and removes the director 
from office. This is discussed further below in para 2.4. 
 
36 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 552; Bleazard & Budlender “Remedies in Judicial Review 
Proceedings” in Quinot et al Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction 253. 
 
37 Hoexter, Lyster & Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 292. See further Erf One Six Seven 
Orchards CC v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (Johannesburg Administration) 1999 (1) SA 104 
(SCA) at 109; Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka and Another 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) para 37 and Littlewood 
v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2006 (3) SA 474 (SCA) para 18.  
 
38 2005 (4) SA 67 (SCA) para 29.   
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power should not be left to the designated functionary.39 In Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited and Another40 the Constitutional 
Court further emphasised that even where there are exceptional circumstances, a court must be 
satisfied that it would be just and equitable and fair to the implicated parties, to grant an order 
of substitution. It is submitted that permitting the court to substitute the board’s decision with 
its own decision, instead of requiring the court to remit the matter to the board of directors for 
a new decision to be taken, is indicative of the wide powers given to a court under section 
71(6)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
2.3 No Time Limit within which a Section 71(6) Review Application must be Instituted 
 
As pointed out earlier,41 section 71(6) of the Companies Act does not impose a time limit within 
which a director or a holder of voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of the director 
may apply to court to review the board’s determination not to remove a fellow board member. 
It is important that such a time limit be imposed. Not imposing a time limit results in the 
director’s position on the board of directors being uncertain because of the possibility that 
another director or a holder of voting rights may apply to court at any time to review the board’s 
decision not to remove him from office.  
 
It is submitted that an applicant under section 71(6) of the Companies Act ought to be given 
twenty business days to apply to court to review the board’s decision not to remove the director 
from office. The period of twenty business days should commence from the date of the board’s 
decision not to remove the director from office. The time period of twenty business days would 
result in section 71(6) of the Companies Act being in harmony with section 71(5) of the 
Companies Act, which gives a director who has been removed from office by the board of 
directors a time period of twenty business days to apply to court to review the board’s 
decision.42  
 
                                                 
39 Gauteng Gambling Board v Silverstar Development Ltd and Others 2005 (4) SA 67 (SCA) para 28. 
 
40 [2015] ZACC 22 paras 35, 47 and 53. 
 
41 See chapter 4, para 4.1. 
 
42 See chapter 4, para 4.1 where this matter is discussed further. 
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2.4  Costs of a Section 71(6) Review Application 
 
In terms of section 71(7) of the Companies Act, if a director or a holder of voting rights entitled 
to be exercised in the election of the director, applies to court under section 71(6) of the 
Companies Act to review the board’s decision not to remove a director from office, he would 
be required to compensate “the company, and any other party” for any costs incurred in relation 
to the application, unless the court reverses the decision of the board. In other words, if the 
court confirms the decision of the board of directors not to remove the director from office, the 
applicant under section 71(6) would be required to compensate the company and any other 
party for the costs incurred in relation to the application.  
 
The fact that the applicant is statutorily required to compensate the “company” implies that the 
review application must be brought against the company itself. However the fact that the 
applicant may be required to compensate “any other party” for costs incurred in relation to the 
application suggests that the review application may also be instituted against the members of 
the board of directors personally, who will be entitled to compensation for any costs incurred 
in the application.  
 
The provisions of section 71(7) embody the general principle in South African civil procedure 
that costs follow the event, that is, that costs are generally awarded against the unsuccessful 
party and that the successful party should be awarded his costs.43 While the general principle 
regarding costs is well-settled in the common law, the courts in their discretion may depart 
from this principle because each case must be decided on its own facts and each case is in 
                                                 
43 See for instance Union Government v Gass 1959 (4) SA 401 (A) at 413; Kunene v South African Mutual Fire 
And General Insurance Co Ltd 1977 (4) SA 508 (D) at 511; Nxumalo and Another v Mavundla and Another 2000 
(4) SA 349 (D) at 354; Mancisco & Sons CC (in liquidation) v Stone 2001 (1) SA 168 (W) at 181; Gauteng 
Provincial Legislature v Kilian and Others 2001 (2) SA 68 (SCA) para 24 and Nzimande v Nzimande and Another 
2005 (1) SA 83 (W) para 75. 
 
322 
 
essence a question of fairness to both sides.44 In Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles45 
the Supreme Court of Appeal asserted that a court’s discretion with regard to costs is a wide, 
unfettered and equitable one, which must be exercised judicially with due regard to all relevant 
considerations. For instance, as the Supreme Court of Appeal indicated, a court may wish in 
certain circumstances to deprive a party of costs, or a portion thereof, or to order less costs than 
it might otherwise have done as a mark of displeasure at such party’s conduct in relation to the 
litigation.46 In Wanderers Club v Boyes-Moffat and Another47 the court enunciated the general 
rule regarding the award of costs as follows: 
 
“The general principle regarding the award of costs is well settled. It is entirely a matter 
for the discretion of the court, which is to be exercised judicially upon a consideration 
of the facts of each case, and in essence it is a matter of fairness to both sides (cf Gelb 
v Hawkins 1960 (3) SA 687 (A) at 694A; Graham v Odendaal 1972 (2) SA 611 (A) at 
616A; Cilliers Law of Costs at 2.03 – 2.05). A general rule of thumb as stated by Van 
Wyk J, in my view, detracts from the wide discretion which exists with regard to costs. 
Or, as it has been succinctly stated by Lloyd LJ in Bolton Metropolitan District Council 
and Others v Secretary of State for the Environment; Bolton Metropolitan District 
Council and Others v Manchester Ship Canal Co; Bolton Metropolitan District Council 
and Others v Trafford Park Development Corp [1996] 1 All ER 184 (CA) at 186 
(Cilliers op cit at 1.04):   
 
‘As in all questions to do with costs, the fundamental rule is that there are 
no rules. Costs are always in the discretion of the court. . . .’” 
 
Notably, under section 71(6) of the Companies Act, the legislature has excluded the common 
law discretion conferred on courts with regard to the making of a costs order. It appears from a 
                                                 
44 Gelb v Hawkins 1960 (3) SA 687 (A) at 694; Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines v General 
Electric Co 1967 (2) SA 32 (T) at 72; Ward v Sulzer 1973 (3) SA 701 (A) at 706; Nieuwoudt v Joubert 1988 (3) 
SA 84 (SE) at 88; Joubert T/A Wilcon v Beacham and Another 1996 (1) SA 500 (C) at 502; Malangu v De Jager 
1996 (3) SA 235 (LCC) at 246-247; McDonald t/a Sport Helicopter v Huey Extreme Club 2008 (4) SA 20 (C) at 
22; Antoy Investments v Rand Water Board (159/2007) [2008] ZASCA10 (20 March 2008) para 9. In Gelb v 
Hawkins 1960 (3) SA 687 (A) at 694 the Appellate Division stated as follows, with regard to the general principle 
on the awarding of costs:  
 
“In seeking a basic principle to apply, I do not think it is necessary or desirable to say more than 
that the Court has a discretion, to be exercised judicially upon a consideration of the facts of each 
case, and that in essence it is a matter of fairness to both sides.” 
 
According to s 48(d) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 a magistrate’s court judgment for costs must be 
“just”. In an appeal from a judgment or order for costs made by a magistrate’s court, a high court may make such 
order of costs as “justice may require” (see s 87(e) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944). 
 
45 1999 (2) SA 1045 (SCA) para 25. 
 
46 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 (2) SA 1045 (SCA) para 25. 
 
47 2012 (3) SA 641 (GSJ) at 643-644. 
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literal interpretation of section 71(7) that even if, in the circumstances, it would be fair not to 
award costs against an unsuccessful applicant in a section 71(6) review application, a court 
“must” nevertheless order an unsuccessful applicant to pay the costs of the company and any 
other party. Section 71(7) is a mandatory provision. It is debatable whether the exclusion of 
this discretion is advisable. On the one hand, the threat of a potential costs order would 
discourage frivolous and vexatious applications to court to review the board’s decision not to 
remove a director from office.48 On the other hand, the threat of a potential costs order would 
also deter bona fide applicants from instituting a review application, even when the application 
is justified. Individual directors and holders of voting rights generally do not have the funds 
and resources necessary to institute litigation proceedings. Therefore the risk of being burdened 
with the costs of the company and any other party if the review action fails is a formidable 
deterrent to instituting a review application. This has the effect that a decision of the board of 
directors not to remove a fellow board member from office, in circumstances where there are 
valid grounds to do so, may frequently go unchallenged.  
 
In contrast, the legislature did not exclude the discretion of the court to make a costs order with 
regard to an application for leave to bring derivative proceedings under section 165 of the 
Companies Act. In terms of section 165(10) of the Companies Act a court “may make any order 
it considers appropriate about the costs”. The costs order may relate to the costs of the 
application for leave to bring a derivative action or to the actual derivative action itself.49 It 
may concern the costs of the person who applied for leave or who was granted leave to bring a 
derivative action, or of the company, or any other party to the proceedings, or of the application 
                                                 
48 See Beinash and Another v Ernst & Young and Others 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC) para 30 where the Constitutional 
Court stated as follows, with regard to making a costs order in instances of vexatious litigation:  
 
“Often parties to litigation on a constitutional issue are required to bear their own costs in relation 
to the proceedings before this Court. The rationale for this has been expressed already in several 
judgments of this Court. In this case, however, by litigating as persistently and vexatiously as they 
did, the applicants placed respondents in the untenable position where they had to respond to such 
unmeritorious litigation, resulting in unnecessary costs. I am therefore in respectful agreement 
with Fevrier AJ that it would be unfair for the harassed respondents to bear the costs. In the 
circumstances, costs should follow the result.”  
 
49 See MF Cassim “Shareholder Remedies and Minority Protection” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company 
Law at 792-793 for a detailed discussion of the costs orders under s 165(10) of the Companies Act and the two 
step process involved in instituting a derivative action. The first process is that a successful application must be 
made to the court for leave to bring proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company, and the second step is 
the derivative action itself.  
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for leave to bring a derivative action.50 Also noteworthy is that if a shareholder applies to court 
to determine the fair value of his shares with regard to the exercise of the appraisal remedy in 
terms of section 164 of the Companies Act,51 the legislature has not excluded the court’s 
discretion in making a costs order, but has conferred on the court the discretion to make an 
“appropriate order of costs”.52 
 
It is submitted that it would be preferable for the general discretion of courts that apply in the 
ordinary course in deciding costs applications to be preserved under section 71(7) of the 
Companies Act. This should be done so that courts may make an award of costs which they 
consider to be fair and equitable in the circumstances of the case. In accordance with this 
submission section 71(7) of the Companies Act should be deleted altogether and replaced with 
a provision conferring on a court the discretion to make any order it considers appropriate on 
the costs of the application in terms of section 71(6).  
 
In Lynmar Investments (Pty) Ltd v South African Railways and Harbours53 the High Court held 
that it was not fettered by a statutory injunction (being the provisions of the now repealed 
Railway Expropriation Act 37 of 1955) as to costs and that it was at liberty to make such order 
as appeared to it to be proper in the circumstances of the case. If section 71(7) of the Companies 
Act is not deleted and replaced with a provision conferring on a court a discretion to make an 
appropriate order of costs, it is submitted that the approach adopted by the High Court in 
Lynmar Investments (Pty) Ltd v South African Railways and Harbours54 ought to be adopted to 
                                                 
50 See MF Cassim The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 148-
151 for a further discussion of the discretion given to courts to make a costs order under s 165(10) of the 
Companies Act and para 3.3.1.2 below for a discussion on s 165(10) of the Companies Act. 
 
51 The appraisal remedy is the right of dissenting shareholders who do not approve of certain triggering events 
(such as an amalgamation or merger) to have their shares bought out by the company in cash at the fair value of 
the shares. In certain instances the fair value of the shares may be determined judicially. See further Delport 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 577-582(2) and MF Cassim “Shareholder Remedies and Minority 
Protection” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law at 796-817 on the appraisal remedy. 
 
52 See s 164(15)(c)(iv) of the Companies Act. In making an appropriate order of costs s 164(15)(c)(iv) requires a 
court to have regard to any offer made by the company for the shareholder’s shares and the final determination of 
the fair value of the shares made by the court. 
 
53 1975 (3) SA 905 (D) at 911. This case concerned an expropriation of a block of flats under the now repealed 
Railway Expropriation Act 37 of 1955. Regarding the award of costs, s 9(1)(c) of this Act set out certain rules 
regarding the award of a costs order by the court. Miller J held that the purpose of the legislature when enacting 
s 9(1) of the Railway Expropriation Act 37 of 1955 was to induce both parties to a dispute in respect of 
compensation for expropriation to act reasonably (at 910). 
 
54 1975 (3) SA 905 (D) at 911. 
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the award of a costs order under section 71(7) of the Companies Act. The courts should still 
have a residual discretion, if valid reasons and justice so require, to depart from the rule in 
section 71(7) of the Companies Act.  
 
For instance, where an applicant under a section 71(6) review application is unsuccessful but 
had meritorious grounds to institute the review application, if a court had a discretion with 
regard to a costs order it would be able to order the applicant to compensate the company for 
its costs, but not to compensate the directors whose conduct was the subject of the complaint.  
It is submitted that conferring on a court a discretion to make a costs order which is fair to both 
parties would strike the right balance in ensuring that on the one hand directors and holders of 
voting rights are not discouraged from instituting bona fide and genuine review applications in 
terms of section 71(6) of the Companies Act, and that on the other hand, they do not institute 
vexatious and frivolous review applications. 
 
Section 71(6) of the Companies Act does not explicitly provide that a successful applicant in 
terms of a section 71(6) review application is entitled to be compensated by the company, or 
by any other party, for the costs incurred by him in such application. In accordance with the 
common law rule that a successful party should be awarded his costs, it is submitted that a 
successful applicant in a section 71(6) review application must be compensated for the costs 
incurred by him in instituting the application.  
 
2.5  Interference by the Judiciary with the Internal Affairs of a Company 
 
The distinct advantage of the provisions of section 71(6) of the Companies Act is that these 
provisions are a deterrent and a safeguard against the board of directors favouring a director 
who ought to be removed from office on the ground that he is ineligible, disqualified, 
incapacitated, neglectful, negligent or derelict. If the board of directors votes against the 
removal of a director who ought properly to be removed from office, it runs the risk of a court 
application under section 71(6) of the Companies Act being instituted. In the event that the 
application is successful, the directors incur the risk of having to pay the costs of the 
application. Access to court is an important safety mechanism in instances where the board of 
directors is unable or is unwilling to remove a director from office.  
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Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 2,55 section 71(6) offends the principle of non-interference 
by courts in the internal affairs of the company.  As a general principle, courts are disinclined 
to interfere with the internal operations of a company involving management decisions.56 
Courts adopt the policy that they should not get involved in situations where the parties are 
capable of resolving their disputes internally.57 The election, retention, dismissal or removal of 
officers, directors and employees are examples of such internal corporate operations, which 
essentially involve management decisions.58 If under a section 71(6) review application a court 
is satisfied that the director in question is ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated, neglectful or 
has been negligent or derelict, it may remove the director from office even if the board of 
directors had voted against removing the director from office. This results in a clear 
infringement of the principle of non-interference in the internal company affairs of a company.  
 
If under section 71(3) of the Companies Act the board of directors were to vote against the 
removal of an ineligible of disqualified director, its failure to remove such a director would 
contravene section 69(2) of the Companies Act which prohibits a person who is ineligible or 
disqualified to act as a director of a company. In this event, the removal of the director by the 
court and the interference by the court in the internal company affairs of the company under 
section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act would clearly be justified. Other instances where the 
removal of a director by the court and the interference in the internal affairs of the company by 
the court would be justified is where there has been some illegality, oppressive conduct or 
fraudulent conduct by the board of directors in failing to remove the director from office.59 The 
                                                 
55 Refer to chapter 2, para 6 where the principle of non-interference by courts in the internal affairs of the company 
is discussed. 
 
56 Maynard v Office Appliances (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1927 WLD 290 at 293; Irvin & Johnson Ltd v Gelcer & Co (Pty) 
Ltd 1958 (2) SA 59 (C); Yende v Orlando Coal Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others 1961 (3) SA 314 (W); Breetveldt 
and Others v Van Zyl and Others 1972 (1) SA 304 (T); Makhuva v Lukoto Bus Service (Pty) Ltd and Others 1987 
(3) SA 376 (V) at 393-395; Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd 2016 (5) SA 414 (GJ) para 59; 
CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another [2018] 1 All SA 450 (GJ) paras 44 and 82. 
 
57 See Cluver and Another v Robertson Portland Cement and Lime Co Ltd 1925 CPD 45 at 52. 
58 Wilkes v Springside Nursing Home, Inc. Mass. 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976) at 662; Connolly v Bain 484 N.W.2d 207 
(Iowa App. 1992) at 211; Demoulas v Demoulas 1996 WL 511519 (Mass. Super. Ct. Pct 1, 1996) para 32. 
 
59 See Maynard v Office Appliances (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd 1927 WLD 290 at 294 and chapter 2, para 6 where these 
grounds are discussed. The dictum of this case was followed in numerous cases, such as Reich v Hathorn Syndicate 
1930 NPD 233; Silverman v Doornhoek Mines 1935 TPD 349; In Re Mulvihal's Mineral Waterworks (Pty) Ltd 
1936 CPD 135; Repp v Ondundu Goldfields Ltd 1937 CPD 375 and Irvin & Johnson Ltd v Gelcer & Co (Pty) Ltd 
1958 (2) SA 59 (C). See further Kronenberg v Sullivan County Steam Laundry Co. 91 N.Y.S. 2d 144 (1949) para 
8 and Demoulas v Demoulas 1996 WL 511519 (Mass. Super. Ct. Pct 1, 1996) para 32. 
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board of directors has some discretion, under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, whether or 
not to remove from office a director whom it has found to be incapacitated, or who has 
neglected or has been derelict in the performance of his functions, or who has been negligent.60 
If a court were to remove from office an incapacitated, neglectful, negligent or derelict director 
whom the board of directors has, in its discretion, decided not to remove from office, the 
interference by the court in the internal affairs of the company would be more difficult to 
justify.61  
 
2.6  Discretion of the Court in a Section 71(6) Review Application  
 
Section 71(6)(b) gives a court a discretion whether or not to remove a director from office even 
if the court is satisfied that the director is ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated, neglectful or 
has been negligent or derelict. This is made clear by the use of the word “may” in section 
71(6)(b) of the Companies Act.  
 
It follows that even if a court is satisfied that a director whom the board of directors has failed 
to remove from office is ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated, neglectful or has been negligent 
or derelict, it is not obliged to remove the director from office. As proposed in chapter 2,62 it is 
submitted that before exercising its discretion to remove a director from office under section 
71(6)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act, a court must give due consideration to the reasons why the 
board of directors in the first place failed to remove the director concerned from office. A court 
should also consider whether the board of directors complied with its fiduciary duties in not 
removing the director from office, whether it has acted with ulterior motives, and whether it 
has acted openly and transparently and in the best interests of the company in not removing the 
director from office.63 It is submitted that if these factors are deliberated upon by courts in a 
section 71(6) review application, due consideration would have been given by the courts to the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the company, and the interference of the 
court may in that event be justifiable. 
                                                 
60 See chapter 3, para 7 where the discretion of the board of directors in removing a director from office is 
discussed. 
 
61 See chapter 2, para 6 where the interference by the judiciary in the internal affairs of a company is discussed 
further. 
 
62 See chapter 2, para 7. 
 
63 See chapter 2, para 7 where these factors are discussed further.  
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3.  SECTION 162 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 
  
Section 162 of the Companies Act also confers on a court the power to remove a director from 
office. Under this provision various stakeholders have locus standi to apply to court for an order 
declaring a director delinquent or under probation.  The concept of a court declaring a director 
delinquent or under probation is a significant innovation of the Companies Act. There is no 
equivalent provision in the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The term “delinquent” has not been 
defined in the Companies Act. It seems that courts will not shy away from placing directors 
under delinquency or probation should the circumstances warrant this.64 
 
Section 71 of the Companies Act provides an additional remedy to the right of a person to apply 
under section 162 of the Companies Act to court for an order declaring a director delinquent or 
placing him under probation.65 Accordingly a director or a shareholder may make an allegation 
under section 71(3) of the Companies Act, and, at the same time may apply to court for an order 
declaring a director delinquent or placing him under probation. A company may also apply in 
terms of section 162 of the Companies Act to declare a director delinquent.66 In Lewis Group 
Limited v Woollam67 the court stated that the right given to a company to apply to declare a 
director delinquent in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act is not to act in its own legal 
interests (which it is able to address in terms of section 71 of the Companies Act), but to 
empower the company to act in the public interest. This is demonstrated by the fact that a 
company may remove a director from office in terms of section 71 of the Companies Act and 
may thereafter apply for a declaration of delinquency against the person concerned 
notwithstanding that he would by then no longer be involved in the administration of the 
company.68   
 
                                                 
64 See R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 26 and Demetriades and Another v 
Tollie and Others 2015 ZANCHC 17 para 51 where the court agreed with this observation. 
 
65 Section 162(10) of the Companies Act. 
 
66 Section 162(2) of the Companies Act. 
 
67 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 42. 
 
68 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 42. 
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Under section 163 of the Companies Act a shareholder or a director of a company may apply 
to court for relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct.69 On considering such an application 
a court may make any interim or final order it considers fit, including an order declaring a 
person delinquent or placing him under probation, as contemplated in section 162 of the 
Companies Act.70  Section 163 of the Companies Act therefore gives a court the power, mero 
motu, in the context of adjudicating an application for relief from oppressive or prejudicial 
conduct, to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation.  The making of an 
order declaring a director delinquent or placing him under probation in the particular context 
of the oppression remedy is not discussed further in this chapter.71 
 
An applicant may apply to have a director declared delinquent even if his motive is to have the 
director removed from office by a court. This was affirmed in Msimang NO and Another v 
Katuliiba and Others.72 In this case the applicants, trustees of a family trust, had instituted an 
application in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act to declare two directors of a company 
delinquent. The trust was a thirty nine per cent shareholder of the company. The directors 
contended that the applicants had invoked the section 162 application for an ulterior purpose. 
It was argued that the ulterior purpose was that the applicants had wanted the court to declare 
the directors delinquent with the effect that the directors would be removed from office so that 
any opposition from them to a takeover of the shareholding of the company would be 
eliminated.73 The court held that although the applicants may have had a commercial objective 
in wanting to remove the directors of the company, this did not make it impermissible for the 
applicants, as shareholders of the company, to invoke a statutory remedy in circumstances 
                                                 
69 In terms of s 163(1) of the Companies Act a shareholder or a director of a company may apply to court for relief 
if (i) any act or omission of the company or a related person has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant; (ii) the business of the company or a related 
person is being or has been carried on or conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or 
that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant; or (iii) the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the 
company or a person related to the company are being or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant.  
 
70 See s 163(2)(f)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
71 The oppression remedy as a remedy which may be relied on by a director who has been removed from office is 
discussed further in chapter 7, para 4. For a general overview of the oppression remedy see Delport Henochsberg 
on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 574-574(17); MF Cassim “Shareholder Remedies and Minority Protection” in 
FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law at 756-775 and MF Cassim The New Derivative Action under the 
Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 179-217. 
 
72 [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ). 
73 Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and Others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 24. 
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where the pre-requisites for invoking the remedy were satisfied.74 Having regard to the 
allegations made against the directors, the court declared the directors to be delinquent directors 
as contemplated in section 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act.75 The court asserted as 
follows: 
 
“ . . . the use of the remedy, under section 162 of the new Companies Act, to effect the 
removal of directors from a company who are acting in contravention of their statutory 
duties, for a commercial purpose, does not have an objectionable and improper purpose. 
The mere invocation of a statutory remedy for reasons other than those, for which it is 
primarily intended, although typical, is not, in my view, complete proof of mala fides. In 
order to prove mala fides, a further inference that an improper result was intended is 
needed. . .”76  
 
In coming to this conclusion the court relied on the dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd en Andere,77 where the court stated that the 
mere application of a particular court procedure for a purpose other than that for which it was 
primarily intended was typical, but not complete proof of mala fides. In order to prove mala 
fides, the court held that a further inference that an improper result was intended is needed.78 
In Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and Others79 the court could not draw such an 
inference from the application.  
                                                 
74 Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and Others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 26. 
 
75 Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and Others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 74.  
 
76 Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and Others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 27. 
 
77 1999 (3) SA 389 (SCA) at 414. 
 
78 Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd en Andere 1999 (3) SA 389 (SCA) at 414. 
 
79 [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ). In this case the main basis for the application to declare the directors delinquent 
under s 162 of the Companies Act was that they had failed to prepare the annual financial statements of the 
company since the financial year ending 28 February 2004; they had failed to convene an annual general meeting 
of the company since the previous annual general meeting held in 2006, and they had failed to appoint an auditor 
since February 2011 when the company’s auditor had resigned (paras 8 and 25). The applicants argued that the 
above failures by the directors constituted grounds for the relief claimed under s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the 
Companies Act (gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the performance of the 
director’s functions within, and duties to, the company). In light of the alleged breach of the directors’ statutory 
duties, the court held that the invocation of the remedy under s 162 of the Companies Act to effect the removal of 
the directors from a company, for a commercial purpose, does not have an objectionable purpose without a further 
inference that an improper result was intended, which the court was unable to draw based on the application itself 
(para 27). The court found that the conduct of the directors constituted gross negligence and wilful misconduct 
(para 69). It held that the failure of the directors to cause the annual financial statements of the company to be 
prepared since 2004 and to hold an annual general meeting since its last annual general meeting in 2006, had been 
grossly negligent (para 69). This conduct was also found to constitute wilful misconduct, as contemplated in 
s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act (para 69). The court found that both directors had known and had 
appreciated that such conduct was wrong but had nevertheless omitted to carry out their statutory duties to the 
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It follows that an applicant with the requisite locus standi may institute an application under 
section 162 of the Companies Act even if his primary purpose in doing so is to have a director 
removed from office by a court. Provided the pre-requisites for declaring a director delinquent 
under section 162 of the Companies Act are satisfied and there is no further inference indicating 
mala fides, the application under section 162 of the Companies Act is not objectionable. 
 
The role and powers of the court in declaring directors delinquent and placing them under 
probation in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act, and hence in removing them from 
office, are discussed below. 
 
3.1  Indirect Judicial Power to Remove Directors from Office 
 
The power conferred on a court to remove a director under section 162 of the Companies Act 
is an indirect power of removal and not a direct power.80 This is because a court is empowered 
to declare a director delinquent, which has the effect of disqualifying the person to be a director, 
and hence of removing him from office. Under section 71(6) of the Companies Act a court has 
the power to remove directors from office but may do so only after the board of directors has 
already voted not to remove the director concerned from office, and only on the application of 
a director or a holder of voting rights in the context of review proceedings. Thus under the 
Companies Act no person may directly apply to a court to remove a director from office. This 
must be done in the context of a section 71(6) review application or in the context of an 
application to declare a director delinquent.  
 
This approach is modelled on the UK and Australian company legislation. In the UK the 
disqualification of directors is regulated by the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986. A disqualification order under this Act has the effect that a person may not, without leave 
of the court, be a director of the company or be concerned in any way with, or take part in, the 
promotion, formation or management of a company.81 Sections 206C, 206D, 206E and 206EEA 
                                                 
company, regardless of the consequences for the company (para 69). It consequently declared the directors 
delinquent (para 74). 
 
80 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 45. 
 
81 See s 1 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. As part of the Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act of 2015 various provisions relating to the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
were introduced in 2015. These provisions introduce new grounds for the disqualification of directors, make the 
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of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, titled “Court power of disqualification” confer on 
the courts a power to disqualify directors from managing corporations for a period that the court 
considers appropriate, on specified grounds set out in these provisions, upon an application by 
ASIC. Should a court exercise this power it has the effect that the director in question is 
removed from office for a period prescribed by the court.  
 
In contrast, under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA the courts have been conferred with a direct 
power to remove directors from office. Section 8.09(a) of the MBCA is titled “Removal of 
directors by judicial proceeding”. The provision empowers a court to remove a director of a 
company from office upon an application by or in the right of the corporation. Section 8.09(a) 
of the MBCA states as follows: 
 
 “The [name or describe] court may remove a director from office or may order other relief, 
including barring the director from reelection for a period prescribed by the court, in a 
proceeding commenced by or in the right of the corporation if the court finds that (i) the 
director engaged in fraudulent conduct with respect to the corporation or its shareholders, 
grossly abused the position of director, or intentionally inflicted harm on the corporation; 
and (ii) considering the director’s course of conduct and the inadequacy of other available 
remedies, removal or such other relief would be in the best interest of the corporation.” 
 
The company legislation of most USA States contains statutory procedures regulating the 
judicial removal of directors from office.82 A direct power to remove directors from office has 
also been conferred on the courts in these USA States.83  
 
                                                 
disqualification regime more efficient and update the matters that courts must take into account when considering 
whether to disqualify a director from office. 
 
82 The legislation of some USA States do not contain any statutory procedures for the judicial removal of directors. 
For example, the States of Massachusetts, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Florida, Georgia, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Texas and Virginia do 
not statutorily permit the judicial removal of directors from office.  
 
83 See for example s 10-809(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes; s 10A-2-8.09(a) of the Alabama Business and 
Nonprofit Entities Code; s 10.06.463 of the Alaska Corporations Code; s 304 of the California Corporations Code; 
s 33-743(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes; s 29-306.09(a) of the District of Columbia Code; s 30-29-809(1) 
of the Idaho Code; s 490.809(1) of the Iowa Code; s 450.1514(1) of the Michigan Business Corporation Act; 
s 1726(c) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law; s 33-8-109(a) of the South Carolina Code of Laws; s 47-
1A-809 of the South Dakota Business Corporation Act; s 48-18-109(a) of the Tennessee Code; s 23B.08.090(1) 
of the Washington Business Corporation Act and s 17-16-809(a) of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act. 
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3.2  Purpose of Section 162 of the Companies Act 
 
The Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 states that the introduction of a 
regime allowing for a court, on application, to declare a director either delinquent (and thus 
prohibited from being a director) or under probation (and restricted to serving as a director 
within the conditions specified) is a major innovation and one of the remedies available to 
shareholders and other stakeholders to hold directors accountable.84 In Grancy Property 
Limited v Gihwala85 the court observed that the innovation in section 162 of the Companies 
Act lies in the introduction of a new civil remedy for those harmed by the conduct of delinquent 
directors. Section 162 of the Companies Act does not invoke criminal liability. The assessment 
of whether a director is delinquent will therefore be determined on a civil standard of proof and 
on a balance of probabilities.  
  
In Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and Others86 the court held that section 162 of the 
Companies Act is directed at protecting companies and corporate stakeholders against company 
directors who have proven themselves unable to manage the business of the company or have 
failed in, or are in neglect of, their duties and obligations as company directors. In Gihwala and 
Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others87 the Supreme Court of Appeal further stated 
that section 162 of the Companies has a protective purpose. Its aim, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal confirmed, is not penal, but to ensure that those who invest in companies are protected 
against directors who engage in serious misconduct of the type that violates the “bond of trust” 
that shareholders have in the people they appoint to the board of directors.88 In Lewis Group 
Limited v Woollam89  the court likewise maintained that the object of section 162 of the 
Companies Act goes “essentially to the provision of a protective remedy in the public interest.”  
 
                                                 
84 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 8. 
 
85 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 155. 
 
86 [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 29. 
 
87 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 144. For a discussion of this case see R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35” 1-28 and J Du Plessis & 
Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African Approach Regarding 
Disqualification of Company Directors” 286-293. 
 
88 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 144. 
 
89 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 40. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others90 
relied on the Australian case of Re Gold Coast Holdings Pty Ltd (In Liq); Australian Securities 
& Investments Commission v Papotto91 in ruling that section 162 of the Companies Act is not 
a penal provision, but its purpose is to protect the investing public. ASIC sought an order in 
this Australian case from the Supreme Court of Western Australia to prohibit the respondent 
from managing a company for a period to be determined by the court.92 The respondent had 
been convicted of repeated acts of dishonesty as a director. In disqualifying the respondent from 
managing any company for seven years, the court stated that the purpose of the order sought 
by ASIC was protective and not punitive, and that the interests to be protected by the order 
included those of the public “who may unwittingly deal with companies run by people who are 
not suitable to be involved in the management of companies”.93  
 
To the extent that section 162 of the Companies Act does not impose a criminal sanction on a 
delinquent director, it is submitted that, as stated by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala 
and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others94 the provision is not a penal provision. 
However, it is further submitted that while the purpose of section 162 of the Companies Act 
may not be penal, the proceedings do indeed embody a punitive element. If the power to declare 
a director delinquent is exercised by the court, there is inevitably a substantial and significant 
interference with the individual’s entrepreneurial freedom.95 This is affirmed by Browne-
Wilkinson V-C in Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd.96 It follows that the rights of the individual 
                                                 
90 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 142. 
 
91 2000 WASC 201. 
 
92 The relevant provision of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 which was applicable in this case was 
s 230(1)(c). This provision has since been repealed and replaced by s 206E which empowers a court to disqualify 
a person from managing corporations for a period the court considers appropriate, in the case of a repeated 
contravention of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
93Re Gold Coast Holdings Pty Ltd (In Liq); Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Papotto 2000 
WASC 201 para 22. 
 
94 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 142.  
 
95 See further R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property 
Limited 2016 ZASCA 35” 8. 
 
96 1988 2 All ER 692 at 696. Brown-Wilkinson V-C asserted that the power to disqualify a person from acting as 
a director is not fundamentally penal but if the power to disqualify is exercised it does involve a substantial 
interference with the freedom of the individual. 
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must be fully protected.97 In a similar vein, in Re Crestjoy Products Ltd98 the Chancery Division 
approved of and adopted the approach of Browne-Wilkinson V-C and commented further that 
proceedings to disqualify a person from acting as a director are a very serious matter. The court 
stated that when a court is faced with a mandatory disqualification period once the facts are 
proved, the matter becomes more nearly penal.99 In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
v Collins & Ors100 the UK Court of Appeal also acknowledged that there are some penal 
elements involved in the disqualification of a director. 
 
A further punitive effect of a declaration of delinquency is that it carries a definite stigma for a 
person who is disqualified from acting as a director.101 The reputational damage caused by a 
delinquency order is extensive and is likely to endure for a long period of time.102 This was 
affirmed in Re Westminster Property Management Ltd Official Receiver v Stern,103 where the 
Chancery Division emphasised that while proceedings to disqualify a person from acting as a 
director are intended primarily for the protection of the public, they nevertheless do involve 
serious allegations and almost always carry a degree of stigma for anyone who is disqualified 
from acting as a director.  
 
In Lewis Group Limited v Woollam104 the court relied on the Australian case of Re HIH 
Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler105 for the proposition that the purpose of 
disqualification orders is purely protective and that such orders are not punitive. In this latter 
decision the Supreme Court of New South Wales, per Santow J, had declared that 
                                                 
97 Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd 1988 2 All ER 692 at 696. See further Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 at 
14 where the Chancery Division approved of this dictum. 
 
98 1990 BCC 23 at 26. 
 
99 Re Crestjoy Products Ltd 1990 BCC 23 at 26. See Dine “Disqualification of Directors” 6-7 for a discussion of 
this case and of the quasi-penal nature of disqualification orders. 
 
100 [2000] BCC 998 at 1007. 
 
101 See Hannigan Company Law 374 for a discussion on the effects of the disqualification of directors under the 
UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
102 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 29. 
 
103 2001 BCC 121 para 36. 
 
104 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 40. 
 
105 [2002] NSWSC 483 para 56. 
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disqualification orders are designed to protect the public from the harmful use of the corporate 
structure but that such orders are not punitive.106 However, in Rich v Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission107 the High Court of Australia, per McHugh J, strongly disagreed with 
this aspect of Santow J’s judgment. McHugh J proclaimed that protective proceedings and 
punitive proceedings are not mutually exclusive categories. The court asserted that the 
supposed distinction between “punitive” and “protective” was “elusive”.108 It observed that 
proceedings brought to protect the public could also have the effect of penalising the 
defendant.109 The factors taken into account in the criminal jurisdiction, the High Court of 
Australia pointed out, such as retribution, deterrence, reformation, contrition and the protection 
of the public, are also central to determining whether a disqualification order should be made 
as well as to the period of the disqualification.110 These factors, the court emphasised, strongly 
resemble sentencing principles under the criminal law and further support the finding that the 
granting of a disqualification order cannot properly be characterised as purely protective, but 
that it also has a punitive element.111  
 
Several subsequent decisions of the Australian courts concurred with McHugh J in Rich v 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission112 that contrary to the finding of Santow J 
in Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler,113 disqualification orders are not purely 
protective and that they do include a penal element. For instance, in Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Vizard114 the Federal Court of Australia affirmed that while it may 
be accepted that the principal object to be achieved by a disqualification order is protective, it 
would be a mistake to treat this as its sole purpose. The court held that it followed from the 
decision of the High Court of Australia in Rich v Australian Securities and Investments 
                                                 
106 Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483 para 56. 
 
107 [2004] 220 CLR 129 para 35.  
 
108 Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] 220 CLR 129 para 32. 
 
109 Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] 220 CLR 129 para 35. 
 
110 Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] 220 CLR 129 para 52. 
 
111 Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] 220 CLR 129 paras 50-52.  
 
112 Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] 220 CLR 129 paras 32, 35, 50-52.  
 
113 [2002] NSWSC 483 para 56. 
 
114 [2005] FCA 1037 para 35. 
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Commission115 that a disqualification order could be imposed not only to protect the 
shareholders against further abuse, but also by way of punishment and general deterrence.116 
The importance of giving due consideration to the objective of general and personal deterrence 
was reinforced in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Beekink117 where the 
full Federal Court concurred with McHugh J that disqualification proceedings have a punitive 
element to them. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales in Gilfillan & Ors v Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission118 likewise concurred with McHugh J and further 
observed  that disqualification orders are not purely protective but do have a punitive element 
to them in that they may be imposed by way of punishment and deterrence. In Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission v Axis International Management Pty Ltd (No 6)119 the 
Federal Court of Australia likewise concurred with McHugh J that the conclusion reached by 
Santow J in Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler120 that disqualification 
proceedings have no punitive element was wrong.121 It is submitted that in Lewis Group Limited 
v Woollam122 the court, with respect, overlooked the fact that the notion that disqualification 
orders are purely protective, as asserted in Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler,123 
on which it relied as authority for this proposition, has in fact been rejected several times by 
the High Court of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia and the Court of Appeal of New 
South Wales in subsequent decisions, which have proclaimed that disqualification proceedings 
do in fact have a punitive element as well.124 
 
                                                 
115 [2004] 220 CLR 129. 
 
116 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vizard [2005] FCA 1037 para 35. 
 
117 [2007] FCAFC 7 paras 80-91. 
 
118 [2012] NSWCA 370 paras 180-185. 
 
119 [2011] FCA 811 (2011) para 9. 
 
120 [2002] NSWSC 483 para 56. 
 
121 See further Austin and Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay's Principles of Corporations Law para 3.400 at 104-
105 and para 7.191 at 265-266 for a discussion on the punitive aspects of a disqualification order. 
 
122 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC). 
 
123 [2002] NSWSC 483 para 56. 
 
124 R Cassim “The Launching of Delinquency Proceedings under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 by means of the 
Derivative Action: Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)” 676. 
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It is telling that section 162(12)(b)(i) of the Companies Act uses the term “rehabilitation” in the 
context of a court deciding whether to suspend an order of delinquency or to set aside an order 
of delinquency or probation. The term “rehabilitation” is akin to “reformation” which was 
found by the High Court of Australia in Rich v Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission125 to resemble sentencing principles under the criminal law, and to indicate that 
there is a punitive element to a disqualification order. In light of the above dicta and in light of 
section 162(12)(b)(i) of the Companies Act, it is submitted that while the purpose of section 
162 of the Companies Act may not be penal, as was maintained by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others126 proceedings to declare a 
director delinquent that have the effect of preventing him from acting as a director do have a 
punitive effect. 
 
In Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker127 the Western Cape High Court declared that in the 
determination of the question of whether or not a person may be declared a delinquent director, 
the purposes of the Companies Act as set out in section 7 must always be borne in mind. The 
purposes of the Companies Act as emphasised by the court in this context are to promote 
compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided in the Constitution in the application of company 
law, to encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies, and to provide a 
predictable and effective environment for the efficient regulation of companies.128 It is 
submitted that, at the same time, a further purpose must be considered, namely to promote the 
development of the South African economy by encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise 
efficiency, as set out in section 7(b)(i) of the Companies Act. Declaring a director delinquent 
is a severe remedy with harsh consequences for directors. It must not be applied without due 
and proper consideration by a court. As the UK Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Trade 
                                                 
125 [2004] 220 CLR 129 para 52. The meaning of the term “rehabilitation” in s 162(12)(b)(i) of the Companies 
Act is discussed further in para 3.11.4.3 below. 
 
126 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 142.  
 
127  2013 JDR 1360 (WCC) para 85. 
 
128 Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker 2013 JDR 1360 (WCC) para 85. The directors in this case had 
consistently failed to hold annual general meetings and to prepare financial statements for presentation at annual 
general meetings. The court found the omissions of the directors to be grossly negligent bordering on wilful 
misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the performance of their functions within, and duties to, the company 
(para 88). Such omissions, the court stated, are inconsistent with the objectives of the Companies Act in relation 
to the efficient and responsible management of companies and to provide a predictable and effective environment 
for the efficient regulation of companies (para 88). 
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and Industry v Davies and Others129 emphasised, per Hobhouse LJ, to be a director of a 
company is a privilege, but it is not one of which a person should be unjustly deprived. 
 
3.3  Locus Standi to Institute an Application under Section 162 of the Companies Act 
 
A wide range of persons may apply to court for an order declaring directors delinquent or 
placing them under probation under section 162 of the Companies Act. It is noteworthy that an 
application to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation may be instituted 
by any person with locus standi against a person who was a director of the company within the 
twenty four months immediately preceding the application.130 It follows that a director who has 
resigned from a company or who has been removed as a director of a company would not 
necessarily escape a court order against him in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act.  
 
Even though the misconduct in issue in section 162 of the Companies Act is in respect of duties 
towards the company, a shareholder has direct standing in terms of section 162 to apply to court 
to declare a director delinquent. The misconduct of the director need not be in respect of the 
shareholder’s personal rights.131 This also applies to the other stakeholders listed in section 162 
of the Companies Act, in that locus standi has been conferred on such stakeholders irrespective 
of whether the duties of the directors of the company are owed to them directly.132  
 
In the UK, under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, applications to court 
for a disqualification order against a director may be made by the Secretary of State for 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, or in certain instances by the official receiver of 
a company133 in a winding-up of the company, the liquidator, or any past or present 
                                                 
129 1996 4 All ER 289 at 302. 
 
130 See s 162(2)(a), 162(3)(a) and 163(4)(a) of the Companies Act.  
 
131 J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African 
Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 293. 
 
132 J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African 
Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 293. 
 
133 A receiver is a person appointed by the court or an individual for the collection or protection of property. If a 
receiver is appointed by a court he is an officer of the court and derives authority from the court order. If he is 
appointed by an individual he derives powers and duties from the terms of the appointment. A receiver who is 
appointed by the court is under the supervision of the court and is responsible to the court for carrying out orders 
regarding the property (James Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases 2183; Osborn’s Concise Law 
Dictionary 345; The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary 914). 
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shareholders or creditors of a company “in relation to which that person has committed or is 
alleged to have committed an offence or other default.”134 Section 162 of the (South African) 
Companies Act does not permit the liquidator of a company or a creditor to apply for a court 
order declaring a director delinquent. Under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, ASIC is 
the only body endowed with locus standi to apply to court to obtain a disqualification order 
against a director.135 Under the MBCA and the corporate legislation of various USA States, 
generally the board of directors or a shareholder suing derivatively in the name of the company 
has locus standi to apply to court to remove a director from office.136 In some USA States a 
shareholder holding a prescribed percentage of shares may, in certain circumstances, lodge an 
application to court to remove a director from office.137 Section 162 of the Companies Act is 
consequently more far-reaching compared to the foreign jurisdictions reviewed in that it 
empowers a much wider range of persons to apply to court to remove a director from office. 
 
The persons who have locus standi to institute an application under section 162 of the (South 
African) Companies Act are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
134 Section 16(2) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Section 1A of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 permits the Secretary of State to accept a disqualification undertaking by a 
director. Instead of applying to court for a disqualification order, in certain circumstances the Secretary of State 
may accept a disqualification undertaking from the director if it is expedient to do so in the public interest (s 1A 
of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986). A disqualification undertaking has the same effect as a 
disqualification order which is made by a court after a court hearing. It is an undertaking by a person that for a 
period specified in the undertaking he will not be a director of a company, act as a receiver of a company’s property 
or directly or indirectly be concerned or take part in the promotion, formation or management of a company unless 
he has the leave of a court, and that he will further not act as an insolvency practitioner (s 1A(1) of the UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986). Disqualification undertakings may be obtained on the ground of 
unfitness, in the case of certain convictions abroad and in the case of persons disqualified for instructing unfit 
directors (s 1A(1) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986). They enable non-contentious cases 
to be dealt with promptly and reduce the burden of costs on the disqualified director (Hannigan Company Law 
376). A director is not obliged to accept a disqualification undertaking, and disputed cases are heard in court 
(Hannigan Company Law 376). See further on the disqualification undertaking Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ 
Company Law 579-580; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 712 and Davies & 
Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 237-238. 
 
135 See Part 2D.6 (Disqualification from Managing Corporations) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
136 See s 8.09(a) of the MBCA. 
 
137 For example, under s 706(d) of the New York Business Corporation Law and s 7-1.2-805 of the Rhode Island 
Business Corporation Act, a shareholder holding ten per cent of the outstanding shares may apply to court to 
remove a director from office. The attorney-general may also apply to court to remove a director from office.  
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3.3.1  Locus Standi of Insiders under Section 162 of the Companies Act 
 
Various insiders have locus standi under section 162 of the Companies Act to apply to court to 
declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation. These are a shareholder, a 
director, the company secretary, a prescribed officer of a company, and a registered trade union 
that represents employees of the company or another employee representative. In addition, the 
company itself has such locus standi under section 162 of the Companies Act. These persons 
are discussed below. 
 
3.3.1.1  Shareholder and Director 
 
As discussed earlier,138 section 71(6) of the Companies Act empowers “any holder of voting 
rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director” to bring an application to review 
the board’s decision not to remove a director from office. In contrast section 162(2) of the 
Companies Act empowers a “shareholder” to apply to court for an order declaring a director 
delinquent. Consequently, in order to apply for a delinquency order a shareholder need not have 
any voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of the director concerned. This broadens 
the group of persons who are entitled to apply to court for an order declaring a director 
delinquent. However, the person must be registered as a shareholder in the certificated or 
uncertificated register of the company.139 
 
In Lewis Group Limited v Woollam140 the Western Cape Division, Cape Town stated that the 
right of a shareholder to apply to declare a director delinquent under section 162 of the 
Companies Act is a personal right that every shareholder enjoys individually. The court 
explained that the personal nature of this right is demonstrated by the fact that a declaration of 
delinquency obtained by a shareholder in company A will also ordinarily result in the 
disqualification of the director as a director of companies B and C, even though it might be 
practically impossible for companies B and C to continue in business without the director.141 
                                                 
138 Refer to chapter 6, para 2.1. 
 
139 See s 1 of the Companies Act which defines a “shareholder” as meaning the holder of a share issued by a 
company and who is entered as such in the certificated or uncertificated securities register, as the case may be. 
 
140 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 43. The court’s classification of s 162 of the Companies Act as a personal right 
of shareholders is discussed further in para 3.3.1.2 below. 
 
141 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 43. 
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Even the best interests of company A, the court proclaimed, would not stand in the way of the 
right of a shareholder of company A to have a director declared delinquent if the shareholder 
were able to prove misconduct by the director in respect of the management of company A that 
showed that it would be in the public interest to have the director declared delinquent.142 The 
court, with respect, appears to have overlooked the fact that this is not necessarily the case since 
a court has the power to make a declaration of delinquency subject to conditions that limit the 
application of the declaration of delinquency to one or more particular categories of 
companies.143  
 
In Kukama v Lobelo & Others144 Kukama applied to court for Lobelo to be declared a 
delinquent director and thus for his removal as a director of two companies. Kukama and 
Lobelo were both fifty per cent shareholders of the two companies, as well as directors of the 
first company. Lobelo was the sole director of the second company. It is not clear from the 
judgment whether Kukama had instituted the application to declare Lobelo a delinquent 
director in his capacity as a director or as a shareholder.145 With regard to the first company, 
                                                 
142 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 43.  
 
143 The conditions limiting a declaration of delinquency to one or more particular companies is discussed further 
in para 3.6.3 below. 
 
144 2012 JDR 0663 (GSJ) para 27. The first delinquency order in South African law was granted in this case, by 
the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg. Kukama applied to court for Lobelo to be declared a delinquent 
director and for his removal as a director of two companies, Peolwane Properties (Pty) Ltd (“Peolwane”) and 
Diphuka Construction (Pty) Ltd (“Diphuka”), of which Kukuma and Lobelo were both fifty per cent shareholders. 
Kukama and Lobelo were also directors of Peolwane but Lobelo was the sole director of Diphuka. In 2010 and 
2011 the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) had made two payments of approximately twenty two million 
Rands and thirty nine million Rands into the banking account of Diphuka. The amount of twenty two million 
Rands was a rebate due by SARS to Peolwane but SARS had in error paid this amount into the bank account of 
Diphuka instead of the bank account of Peolwane. It transpired that the payment of thirty nine million Rands was 
not due by SARS at all to either Peolwane or Diphuka and appeared to have been made following certain fictitious 
invoices submitted to SARS by Peolwane’s tax consultant, who had been appointed by Lobelo without Kukama’s 
consent to handle the tax affairs of the companies. The twenty two million Rand payment had not been transferred 
to Peolwane’s bank account as it should have been and Lobelo had not used it for the benefit of Peolwane but had 
used it for the benefit of other companies that were not subsidiaries of Peolwane. Kukuma averred that Lobelo 
had engaged in reckless trading (s 22 of the Companies Act), using his position as a director and information 
acquired as a director to gain a personal advantage (s 76), not acting in good faith and for a proper purpose or in 
the best interests of the company (s 76(3)) and that he had grossly abused his position as a director in the manner 
envisaged in s 162(5) of the Companies Act. The court held that the conduct of Lobelo fell short of the standard 
expected of a director of Peolwane to such an extent that it amounted to wilful misconduct, breach of trust and a 
gross abuse of his position as a director (paras 13 and 20.1). It consequently declared Lobelo a delinquent director 
(para 28). The court did not specify the duration of Lobelo’s declaration of delinquency, but in terms of s 162(6)(b) 
of the Companies Act a declaration of delinquency in terms of s 162(5)(c) to (f) subsists for seven years from the 
date of the order (or such longer period as determined by the court at the time of making the declaration). 
 
145 Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 569. 
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Kukama could have instituted the application either in his capacity as a director or as a 
shareholder. It is submitted that since Lobelo was the sole director of the second company, the 
application would have to have been instituted by Kukama in his capacity as a shareholder of 
the second company. 
 
Section 162 empowers a single shareholder or a single director to bring an application to declare 
a director delinquent. This confers considerable power on such a person to launch legal 
proceedings to declare a director to be delinquent. In contrast, under the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 a director as such does not have locus standi to apply to court to 
disqualify another director. In the UK a shareholder may institute such an application but only 
in certain instances as a personal application.146 Under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 
neither a shareholder nor a director has locus standi to apply to court to disqualify a director 
and hence to remove him from office. Under section 8.09 of the MBCA a single shareholder or 
a single director does not have locus standi to apply to court to remove a director. Instead, the 
application must be brought “by or in the right of the corporation”. Likewise, in terms of section 
225(c) of the DGCL a single shareholder or a single director does not have locus standi to apply 
to court to remove a director from office since the application must be brought by the 
“corporation, or derivatively in the right of the corporation by any stockholder”. Several USA 
                                                 
146 See s 16(2) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. A shareholder is empowered to institute 
an application to disqualify a director under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 only under s 2 
(disqualification on conviction of indictable offence), s 3 (disqualification for persistent breaches of companies 
legislation), s 4 (disqualification for fraud in the winding-up of a company) and s 5 (disqualification on summary 
conviction) of this Act. 
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States, such as New York,147 Rhode Island,148 Illinois,149 California,150 Alabama,151 Alaska,152 
Tennessee153 and Washington154 require shareholders holding at least ten per cent of the 
                                                 
147 Section 706(d) of the New York Business Corporation Law states that an action to procure a judgment removing 
a director for cause may be brought by the attorney-general or by the holders of ten per cent of the outstanding 
shares, whether or not entitled to vote. The court may bar from re-election any director so removed for a period 
fixed by the court.  
 
148 Section 7-1.2-805(d) of the Rhode Island Business Corporation emulates s 706(d) of the New York Business 
Corporation Law. The court may bar from re-election any director so removed for a period fixed by the court. This 
provision is codified in Title 7 (Corporations, Associations and Partnerships), Chapter 7-1.2 (Rhode Island 
Business Corporation Act) of the Rhode Island General Laws. 
 
149 Section 8.35(b) of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 provides that the circuit court of the county in 
which the corporation’s office is registered may remove a director of the corporation from office in a proceeding 
commenced either by the corporation or by shareholders of the corporation holding at least ten per cent of the 
outstanding shares of any class if the court finds that the director is engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or 
has grossly abused his position to the detriment of the corporation and removal is in the best interest of the 
corporation. This provision is codified in Chapter 805 (Business Organizations), 805 ILCS 5 (Business 
Corporation Act of 1983) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. 
 
150 Section 304 of the California Corporations Code states that the superior court of the proper county may, at the 
suit of shareholders holding at least ten per cent of the number of outstanding shares of any class, remove from 
office any director in the case of fraudulent or dishonest acts or gross abuse of authority or discretion with reference 
to the corporation and may bar from re-election any director so removed for a period prescribed by the court. 
Section 304 of the California Corporations Code is codified in Chapter 3 (Directors and Management), Title 1 
(Corporations), Division 1 (General Corporation Law) of the California Corporations Code. 
 
151 Section 10A-2-8-09(a)  of the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entities Code provides that the circuit court of 
the county where a corporation’s principal office is located (or if none in this state, its registered office) may 
remove a director of the corporation from office in a proceeding commenced either by the corporation or by its 
shareholders holding  at least ten per cent of the outstanding shares of any class if the court finds that the director 
engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of authority or discretion, with respect to the 
corporation, and removal is in the best interest of the corporation. This provision is codified in Title 10A (Alabama 
Business and Nonprofit Entities Code), Chapter 2 (Business Corporations) of the Code of Alabama. 
  
152 Section 10.06.463 of the Alaska Corporations Code provides that the superior court may, at the suit of the board 
or the shareholders holding at least ten per cent of the number of outstanding shares of any class, remove from 
office a director for fraudulent or dishonest acts, gross neglect of duty, or gross abuse of authority or discretion 
with reference to the corporation and may bar from re-election a director removed in that manner for a period 
prescribed by the court. This provision is codified in Chapter 10.06 (Alaska Corporations Code), Title 10 
(Corporations and Associations) of the Alaska Statutes. 
 
153 Section 48-18-109(a) of the Tennessee Business Corporation Act provides that any court of record having 
equity jurisdiction in the county where a corporation’s principal office (or if none in this state, its registered office) 
is located may remove a director of the corporation from office in a proceeding commenced either by the 
corporation or by its shareholders holding at least ten per cent of the outstanding shares of any class if the court 
finds that the director engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of authority or discretion with 
respect to the corporation, and removal is in the best interest of the corporation. This provision is codified in 
Chapter 18 (Directors and Offices), Title 48 (Corporations and Associations For-Profit Business Corporations) of 
the Tennessee Code. 
 
154 Section 23B.08.090(1) of the Washington Business Corporation Act states that the superior court of the county 
where a corporation’s principal office or its registered office is located may remove a director of the corporation 
from office in a proceeding commenced either by the corporation or by its shareholders holding at least ten per 
cent of the outstanding shares of any class if the court finds that the director engaged in fraudulent or dishonest 
conduct with respect to the corporation, and removal is in the best interest of the corporation. This provision is 
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outstanding shares to institute a court application to remove a director from office. South 
Carolina requires five per cent of the outstanding shares to be held by a shareholder in order to 
bring an action to remove a director from office.155 Only one USA State, Pennsylvania, permits 
a single shareholder to bring an action to remove a director from office. Section 1726(d) of the 
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law156 provides that “any” shareholder or director may 
apply to court to remove a director from office. The company must nevertheless be a party to 
the application and the shareholder must comply with the requirements relating to derivative 
actions. Section 162(2) of the (South African) Companies Act is distinctly much wider 
compared to the equivalent provisions in the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986, the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and the legislation of 
several USA States since it permits a single director or a single shareholder to institute an 
application to court to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation and thereby 
to remove him from office. 
 
3.3.1.2  The Company  
 
Section 162(2) of the Companies Act confers on companies standing to bring proceedings to 
declare their own directors as delinquent. In contrast, under both the UK Company Directors 
                                                 
codified in Chapter 23B.08 (Directors and Officers), Title 23B (Washington Business Corporation Act) of the 
Revised Code of Washington. 
 
155 Section 33-8-109(a) of the South Carolina Code of Laws provides that the circuit court of the county where a 
corporation’s principal office (or, if none in this state, its registered office) is located may remove a director of the 
corporation from office in a proceeding commenced either by the corporation or by its shareholder holding at least 
five per cent of the outstanding shares of any class if the court find that the director engaged in fraudulent or 
dishonest acts, or gross abuse of authority in discharge of duties to the corporation, and the removal is in the best 
interest of the corporation. This provision is codified in Chapter 8 (Directors and Officers), Title 33 (Corporations, 
Partnerships and Associations) of the South Carolina Code of Laws. 
 
156 Section 1726(c) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law states that “[u]pon application of any 
shareholder or director, the court may remove from office any director in case of fraudulent or dishonest acts, or 
gross abuse of authority or discretion with reference to the corporation, or for any other proper cause, and may bar 
from office any director so removed for a period prescribed by the court. The corporation shall be made a party to 
the action and as a prerequisite to the maintenance of any action under this subsection a shareholder shall comply 
with Subchapter F (relating to derivative actions).” 
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Disqualification Act 1986 and the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 the company does not 
have locus standi to apply to court to disqualify its own directors. 
  
In Lewis Group Limited v Woollam157 the question arose whether a shareholder may institute 
proceedings to declare a director delinquent under section 162 of the Companies Act by means 
of a derivative action.158 In this case Woollam, a minority shareholder, had served a notice in 
terms of section 165(2)(a) of the Companies Act requesting the company to commence 
proceedings to declare its chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chairperson of the 
board and the chairperson of the audit and risk committee delinquent.159 In terms of section 
                                                 
157 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC). 
 
158 In the corporate context, the term “derivative action” relates to proceedings instituted by persons given standing 
“to litigate in their own names for and behalf of the corporation” in respect of wrongs done to the corporation 
(Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 27). The derivative action is brought by a minority 
shareholder or other applicant on behalf of a company in order to protect the legal interests of the company (MF 
Cassim The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 5). The essential 
rationale of derivative proceedings is that they permit the institution or continuance of proceedings in a company’s 
best interests in circumstances in which the company does not act on its own initiative, and which would otherwise 
not reach the court (Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 31). The classic scenario of 
the derivative action is where the wrongdoers who have harmed the company are the controllers of the company, 
who use their control of the company to prevent the company from instituting legal proceedings against them to 
remedy the wrong that they themselves have committed on the company (MF Cassim The New Derivative Action 
under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 7; see further Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 587.) Where a wrong is done to the company the “proper plaintiff” is the company 
itself and not the shareholders (see Foss v Harbottle (1983) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189). Therefore, the derivative 
action is an exception to the “proper plaintiff” rule. The basis of the rule is the fundamental tenet of company law 
that a company is a separate legal entity distinct from its shareholders, as laid down in Salomon v Salomon & Co 
[1897] AC 22 (see Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 587 and MF Cassim The New 
Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 5). The term “derivative” is 
applied because although the litigation is instituted and prosecuted in A’s name (the applicant) the right of action 
concerned is derived from B (the company) in order to redress a wrong done to the company (MF Cassim The 
New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 5). Moreover, the benefits of 
any judgment obtained in favour of A (the applicant) in such an action, accrue to B (the company) and not to A 
(Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 27). In other words the shareholder is seeking to 
protect the rights of the company and not his own interests or his own personal shareholder rights (MF Cassim 
The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 5). For a detailed 
discussion of the derivative action under the Companies Act see Coetzee “A Comparative Analysis of the 
Derivative Litigation Proceedings under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 290-
305; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 586-596(8); MF Cassim The Statutory Derivative 
Action under the Companies Act of 2008: Guidelines for the Exercise of the Judicial Discretion (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis) and MF Cassim The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion. 
 
159 Some of the grounds for the contention that the directors should be declared delinquent were that (i) Lewis 
Stores (Pty) Ltd (a subsidiary of Lewis Group Limited) had sold employment insurance to its customers who were 
pensioners and self-employed persons who had no insurable interest in terms of the relevant insurance policies; 
(ii) the customers of Lewis Stores (Pty) Ltd were required, whether they wished to or not, to purchase extended 
warranties on goods purchased; (iii) compulsory delivery fees were charged, irrespective of whether the customers 
required delivery of the goods to be effected; (iv) the accounts of Lewis Group Limited appeared to overstate 
revenue from the sale of insurance policies; (v) Lewis Group Limited had inappropriate revenue obligation policies 
with regard to the sale of extended warranted that resulted in the on-going overstatement of reported revenue; and 
(vi) there were various accounting policy errors in the interim financial statements for the period ended 30 
September 2015. 
347 
 
165(2)(a) of the Companies Act a shareholder is empowered to serve a demand on a company 
to commence legal proceedings or to take related steps to protect the legal interests of the 
company.160 The statutory demand provided for in section 165(2) of the Companies Act is a 
procedural precursor to the possible institution of derivative proceedings under section 165(5) 
of the Companies Act.161 Lewis Group Limited applied to court to set aside Woollam’s demand 
on the ground that it was frivolous, vexatious and without merit.162 The court was required to 
decide whether “a person is able to proceed derivatively for the given relief when that person 
is given standing under the [Companies] Act to proceed for such relief personally.”163 
 
In finding that Woollam was not entitled to use the remedy of a derivative action in section 165 
of the Companies Act to achieve a declaration of delinquency in terms of section 162, the court 
stated that a shareholder’s right to seek a declaration of delinquency against a director under 
section 162 co-exists with the same right separately invested in the company by the same 
provision.164 After investigating the preliminary procedures in terms of section 165 of the 
Companies Act with regard to derivative proceedings, the court opined that these procedures 
are not well suited to proceedings by shareholders to declare directors delinquent.165 
Accordingly the court ruled that “it is not within the scheme” of the Companies Act that 
shareholders should ordinarily seek to proceed derivatively to obtain a delinquency order in 
                                                 
160 Under s 165(2) of the Companies Act a person may serve a demand upon a company to commence or continue 
legal proceedings, or take related steps, to protect the legal interests of the company if the person (i) is a shareholder 
or a person entitled to be registered as a shareholder of the company or of a related company; (ii) is a director or 
prescribed officer of the company or of a related company; (iii) is a registered trade union that represents 
employees of the company or another representative of employees of the company; or (iv) has been granted leave 
of the court to do so, which may be granted only if the court is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so 
to protect a legal right of that other person. 
  
161 Mouritzen v Greystones Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 74 (KZD) para 22; Mbethe v United Manganese of 
Kalahari (Pty) Ltd 2016 JDR 0271 (GJ) para 47; Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 
6. 
 
162 In terms of s 165(3) of the Companies Act a company that has been served with a demand in terms of s 165(2) 
of the Companies Act may apply within fifteen business days to a court to set aside the demand on the grounds 
that it is frivolous, vexatious or without merit. If a company does not make such an application or the court does 
not set aside the demand, the company must appoint an independent and impartial person or committee to 
investigate the demand (s 165(4) of the Companies Act). 
 
163 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 19. For a discussion of this case see R Cassim 
“The Launching of Delinquency Proceedings under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 by means of the Derivative 
Action: Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)” 673-688. 
 
164 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 27. 
 
165 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) paras 45-49. 
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terms of section 162 of the Companies Act.166 The court consequently set aside Woollam’s 
demand in terms of section 165(3) of the Companies Act, and held that he must institute a 
delinquency application personally, and not by means of a derivative action.167 The court held 
further, obiter, that there was in any case no merit in Woollam’s demand to have the four 
directors declared delinquent as he had due to insufficient evidence failed to prove that the 
conduct of the directors fell within the scope of section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act.168 
 
The High Court in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam169 proclaimed that when both the company 
and the shareholder have the same standing to sue for the same relief on the basis of the same 
facts, a shareholder has no need in the interests of justice to litigate in the corporation’s own 
name when he can do so in his own name. In coming to this conclusion the court relied on the 
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill.170 The matter concerned 
the calling of an annual general meeting by Probe Mines Limited. The issue before the Ontario 
Court of Appeal related to alleged misconduct by the directors and defendant shareholders, 
including allegations of having sent out a false and misleading information circular with a 
notice calling for the annual general meeting of the company. The relief sought was an 
injunction against holding the annual general meeting, and a declaration that the proxies which 
had been solicited had been null and void. The plaintiff shareholders had not clearly stated in 
their action whether their claim was a personal or a derivative one. Counsel for Probe Mines 
Limited argued that the matter was not properly before the court as the plaintiff had not obtained 
the leave of the court to bring a derivative action, pursuant to section 99 of the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act R.S.O. 1970.171 In ascertaining whether the action was to be instituted by the 
                                                 
166 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 49. 
 
167 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 52. 
168 See Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) paras 53-82 where the court examined the 
various grounds of complaint and found that it did not satisfy the grounds set out in s 162(5)(c) of the Companies 
Act. On 1 November 2016 the applicant applied for leave to appeal this judgment. His application for leave to 
appeal was refused on 9 December 2016. The applicant thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal for 
leave to appeal. On 4 April 2017 he was granted leave to appeal (see JSE SENS announcement (4 April 2017) 
available at https://www.moneyweb.co.za/mny_sens/lewis-group-limited-woollams-first-demand-in-terms-of-
section-1652-of-the-companies-act/ (accessed on 7 April 2017). The outcome of the appeal is awaited at the time 
of writing this thesis. 
169 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 48. 
 
170 (1974) 54 DLR (3d) 672 (Ont CA). 
171 Under s 99 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act R.S.O. 1970 c.53 a shareholder was entitled to bring a 
derivative action only after obtaining a court order permitting him to commence it. This provision has now been 
replaced by s 246 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act R.S.O. 1990, which states as follows:  
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shareholders personally or derivatively, the Ontario Court of Appeal applied the following test, 
which was relied on by the High Court in Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam:172 
 
“In one sense every injury to a company is indirectly an injury to its shareholders. On the 
other hand, if one applies the test: ‘Is this wrongful act one in respect of which the company 
could sue?’, a shareholder who is personally and directly injured must surely be entitled to 
say, as a matter of logic, ‘the company cannot sue for my injury; it can only sue for its 
own’.”173 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal proclaimed that a personal action would not arise simply because 
the corporation itself has been damaged and as a consequence of the damage to it, its 
shareholders have been injured.174 In other words, an incidental injury would not be regarded 
as a wrong to the shareholders personally.175 The Court of Appeal held that while the 
preparation, approval and circulation to shareholders of a misleading annual report was 
undoubtedly a wrong to the company, the circulation of such a report to shareholders was also 
a wrong to the shareholders.176 The court held that the sending out of a misleading information 
circular by the directors was a breach not only of the directors’ fiduciary duty to the company 
but also a breach of duty to the shareholders.177  It stated that the shareholders had a right to 
expect that the information sent to them was fairly presented, reasonably accurate and not 
misleading.178 On this basis the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that an action challenging the 
information circular was not a derivative one, but was a personal action of the shareholders.179 
It consequently held that leave of the court to institute the action was not necessary.180 
                                                 
“Subject to subsection (2), a complainant may apply to court for leave to bring an action in the 
name and on behalf of a corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or intervene in an  action to which 
any such body corporate is a party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the 
action on behalf of the body corporate.” 
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176 Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill (1974) 54 DLR (3d) 672 (Ont CA) at 679.  
 
177 Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill (1974) 54 DLR (3d) 672 (Ont CA) at 679.  
 
178 Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill (1974) 54 DLR (3d) 672 (Ont CA) at 679.  
 
179 Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill (1974) 54 DLR (3d) 672 (Ont CA) at 681.  
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In Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam181 the court held that the corollary to the above test applied by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill182 must “surely be that when both the 
company and the shareholder have the same standing to sue for the same relief on the basis of 
the same facts the company must be entitled to say the shareholder has no need in the interests 
of justice to litigate in the corporation’s name when he can do so in his own.” In finding that 
Woollam had a right to a personal action, the High Court held that the duty of company 
directors to act honestly and in accordance with their fiduciary duties is owed not only to the 
company, but “also to the shareholders personally.”183 The High Court found justification for 
this statement in the provisions of section 218(2) of the Companies Act.184 It proclaimed that 
the debate whether at common law directors owe a fiduciary duty to an individual shareholder 
is rendered largely academic by section 218(2), which makes it clear that such a duty is owed 
to individual shareholders.185 The court consequently held that the fact that directors owe a duty 
to shareholders personally, as indicated by section 218(2), meant that a shareholder could not 
seek to proceed derivatively to obtain the remedy available in terms of section 162 of the 
Companies Act because a shareholder had personal standing to seek the relief.186  
 
It is respectfully submitted that the reliance by the High Court in Lewis Group Limited v 
Woollam187 on the dictum of Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill188 is questionable for two reasons. The 
first is that the validity of the test formulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal, in terms of which 
a distinction is drawn between personal and derivative actions, has been questioned and 
criticised.189 It has been argued that shareholder actions cannot all be arbitrarily placed in one 
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189 A derivative action is one for the redress of a wrong to the company itself while a personal action by a 
shareholder is to redress the wrong done to the shareholder as distinct from the company (Beck “The Shareholders’ 
Derivative Action” 185; McGuiness Canadian Business Corporations Law 1360; Coetzee “A Comparative 
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category to the exclusion of others.190 It has further been argued that there will always remain 
grey areas of wrongs that do not lend themselves to easy categorisation, and that in practice, 
the line between personal and derivative actions is not clear.191 It has been contended that it is 
particularly difficult to distinguish one from the other, particularly when personal and 
derivative actions are interrelated.192  
 
Likewise, in South African law there could in many instances be an overlap between a personal 
claim and a derivative action in that the same wrong may violate the rights of both the 
shareholder personally as well as those of the company.193 It is argued that merely because an 
applicant has available to him, or has already commenced, a personal claim against the 
defendant is an insufficient basis for concluding that a derivative action is contrary to the best 
interest of the company, and for withholding leave to institute a derivative action.194 The 
attempt made by the court in Group Limited v Woollam195 to classify the enforcement rights in 
section 162 of the Companies Act as a personal or a statutory derivative action has been 
criticised.196  It has been argued that any attempt to do so would lead to confusion and would 
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detract from the importance of the remedy since the remedy in section 162 is sui generis to the 
Companies Act, and to justify or interpret section 162 with reference to the personal right or 
statutory derivative action would serve no purpose.197 
 
It is submitted that the second reason why the High Court’s reliance in Lewis Group Limited v 
Woollam198 on the dictum of Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill199 is questionable is that the assertion 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders200 is, 
respectfully, generally regarded as being incorrect.201 Welling202 states that it “is absolutely 
clear in Canadian law that the person to whom corporate managers owe their duty is the 
corporation: not the shareholders, not the creditors, not the general public, but the corporate 
entity itself.” Welling, Smith & Rotman203 assert further that Goldex Mines Ltd v Revill204 
contains “many dangerous statements which, as they come from the Court of Appeal, will 
inevitably be picked up and cited in support of further extensions of fiduciary duties”.  In the 
leading Canadian case of Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise205 the Supreme 
Court of Canada affirmed that 
 
“[a]t all times, directors and officers owe their fiduciary obligation to the corporation. The 
interests of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of the creditors or those 
of any other stakeholders.” 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the ruling by the High Court in Lewis Group Limited 
v Woollam206 that directors owe a duty to shareholders personally, as indicated by section 
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218(2) of the Companies Act, is likewise questionable. It is widely accepted that under the 
South African common law directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company and do 
not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders individually.207 There may be certain specific or 
special circumstances based on the facts of the particular case where directors may be found to 
owe a fiduciary duty to a specific individual shareholder.208 It is nevertheless generally accepted 
that under the common law, although a director may owe fiduciary duties to an individual 
shareholder, he does not do so by the mere fact of being a director, but only where some 
personal relationship arises between the director and shareholder, or because of some particular 
dealing or transaction between them.209  
 
Section 218(2) of the Companies Act states that a person who contravenes “any provision” of 
the Companies Act is liable to “any other person” for any loss or damage suffered by that person 
as a result of that contravention. While the words “any other person” in section 218(2) would 
include shareholders and the reference to “any provision” of the Companies Act would include 
the directors’ fiduciary duties set out in section 76 of the Companies Act210 in order for a 
shareholder to rely on section 218(2) to institute an action against a director for a breach of his 
fiduciary duties, the shareholder must have personally suffered some “loss or damage” as a 
result of the breach of fiduciary duty. A plaintiff under a section 218(2) claim must specify the 
exact loss or damage sustained by him as a result of the contravention of the Companies Act.211 
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To succeed on the basis of section 218(2), it must not only be shown that a person had 
contravened a provision of the Companies Act and that another person had suffered loss or 
damage, but it must also be shown that such loss or damage suffered was as a result of that 
contravention.212 In other words, there must be proof of a causal link or connection between 
the contravention of the Companies Act, and the damage or loss for which the person may be 
held liable.213  
 
A director’s breach of a fiduciary duty would in most instances not necessarily result in personal 
loss or damage being suffered by a shareholder. In most instances the loss or damage would be 
suffered by the company itself. The so-called loss suffered by a shareholder by way of a 
reduction in the value of his shares is merely reflective of the loss suffered by the company and 
is not a loss in its own right.214 In Lewis Group Limited v Woollam215 the court accepted that 
the reflective loss suffered by a shareholder by way of a diminution in the value of his shares 
may not be claimed under section 218(2) of the Companies Act. Accordingly, it is submitted 
that section 218(2) of the Companies Act is not in fact any indication that directors owe their 
fiduciary duties to shareholders personally since a shareholder may not generally institute an 
action against a director for breach of his fiduciary duty under section 218(2). He may do so 
only if he has personally suffered some loss or damage, which he is able to accurately quantify, 
as a result of the breach of the director’s fiduciary duty.  It is with respect, submitted that section 
218(2) has not altered the common law position that directors generally stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company and not to the individual shareholders, as proclaimed by the court 
in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam.216 It follows that the High Court’s assertion that Woollam 
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could not seek to proceed derivatively to obtain the remedy available in terms of section 162 
of the Companies Act because he had personal standing to seek the relief, is contentious.  
 
It is moreover respectfully submitted that, contrary to the assertion of the High Court in 
Lewis Group Limited v Woollam,217 there is merit, in the interests of justice, in a shareholder 
proceeding derivatively for the relief provided for in section 162 of the Companies Act, instead 
of instituting the proceedings himself. One cogent reason why a shareholder may wish to 
choose to serve a demand on a company in terms of section 165(2) of the Companies Act to 
commence legal proceedings to declare its directors delinquent is that the shareholder would 
not have to personally bear the high costs and expenses of legal proceedings. If the company 
complies with the shareholder’s demand under section 165(2) of the Companies Act to initiate 
delinquency proceedings, the shareholder’s legal costs would be minimal and he may not even 
have to enter a court room.218  
 
Section 165(10) of the Companies Act provides that a court may make any order it considers 
appropriate about the costs of the person who applied for or was granted leave to institute 
derivative proceedings, the company or any other party to the proceedings. If a shareholder is 
successful under section 165 of the Companies Act in instituting derivative proceedings, the 
company may be ordered by the court to bear his legal costs and expenses. Even if a shareholder 
is not successful in instituting derivative action proceedings, a court may, in its discretion, 
require the company to bear the legal costs and expenses of the proceedings. A court may for 
instance make such a determination if the shareholder had acted bona fide and his application 
was meritorious despite the fact that it was unsuccessful. In contrast, section 162 of the 
Companies Act does not contain any provisions relating to the costs orders which a court may 
grant.  Presumably, the common law rule that costs follow the event would apply, that is, that 
costs are generally awarded against the unsuccessful party and that the successful party should 
be awarded his costs.219 This means that a shareholder who is unsuccessful under section 162 
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would have to bear the legal costs and expenses of all the parties involved in the application. It 
seems onerous and burdensome to require a shareholder who institutes an action under section 
162 of the Companies Act to bear all the legal costs, particularly if the purpose of section 162 
is said to be “essentially to the provision of a protective remedy in the public interest.”220 The 
unfairness of the costs burden on a single shareholder is further underscored if one considers 
that all the shareholders of a company would benefit from the shareholder’s efforts if his 
application to declare a director delinquent is successful. A bona fide shareholder who does not 
have deep pockets but wishes to protect the company or the public from the future misconduct 
of a director of a company would be discouraged and disincentivised from instituting a section 
162 application, if he is required to bear the risk of personally paying for the legal costs. This 
may result in shareholder apathy, and in delinquent directors escaping accountability for their 
misconduct. On the other hand, if the bona fide shareholder were empowered to serve a demand 
on a company in terms of section 165(2) to commence legal proceedings or to institute 
delinquency proceedings by means of a derivative action, this could encourage and incentivise 
him, to do so in the public interest and the interest of the company. On this basis it is submitted 
that there is certainly merit, in the interests of justice, in permitting shareholders to institute 
delinquency proceedings in terms of section 165 of the Companies Act.221  
 
The court in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam222 conceded that the language of sections 162 
and 165 of the Companies Act read together do not explicitly exclude the use of the derivative 
action procedure in section 162 proceedings. It held that it is not inconceivable that, 
exceptionally, it might be “appropriate in certain circumstances”223 for a shareholder to institute 
delinquency proceedings derivatively. One example the court gave where a shareholder may 
do so is where a company has already instituted proceedings for a declaration of delinquency, 
but has failed to prosecute the proceedings to conclusion. In these circumstances the best 
interests of the company might be served, the court stated, by the continuation by the 
shareholder of the proceedings derivatively because the costs that had already been incurred by 
the company would be squandered if the shareholder were to initiate proceedings afresh for the 
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same relief on the same facts in his own name.224  However, this is an exception, and in general, 
the court held that a shareholder must institute delinquency proceedings personally rather than 
by means of a derivative action.  
 
The legislature explicitly empowered a shareholder, director, prescribed officer, registered 
trade union that represents employees of the company or another representative of employees 
of the company to apply to court both for an order declaring a director delinquent and to institute 
proceedings by means of the derivative action procedure.225 As the court in Lewis Group 
Limited v Woollam226 itself conceded, the language of sections 162 and 165 read together do 
not expressly exclude the use of the derivative action procedure in section 162 proceedings. It 
is submitted that had the legislature wished to exclude delinquency proceedings being instituted 
by means of a derivative action, it would have expressly done so.  
 
The High Court in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam227 failed to comprehensively define when 
it might be “appropriate in certain circumstances” for a shareholder to institute delinquency 
proceedings derivatively and when these exceptional circumstances may arise. Only one 
example of when it might be appropriate was provided, that is, when a company has already 
instituted delinquency proceedings but fails to prosecute them to conclusion.228 Should a 
shareholder wish to use the derivative action procedure in section 162 proceedings, he may first 
have to overcome the hurdle of convincing the court that he is doing so in “appropriate” 
circumstances. This additional hurdle is expressly required by neither section 165 nor by 
section 162 of the Companies Act. It may well unnecessarily complicate the already complex 
and multifaceted procedures laid down in section 165 of the Companies Act. It is submitted 
that the circumstances when it would be appropriate to use the derivative action procedure in 
                                                 
224 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 51. 
 
225 See ss 162(2) and 165(2) of the Companies Act. A company secretary is explicitly empowered to apply to court 
for an order declaring a director delinquent but not to institute proceedings by means of the derivative action 
procedure. Leave may however be granted to a company secretary to do so under s 165(2)(d) of the Companies 
Act, in terms of which a court may grant leave to a person to institute proceedings by means of the derivative 
action if the court is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so to protect a legal right of that other person.  
 
226 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 50. 
 
227 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 50. 
 
228 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 50. 
 
358 
 
section 162 proceedings are vague and have not been clearly defined by the court in 
Lewis Group Limited v Woollam.229 
 
In contrast, the MBCA and the DGCL make explicit provision for derivative action proceedings 
to be instituted by a shareholder to remove a director from office. Under section 8.09(a) of the 
MBCA, a court may remove a director of the company from office in proceedings commenced 
“by or in the right of the corporation” (that is, derivative actions). The proceedings must be 
brought by the board of directors, or by a shareholder, who must sue derivatively.230 Section 
8.09(b) of the MBCA states that a shareholder proceeding on behalf of the corporation under 
section 8.09(a) must comply with all the requirements of subchapter 7D of the MBCA, dealing 
with derivative actions (save for section 7.41(i)).231 Likewise, section 225(c) of the DGCL 
states that judicial removal proceedings must be instituted “upon application by the corporation, 
or derivatively in the right of the corporation by any stockholder”. Other USA States which 
also require judicial removal proceedings of a director to be commenced derivatively in the 
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right of the company by the shareholders are Connecticut,232 the District of Columbia,233 
Idaho,234 Iowa,235 South Dakota236 and Wyoming.237 As was mentioned above238 only one USA 
State, Pennsylvania, permits a single shareholder to bring an action to remove a director from 
office. Section 1726(d) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law is akin to section 162 
of the (South African) Companies Act in that it empowers a single shareholder to apply to court 
to remove a director from office. The former provision nevertheless states that the company 
must be a party to the application, and the shareholder must in addition comply with the 
requirements relating to derivative actions.239 Section 162(2) of the (South African) Companies 
Act is comparatively much wider than the MBCA, the DGCL and the corporate legislation of 
several USA States in that it permits not only a single shareholder to commence judicial 
removal proceedings under section 162 but, according to Lewis Group Limited v Woollam,240 
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corporation must comply with the requirements of derivative actions, contained in ss 47-1A-740 to 47-1A-747. 
This provision is codified in Chapter 01A (South Dakota Business Corporation Act), Title 47 (Corporations) of 
the South Dakota Codified Laws. 
 
237 Section 17-16-809(a) of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act provides that judicial removal proceedings 
must be commenced “by or in the right of the corporation” and that a shareholder proceeding on behalf of the 
corporation must comply with the requirements of derivative actions, contained in ss 17-16-740 to 17-16-747. 
This provision is codified in Chapter 16 (Wyoming Business Corporation Act), Title 17 (Corporations, 
Partnerships and Associations) of the Wyoming Code. 
 
238 See para 3.3.1.1 above. 
 
239 Section 1726(c) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law. 
 
240 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC). 
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such proceedings may not be commenced derivatively by the shareholder but must be 
commenced in the shareholder’s own name. 
 
The High Court in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam241 asserted that it had not encountered a 
case in South Africa or abroad, in which the type of relief sought by Woollam under section 
162 of the Companies Act had been sought or granted in derivative proceedings. The court did 
not, however, consider USA law on the question whether proceedings to court to remove a 
director from office may be instituted by means of the derivative actions. As mentioned,242 
section 5(2) of the Companies Act states that, to the extent appropriate, a court interpreting or 
applying the Companies Act may consider foreign company law. In Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 
153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd and Others243 the High Court observed 
that company law in South Africa has for many decades tracked the English system and had 
taken its lead from the relevant English Companies Act and jurisprudence, but section 5(2) of 
our Companies Act now encourages our courts in interpreting the Companies Act to look 
further afield and to have regard in appropriate circumstances to other corporate law 
jurisdictions, be they American, European, Asian or African. Since USA law makes explicit 
provision for derivative action proceedings to be instituted by a shareholder to remove a 
director from office, under section 5(2) of the Companies Act, the court in Lewis Group v 
Woollam244 ought to have also considered USA law in determining whether a shareholder may 
institute court proceedings to remove a director from office by means of the derivative action. 
The court’s judgment may have been influenced in a different direction had it considered USA 
law on this point.245 
 
3.3.1.3 Company Secretary, Prescribed Officer, Trade Union and Employee Representative 
 
A company secretary, prescribed officer of the company, registered trade union that represents 
employees of the company or another representative of the employees of the company may 
                                                 
241 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 6. 
 
242 See chapter 1, para 3. 
 
243 2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC) para 26. 
 
244 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC). 
 
245 R Cassim “The Launching of Delinquency Proceedings under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 by means of the 
Derivative Action: Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)” 685-687.  
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apply to court, under section 162(2) of the Companies Act, for an order declaring a director 
delinquent or under probation. It should be noted that this group of persons is not empowered 
to institute proceedings to remove a director from office under section 71(3). This widens 
considerably the range of persons who have locus standi to apply to court to remove a director 
from office compared to the equivalent provisions under the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA and the 
corporate legislation of various USA States, which do not confer locus standi on this group of 
persons to apply to court to remove a director from office. There is much potential for a 
registered trade union that represents employees of the company or another representative of 
the employees of the company to put directors under considerable pressure by exercising or 
threatening to exercise such rights.246 The mere fact that this group of persons has locus standi 
to apply to court under section 162 of the Companies to declare directors delinquent may be 
daunting for most directors even if the prospects of a court declaring them delinquent may be 
minimal in the circumstances.247 
 
3.3.2  Locus Standi of the CIPC and the Takeover Regulation Panel under Section 162 of 
the Companies Act 
 
The CIPC and the Takeover Regulation Panel may institute proceedings to declare a director 
delinquent or to place him under probation.248 One example where the CIPC exercised its rights 
                                                 
246 J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African 
Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 277. 
 
247 J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African 
Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 277. 
 
248 Section 162(3) of the Companies Act. The Takeover Regulation Panel is established by s 196 of the Companies 
Act as a juristic person, to function as an organ of state within the public administration, but as an institution 
outside the public service.  It has jurisdiction throughout South Africa. It is independent, and is subject only to the 
Constitution, the law and any policy statement, directive or request issued to it by the Minister in terms of the 
Companies Act. It must be impartial and must perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. In carrying 
out its functions the Takeover Regulation Panel may have regard to international developments in the field of 
company law. It may also consult any person, organisation or institution with regard to any matter. The Takeover 
Regulation Panel is responsible for regulating affected transactions and offers to the extent provided for in Parts 
B (Authority of Panel and Takeover Regulations) and C (Regulation of affected transactions and offers) of Chapter 
5 (Fundamental transactions, takeovers and offers) of the Companies Act and the Takeover Regulations, 
investigating complaints with respect to affected transactions and offers in accordance with Part D of Chapter 7 
of the Companies Act, applying for a court order to wind up a company in the manner contemplated in s 81(1)(f) 
of the Companies Act, and consulting with the Minister in respect of additions, deletions or amendments to the 
Takeover Regulations (see ss 196 and 201 of the Companies Act). On 30 January 2018 Steinhoff International 
Holdings N.V. (Incorporated in the Netherlands) (“Steinhoff International”) announced the receipt of a compliance 
notice by the CIPC. The compliance notice gave the directors of Steinhoff International six months to identify the 
individuals involved in the falsification of accounting records. The notice further required the board of directors 
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under section 162 of the Companies Act was with regard to a director of a state-owned 
company, the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation SOC Limited (NECSA). In 2016 the 
CIPC applied to the Gauteng High Court, Pretoria for the chief executive officer of NECSA to 
be placed under probation in terms of section 162(7) of the Companies Act. Some of the 
directors of NECSA had complained to the CIPC that the chief executive officer had violated 
NECSA’s motor vehicle policy, and had refused to comply with a board instruction to 
reimburse NECSA for the personal use of a company vehicle. Following an investigation, the 
CIPC applied to the Gauteng High Court, Pretoria to have the director placed under probation. 
The basis for the application was that the director had acted in a manner materially inconsistent 
with the duties of a director.249  
 
3.3.3  Locus Standi of an Organ of State under Section 162 of the Companies Act 
 
An organ of state responsible for the administration of any legislation may institute proceedings 
to declare a director delinquent. An “organ of state” has the meaning set out in section 239 of 
the Constitution.250 Section 239 of the Constitution defines an “organ of state” as meaning: 
                                                 
to institute criminal action against the individuals identified in the falsification of accounts. In addition, the 
compliance notice required the board to institute civil action in terms of ss 77 (liability of directors and prescribed 
officers) and 162 of the Companies Act against the directors responsible for the falsification of accounting records 
(see JSE SENS announcement (30 January 2018) available at https://www.moneyweb.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/ftp/senspdfs/SENS_20180130_S394527.pdf?x31826 (accessed on 31 January 2018) and Crotty 
“Steinhoff served with hard-hitting compliance notice” (31 January 2018) available at 
https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/retail-and-consumer/2018-01-31-steinhoff-served-with-hard-
hitting-compliance-notice/ (accessed on 31 January 2018)). Irrespective of whether or not the board of directors 
of Steinhoff International takes steps to declare any of its directors delinquent, the CIPC has locus standi in terms 
of s 162(3) of the Companies Act to apply to court to declare any such directors delinquent if valid grounds to do 
so exist. 
 
249 See s 162(7)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act. Soon after this application was made, a former director of NECSA 
applied to have the chief executive officer of NECSA declared a delinquent director on the grounds that, inter 
alia, he had misled the board of directors, he had failed to inform it that he had not obtained security clearance, he 
had appointed a chief financial officer who had been suspended from his former position for procurement 
irregularities, he had provided funds to a political party without the consent of the board and he would not co-
operate with the auditor-general in providing necessary documentation. Despite this pending court application, the 
chief executive officer was reappointed in December 2016 to the board of directors of NECSA for a further three 
years. The chairman of NECSA declared that the complaints by the previous board over the conduct of the chief 
executive officer, which included the abuse of the company car, had been defeated (Paton “Regulator seeks to 
penalize Necsa CE” (22 January 2016) available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/energy/2016-
01-22-regulator-seeks-to-penalise-necsa-ce/  (accessed on 3 April 2017); Phandle “Necsa hit by second court case” 
(27 January 2016) available at http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/business/2016/01/27/necsa-hit-by-second-court-
case/ (accessed on 3 April 2017); Paton “Necsa boss gets three more years at the helm” (12 December 2016) 
available at https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/business-day/20161212/281500750884840 (accessed on 3 
April 2017).  
 
250 Section 1 of the Companies Act. 
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  “(a)   any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local 
          sphere of government; or 
      (b)    any other functionary or institution- 
(i)  exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a 
provincial constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial officer” 
 
It follows from the above definition that any Department of State or Department of 
administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government which administers any 
legislation may institute proceedings to declare a director delinquent. A court or a judicial 
officer may not institute proceedings to declare a director delinquent since they fall outside the 
scope of the definition.251 An organ of state responsible for the administration of any legislation 
may institute proceedings to declare a director delinquent, but not to place him under 
probation.252 When an organ of state applies to court for an order declaring a director delinquent 
it must serve a copy of its application on the CIPC.253 
 
3.3.4  Guarding Against Abuse of Section 162  
 
It is important to guard against abuse of applications to declare directors delinquent. Persons 
with locus standi may use the mechanism of applying to court to declare a director delinquent 
or to place him under probation to lodge vexatious claims. This may result in damage being 
caused to the company and the reputation of the directors.254 This is especially important with 
regard to a public company that is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, where the value 
of the company’s shares may easily be affected by the mere fact of the institution of an 
application in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act.  
 
                                                 
251 On the meaning of “organ of state” see Minister of Education, Western Cape, and Others v Governing Body, 
Mikro Primary School, and Another 2006 (1) SA 1 (SCA) para 20; Mittalsteel South Africa Ltd (formerly Iscor 
Ltd) v Hlatshwayo 2007 (1) SA 66 (SCA) paras 6 and 19 and Katshwa and Others v Cape Town Community 
Housing Co (Pty) Ltd and Four Similar Cases 2014 (2) SA 128 (WCC) paras 46-47. 
 
252 Section 162(4) of the Companies Act gives standing to an organ of state to apply to a court for an order declaring 
a person delinquent, but does not make any mention of an order to place a person under probation. 
 
253 Section 162(13) of the Companies Act. 
 
254 R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 436. 
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For example, in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam255 Lewis Group Limited, a public company 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, argued that Woollam had not acted in good faith 
by launching proceedings to have four directors of the company declared delinquent, and that 
his application had been vexatious. The company contended that Woollam was involved in 
short-selling activities,256 and that his conduct in instituting delinquency proceedings against 
the directors of the company was directed at driving down the share price of the company in 
order to benefit these activities.257 The negative publicity given to the company as a result of 
the delinquency proceedings instituted by the shareholder had an adverse effect on the share 
price of the company.258 The court noted that Woollam had failed to disclose his short-selling 
activities when making public his adverse opinions of the business activities of the company.259 
The court proclaimed that this had raised an ethical question, but the court did not decide on 
whether Woollam had acted in bad faith as the company had already referred this issue to the 
Financial Services Board for investigation.260 Due to insufficient evidence the Financial 
Services Board subsequently cleared Woollam of insider trading.261 The decision in Lewis 
Group Limited v Woollam262 illustrates the extent of the power conferred on a single 
                                                 
255 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC). This case is discussed in para 3.3.1.2 above. 
 
256 Short-selling is an investment strategy whereby the investor “borrows” shares for an agreed fee from a holder 
thereof, and sells them into the market at a time when he expects the price to drop.  The investor then purchases 
an equivalent number of shares at the lower price to which they have fallen to be able to return them to the “lender”, 
which is usually a brokerage firm. The investor’s profit is the difference between the price at which he sold the 
shares and that at which he purchased replacements to return to the “lender”, less the costs of the transactions (see 
Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 85; S v Mcpherson 1972 (2) SA 348 (E) at 354; 
Hannover Group Reinsurance (Pty) Ltd and Another v Gungudoo and Another [2011] 1 All SA 549 (GSJ) para 
6; Chitimira A Comparative Analysis of the Enforcement of Market Abuse Provisions (2012) (Unpublished LLD 
Thesis) 178-181; Chitimira “Unpacking Selected Key Elements of the Insider Trading and Market Manipulation 
Offences in South Africa” at 36). 
 
257 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 86. 
 
258 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 86. 
 
259 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 87. 
 
260 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 87.  
 
261 FSB Press Release (28 September 2016) available at 
https://www.fsb.co.za/Departments/communications/Documents/2016-09-28%20(2).pdf (accessed on 7 April 
2017); Smith “Consumer watchdog cleared of Lewis allegations” (30 September 2016) available at 
http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Retail/consumer-watchdog-cleared-of-lewis-allegations-20160930 (accessed 
on 7 April 2017); S Cassidy “Woollam shrugs off ‘dirty tricks and lies’ in Lewis fight” (30 September 2016) 
available at http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/woollam-shrugs-off-dirty-tricks-and-lies-in-lewis-
fight-2074840 (accessed on 7 April 2017). 
 
262 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC). 
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shareholder to institute proceedings to declare a director delinquent. If done in bad faith, not 
only the reputation of the directors concerned but also the share price of a company may 
potentially be detrimentally affected. Of course, if the application under section 162 of the 
Companies Act is proved to be vexatious, frivolous or without any merit, a court would not 
grant an order of delinquency against the director concerned, but while pending the application 
may nevertheless still affect the reputation of the director concerned as well as the share price 
of the company. 
 
As the court in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam263 pointed out, section 162 of the Companies 
Act does not contain any filters or safeguards to guard against applications that are vexatious, 
frivolous or without merit. It is submitted that if a shareholder were to institute proceedings to 
declare a director delinquent by means of a derivative action, this would have the advantage of 
quickly curbing the abuse of section 162 since a court would be able to screen out at a 
preliminary stage any proceedings instituted with an ulterior motive. The court held further that 
in considering whether to set aside a shareholder’s demand in terms of section 165(3) of the 
Companies Act, a court may take the good faith of the shareholder into account.264 Accordingly 
if a shareholder were to institute proceedings to declare a director delinquent by means of a 
derivative action, the good faith requirement would serve to filter out at any early stage any 
applications that are frivolous or vexatious. The damage done to the share price of Lewis Group 
Limited and to the reputation of directors could well have been more extensive had the 
application been instituted by Woollam personally, and had the directors of the company been 
involved in a protracted legal battle, in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act.265  
Moreover, if a company is able to successfully apply to court to set aside a demand in terms of 
section 165(3) on the ground that it is frivolous, vexatious or without merit, this may well serve 
to discourage a shareholder from thereafter proceeding under section 162 to declare the 
directors of the company delinquent.266  
 
                                                 
263 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 47. 
 
264 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 89. 
 
265 See further R Cassim “The Launching of Delinquency Proceedings under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 by 
means of the Derivative Action: Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)” 683-685.  
 
266 R Cassim “The Launching of Delinquency Proceedings under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 by means of the 
Derivative Action: Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC)” 682. 
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3.4  The Grounds for a Declaration of Delinquency  
 
Section 162(5) of the Companies Act lists the grounds which may be relied on by a person with 
locus standi to apply to court to declare a director delinquent. Each group of persons with locus 
standi to apply to court to declare a person delinquent267 may raise specific grounds of 
delinquency and probation, as set out in sections 162(2), 162(3) and 162(4) of the Companies 
Act. A declaration of delinquency must be made in relation to one of the statutory grounds set 
out in section 162 of the Companies Act.268 In Cook: Geoffrey v Hesber Impala (Pty) Ltd and 
Others269 the application to declare a director delinquent was unsuccessful because the 
applicant was unable to establish that any one of the specific grounds stipulated in section 162 
of the Companies Act had been contravened.270  
 
While the first two grounds of delinquency referred to in paragraphs 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below 
relate to individuals serving as directors when already prohibited from doing so,271 in Grancy 
Property Limited v Gihwala272 the court termed the other grounds listed in section 162(5)(c) of 
the Companies Act as “substantive” abuses of office. The court commented that the conduct 
listed in section 162(5)(c) falls under the description of conduct that evinces a lack of genuine 
                                                 
267 The groups of persons with locus standi to apply to court to declare a director delinquent are discussed above 
in paras 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. 
 
268 Cook: Geoffrey v Hesber Impala (Pty) Ltd and Others (2014/45832) [2016] ZAGPJHC 23 (19 February 2016) 
paras 60-61. 
 
269 (2014/45832) [2016] ZAGPJHC 23 (19 February 2016). 
 
270 The applicant and respondent were directors of Hesber Impala (Pty) Ltd. The applicant argued that the 
respondent had grossly abused his position as a director, taken personal advantage of an opportunity and 
intentionally inflicted harm upon the company by constructing an illegal structure on the company’s property 
without municipal planning or environmental approval, and further conducting illegal tourist activities thereon. 
The applicant argued that this action of the respondent had exposed the company to the danger of having an illegal 
structure erected on its property for which no public liability insurance could be obtained. Therefore, the applicant 
argued, the company had been exposed to substantial risk and possible criminal proceedings. The respondent 
contended that the structure was merely temporary and had been erected on the property with the consent of the 
applicant. The court found that there was a dispute of material facts whether the applicant had consented to the 
erection by the respondent of the structure, and whether or not the structure had been permanent or temporary. In 
light of the dispute of material facts the court held that the application to declare the respondent a delinquent 
director could not be resolved on the papers. For this reason the court dismissed the application to declare the 
respondent a delinquent director.  
 
271 Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 156. 
 
272 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 156. 
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concern for the company’s prosperity.273 In Lewis Group Limited v Woollam274 the court 
observed that for a company or any of its shareholders to succeed in obtaining a declaration of 
delinquency in respect of any of the company’s directors they must demonstrate very serious 
misconduct by the director concerned. Establishing so-called “ordinary” negligence, poor 
business decision-making, or misguided reliance by a director on incorrect professional advice 
would not be enough under section 162 of the Companies Act.275 A similar sentiment was 
expressed by Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd276 in 
respect of the equivalent remedy under section 295 of the UK Companies Act of 1985 (the 
predecessor of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986). The learned judge 
remarked in this case that ordinary commercial misjudgment is in itself not sufficient to justify 
disqualification, and that in the normal case the conduct complained of must display a lack of 
commercial probity.277  
 
The grounds on which a declaration of delinquency may be made by a court, stipulated in 
section 162 of the Companies Act, are next discussed. Thereafter, other grounds for the judicial 
removal of directors in the UK, Australia and the USA, which are not provided for in the (South 
African) Companies Act, are considered. 
 
3.4.1  Consenting to Serve as a Director while Ineligible or Disqualified 
 
The first ground of delinquency in section 162(5)(a) of the Companies Act is that the person 
consented to serve as a director or acted in the capacity of a director or prescribed officer whilst 
ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69 of the Companies Act.278  
 
Section 162(5)(a) of the Companies Act states that this ground of delinquency does not apply 
if the person was acting under the protection of a court order contemplated in section 69(11) or 
                                                 
273 Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 176. 
 
274 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 18. 
 
275 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 18. 
 
276 1988 2 All ER 692. 
 
277 Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd 1988 2 All ER 692 at 696. 
 
278 See chapter 3, paras 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 for a discussion of the grounds of ineligibility and disqualification to be a 
director.  
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as a director contemplated in section 69(12). In terms of section 69(11) of the Companies Act 
a court may exempt a person from the application of the grounds of disqualification set out in 
section 69(8)(b) of the Companies Act.279 The reference to section 69(12) in section 
162(5)(a)(ii) is an error as section 69(12) was deleted by section 46(c) of the Companies 
Amendment Act 3 of 2011.  
 
As was mentioned above, this ground of delinquency relates to a person serving or acting as a 
director when already prohibited from doing so.280 It may be relied on by the first and the 
second group of persons with locus standi under section 162 of the Companies Act referred to 
in paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.281  
 
3.4.2  Acting as a Director while under a Probation Order 
 
In terms of section 162(5)(b) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a 
person to be a delinquent director if the person while under a probation order in terms of section 
162 of the Companies Act or in terms of section 47 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, 
acted as a director in a manner that contravened that order.282 A contravention of a probation 
order is thus a ground for being declared a delinquent director. This ground of delinquency 
relates to a person acting as a director when already prohibited from doing so283 and may be 
relied on by the first and the second group of persons with locus standi under section 162 of 
the Companies Act referred to in paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.284  
 
                                                 
279 The exemption from the application of the grounds of disqualification is discussed further in chapter 3, para 
6.1.3. 
 
280 See Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 156.  
 
281 Sections 162(2)(b)(i) and 162(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
282 Section 47 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 disqualifies certain persons from managing a close 
corporation. These persons include a person under legal disability, an unrehabilitated insolvent, a person who is 
disqualified from being a director of a company in terms of s 69(8) to (11) of the Companies Act and a person 
who has been placed under probation by a court in terms of s 162 of the Companies Act or s 47(1C) of the Close 
Corporations Act 69 of 1984. Section 47(1C) confirms that s 162 of the Companies Act, read with the changes 
required by the context, applies to a close corporation. 
 
283 See Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 156. 
 
284 Sections 162(2)(b)(i) and 162(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
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3.4.3  Gross Abuse of the Position of a Director 
  
 In terms of section 162(5)(c)(i) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a 
person a delinquent director if the person, while a director, grossly abused the position of 
director. This ground of delinquency may be relied on by the first and the second group of 
persons with locus standi under section 162 of the Companies Act referred to in paragraphs 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.285 The term “gross abuse” has not been defined in the Companies Act. 
A court would have a discretion to determine whether a director’s conduct amounts to “gross 
abuse” of the position of director.  
 
 The inclusion of the ground of “gross abuse of the position of director” as a basis for the judicial 
removal of a director in the (South African) Companies Act appears to have been influenced 
by the corresponding section 8.09(a) of the MBCA. The section states that a court may remove 
a director from office in a proceeding commenced by or in the right of the company if the court 
finds that the director “grossly abused the position of director”. USA States which have adopted 
the ground of grossly abusing the position of director include Connecticut,286 the District of 
Columbia,287 Idaho,288 Iowa,289 South Dakota290 and Wyoming.291 Section 8.35(b) of the 
Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 requires the gross abuse of the position of director 
to have been “to the detriment of the corporation”. In contrast, under section 162 of the (South 
African) Companies Act, whether or not the director’s gross abuse of his position was to the 
detriment of the company is irrelevant – it is sufficient as a ground of delinquency if the director 
grossly abused his position, even if this was not to the detriment of the corporation.  
 
 In Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others292 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
found that gross abuse is not a trivial misdemeanour or an unfortunate fall of grace. As Binns-
                                                 
285 Sections 162(2)(b)(i) and 162(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
286 Section 33-743(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes. 
 
287 Section 29-306.09(a)(1) of the District of Columbia Code. 
 
288 Section 30-29-809(a) of the Idaho Code. 
 
289 Section 490.809(1)(a) of the Iowa Code. 
 
290 Section 47-1A-809 of the South Dakota Business Corporation Act. 
 
291 Section 17-16-809(a)(i) of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act. 
 
292 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 143. 
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Ward J in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam293 stated, the adjective “gross” used in a context 
like “gross abuse” denotes obvious and egregious conduct. The learned judge stated further that 
gross abuse of the position of director must relate to the use of the position as director, and not 
the performance by the person concerned of his duties and functions as a director, because that 
is a matter dealt with in terms of section 162(5)(c)(iv) of the Companies Act.294   
 
An example of a gross abuse of the position of a director in a South African company is found 
in Demetriades and Another v Tollie and Others.295 In this case the court declared a director of 
a company delinquent on the basis that he had grossly abused the position of director in that he 
took advantage of information of the company of which he was a director, and had seized an 
opportunity to directly compete with the company by means of another company of which he 
was also a director.296 This case seems to indicate that directors who are found to have taken 
personal advantage of information or to have appropriated corporate opportunities in breach of 
their fiduciary obligations to the company,297 will generally be found to have grossly abused 
their positions as directors.  
 
 A further example of a gross abuse of the position of director emanates from the USA case of 
Markovitz v Markovitz.298 It was alleged in this case, as a ground for the removal of a director 
                                                 
293 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 14. 
 
294 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 14. See paras 3.4.6 and 3.4.7 below where the 
provisions of s 162(5)(c)(iv) of the Companies Act are discussed. 
 
295 2015 ZANCHC 17. 
 
296 The court found further that the director had acted in a manner that had amounted to a breach of trust by using 
the information of the company with the intention to compete with it through another company of which he was 
also a director. Such acts, the court held, satisfy the requirements set out in s 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act 
(Demetriades and Another v Tollie and Others 2015 ZANCHC 17 para 60). 
297 Taking personal advantage of information or an opportunity, contrary to s 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act, is 
listed as a ground of delinquency, in s 162(5)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act. This ground of delinquency is discussed 
below in para 3.4.4. 
 
298 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939). See also chapter 2, para 6 where this case is discussed. The shareholders who had the 
power to remove the director from office did not wish to do so because the shareholders who had elected him to 
office were his mother and brother. The majority shareholders instituted proceedings under Article IV, s 405C of 
the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1933 requesting the court to remove the director from office and 
to bar him from re-election for a period prescribed by the court. Section 405C of the Pennsylvania Business 
Corporation Law of 1933 empowered shareholders holding at least ten per cent of the shares of the company to 
institute proceedings requesting a court to remove a director in the case of fraudulent or dishonest acts, or gross 
abuse of authority or discretion. Prior to the enactment of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law the power 
to remove a director from office could be exercised only by the shareholders. 
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from office, that the director in question had grossly abused the authority and discretion vested 
in him as a director by deliberately annoying and harassing the other officers of the company 
in the performance of their duties to the detriment and harm of the business.299 It was further 
alleged that the director had demoralised the office force by making requests for detailed 
information which he already possessed; insisting that private drawers in the offices be opened; 
changing locks on doors, and making himself personally objectionable to the officers, 
employees and customers of the company such that its interests were jeopardised and the 
morale of the company was impaired.300 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the 
director had indeed harassed his fellow officers and employees in the transaction of the 
company’s business.301 The court held that the director was under a duty and responsibility to 
discharge the functions of his office with fidelity to the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, and to co-operate with the other officers of the company – and not to thwart or 
obstruct them in the performance of their duties.302 Based on the above conduct, the court held 
that the director was guilty of “gross abuse of authority”.303 The court consequently removed 
the director from his position as director and barred him from re-election for a period of two 
years.304 
 
3.4.4  Taking Personal Advantage of Information or an Opportunity 
 
In terms of section 162(5)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a 
person a delinquent director if the person, while a director, took “personal” advantage of 
information or an opportunity, contrary to section 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act. In Gihwala 
and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others305 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that 
                                                 
299 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 47. 
 
300 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 47. 
 
301 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 48. 
 
302 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 48. 
 
303 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 48. 
 
304 Markovitz v Markovitz 8 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1939) at 48. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remarked that the two-
year period during which the director had been barred from re-election was not unduly prolonged in view of the 
director’s behaviour in the company. It opined that this two-year period would undoubtedly afford a reasonable 
time for the existing friction and dissension in the company to disappear, and would serve as a warning that a 
repetition of such misconduct may serve in the future as a ground for further disqualification to hold the office of 
director (at 48). 
 
305 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 143. 
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this ground of delinquency covers two types of conduct. The first is insider trading, whereby a 
director makes use of confidential price-sensitive information which is known only because of 
his position as a director, for personal advantage. The second type of conduct is where a director 
appropriates a business opportunity that should have accrued to the company.306 This provision 
is aimed at deterring directors from making use of their positions as directors or from using 
corporate information obtained while acting as directors for their personal benefit.307 This 
ground of delinquency may be relied on by the first and the second group of persons with locus 
standi under section 162 of the Companies Act referred to in paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 
above.308  
 
Section 76(2)(a)(i) of the Companies Act provides that a director must not use the position of 
director or any information obtained while acting in the capacity of a director to gain an 
advantage for the director, or for another person other than the company or a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the company. The specific reference to the word “personal” in section 
162(5)(c)(ii) appears to impliedly indicate that this ground of delinquency applies only if the 
director in question took advantage of his position or information to gain an advantage for 
himself. This ground is therefore narrower than section 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act which 
prohibits a director from using his position or any information to gain an advantage for himself 
“or for another person other than the company or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company”.  
                                                 
306 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 143. On the corporate 
opportunity doctrine see Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554 (PC); Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co 
Ltd 1921 AD 168; Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley [1972] 2 All ER 162; Canadian Aero Service 
Ltd v O’Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371 (SCC); Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] 2 BCLC 241 (CA); Da Silva and Others 
v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 620 (SCA); Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific 
Regard to Corporate Opportunities (Unpublished LLD Thesis); Havenga “Corporate Opportunities: A South 
African Update (Part 1)” 40-55; Havenga “Corporate Opportunities: A South African Update (Part 2)” 233-251; 
Griffin Company Law Fundamental Principles 302-306; Havenga “Appropriation of Corporate Opportunities by 
Directors and Employees” 169-178; Dignam Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 395-409; 
Kershaw Company Law in Context 514-575; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 298-298(5); 
FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law at 538-554; 
Havenga “Directors’ Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 257-268; Birds 
et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 616-621; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company 
Law 504-508; Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases and Materials in Company Law 387-426; Davies 
& Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 543-551 and Hannigan Company Law 264-274. 
 
307 FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law at 550. 
For a detailed discussion of s 76(2)(a)(i) of the Companies Act see Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 297-298(6); FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 550-553 and Havenga “Directors’ Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities and the Companies Act 
71 of 2008” 265-266. 
 
308 Sections 162(2)(b)(i) and 162(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
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In terms of section 206C of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, on application by ASIC, 
a court may disqualify a person from managing corporations for a period that the court 
considers appropriate if a declaration is made under section 1317E (civil penalty provision) that 
the person has contravened a corporation or scheme civil penalty provision, and if a court is 
satisfied that the disqualification is justified. Civil penalty provisions include the fiduciary 
duties of company directors, such as the duty to exercise powers and discharge duties in good 
faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose; the duty not to improperly 
use one’s position as a director or information obtained in the capacity as a director to gain an 
advantage for oneself or someone else, or to cause detriment to the corporation.309 These 
grounds are very similar to the grounds provided for in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act. 
While section 162(5)(c)(i) of the Companies Act lists as a ground of delinquency the taking of 
“personal” advantage or information of an opportunity by a director, section 206C of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001 lists as a ground of judicial disqualification a director 
gaining an advantage for themselves “or someone else”, or using information to gain an 
advantage for themselves or “someone else”.310 Section 206C of the Australian Corporations 
Act of 2001 is thus wider in scope than section 162(5)(c)(i) of the (South African) Companies 
Act. 
 
3.4.5  Inflicting Harm Intentionally or by Gross Negligence  
 
In terms of section 162(5)(c)(iii) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a 
person a delinquent director if the person, while a director, “intentionally, or by gross 
negligence” inflicted harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the company, contrary to 
section 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act. Section 76(2)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act states that a 
director must not use the position of director or any information obtained while acting in the 
capacity of a director to knowingly cause harm to the company or a subsidiary of a company.  
 
                                                 
309 Sections 1317E, 180(1), 181(1), 182(1) and 183(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. There are 
several other civil penalty provisions on which ASIC may rely to apply to court to disqualify a director from 
managing corporations, such as contraventions in relation to financial records and financial reports (s 344(1)), 
contraventions of certain requirements regarding share capital (ss 254L(2), 256D(3), 259F(2) and 260D(2)), 
insolvent trading (s 588G(2)) and insider trading (ss 1043A(1) and 1043A(2)). 
 
310 Section 206C read with ss 1317E, 182(1)(a) and 183(1)(a) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.  
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This ground of delinquency may be relied on by the first and the second group of persons with 
locus standi under section 162 of the Companies Act referred to in paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 
above.311  
 
In Lewis Group Limited v Woollam312 the court commented that the section 162(5)(c)(iii) 
ground of delinquency is “somewhat clumsily worded”. This is because section 76(2)(a)(ii) of 
the Companies Act, on which this ground is based, refers to “knowingly” causing harm to the 
company, while section 162(5)(c)(iii) refers to inflicting harm upon the company 
“intentionally, or by gross negligence”. The court stated that while “knowingly” is readily 
reconcilable with “intentionally” it is not readily reconcilable with “gross negligence”. 
Nevertheless, the court commented, it is clear enough that what is required by section 
162(5)(c)(iii) is conduct intended to harm the company, alternatively, an attitude of 
recklessness by the director in the face of an appreciation that his conduct could cause the 
company harm.313 The meaning of the phrase “gross negligence” is this context is discussed 
further in paragraph 3.4.6 below. 
 
In Profica (Pty) Ltd v Dunkley314 the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg declared a 
director delinquent on the basis that he had knowingly inflicted harm upon a company contrary 
to section 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act. The facts, briefly, are that the first respondent had 
been employed by the first applicant initially as a senior project manager and was later 
appointed to the position of a director at Profica Project Management (Pty) Ltd. The applicants 
applied to court for an order interdicting the first respondent (the director) and the second 
respondent (a company) from utilising, exploiting and divulging its confidential and proprietary 
information, and declaring the first respondent to be a delinquent director. The court found that 
the first respondent had acted in breach of various obligations in terms of a restraint of trade 
agreement; he had breached his common law duty not to unlawfully compete with the applicant; 
                                                 
311 Sections 162(2)(b)(i) and 162(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
312 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 16. 
 
313 Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 16. For a detailed discussion of s 76(2)(a)(ii) 
of the Companies Act see FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liability of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 550-553 and Havenga “Directors’ Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities and the Companies Act 
71 of 2008” 265-266. 
 
314 2012 JDR 2394 (GSJ).  
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he had unlawfully misused the applicants’ confidential and proprietary information as a 
springboard whilst acting in competition with the applicants; he had breached his duties in 
terms of section 76(5) of the Companies Act by not declaring a personal financial interest in 
relation to the applicants’ contracts, and he had acted in breach of section 76(3) of the 
Companies Act in that he had failed to exercise his powers and perform his functions as a 
director in good faith or in the best interest of the company.315 Based on the above breaches, 
the court declared that the first respondent had used his position as a director to gain an 
advantage for himself and for the second respondent and had knowingly caused harm to the 
applicants. The court consequently granted the interdict which had been requested by the 
applicants and declared the first respondent delinquent in terms of section 162(5)(c)(iii) of the 
Companies Act.316 
 
Section 8.09(a) of the MBCA contains an equivalent ground for the judicial removal of 
directors as that contained in section 162(5)(c)(iii) of the (South African) Companies Act. In 
terms of section 8.09(a) of the MBCA a court may remove a director from office if the director 
“intentionally inflicted harm on the corporation”. USA States which have also listed the ground 
of intentionally inflicting harm on the corporation as a basis for the judicial removal of a 
director, include Connecticut,317 the District of Columbia,318 Idaho,319 Iowa,320 South Dakota321 
and Wyoming.322 This ground is, however, narrower than the one provided for in section 
162(5)(c)(iii) of the (South African) Companies Act in that gross negligence will not suffice 
for the removal by the court of a director from office under the MBCA and these USA statutes, 
as is the case under section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act. The threshold for the 
misconduct of a director before a court will remove him from office is set much higher in the 
MBCA and the legislation of these USA States than in section 162 of the (South African) 
                                                 
315 Profica (Pty) Ltd v Dunkley 2012 JDR 2394 (GSJ) para 31. 
 
316 Profica (Pty) Ltd v Dunkley 2012 JDR 2394 (GSJ) paras 37.1 and 37.2. 
 
317 Section 33-743(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes. 
 
318 Section 29-306.09(a)(1) of the District of Columbia Code. 
 
319 Section 30-29-809(1)(a) of the Idaho Code. 
 
320 Section 490.809(1)(a) of the Iowa Code. 
 
321 Section 47-1A-809 of the South Dakota Business Corporation Act. 
 
322 Section 17-16-809(a)(i) of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act. 
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Companies Act, where gross negligence would suffice to remove the director from office. A 
further respect in which the equivalent ground under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA (and the 
USA States listed above) is much narrower than section 162(5)(c)(iii) of the (South African) 
Companies Act is that under these USA provisions it must be shown that the director inflicted 
harm upon the company itself, while section 162(5)(c)(iii) extends this ground to the infliction 
of harm on a subsidiary of the company.  
 
3.4.6  Gross Negligence, Wilful Misconduct and Breach of Trust 
 
In terms of section 162(5)(c)(iv) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a 
person a delinquent director if the person, while a director, acted in a manner that amounted to 
gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the performance of the 
director’s functions within, and duties to, the company. This ground of delinquency may be 
relied on by the first and the second group of persons with locus standi under section 162 of 
the Companies Act referred to in paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.323 
 
A court has a discretion to determine whether a director’s conduct amounts to “gross 
negligence” or “wilful misconduct”. These terms have not been defined in the Companies Act. 
A court would have to interpret these terms in the context of section 162(5)(c) of the Companies 
Act, although they are not new terms in our law.  
 
Regarding the meaning of “gross negligence”, in MV Stella Tingas: Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v 
Owners of the MV Stella Tingas and Another324 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that while 
gross negligence is not an exact concept capable of precise definition, it differs from ordinary 
negligence in that it involves a departure from the standard of the reasonable person to such an 
extent that it may properly be categorised as extreme. In Gihwala and Others v Grancy 
Property Limited and Others325 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that there was a long 
history of courts treating gross negligence as the equivalent of recklessness when dealing with 
the conduct of those responsible for the administration of companies,326 and that recklessness 
                                                 
323 Sections 162(2)(b)(i) and 162(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
324 2003 (2) SA 473 (SCA) para 7. 
 
325 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 144. 
 
326 See for example Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) 143-144; 
Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) para 13 and Tsung v Industrial Development 
377 
 
is plainly serious misconduct.327 In KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v Hamman328 the court approved 
of and adopted into South African law the dictum regarding the meaning of the concept of 
“wilful misconduct” as propounded in the UK case of Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v South 
African Airways.329 In this case the concept of “wilful misconduct” was described as meaning 
conduct which goes far beyond negligence and involves a person doing or omitting to do that 
which is not only negligent but that which he knows and appreciates is wrong, and is done or 
omitted regardless of the consequences.330 In Msimang v Katuliiba331 the court ruled that in the 
determination of the terms “gross negligence” and “wilful misconduct” in the context of section 
                                                 
Corporation of South Africa 2013 (3) SA 468 (SCA) paras 29-31. In Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) 
Ltd v Snyman 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) the appellants, being former concurrent creditors of the company, had 
instituted an action against the respondents, being the directors of the company, in terms of s 424(1) of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (liability of directors for reckless or fraudulent conduct of business). Their action was 
dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal held the directors personally liable to the appellants for debts 
incurred to the company, in terms of s 424(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, where it had been established that 
at the relevant times there was no reasonable prospect of payment of the company’s debts when due. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal noted that the ordinary meaning of “recklessly” includes gross negligence and that recklessness 
itself connotes at the very least gross negligence (at 143-144). In Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 
(6) SA 585 (SCA) a father and son had run a close corporation without proper books or documentation and had 
allowed a debt due to the respondent to be transferred to the close corporation from another close corporation 
without receiving any consideration. The respondent approached the High Court for an order holding the father 
and son (the appellants) personally liable for payment of the debt on the basis of s 64(1) of the Close Corporations 
Act 69 of 1984 (liability for carrying on the business of a close corporation recklessly, with gross negligence, with 
intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose). The High Court gave judgment against the appellants 
for the full amount claimed. The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the father and son. It held that 
it was not necessary for it to be decided at this stage whether there is a meaningful difference between “reckless” 
and “gross negligence”. The court stated that acting recklessly meant a failure to give consideration to the 
consequences of one’s actions (paras 13-14). It found that the father and son had shown a reckless disregard for 
the solvency of the close corporation and for its ability to repay the debts it had incurred, and had been knowing 
parties to the reckless operation of the business of the close corporation (para 18 and paras 23-24). In Tsung v 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa 2013 (3) SA 468 (SCA) the appellants, who were directors 
of a company that ran a textile-manufacturing business in the Western Cape, had borrowed a substantial amount 
of money from the respondents to set up the business. Despite becoming factually and commercially insolvent the 
appellants had concluded transactions which had the effect of recovery of their investment in the company at the 
expense of creditors. They had also used the company’s bank account to pay their personal expenses. The 
respondents instituted an action to recover their investment in the company from the appellants personally in terms 
of s 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 on the basis that the business had been carried on recklessly or with 
intent to defraud creditors. The High Court held that the conduct of the appellants fell within the ambit of s 424 of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The directors of the company appealed this decision on the ground that there had 
been no deliberate or reckless wrongdoing in the conduct of the business. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed the decision of the High Court. It held that if one has deliberately depleted the company’s assets or 
misused its corporate form for one’s own purposes, then that conduct would fall within the ambit of s 424 (para 
31). 
 
327 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 144. 
 
328  2002 (3) SA 818 (W) para 17. 
   
329  1977 1 Lloyd's Rep 564. 
 
330 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v South African Airways 1977 1 Lloyd's Rep 564 at 569. 
 
331 2012 JDR 2391 (GSJ) para 39. The facts of this case are discussed above in note 79. 
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162(5)(c) of the Companies Act, a court must have regard to the conduct of the directors in the 
performance of their duties as directors of the company in terms of the company’s 
memorandum of incorporation and the statutory framework. This approach was approved in 
Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker.332  
 
In Companies and Intellectual Property Commission v Cresswell and Others333 the High Court 
advised that in determining the question of gross negligence, a court should resist examining 
the various allegations made against a director in a singular fashion, but should rather look 
holistically at the alleged conduct and performance of the director pursuant to the application 
in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act. In this case the court declared a director 
delinquent in terms of section 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act on the basis that he had 
been grossly negligent. The main basis for the director’s gross negligence was that he had 
traded the company in insolvent circumstances and had permitted a public company to operate 
without proper accounting systems.334  
 
In Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others335 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
found that the conduct of the first and second appellants had amounted to gross abuse of the 
                                                 
332 2013 JDR 1360 (WCC) para 84. This case is discussed above in note 128. 
 
333 (21092/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC 38 (27 March 2017) para 36. 
  
334 Companies and Intellectual Property Commission v Cresswell and Others (21092/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC 38 
(27 March 2017) para 37. The facts of this case are that the CIPC brought an application in terms of s 162 of the 
Companies Act to declare the third respondent a delinquent director. The third respondent was a director of 
Skyport Corporation Limited (in liquidation). It had applied to the Civil Aviation Authority for a licence to operate 
an international airport near Malmesbury, but this licence had not been granted. The company nevertheless 
continued to receive funds from investors. An investigation revealed that the third respondent had allowed the 
company to carry on business while knowing that it was commercially insolvent; had made personal withdrawals 
from the company’s bank account; had made offers for the sale of the company’s shares directly to the public 
without a prospectus; had failed to hold annual general meetings; had failed to keep proper accounting records 
and had failed to follow proper procedures in the allocation of shares to directors and officers (para 20). The court 
held that the conduct of the third respondent was grossly negligent (para 37) and it granted an order declaring the 
third respondent delinquent in terms of s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act, for a period of seven years (para 
41).  
 
335 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 139. Briefly the facts of this case are that the first and second appellants were 
directors of Seena Marena Investments (Pty) Ltd (“SMI”). The Dines Gihwala Family Trust and the second 
appellant were equal shareholders of SMI. In 2005 the first and second appellants entered into a verbal agreement 
with Grancy Property Limited for the company to acquire a one-third shareholding in SMI. SMI needed the 
funding from Grancy Property Limited to enable it to acquire a stake in a special purpose vehicle formed as part 
of a black economic transaction linked to a property loan stock company listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. The second appellant did not have the resources to pay for his shares in SMI as a one-third shareholder. 
It was consequently agreed between the parties that the first appellant and Grancy Property Limited would each 
loan a sum of money to the second appellant to enable the second appellant to pay for his shares in SMI. The 
agreement between the parties was that the loans would attract interest at a commercial rate and if and when the 
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position of a director, gross negligence akin to recklessness, as well as breach of trust in relation 
to the performance of the director’s duties to the company. The first and second appellants had 
failed to ensure that the share register of the company had properly reflected the persons who 
were entitled to be registered as shareholders. They had also failed to ensure that the company 
kept proper accounting records. Furthermore they had contravened the provisions of section 
226 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which prohibited a company from making certain loans 
to a director of the company. The first and second appellants had further appropriated financial 
benefits for themselves and had excluded a shareholder of the company from the benefits of 
such investments. This conduct, the Supreme Court of Appeal held, fell squarely within the 
scope of section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act.336 The court also held that the actions of the 
first and second appellants had constituted wilful misconduct because such actions were 
intentional and were done with knowledge of the obligations owed to the shareholder under an 
investment agreement.337 For the above reasons the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
declaring the first and second appellants delinquent directors was entirely justified.338  
 
In declaring the first appellant a delinquent director, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala 
and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others339 emphasised the fact that the first appellant 
was at the time both a businessman and attorney, and also the chairman of one of South Africa's 
largest law firms and the chairman of Redefine Income Fund Limited, which was one of the 
largest property loan stock companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. These 
                                                 
second appellant realised his interests at a profit, the first appellant and Grancy Property Limited would share in 
a proportion of the profit. It was agreed that the first appellant would draft an agreement acknowledging the one-
third share of Grancy Property Limited in SMI. Thereafter the business relationship between the parties soured 
for various reasons. The first and second appellants failed to register Grancy Property Limited as a shareholder of 
SMI and resisted its attempts to secure its registration in the share register. Information sought by Grancy Property 
Limited regarding its investment was not forthcoming from the first appellant, and despite numerous requests, 
Grancy Property Limited was not given access to the books and records of SMI nor to its annual financial 
statements. Of great concern to Grancy Property Limited was that the first appellant had failed to conclude the 
agreement acknowledging its one-third share in SMI. Moreover, the first and second appellants had made various 
payments to themselves, and had received dividend payments from the special purpose vehicle in question but had 
failed to share with Grancy Property Limited any funds received by SMI, even though Grancy Property Limited 
was a shareholder of SMI. Instead of repaying Grancy Property Limited its loan to SMI, at the instigation of the 
first appellant, an investment was made by the first appellant in a property development company in which the 
first appellant’s wife and the Dines Gihwala Family Trust had an interest.  
336 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 138. 
  
337 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 139. 
 
338 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 139. 
 
339 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 136.  
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personal qualifications influenced the court in its decision to declare the first appellant a 
delinquent director.340 In a similar vein, in Lobelo v Kukama341 the court found that the conduct 
of the first appellant, who was declared a delinquent director by the court, was “particularly 
inexplicable” considering the facts that he was a well-qualified and experienced director who 
held more than one tertiary degree, owned significant business interests, held directorships in 
various companies and had been active in the corporate world for more than a decade. Based 
on these facts the court reasoned that the first appellant was quite able to familiarise himself 
with the obligations of a director of a company insofar as they related to the conduct of the 
business of the companies in question and that he was obliged to do so.342 In Cape 
Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker343 too, the court drew attention to the fact that all the 
members of the board of directors, who were the respondents in the proceedings in terms of 
section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act, were persons with substantial tertiary qualifications, 
there being a medical practitioner, a legal practitioner, an accounting practitioner and other 
directors who held doctoral qualifications in their respective areas of knowledge. For this 
reason the court asserted that each one of the members of the board of directors ought to and 
should apply such skill as each of them possessed for the benefit of the company.344 
 
It is evident from a review of the case law that, in ascertaining whether a director has grossly 
abused his position as a director or has acted in a manner that amounted to gross negligence or 
wilful misconduct in the context of section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act, a court will take 
into account the personal background and qualifications of the director in question. To this 
extent the test is subjective. The expectations of a director will vary according to his knowledge 
and experience, and a higher standard will be expected of educated and experienced persons. 
                                                 
340 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 136. 
 
341 2013 JDR 1434 (GSJ) para 25. This was an appeal against the delinquency order granted against two directors 
in Kukama v Lobelo & Others 2012 JDR 0663 (GSJ) (discussed above in note 144). In the appeal, Lobelo argued 
that the court a quo should have placed him under probation as contemplated in s 162(7)(a)(ii) (acting in a manner 
materially inconsistent with the duties of a director), instead of granting a declaration of delinquency (para 14). 
The full bench of the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg held that the conduct of Lobelo was more than 
sufficient to justify the order declaring Lobelo a delinquent director as found by the court a quo (para 41). It found 
that the argument that Lobelo should have been placed under probation, was without substance (para 41). The 
court consequently dismissed the appeal on the basis that it could not find any fault with the reasoning of the court 
a quo (para 25). 
 
342 Lobelo v Kukama 2013 JDR 1434 (GSJ) para 25. 
 
343 2013 JDR 1360 (WCC) para 9.  
 
344 Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Druker 2013 JDR 1360 (WCC) para 9. 
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Thus, if a director holds tertiary degrees and has extensive experience his conduct will be 
measured against this higher subjective standard. In ascertaining whether the grounds in section 
162(5)(c) of the Companies Act have been breached, it thus seems that courts, in their 
discretion, apply both an objective and a subjective assessment. The objective element lies in 
ascertaining whether the conduct in question amounts to “gross abuse”, “gross negligence” or 
“wilful misconduct”, as referred to in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act and as defined 
in our law, while the subjective element lies in considering and weighing the personal 
qualifications and experience of the director in question in determining whether the offences in 
question have been committed by such a director.345  
 
3.4.7  Unauthorised Acts, Reckless Trading and Fraud 
 
In terms of section 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) a court must make an order declaring a person a delinquent 
director if the person, while a director, acted in a manner contemplated in sections 77(3)(a), 
77(3)(b) or 77(3)(c) of the Companies Act. This ground of delinquency may be relied on by the 
first and the second group of persons with locus standi under section 162 of the Companies Act 
referred to in paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.346  
 
Section 77(3)(a) provides that a director of a company is liable for any loss, damages or costs 
sustained by the company as a direct or indirect consequence of the director having acted in the 
name of the company, signed anything on behalf of the company, or purported to bind the 
company or authorised the taking of any action by or on behalf of the company, despite 
knowing that the director lacked the authority to do so. Section 77(3)(b) provides that a director 
of a company is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or 
indirect consequence of the director having acquiesced in the carrying on of the company’s 
business despite knowing that it was being conducted in a manner prohibited by section 22(1) 
of the Companies Act. Section 22(1) prohibits a company from carrying on its business 
recklessly, with gross negligence, with intent to defraud any person or “for any fraudulent 
purpose.” Section 77(3)(c) also relates to fraudulent activities. It provides that a director of a 
company is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect 
                                                 
345 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35” 21. 
 
346 Sections 162(2)(b)(i) and 162(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
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consequence of the director having been a party to an act or omission by the company despite 
knowing that the act or omission was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder 
of the company or had “another fraudulent purpose”.  
 
Section 4 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 similarly makes fraud and 
fraudulent trading (in the course of the winding-up of a company) a ground upon which a 
disqualification order may be made.347 Section 10 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 further makes participation in fraudulent trading and wrongful 
trading a ground upon which a disqualification order may be made.348 Likewise, section 206C 
of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 makes insolvent trading a ground for a court to 
disqualify a director from managing a company.349 
 
Section 8.09(a) of the MBCA also lists as a ground for the judicial removal of a director 
fraudulent conduct with respect to the company or its shareholders. However, the equivalent 
ground for judicial removal in section 8.09(a) of the MBCA is again narrower than section 
162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) of the Companies Act. While both provisions regard fraudulent conduct as a 
ground for the judicial removal of a director, under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA the fraudulent 
conduct must be directed at the company or its shareholders, while under section 
162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) read with section 77(3)(c) of the (South African) Companies Act the 
fraudulent conduct may extend to a creditor or an employee of the company. Even if, under 
section 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) read with section 77(3)(c) of the (South African) Companies Act, the 
conduct does not extend to a shareholder, a creditor or an employee, a court may still declare a 
director delinquent if the conduct “had another fraudulent purpose”. Some USA States which 
also list fraudulent conduct as a ground for the judicial removal of a director include 
                                                 
347 Under s 4 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 a court may make a disqualification order 
against a person if in the course of the winding-up of the company it appears that he has been guilty of fraudulent 
trading or has otherwise been guilty of any fraud in relation to the company. The maximum period of 
disqualification under s 4 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is fifteen years. 
 
348 In terms of s 10 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 if a person contravenes s 213 
(fraudulent trading) or s 214 (wrongful trading) of the UK Insolvency Act of 1986 the court may, if it thinks fit, 
make a disqualification order against the person. The maximum period of disqualification under s 10 of the UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is fifteen years.  
 
349 See s 206C read with ss 1317E and 588G(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 which makes insolvent 
trading a ground for a court to disqualify a director from managing a company. 
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Connecticut,350 the District of Columbia,351 Idaho,352 Iowa,353 South Dakota,354 Wyoming,355 
South Carolina,356 Washington,357 Tennessee, 358 Alaska,359 Alabama,360 Illinois361 and 
California.362 
 
3.4.8  Repeated Compliance Notices 
 
In terms of section 162(5)(d) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a 
director to be delinquent if the person has repeatedly been subject to a compliance notice or 
similar enforcement mechanism, for substantially similar conduct, in terms of any legislation. 
For the purposes of section 162 of the Companies Act “legislation” is defined in section 162(1) 
as meaning any national or provincial legislation (a) relating to the promotion, formation or 
management of a juristic person; (b) regulating an industry or sector of an industry; or (c) 
imposing obligations on, prohibiting any conduct by, or otherwise regulating the activities of, 
a juristic person. The CIPC or the executive director of the Takeover Regulation Panel may 
issue a compliance notice to any person whom they believe, on reasonable grounds, has 
contravened the Companies Act.363 This ground is wider than a contravention of the Companies 
                                                 
350 Section 33-743(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes. 
 
351 Section 29-306.09(a)(1) of the District of Columbia Code. 
 
352 Section 30-29-809(1)(a) of the Idaho Code. 
 
353 Section 490.809(1)(a) of the Iowa Code. 
 
354 Section 47-1A-809 of the South Dakota Business Corporation Act. 
 
355 Section 17-16-809(a)(i) of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act. 
 
356 Section 33-8-109(a) of the South Carolina Code of Laws lists as a ground for the judicial removal of a director 
the engagement by the director in fraudulent or dishonest acts.  
 
357 Section 23B.08.090(1) of the Washington Business Corporation Act. 
 
358 Section 48-18-109(a)(1) of the Tennessee Code. 
 
359 Section 10.06.463 of the Alaska Corporations Code. 
 
360 Section 10A-2-8-09(a) of the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entities Code. 
 
361 Section 8.35(b) of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983. 
 
362 Section 304 of the California Corporations Code. 
 
363 Section 171(1)(a) of the Companies Act. In terms of s 171(1) of the Companies Act, the CIPC or the executive 
director of the Takeover Regulation Panel may issue a compliance notice to any person whom they believe, on 
reasonable grounds (a) has contravened the Companies Act; or (b) has assented to, was implicated in, or directly 
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Act because it applies even if a person has repeatedly been personally subject to a similar 
enforcement mechanism, for substantially similar conduct, in terms of any legislation. Only the 
CIPC, the Takeover Regulation Panel and an organ of state may rely on this ground of 
delinquency.364 If an organ of state relies on this ground of delinquency the legislation in 
question must be one which is administered by that organ of state.365 
 
3.4.9  Conviction of Offences  
 
In terms of section 162(5)(e) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a 
person a delinquent director if the person has at least twice been personally convicted of an 
offence or subjected to an administrative fine or penalty in terms of any legislation. Only the 
CIPC, the Takeover Regulation Panel and an organ of state may rely on this ground of 
delinquency.366 If an organ of state relies on this ground of delinquency the legislation in 
question must again be one which is administered by that organ of state.  
 
Section 162(5)(e) of the Companies Act is akin to section 206E of the Australian Corporations 
Act of 2001. Section 206E empowers ASIC to apply to court to disqualify a person from 
managing corporations for the period that the court considers appropriate if the person has at 
least twice contravened the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 and the court is satisfied that 
the disqualification is justified. In order for this ground of disqualification to apply the person 
must have been a member of the body corporate that has contravened the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 and that each time a contravention occurred reasonable steps to 
prevent the contravention were not taken by that person.367 In exercising its discretion whether 
to grant a disqualification order the court may have regard to the person’s conduct in relation 
                                                 
or indirectly benefited from, a contravention of the Companies Act, unless the alleged contravention could 
otherwise be addressed in terms of the Companies Act by an application to a court or to the Companies Tribunal.  
 
364 Sections 162(3)(b)(i) and 162(4)(b) of the Companies Act. The reason for this is that the other parties who have 
locus standi under s 162(2) of the Companies Act would probably not have any knowledge of non-compliance 
and would not be able to prove it without access to the records of the CIPC or the Takeover Regulation Panel (J 
Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African Approach 
Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 278). 
 
365 Section 162(4)(b) of the Companies Act.  
 
366 Sections 162(3)(b)(i) and 162(4)(b) of the Companies Act.  
 
367 Section 206E(1)(a)(i) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
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to the management, business or property of any corporation, and any other matters that the 
court considers appropriate.368  
 
Section 206E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 confines this ground of 
disqualification to a contravention of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 – it does not 
extend to a contravention of any legislation, as is the case under the more far-reaching section 
162(5)(e) of the (South African) Companies Act. “Legislation” is defined broadly in section 
162(1) of the Companies Act.369 This means that, for instance, an organ of state which 
administers legislation may launch an application to declare a director delinquent if the director 
has twice been subject to an administrative fine under that legislation notwithstanding that the 
legislation in issue has no connection with the director’s position as a director or to his functions 
as a director. It is submitted that this ground is unnecessarily wide. 
 
 3.4.10  Director of Company Convicted of an Offence 
 
In terms of section 162(5)(f) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a 
person a delinquent director if within a period of five years, the person was a director of one or 
more companies or a managing member of one or more close corporations, or the person 
controlled or participated in the control of a juristic person, irrespective of whether 
concurrently, sequentially or at unrelated times, that was convicted of an offence or subjected 
to an administrative fine or similar penalty in terms of any legislation administered by that 
organ of state. The person in question must have been a director of each such company or a 
managing member of each such close corporation as the case may be or must have been 
responsible for the management of each such juristic person, at the time of the contravention 
that resulted in the conviction, administrative fine or other penalty.370  
 
Before a declaration of delinquency may be granted by a court under this ground, the court 
must also be satisfied that the declaration of delinquency is justified, having regard to the nature 
of the contraventions, and the person’s conduct in relation to the management, business or 
property of any company, close corporation or juristic person at the time. Unlike the grounds 
                                                 
368 Section 206E(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
369 The definition of “legislation” for the purposes of s 162 of the Companies Act is set out in para 3.4.8 above. 
 
370 Section 162(5)(f)(i) of the Companies Act. 
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of delinquency referred to above, in respect of this ground the court has a discretion with regard 
to granting a declaration of delinquency since it must be “satisfied” that the declaration of 
delinquency is justified.371 Only the CIPC, the Takeover Regulation Panel and an organ of state 
may rely on this ground of delinquency.372  
 
3.4.11  Other Grounds of Delinquency in Foreign Jurisdictions 
 
Section 162 of the Companies Act does not give a court a discretion to rely on any grounds of 
delinquency not listed in section 162(5) of the Companies Act. In Cook: Geoffrey v Hesber 
Impala (Pty) Ltd and Others373 the court affirmed that a declaration of delinquency must be 
made in relation to one of the legislated grounds set out in section 162 of the Companies Act. 
It follows that if a director’s conduct does not fall into any of the grounds listed in section 
162(5) of the Companies Act, he may not be declared delinquent and consequently be removed 
from office.  
 
The UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 provides for a number of grounds on 
which a disqualification order may be made. These grounds include committing an indictable 
offence in connection with the promotion, formation, management or liquidation of a 
company;374 persistent default in complying with the disclosure obligations of the UK 
Companies Act of 2006;375 fraud;376 fraudulent and wrongful trading377 and conduct that makes 
the director unfit to be concerned in the management of the company.378 The ground of being 
                                                 
371 Section 162(5)(f)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
372 Sections 162(3)(b)(i) and 162(4)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
373 (2014/45832) [2016] ZAGPJHC 23 (19 February 2016) paras 60-61. 
 
374 Section 2 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Examples of such offences are convictions 
for theft, other offences of dishonesty against outsiders, and insider trading (Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company 
Law 580). 
 
375 Section 3 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. These disclosure requirements relate to 
provisions of the companies legislation requiring any return, account or other document to be filed with, delivered 
or sent, or notice of any matter to be given, to the registrar of companies. A person is conclusively proved to be a 
persistent defaulter under this provision if it is shown that within five years he has been adjudged guilty of three 
or more defaults (s 3(2) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986). 
 
376 Section 4 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
377 Section 10 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
378 Section 6 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. In practice, most disqualification orders 
are made under s 6 of the UK Companies Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (unfit directors of insolvent 
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“unfit” to be concerned in the management of the company is only available as a ground for 
disqualification if the company has become insolvent, whether while the person was a director 
or subsequently.379 Part I of Schedule 1 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986 sets out a broad range of factors that are relevant in determining whether a director is unfit 
to be concerned in the management of a company. These factors include any misfeasance or 
breach of any fiduciary duty by the director in relation to a company or overseas company, any 
material breach of any legislative or other obligation of the director which applies as a result of 
being a director of a company or overseas company, and the frequency of such conduct.380 
 
The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015 has proposed amendments to the 
UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 in order to extend the grounds on which 
disqualification orders may be made and to strengthen the director disqualification regime in 
the UK. One of the new amendments implemented by the Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act of 2015 is that the Secretary of State may apply to court for a disqualification 
order against a person who has been convicted of a “relevant foreign offence.”381 An example 
of a “relevant foreign offence” is an offence committed outside Great Britain in connection 
with the promotion, formation, management, liquidation or striking off of a company (or any 
similar procedure) and which corresponds to an indictable offence under the law of England 
                                                 
companies) (Belcher “What Makes a Director Fit: An Analysis of the Workings of Section 17 of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986” 388; Shopovski, Bezzina & Zammit “The Disqualification of Company 
Directors and its Effect on Entrepreneurship” 20; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company 
Law 248; Hannigan Company Law 175). 
 
379 Section 6(1)(a) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. This provision obliges a court to 
make a disqualification order against an individual if it is satisfied that he is or has been a director of a company 
that has at any time become insolvent and that his conduct as a director of that company makes him unfit to be 
concerned in the management of a company. For a further discussion of s 6 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 see Dine “Disqualification of Directors” 7-9; Walters “Directors’ Duties: The Impact 
of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986” 113-119; Griffin Company Law Fundamental 
Principles 353-361; Dignam Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 340-350; Kershaw Company 
Law in Context 807-810; Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 581-584; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, 
French & Ryan on Company Law 711-717; Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases and Materials in 
Company Law 309-319; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 241-243; Hannigan 
Company Law 379-383.  
 
380 See Part I of Schedule 1 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and s 106(6) of the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015. Under s 6 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986 the minimum period of disqualification is two years and the maximum period is fifteen years (s 6(4) of the 
UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986). 
 
381 Section 5A of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
388 
 
and Wales or Scotland.382 In a similar vein, under section 206EAA(3) of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 ASIC has the power to apply to court to disqualify a director who 
has been disqualified under the law of a foreign jurisdiction. The court must be satisfied that 
the disqualification is justified. In determining whether the disqualification is justified a court 
may have regard to the person’s conduct in relation to the management, business or property 
of the foreign company, as well as any other matters that the court considers appropriate.383 In 
contrast, section 162(5) of the (South African) Companies Act does not contain a ground of 
delinquency relating to whether a director has been convicted of a foreign offence or has been 
disqualified under the law of a foreign country.384 
 
As is the case under section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act, the MBCA also limits 
the grounds for the judicial removal of a director to the grounds listed in section 8.09(a) of the 
MBCA. In contrast, some USA States give courts a statutory discretion to rely on grounds for 
the removal of a director that are not listed in the applicable legislation. For instance, section 
1726(c) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law states that, upon the application of any 
shareholder or director, a court may remove from office any director in the case of fraudulent 
or dishonest acts, or gross abuse of authority or discretion with reference to the corporation, or 
“for any other proper cause”. The court is given a wide discretion to determine whether a 
particular act of a director constitutes “proper cause”. Section 706(d) of the New York Business 
Corporation Law also states that directors may be removed for “cause” by a court, without 
specifying what that cause may be. Similarly, section 7-1.2-805 of the Rhode Island Business 
Corporation Act states that directors may be judicially removed by a court for cause.385  
 
It is submitted that in light of the fact that the effects of a declaration of delinquency are harsh, 
it is preferable to have a closed list of grounds on which a director may be declared delinquent. 
                                                 
382 Section 5A(3) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The maximum period of 
disqualification under s 5A is fifteen years (s 5A(6)).  
 
383 Section 206EAA(3) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. In terms of regulation 2D.6.01 of the 
Corporations Regulations 2001 made under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, only New Zealand is 
currently designated as a prescribed foreign jurisdiction. 
 
384 In terms of s 69(8)(b) of the Companies Act a person will however be disqualified to be a director of a company 
if he has been convicted in South Africa or elsewhere and imprisoned without the option of a fine or fined not 
more than the prescribed amount for inter alia theft, fraud or perjury. 
 
385 See chapter 3, para 6.5 where the meaning of the phrase “for cause” as used in the legislation in the USA is 
discussed. 
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Such an approach would also be in line with the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986, the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA and most USA States that permit 
the judicial removal of directors.  
 
3.5  The Grounds for a Probation Order 
  
Section 162(7) of the Companies Act lists the grounds which may be relied on by a person with 
locus standi to apply to court to make an order placing a person under probation. As indicated, 
an organ of state responsible for the administration of any legislation is not empowered by the 
Companies Act to apply to court for an order placing a person under probation. It is only 
empowered to apply to court for an order declaring a person delinquent.386 The grounds for a 
probation order and the parties who may rely on them are considered below. 
  
3.5.1  Failing to Vote against Solvency and Liquidity Resolution 
 
In terms of section 162(7)(a)(i) of the Companies Act a court may make an order placing a 
person under probation if, while serving as a director, the person was present at a meeting387 
and failed to vote against a resolution despite the inability of the company to satisfy the 
solvency and liquidity test,388 contrary to the Companies Act. This ground for a probation order 
may be relied on by the first and the second group of persons with locus standi under section 
162 of the Companies Act referred to in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.3.2 above.389 
 
3.5.2  Acting Materially Inconsistent with Duties of a Director 
 
In terms of section 162(7)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act a court may make an order placing a 
person under probation if, while serving as a director, the person acted in a manner that was 
materially inconsistent with the duties of a director. This ground for a probation order may be 
relied on by the first and the second group of persons with locus standi under section 162 of 
                                                 
386 See s 162(4) of the Companies Act and para 3.3.3 above. 
 
387 Section 1 of the Companies Act defines the phrase “present at a meeting” to mean present in person, or able to 
participate in the meeting by electronic communication, or to be represented by a proxy who is present in person 
or able to participate in the meeting by electronic communication.  
 
388 The solvency and liquidity test is set out in s 4 of the Companies Act. 
 
389 Sections 162(2)(b)(ii) and 162(3)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
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the Companies Act referred to in paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.390 
 
It is not sufficient for a director to have acted inconsistently with the duties of a director, in 
order to meet the standard set in section 162(7). He must have acted in a manner that was 
“materially” inconsistent with the duties of a director. Section 1 of the Companies Act defines 
“material” as meaning significant in the circumstances of a particular matter to a degree that is 
of consequence in determining the matter, or to a degree that might reasonably affect a person’s 
judgment or decision-making in the matter. In Motale v Abahlobo Transport Services (Pty) 
Limited and Others391 the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town placed a director under 
probation for one year, in terms of section 162(7)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act, on the basis that 
he had acted in a manner that was materially inconsistent with the duties of a director. The 
applicant, who was a director and a shareholder of the company, had repeatedly applied for 
access to certain company records. The documents related essentially to the tax affairs of the 
company, and also included certain bank statements. The applicant contended that the conduct 
of the second respondent, also a director of the company, in ignoring his requests was materially 
inconsistent with his obligations as a director of the company, and that he should be placed 
under probation in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act. The court concurred with the 
applicant. It held that the applicant had certain rights to the company documentation by virtue 
of the fact that he was a director and shareholder of the company.392 The court ruled that by 
failing to provide the applicant with the documents requested by him, the respondent had acted 
in a manner that was materially inconsistent with the duties of a director.393  
 
3.5.3  Oppressive or Prejudicial Conduct 
 
In terms of section 162(7)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act a court may make an order placing a 
person under probation if, while serving as a director, the person acted in, or supported a 
decision of the company to act in, a manner that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial in terms 
                                                 
390 Sections 162(2)(b)(ii) and 162(3)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
391 [2015] JOL 34696 (WCC). 
 
392 Motale v Abahlobo Transport Services (Pty) Limited and Others [2015] JOL 34696 (WCC) at 11. 
 
393 Motale v Abahlobo Transport Services (Pty) Limited and Others [2015] JOL 34696 (WCC) at 17. 
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of section 163(1) of the Companies Act.394 A court may declare a person under probation under 
section 162(7)(a)(iii) only if the court is satisfied that the declaration is justified having regard 
to the circumstances of the company’s (or close corporation’s) conduct, if applicable, and the 
person’s conduct in relation to the management, business or property of the company (or close 
corporation) at the time.395 This ground for a probation order may be relied on by the first and 
the second group of persons with locus standi under section 162 of the Companies Act referred 
to in paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.396 
 
3.5.4  Failure of Companies to Pay Creditors or Meet Obligations 
      
In terms of section 162(7)(b) of the Companies Act a court may make an order placing a person 
under probation if, within any period of ten years after the effective date397 the person was a 
director of more than one company or a managing member of more than one close corporation 
(be it concurrently, sequentially or at unrelated times), and during that time two or more of 
those companies or close corporations had each failed to fully pay all their creditors or meet all 
their obligations (except under a business rescue plan resulting from a resolution of the board 
of directors in terms of section 129 of the Companies Act or a compromise with creditors in 
terms of section 155 of the Companies Act). This provision is aimed at “phoenix” companies 
where a director of a company that is liquidated due to commercial insolvency simply registers 
a new company and repeats the process several times.398 
 
                                                 
394 Under s 163(1) of the Companies Act a shareholder or a director of a company may apply to court for relief if 
(i) any act or omission of the company or a related person has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
to or that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant; (ii) the business of the company or a related person is 
being or has been carried on or conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of the applicant; or (iii) the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company or a 
person related to the company are being or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant. For an overview of the oppression remedy 
see Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 574-574(17); MF Cassim “Shareholder Remedies and 
Minority Protection” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law at 756-775 and MF Cassim The New 
Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 179-205. The oppression remedy 
is discussed further in chapter 7, para 4.  
 
395 Section 162(8)(a) of the Companies Act.  
 
396 Sections 162(2)(b)(ii) and 162(3)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
397 The “effective date” is defined in s 1 of the Companies Act as the date when a provision came into operation 
in terms of s 225 of the Companies Act. This date is 1 May 2011. 
 
398 J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African 
Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 280. 
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A court may declare a person under probation under this ground only if it is satisfied that the 
manner in which the company or close corporation was managed was wholly or partly 
responsible for it failing to meet its obligations.399 In addition, the court must be satisfied that 
the declaration is justified, having regard to the circumstances of the company’s or close 
corporation’s failure, and the person’s conduct in relation to the management, business or 
property of the company or close corporation at the time.400 
 
This ground for a probation order may only be relied on by the CIPC and the Takeover 
Regulation Panel.401 
 
3.6  The Effect of a Declaration of Delinquency and a Probation Order 
 
Both a declaration of delinquency and a probation order have significant implications for a 
director, which are discussed below. 
 
3.6.1  Disqualification and Removal from Office  
 
Section 69(8)(a) of the Companies Act states that a person is disqualified to be a director of a 
company if a court has declared such person to be delinquent in terms of section 162 of the 
Companies Act. In terms of section 69(11) of the Companies Act a court may exempt a person 
from any of the grounds of disqualification set out in section 69(8)(b) of the Companies Act, 
but it may not exempt a person from being disqualified from being a director of a company if 
a court has declared that person to be delinquent.402 In both Grancy Property Limited v 
Gihwala403 and Lewis Group Limited v Woollam404  the Western Cape Division, Cape Town 
affirmed that the real effect of declaring a person delinquent is that he is thereupon disqualified, 
                                                 
399 Section 162(8)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
400 Section 162(8)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
401 Section 162(3)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
402 See chapter 3, para 6.1.3 where the grounds of disqualification to be a director are discussed. 
 
403 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 159. 
 
404 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC) para 6. 
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for so long as the declaration remains in force, from being a director of a company.405 This 
means that a delinquent director is denied the privilege of conducting business through a 
company with limited liability. He will however be able to conduct business as a sole trader, or 
as a partner in a partnership.406 
 
A declaration of delinquency which is made on the ground that a person consented to serve as 
a director or acted in the capacity of a director while ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 
69 of the Companies Act, or acted as a director in a manner that contravened an order of 
probation, is unconditional and subsists for the lifetime of the person declared delinquent.407 
On this basis a court is empowered to remove a director from office for the duration of his 
lifetime, which is rather harsh. In all other instances a declaration of delinquency subsists for 
seven years from the date of the court order, or such longer period as determined by the court 
at the time of making the declaration.408 The declaration of delinquency may in such instances 
be made subject to any conditions that the court considers appropriate.409 A court has a 
discretion to extend the duration of the declaration of delinquency but it has no discretion to 
reduce the seven year period.410  
 
This is sustained by section 70(1)(b)(iv) of the Companies Act which states that a person ceases 
to be a director and a vacancy arises on the board of a company if the person is declared a 
delinquent director or is placed under probation on conditions that are inconsistent with 
continuing to be a director of the company, in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act. 
Consequently the effect of an order of delinquency is that a person is indirectly removed from 
office by a court. As the High Court in Kukama v Lobelo411 proclaimed, there is no need for a 
                                                 
405 See further Rabinowitz v Van Graan and Others 2013 (5) SA 315 (GSJ) para 20 where the court stated that the 
consequence of an order of delinquency is that such a person is disqualified from being a director of the company. 
 
406 See Bradley “Enterprise and Entrepreneurship: The Impact of Director Disqualification” 66. 
 
407 Sections 162(5)(a), 162(5)(b) and 162(6)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
408 Section 162(6)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
409 Section 162(6)(b)(i) of the Companies Act.  
 
410 This is made clear from the wording of s 162(6)(b)(ii) which provides that a declaration of delinquency 
“subsists for seven years from the date of the order, or such longer period as determined by the court at the time 
of making the declaration”. 
 
411 2012 JDR 0062 (GSJ) para 22. The facts of this case are discussed in note 144 above. 
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court to order the removal of a delinquent person from office because of the “automatic inherent 
effect of such a declaration”. This was affirmed by the High Court in Msimang NO and Another 
v Katuliiba and Others.412  
 
The effect of an order of probation is that a person may not serve as a director except to the 
extent permitted by the order of probation.413 A director who is under a probation order is thus 
restricted to serving as a director within the conditions of that probation order.414 A probation 
order subsists for a period not exceeding five years, as determined by the court at the time it 
makes the declaration.415 Like an order of delinquency, an order of probation may be subject 
to such conditions as the court considers appropriate.416  
 
Under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 a disqualified director is not only 
prohibited from being a director of a company417 but is also prohibited, without leave of the 
court, from “in any way, whether directly or indirectly” being concerned or taking part “in the 
promotion, formation or management of a company”.418 Under section 219(1) of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973419 a court was empowered to make an order in certain circumstances 
disqualifying a director from being concerned or taking part in the management of any company 
“whether directly or indirectly”. In contrast, under section 162 of the Companies Act a 
delinquent director is prohibited from being a director of a company but is not prohibited from 
taking part in the management of the company directly or indirectly.420 It is submitted that the 
approach which was adopted under section 219(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and in the 
                                                 
412 [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 32. 
 
413 Section 69(5) of the Companies Act. 
 
414 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 8. 
 
415 Section 162(9)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
416 Section 162(9) of the Companies Act. 
 
417 Section 1(1)(a) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
418 Section 1(1)(d) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  
 
419 Section 219(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 is discussed further below in para 3.7. 
 
420 See s 69(8)(a) of the Companies Act, which provides that a “person is disqualified to be a director of a 
company” if a court has declared the person to be delinquent in terms of s 162 of the Companies Act. No mention 
is made with regard to whether the person may directly or indirectly take part in the management of the company. 
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UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is commendable because it prohibits a 
disqualified director from being involved in the promotion, formation or management of a 
company in a capacity other than a director (such as giving instructions through a nominee 
director).421 The UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 further prohibits a 
disqualified person from being a liquidator or an administrator of a company, as well as a 
receiver or a manager of a company’s property, for a specified period beginning with the date 
of the order.422 A court must order the person to be disqualified from all of these activities or 
positions for the determined period.423 It may not disqualify a person from only a selection of 
these activities or positions.424  
 
Under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, as discussed below,425 a disqualification order 
made by a court disqualifies a person from managing corporations for the period that the court 
considers appropriate. Under the MBCA and the corporate legislation of those USA States 
which permit the judicial removal of directors, in addition to removing a director from office, 
the court may bar the director from re-election for a period prescribed by the court.426  
 
                                                 
421 See Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 238. 
 
422 Section 1(1) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
423 Re Gower Enterprises Ltd (No 2) [1995] BCC 1081 at 1084-1085; R v Cole, Lees & Birch [1998] BCC 87 
(1997) at 92; Re Adbury Park Estates Ltd [2003] BCC 696 at 697-698.  
 
424 Re Gower Enterprises Ltd (No 2) [1995] BCC 1081 at 1084-1085; R v Cole, Lees & Birch [1998] BCC 87 
(1997) at 92; Re Adbury Park Estates Ltd [2003] BCC 696 at 697-698.  Thus a disqualification order under the 
UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is a sweeping prohibition in terms of which the disqualified 
person is prohibited from engaging in any of these activities in relation to any company, whether it is a private 
company or a public company (Walters “Leave to Act as a Company Director following Disqualification” 239). 
 
425 See para 3.6.2 below. 
 
426 See s 8.09(a) of the MBCA and see for example s 10A-2-8.09(b) of the Alabama Business and Nonprofit 
Entities Code; s 10.06.463 of the Alaska Corporations Code; s 304 of the California Corporations Code; s 33-
743(c) of the Connecticut General Statutes; s 29-306.09(c) of the District of Columbia Code; s 30-29-809(3) of 
the Idaho Code; s 8.35(b) of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983; s 490.809(3) of the Iowa Code; 
s 450.1514(2) of the Michigan Business Corporation Act; s 706(d) of the New York Business Corporation Law; 
s 1726(c) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law; s 7-1.2-805(d) of the Rhode Island Business Corporation 
Act; s 33-8-109(b) of the South Carolina Code of Laws; s 47-1A-809 of the South Dakota Business Corporation 
Act; s 48-18-109(b) of the Tennessee Code; s 23B.08.090(2) of the Washington Business Corporation Act and 
s 17-16-809(c) of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act. 
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3.6.2  Period of Disqualification and Removal from Office 
 
As was stated above,427 section 162(6) of the Companies Act does not give a court any discretion 
to determine the minimum period of the declaration of delinquency. A court has a discretion only 
to extend the declaration of delinquency to a period longer than seven years. In contrast, a court 
is given a discretion to determine the minimum period for which a director is placed under 
probation. Section 162(9)(b) of the Companies Act places a cap of five years on the probation 
period, but a court is entitled in its discretion to impose a probationary period of less than five 
years.428 Section 162(9)(b) of the (South African) Companies Act mirrors section 10-809(b) of 
the Arizona Revised Statutes, discussed below. 
 
The period of disqualification under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
varies depending on the grounds for disqualification. In most instances this Act does not 
prescribe minimum periods of disqualification, as the (South African) Companies Act does; 
instead it prescribes maximum periods of disqualification. In respect of a disqualification for 
persistent breaches of the companies legislation and a disqualification on summary conviction 
the maximum period of disqualification is five years,429 but in the other instances the maximum 
period of disqualification is fifteen years.430 It is only with regard to a disqualification of unfit 
directors of insolvent companies, in terms of section 6 of this Act, that a minimum period of 
disqualification has been prescribed (being two years) as well as a maximum period of 
disqualification (being fifteen years). Courts in the UK are thus given a discretion in most 
instances to determine the minimum period of the disqualification of a director. In Re Sevenoaks 
Stationers (Retail) Ltd431 the UK Court of Appeal identified three brackets of periods of 
disqualification under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 with regard to 
disqualifying unfit directors where the maximum period of disqualification is fifteen years. The 
top bracket for a period of over ten years should be reserved for particularly serious cases (for 
                                                 
427 See para 3.6.1 above. 
 
428 Section 162(9)(b) provides that a probation order subsists for a period not exceeding five years, as determined 
by the court at the time it makes the declaration. 
 
429 Sections 3(5) and 4(5) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
430 For example, in terms of ss 4(3) (disqualification for fraudulent trading), 6(4) (disqualification of unfit directors 
of insolvent companies) and 10(2) (participation in wrongful trading) the maximum period of disqualification is 
fifteen years. 
 
431 [1991] Ch 164, CA. 
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example, where a director who has already had one period of disqualification imposed on him 
falls to be disqualified again).432 The minimum bracket of two to five years should be applied 
where, although disqualification is mandatory, the case is not very serious.433 The middle 
bracket of six to ten years should be applied for serious cases which do not merit the top 
bracket.434  
 
The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 gives courts a high degree of discretion to determine 
the disqualification period of directors. Courts in Australia are empowered to disqualify directors 
for the period that they consider appropriate.435 It is only with regard to a disqualification where 
a director has managed failed companies within the past seven years that the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 imposes a maximum disqualification period of twenty years.436 As is 
the case in the UK, courts in Australia are given a discretion to determine the minimum period 
of disqualification of a director. Some of the factors that are considered by courts in exercising 
this discretion are the specific deterrence of the director in question; the general deterrence and 
whether the penalty is harsh enough to discourage other people from engaging in similar conduct; 
the propensity that the director may engage in similar conduct in the future; the amount of loss 
suffered by the company; whether the director has a history of similar breaches; the degree of 
seriousness of the contraventions; whether dishonest conduct is involved (which attracts a longer 
disqualification period); the remorse shown by the director; the need to balance the personal 
hardship to the director against the public interest and the need for the protection of the public 
from any repetition of the conduct, and the likelihood of the director reforming his ways (which 
is stated to be a mitigating factor).437 The factors used by the courts in Australia to determine an 
                                                 
432 Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164, CA at 174. 
 
433 Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164, CA at 174. 
 
434 Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164, CA at 174. 
 
435 See ss 206C(1) (disqualification for a contravention of a civil penalty provision), 206D(1) (disqualification on 
the basis of insolvency and non-payment of debts), 206E(1) (disqualification for repeated contraventions of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001) and 206EAA(1) (disqualification under a law of a foreign jurisdiction) which 
provide that a court may disqualify a person from managing corporations for a period that the court considers 
appropriate. 
 
436 Section 206D(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
437 See Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483 para 56 where these factors were 
laid down. See further Elliott v Australian Securities and Investments Commission; Plymin v Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission [2004] VSCA 54 (2004) where the Victorian Court of Appeal approved of and 
applied these factors; Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] 220 CLR 129 paras 48-50 
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appropriate period of disqualification are useful guidelines for South African courts to consider 
in deciding whether or not to extend the period of delinquency in terms of section 162(6)(b)(ii) 
of the Companies Act to longer than seven years. 
 
Section 8.09(a) of the MBCA confers a discretion on courts to bar the director concerned from 
re-election for a period prescribed by the court. A court thus has the discretion to determine the 
period of time for which the director concerned will be removed from office. Likewise, most of 
the USA States which permit the judicial removal of directors confer on the court a discretion to 
bar the director from re-election for a period prescribed by the court.438 Section 10-809(b) of the 
Arizona Revised Statutes differs from this trend by imposing a maximum period of five years for 
which a court may bar a director from re-election, but it does not lay down a minimum period in 
this regard.  
 
Section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act is patently much stricter than the equivalent 
legislation in foreign jurisdictions. South African courts do not have any discretion to deviate 
from the minimum period of delinquency prescribed by the Companies Act. In Grancy 
Property Limited v Gihwala439 the Western Cape High Court observed that the purpose of 
prescribing minimum periods for an order of delinquency is to remove unscrupulous directors 
from office in order to protect investors. Further objectives, the court stated, are to ensure 
greater consistency in the application of section 162 of the Companies Act and to ensure that 
the section has a sufficient deterrent effect.440 The Companies Act, however, offers some relief 
for directors to apply to court for the suspension of the order of delinquency after three years 
or to set aside an order of delinquency more than two years after it was suspended, or to set 
                                                 
and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Axis International Management Pty Ltd (No 6) [2011] 
FCA 811 (2011) paras 8-9 where these factors were generally approved and adopted. 
  
438 See for example s 10A-2-8.09(b) of the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entities Code; s 10.06.463 of the 
Alaska Corporations Code; s 304 of the California Corporations Code; s 33-743(c) of the Connecticut General 
Statutes; s 29-306.09(c) of the District of Columbia Code; s 30-29-809(3) of the Idaho Code; s 8.35(b) of the 
Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983; s 490.809(3) of the Iowa Code; s 450.1514(2) of the Michigan Business 
Corporation Act; s 706(d) of the New York Business Corporation Law; s 1726(c) of the Pennsylvania Business 
Corporation Law; s 7-1.2-805(d) of the Rhode Island Business Corporation Act; s 33-8-109(b) of the South 
Carolina Code of Laws; s 47-1A-809 of the South Dakota Business Corporation Act; s 48-18-109(b) of the 
Tennessee Code; s 23B.08.090(2) of the Washington Business Corporation Act and s 17-16-809(c) of the 
Wyoming Business Corporation Act. 
 
439 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 194. 
 
440 Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 194. 
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aside an order or probation more than two years after it was made.441 It is submitted that the 
absence of a discretion given to courts to determine a minimum period of delinquency is 
justifiable because a disqualified director may apply to court after three years to suspend the 
order of delinquency.442  
 
3.6.3  Conditions Imposed on Delinquency or Probation Orders 
 
Some of the conditions that a court may impose on the order of delinquency or probation are 
that the director concerned be required to undertake a designated programme of remedial 
education relevant to the nature of his conduct as a director,443 or to carry out a designated 
programme of community service.444 It has been suggested that a condition compelling the 
director to undergo relevant training courses educating him on the legal requirements and 
responsibilities attached to his position would be useful.445 A court may also order the miscreant 
director to pay compensation to any person adversely affected by his conduct as a director, to 
the extent that such a victim does not otherwise have a legal basis for claiming compensation.446 
The wide scope in the wording of this provision is questionable since it could be construed to 
mean that if one of the elements that ought to be present for contractual or delictual liability is 
not established, a court may nevertheless still order a director to pay compensation to a victim 
in circumstances when such an order would not ordinarily have been made under the principles 
                                                 
441 Section 162(11) of the Companies Act. 
 
442 Refer to para 3.11 below where the suspension of a declaration of delinquency and the setting aside of a 
probation order are discussed. 
 
443 Section 162(10)(a) of the Companies Act.  
 
444 Section 162(10)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
445 Griffin “The Disqualification of Unfit Directors and the Protection of the Public Interest” 230. It is of interest 
that the chief executive officer of Telkom SA SOC Limited was required by the CIPC to complete a corporate 
governance course in 2014 after Telkom SA SOC Limited was found to have breached the Companies Act. The 
chief executive officer faced a penalty of one million Rand and referral to the National Prosecuting Authority if 
he did not attend the course. He duly attended a two week course on corporate governance. The notice to attend 
the course was issued by the CIPC after a six million Rand interest-free loan had been awarded to the chief 
financial officer in breach of relevant corporate rules. This was the first time that such a notice was issued to a 
director by the CIPC (see Business Report “Maseko forced to take director duties course” (30 May 2014) available 
at http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/maseko-forced-to-take-director-duties-course-1696083 
(accessed on 7 June 2017). The request that the chief executive officer attend the corporate governance course 
was not made in the context of a delinquency or a probation declaration, but it does provide some idea of the type 
of remedial education which may be imposed on a director who is declared delinquent or placed under probation. 
 
446 Section 162(10)(c) of the Companies Act. 
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of contract or delict law.447 This is not a closed list, and a court’s power to make conditions 
ancillary to the declaration of delinquency is not limited.448  
 
Section 162(6)(b)(i) of the Companies Act also empowers a court to impose a condition limiting 
the application of the declaration of delinquency to one or more particular categories of 
companies.  An example of such a limitation, as provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others,449 is that a director may be 
declared delinquent in relation to a financial services company but may be permitted to be a 
director of an engineering firm. Another example emanates from Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd 
v Druker450 where the court limited the declaration of delinquency to the directorship which the 
miscreant directors held in one particular company but did not extend it to any other corporate 
entities which the directors may have used in the conduct of their profession. In Demetriades v 
Tollie451 the court likewise limited the declaration of delinquency to one particular company 
only. 
 
A further condition that the court may impose when making a probation order is that the person 
concerned be limited to serving as a director of a private company, or of a company of which 
that person is the sole shareholder.452 This condition is questionable because a private company 
and a company of which the director under probation is the sole shareholder may well have 
external stakeholders, such as creditors and employees, who would be at risk if the director 
under probation is not in fact fit to manage the company.453 
 
Another condition that the court may impose when making a probation order is that the person 
concerned be supervised by a mentor in his future participation as a director while the order 
                                                 
447 R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 438. 
 
448 See s 162(10) of the Companies Act. This is made clear from the words “[w]ithout limiting the powers of the 
court” in s 162(10) of the Companies Act. 
 
449 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 144. 
 
450 2013 JDR 1360 (WCC) para 91. 
 
451 2015 ZANCHC 17 para 61. 
 
452 Section 162(10)(d) of the Companies Act. 
 
453 J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African 
Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 282. 
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remains in force.454 The concept of mentorship is recommended by the King IV Report, which 
encourages the mentorship of inexperienced directors.455 An example of a case where a court 
appointed a mentor to supervise a director is Motale v Abahlobo Transport Services (Pty) 
Limited and Others.456  In this case the court had placed a director of a company under probation 
for one year and appointed a mentor to supervise him in his future participation as a director of 
the company whilst the order of probation remained in force. Without limiting the mentor’s 
discretion as to how the supervision was to be carried out, the court held that the mentor would 
be entitled to attend monthly directors’ and shareholders’ meetings of the company, and for 
half an hour prior to such meetings to meet with the directors of the company in order to discuss 
the business to be considered at the monthly meeting. The court ordered the director to pay the 
costs of the mentor.457 A further appropriate condition where a director has mismanaged funds 
of the company would be to require supervision by a qualified accountant and to also restrict 
the director from operating bank accounts of the company.458  
 
In Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala459 the Western Cape High Court did not impose any 
conditions on the declaration of delinquency against the first and second appellants. The court 
asserted that, in view of the persistent serious misconduct of the first and second appellants, 
this was not a case where the court should consider imposing conditions that would limit the 
application of the declarations of delinquency.460 The Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala 
and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others461 did not impose any conditions on the 
declaration of delinquency against the first and second appellants and did not consider whether 
                                                 
454 Section 162(10)(d)(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
455 The King IV Report, principle 7, recommended practice 23 recommends that members of the board of directors 
with no or limited governing experience should be provided with mentorship and encouraged to undergo training. 
The intention of the mentorship programme is to develop directors so that they could fully play an effective role 
as members of the board (Mongalo “Director Inductions and Board Evaluations” in Loubser & Mahony Company 
Secretarial Practice 10-5). 
 
456 [2015] JOL 34696 (WCC). 
457 Motale v Abahlobo Transport Services (Pty) Limited and Others [2015] JOL 34696 (WCC) at 20-21. 
 
458 Hicks “Director Disqualification: Can it Deliver?” 447. See para 3.11.3.3 below for a discussion on the type of 
conditions which may be imposed by courts on the suspension of a delinquency order under s 162(11) of the 
Companies Act. 
 
459 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 207. 
 
460 Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) paras 207-208. 
 
461 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA).  
  
402 
 
any conditions ought to be imposed.462 A declaration of delinquency is a harsh and serious 
order, particularly so under section 162(5) of the Companies Act, which is much stricter than 
the comparable provisions in the foreign jurisdictions considered. In light of the fact that section 
162(5) of the Companies Act is said by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala and Others v 
Grancy Property Limited and Others463 to be protective of the public rather than penal, it is 
submitted that the courts ought to make more effective use of their power to impose appropriate 
ancillary conditions to declarations of delinquency in an effort to protect the public from any 
repetition of the delinquent conduct by the director in question and to facilitate the rehabilitation 
of delinquent directors.464  
 
3.6.4  Name on Public register 
 
A further consequence of being declared delinquent is that the director’s name is put on a public 
register of persons who are disqualified from being directors. In terms of section 69(13) of the 
Companies Act the CIPC must establish and maintain a public register of persons who are 
disqualified from serving as a director in terms of an order of court pursuant to the Companies 
Act or any other law.465 Under section 69(8)(a) of the Companies Act a person would be 
disqualified to be a director if the court has declared him to be delinquent in terms of section 
162 of the Companies Act. Therefore the public register would include persons who have been 
declared delinquent by a court in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act.  In terms of section 
69(13) of the Companies Act, the public register must also list the persons who are subject to 
an order of probation as a director, whether in terms of an order of a court pursuant to the 
Companies Act or any other law. The public register of persons who are disqualified to be 
directors serves to heighten awareness of the disqualification and the delinquency order and 
has an important deterrence effect.466 
 
                                                 
462 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA). 
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464 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
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Neither section 69(13) of the Companies Act nor regulation 39(3)467 dealing with the register 
of disqualified directors specify whether the entries on the public register are to be deleted once 
the court order expires. The UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 also makes 
provision for the creation of a register of disqualification orders (to be created by the Secretary 
of State), that is open to public inspection.468 Section 18(3) of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 states that when an order of which an entry is made in the register 
ceases to be in force, the Secretary of State shall delete the entry from the register and all 
particulars relating to it.  It is submitted that this would be a commendable approach to adopt 
with regard to the public register to be maintained in terms of section 69(13) of the Companies 
Act by the CIPC.   
 
With regard to listed companies, the JSE Listings Requirements requires directors of the issuer 
(being a company whose shares have been admitted to listing) and its major subsidiaries to 
disclose in any pre-listing statements and circulars relating to rights offers and capitalisation 
issues, the details of any court orders declaring the directors delinquent or placing them under 
probation in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act or section 47 of the Close Corporations 
Act 69 of 1984.469 This disclosure requirement applies only to directors of public listed 
companies. 
 
3.7  Retrospectivity  
 
In Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others470 the question before the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was whether section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act had 
                                                 
467 Regulation 39(3) of the Companies Regulations, 2011 provides that in addition to the court orders received 
from the Registrar of the Court under s 69(11A), the CIPC may for purposes of maintaining the register of persons 
disqualified from serving as directors, obtain relevant information from the official records of the clerk of the 
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468 Section 18 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The Disqualified Directors Register is 
kept by Companies House on behalf of the Secretary of State. It lists all directors that are currently prohibited 
from involving themselves with a company. It also shows the length of time the director has been disqualified, as 
well as the relevant section of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 under which the director was 
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further on the Disqualified Directors Register Shopovski, Bezzina & Zammit “The Disqualification of Company 
Directors and its Effect on Entrepreneurship” 20).  
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retrospective effect. In other words, in considering an application to declare a director 
delinquent or to place him under probation, may a court consider conduct of the director which 
had occurred prior to the effective date of the Companies Act, being 1 May 2011? 
 
At common law a statute is presumed not to have retrospective effect, save if this presumption 
is rebutted by provisions or indications in the statute, whether expressly or by necessary 
implication.471 The presumption against retrospectivity does not apply when it must be inferred 
from the provisions of the statute in question that the legislature intended the statute to be 
retrospective.472 The presumption against retrospectivity is based on the elementary 
considerations of fairness that one should know what the law entails in order to adjust one’s 
conduct accordingly, and that the legislature must not be taken to have intended anything 
unjust.473 Lord Denman in a much quoted dictum in R v St Mary’s Whitechapel (Inhabitants),474 
a decision handed down by the Queens Bench Division, asserted that a statute is not 
retrospective merely “because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time 
antecedent to its passing”. Relying directly on this dictum the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
                                                 
471 Mahomed NO v Union Government 1911 AD 1 at 8; R v Grainger 1958 (2) SA 443 (A) at 446; Adampol (Pty) 
Ltd v Administrator, Transvaal 1989 (3) SA 800 (A) at 805-806; National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 
1995 (1) SA 475 (A) at 483; Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v Jooste 1997 (4) SA 418 (SCA) 424; 
Unitrans Passenger (Pty) Ltd t/a Greyhound Coach Lines v Chairman, National Transport Commission, and 
Others; Transnet Ltd (Autonet Division) v Chairman, National Transport Commission, and Others 1999 (4) SA 1 
(SCA) paras 12-13; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus 2000 (1) SA 1127 (SCA) paras 31; 
Western Cape Provincial Government and Others: In Re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial 
Government and Another 2001 (1) SA 500 (CC) para 65; Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation of Statutes, 
Contracts and Wills 323; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 61; LM Du Plessis “Statute Law 
and Interpretation” in LAWSA para 341.  
 
472 Lek v Estate Agents Board 1978 (3) SA 160 (C) at 169; Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation of Statutes, 
Contracts and Wills 323 and LM Du Plessis “Statute Law and Interpretation” in LAWSA para 341.  
 
473 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus 2000 (1) SA 1127 (SCA) paras 31 and 36; LM Du Plessis 
“Statute Law and Interpretation” in LAWSA para 341. See further for a discussion on the retrospectivity of statutes 
Lek v Estate Agents Board 1978 (3) SA 160 (C) at 169; Adampol (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, Transvaal 1989 (3) 
SA 800 (A) at 805-806; Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council; President Insurance Co Ltd v Kruger 1994 (3) 
SA 789 (A) 793-794; National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 (1) SA 475 (A) at 483; Workmen's 
Compensation Commissioner v Jooste 1997 (4) SA 418 (SCA) at 424; Krok v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service 2015 (6) SA 317 (SCA) para 40; Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation of Statutes, 
Contracts and Wills 319-330; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 61 and LM Du Plessis “Statute 
Law and Interpretation” in LAWSA para 341.  
 
474 R v St Mary’s Whitechapel (Inhabitants) 116 ER 811 (1848) at 814. See for instance R v Grainger 1958 (2) SA 
443 (A) at 446; Adampol (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, Transvaal 1989 (3) SA 800 (A) 812 at 817-818; Swanepoel v 
Johannesburg City Council; President Insurance Co Ltd v Kruger 1994 (3) SA 789 (A) at 793-794 and Krok v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2015 (6) SA 317 (SCA) para 40 which referred to and approved of 
R v St Mary’s Whitechapel (Inhabitants) 116 ER 811 (1848) at 814.  
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Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others475 held that section 162(5) of the 
Companies Act is not retrospective. 
 
It is submitted, however, that in considering the retrospectivity of section 162(5) of the 
Companies Act, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited476 
overlooked the definition of retrospectivity as propounded in National Iranian Tanker Co v MV 
Pericles GC,477 where the Supreme Court of Appeal defined what it means for a statute to be 
retrospective, as follows:  
 
“A statute is retrospective in its effect if it takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under 
existing laws or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability 
in regard to events already past.” 
 
If this definition of retrospectivity is applied to section 162(5) of the Companies Act, it is 
arguable that the provision is in fact retrospective as it creates “a new disability in regard to 
events already past”.478 In Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala479 the court affirmed that section 
162(5) of the Companies Act introduces prospective consequences to conduct that was already 
unlawful, and that the innovative aspect of section 162(5) of the Companies Act is that it 
introduces a new civil remedy for those harmed by the conduct of delinquent directors.480 
 
Under section 219 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 a court was, in certain circumstances, 
empowered to make an order prohibiting a director from taking part in the management of a 
company.481 In Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala482 the court stated that all the categories of 
                                                 
475 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 41. 
 
476 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA). 
 
477  1995 (1) SA 475 (A) at 483.  
 
478 National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC 1995 (1) SA 475 (A) 483; R Cassim “Delinquent Directors 
under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35” 11. 
 
479 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 164. 
 
480 Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 155. 
 
481 See further on s 219 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 125-126; Beuthin & 
Luiz Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 182 and Kunst, Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 420-
422(1). It was observed by Cilliers & Benade that s 219 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was in “disuse” in South 
Africa and that there were no reported cases on s 219 (Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 126). 
  
482 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 175. 
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conduct provided for in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act were covered by section 
219(1)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. It is respectfully submitted, however, that the 
grounds provided in section 219(1)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 were in fact much 
narrower than those provided in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act.483 Section 
219(1)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 disqualified a person from being a director of a 
company if in the course of the winding-up or judicial management of the company it appeared 
that such a person had been guilty of fraud in relation to the company or of any breach of his 
duty to the company. Section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act is much wider than section 
219(1)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, since an application to declare a director 
delinquent and thus to disqualify him from acting as a director would apply if a director 
breached his duties to the company at any time while a director, and is not restricted to conduct 
that occurs in the course of the winding-up of the company. It is consequently submitted that, 
contrary to the observation of the court in Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala,484 not all the 
categories of conduct provided for in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act were covered by 
section 219(1)(c)(ii) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The remedy of declaring a director 
delinquent is a new disability which did not exist prior to 1 May 2011. According to the dictum 
in R v St Mary’s Whitechapel (Inhabitants)485 the fact that some of the requisites for an action 
under section 162(5) of the Companies Act may be drawn prior to 1 May 2011 does not make 
section 162(5) retrospective. On the other hand, according to the dictum in National Iranian 
Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC486 the fact that section 162 of the Companies Act creates a new 
disability in regard to past events would, it is submitted, make section 162(5) retrospective.487 
 
In Pride 73 Properties (Pty) Ltd v Theunis Christoffel Du Toit488 the North Gauteng High Court, 
Pretoria held that conduct which had occurred prior to 1 May 2011 could not be taken into 
account in any court application in terms of section 162(5) of the Companies Act. The court 
                                                 
483 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35” 11. 
 
484 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC). 
 
485 116 ER 811 (1848) at 814. 
 
486  1995 (1) SA 475 (A) at 483. 
 
487 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35” 12. 
 
488 2013 JDR 2001 (GNP). 
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reasoned that if section 162(5) of the Companies Act had retrospective effect the rights of 
directors to engage freely in economic activities and to be involved in business ventures at all 
levels would be infringed.489 In the view of the court, this was not envisaged by Parliament.490 
The court accordingly held that any retrospective application of section 162(5) of the 
Companies Act would operate unfairly on directors. Consequently, in considering the 
application which had been brought under section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act, the court 
declined to take into consideration the conduct of the relevant directors that had occurred prior 
to 1 May 2011. 
 
It appears, however that the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria overlooked the provisions of 
item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Companies Act which states: 
 
 “A right of any person to seek a remedy in terms of this Act applies with respect to conduct 
pertaining to a pre-existing company and occurring before the effective date, unless the person 
had commenced proceedings in a court in respect of the same conduct before the effective 
date.” 
 
Section 162(5) of the Companies Act provides a specific remedy in the Companies Act as 
referred to in item 7(7) of Schedule 5, that is, a remedy to have a director declared delinquent,491 
and accordingly section 162(5) of the Act would apply with respect to conduct pertaining to a 
pre-existing company492 if such conduct had occurred prior to the effective date of 1 May 2011, 
provided that no legal proceedings in respect of that conduct had been commenced before that 
date.  This was affirmed in Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala493 where the court found that 
the wording of item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Companies Act is clear that in an application 
under section 162 of the Companies Act past conduct of the relevant director may be taken into 
                                                 
489 Pride 73 Properties (Pty) Ltd v Theunis Christoffel Du Toit 2013 JDR 2001 (GNP) para 43. 
 
490 Pride 73 Properties (Pty) Ltd v Theunis Christoffel Du Toit 2013 JDR 2001 (GNP) para 45. 
 
491 See Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 162. 
 
492 A pre-existing company is a company registered in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973; an existing 
company in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (other than an external company); a close corporation which 
converted to a company under the Companies Act, or a company which was deregistered in terms of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 and was subsequently registered in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (see s 1 of 
the Companies Act). 
 
493 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 163.  
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account, unless legal proceedings in respect thereof had already been commenced before 1 May 
2011.494 
 
It is submitted that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala and Others v Grancy 
Property Limited and Others495 did not consider and did not apply the definition of 
retrospectivity laid down in National Iranian Tanker Co v MV Pericles GC,496 the correct 
conclusion regarding the retrospectivity of section 162(5) of the Companies Act was 
nonetheless reached by the court. This is because item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Companies 
Act indicates that the legislature intended that conduct prior to 1 May 2011 could validly be 
considered in proceedings under section 162(5) of the Companies Act.  
 
3.8  Prescription Period in Declaring a Director Delinquent or under Probation 
 
It is not clear from the Companies Act how far back item 7(7) of Schedule 5 to the Companies 
Act extends in the context of considering an application to declare a director delinquent or to 
place him under probation. Item 7(7) of Schedule 5 simply states that the right of a person to 
seek a remedy in terms of the Companies Act applies with respect to conduct pertaining to a 
pre-existing company and “occurring before the effective date”. In applying the remedy in 
section 162(5) of the Companies Act in Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited497 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal took into consideration conduct of the directors which had occurred as far back 
as 2005. This raises the question whether there is a limit to the number of years before the 
effective date of 1 May 2011 the conduct in question may be considered in an application under 
section 162(5) or section 162(7) of the Companies Act. The answer to the converse question is 
equally unclear, that is, how many years after the conduct has occurred may an application 
under section 162(5) or section 162(7) of the Companies Act be instituted. 
 
Under section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act a court must make an order declaring a person 
a delinquent director if the relevant offence set out in the section was committed by the person 
                                                 
494 See further R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property 
Limited 2016 ZASCA 35” 13. 
 
495 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA). 
 
496 1995 (1) SA 475 (A) at 483. 
   
497 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA). 
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“while a director”. It is submitted that the words “while a director” indicate that the application 
may be brought at any time after the offence was committed provided that the offence was 
committed while the person was a director of the company. The only time limitation imposed 
in section 162 is that, in terms of sections 162(2), 162(3) and 162(4) of the Companies Act, an 
application to declare a director delinquent may be brought if the person in question was a 
director of the company within the twenty four months immediately preceding the application. 
Apart from this restriction, a prescription period has not been imposed under section 162(5)(c) 
of the Companies Act regarding the time period within which an application must be brought 
to declare a person a delinquent director. It is arguable that the Prescription Act 68 of 1969498 
would not apply in this instance because this statute applies primarily with regard to the 
acquisition of ownership by prescription,499 the acquisition and extinction of servitudes by 
prescription,500 and the prescription of debts,501 while section 162 of the Companies Act relates 
to a declaration which affects the status of a person. 
                                                 
498 The Prescription Act 68 of 1969 deals with the effect of the effluxion of time on obligations. An obligation is 
extinguished or rendered unenforceable by the effluxion of time. The rationale of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 
is aimed at fairness towards a debtor. One of its main purposes is to protect a debtor from old claims against which 
it cannot effectively defend itself because of loss of records or witnesses caused by the lapse of time. The Act is 
designed to ensure finality and certainty in business affairs, and to promote efficiency by providing an incentive 
for the quick enforcement of claims (Murray & Roberts Construction (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Upington Municipality 
1984 (1) SA 571 (A) at 578; Uitenhage Municipality v Molloy 1998 (2) SA 735 (SCA) at 742; De Jager en Andere 
v Absa Bank Bpk 2001 (3) SA 537 (SCA) para 12; Trinity Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Grindstone Investments 
132 (Pty) Ltd 2018 (1) SA 94 (CC) para 35; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 561; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 476). The Prescription Act 68 of 1969 lays down periods of prescription 
which apply to the acquisition of ownership, the acquisition and extinction of servitudes by prescription 
(acquisitive prescription) and the prescription of various categories of debt (extinctive prescription). See further 
on the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 560-580; Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law 851-855 and Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 475-487. 
 
499 See ss 1-5 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. Section 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 provides that a 
person shall become the owner of a thing which he has possessed openly and as if he were the owner thereof for 
an uninterrupted period of thirty years or for a period which, together with any periods for which such thing was 
so possessed by his predecessors in title, constitutes an uninterrupted period of thirty years. 
 
500 See ss 6-9 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. In terms of s 6 a person shall acquire a servitude by prescription 
if he has openly and as though he were entitled to do so, exercised the rights and powers which a person who has 
a right to such servitude is entitled to exercise, for an uninterrupted period of thirty years, or, in the case of a 
praedial servitude, for a period which, together with any periods for which such rights and powers were so 
exercised by his predecessors in title, constitutes an uninterrupted period of thirty years. 
 
501 See ss 10-16 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. In terms of s 10 a debt is extinguished by prescription after 
the lapse of the period which applies in respect of the prescription of such debt. For instance, a debt secured by a 
mortgage bond and a judgment debt prescribes after thirty years; a debt owed to the State prescribes after fifteen 
years; a debt arising from a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument or from a notarial contract prescribes 
after six years, while any other debt prescribes after three years. A debtor is not legally bound to perform in terms 
of an obligation which has prescribed. Prescription begins to run as soon as the debt is due (s 12(1)). A debt is not 
regarded as being due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the debtor and of the facts from which 
the debt arises (s 12(3)). A creditor will however be deemed to have such knowledge if he could have acquired it 
by exercising reasonable care (s 12(3)) (see further Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZACC 13 paras 82-86; 
Off-beat Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Shareblock Ltd and Others 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC) 
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In terms of section 162(5)(f) of the Companies Act in assessing whether a person was a director 
of one or more companies that were convicted of an offence or subjected to an administrative 
fine or similar penalty, the assessment must be made within a period of five years. It should be 
noted that the legislature does not state that the assessment must be made in the previous five 
years, but “within a period of five years” which could be any period of five years at any time. 
This is accordingly not a time limitation on the application of section 162 of the Companies 
Act. 
 
Regarding a probation order, section 162(7)(a) of the Companies Act provides that a court may 
make an order placing a person under probation if “while serving as a director” the person had 
contravened the provisions set out in section 162(7)(a).502 Again, there is no statutory time limit 
imposed under section 162(7)(a). Section 162(7)(b) states that a court may make an order 
placing a person under probation if within “any” period of ten years after the effective date the 
person contravened the provisions set out in section 162(7)(b).503 This means that under section 
162(7)(b) the only conduct of the director that may be considered in the application to place 
him under probation is conduct which has occurred in any ten year period after 1 May 2011. 
There is, however, no prescription period imposed with regard to the lodging of the application, 
which may be brought with regard to “any” period of ten years after the effective date. 
 
In contrast, a prescription period has been imposed under section 77(7) of the Companies Act 
in terms of which proceedings to recover any loss, damages or costs for which a person is or 
may be held liable in terms of section 77 of the Companies Act may not be commenced more 
than three years after the act or omission that gave rise to that liability. It is strange that the 
legislature did not impose a prescription period with regard to section 162 of the Companies 
Act when it imposed a prescription period with regard to the liability of a director under section 
77 of the Companies Act, particularly since there is an overlap between some of the grounds of 
delinquency under section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act and the grounds of liability under 
                                                 
paras 43-49; Fluxmans Incorporated v Levenson [2017] 1 All SA 313 (SCA) paras 7-9; Trinity Asset Management 
(Pty) Ltd v Grindstone Investments 132 (Pty) Ltd 2018 (1) SA 94 (CC) paras 36-42 and Van der Merwe et al 
Contract: General Principles 481-483). 
 
502 See paras 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 above where s 162(7)(a) is discussed. 
 
503 See para 3.5.4 above where s 162(7)(b) is discussed. 
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section 77 of the Companies Act. For instance, a breach of section 76(2)(a) and sections 
77(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the Companies Act are grounds for a declaration of delinquency and at 
the same time are also grounds under which a director may be held liable for loss, damages or 
costs under section 77 of the Companies Act.504 This means that one must recover loss, damages 
or costs from a director for a breach of section 77 of the Companies Act within three years after 
the act or omission that gave rise to that liability, but one is not limited by this three year 
prescription period with regard to an application to declare a director delinquent for the same 
action under section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act. The failure of the legislature to explicitly 
provide for a prescription period in section 162 of the Companies Act would suggest that a 
prescription period does not apply to section 162 of the Companies Act. But it remains to be 
seen how courts will interpret these provisions.505 
 
Sections 162(2)(a), 162(3)(a) and 162(4)(a) are further curious provisions of the Companies 
Act in this context. Under these provisions, an application to declare a director delinquent or to 
place him under probation may be brought if the person is currently a director of a company or 
was a director of that company within the twenty four months immediately preceding the 
application. An application to declare a director delinquent may be brought against a former 
director only if the former director was a director of the company within twenty four months 
immediately preceding the application. It is not clear why the legislature imposed a twenty four 
month prescription period with regard to bringing an application of delinquency or probation 
against a former director, but did not impose any prescription period at all with regard to 
bringing an application of delinquency or probation against a person who is currently still a 
director of the company in question. A person could well commit any of the offences set out in 
section 162(5) of the Companies Act and then simply resign from the company, or be removed 
as a director of the company in terms of section 71 of the Companies Act. If an application to 
declare him delinquent or to place him under probation is not lodged within twenty four months 
after his departure from the company, such a person is immune from such an action. More 
disconcerting is that it is possible that the misconduct of a director may only be discovered 
                                                 
504 See ss 162(5)(c)(ii), 162(5)(c)(iii), 76(2)(a), 77(2)(a) and 77(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the Companies Act. These 
provisions are discussed in paras 3.4.4, 3.4.5 and 3.4.7 above. 
 
505 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35” 15. 
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more than twenty four months after his resignation from a company, in which event he would 
at that stage be immune from a declaration of delinquency.506  
 
The twenty four month limitation in sections 162(2)(a), 162(3)(a) and 162(4)(a) of the 
Companies Act strangely does not start to run when the applicant becomes aware of the 
misconduct of the director in question but starts to run as soon as the director in question ceases 
to be a director of the relevant company.507 It is not clear whether the twenty four month 
prescription period is merely arbitrary or whether there is any policy underlying it. If so, it is 
not clear what the policy is and why a three-year prescription period was not adopted. 
 
Proceedings under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 for the 
disqualification of an unfit director of an insolvent company must be commenced within three 
years of the date on which the company of which that person is or was a director became 
insolvent.508 It is only with the leave of the court that an application for the disqualification of 
an unfit director of an insolvent company may be made more than three years after the company 
becomes insolvent.509 In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies and Others510 the 
UK Court of Appeal, per Hobhouse LJ, asserted that to be a director represents, or may 
represent a person’s means of livelihood and his ability to carry on his business activities, and 
if he has to defend proceedings which may disqualify him from being a director, he should 
know about this within a reasonable time and not be left in a state of uncertainty. Millett LJ 
emphasised that the requirement to proceed timeously against delinquent directors is imposed 
for two reasons. The first reason is for the protection of directors, so that they may be able to 
organise their affairs once the statutory time limit has passed free of the risk of future 
                                                 
506 See generally R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy 
Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35” 15. 
 
507 By way of comparison, prescription on a debt begins to run as soon as the debt is due, but the debt is not 
regarded as being due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the debtor and the facts from which the 
debt arises (s 12(3) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969). A creditor will be deemed to have such knowledge if he 
could have acquired it by exercising reasonable care (s 12(3) of the Prescription Act 69 of 1969). The object of 
s 12(3) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 is to excuse innocent inaction (Minister of Finance and Others v Gore 
NO 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA) paras 12-19; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 481).  
 
508 This time period was two years but the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015 extended it to 
three years with effect from 1 October 2015 (see s 7(2) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
read with s 108 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015). 
 
509 Section 7(2) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
510 [1996] 4 All ER 289 at 302. 
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disqualification.511 The second reason is to protect the public because it is “obviously wrong” 
in the public interest that a person who is unfit to be a director should be left free to be a director 
any longer than is necessary.512 In Re Probe Data Systems Ltd (No 3), Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry v Desai513 Scott LJ in the UK Court of Appeal emphasised that a court must 
take four factors into account in considering whether to grant leave to commence 
disqualification proceedings after the statutory period (which at the time was two years) had 
passed. These factors are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the strength of the 
case against the director and the degree of prejudice caused to the director by the delay.514 In 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies and Others515 Millet LJ emphasised that the 
extension of the statutory period to apply for disqualification proceedings against directors must 
be exercised sparingly and with great caution.  
 
To revert to the question posed earlier, how far before the effective date of 1 May 2011 may 
conduct of a director be considered for purposes of an application under section 162(5) or 
section 162(7) of the Companies Act? In the absence of any clear guidelines in the Companies 
Act and in light of the fact that, as long as he is still a director of the company in question, there 
is no prescribed statutory time limit for instituting an application to declare a director 
delinquent, it seems that there is no limit on how many years before the effective date of 1 May 
2011 the misconduct of a director must have occurred before it may be taken into account for 
the purposes of an application under section 162(5) of the Companies Act.516 Likewise with 
regard to a probation order, there is no statutory time limit prescribed, provided that the offence 
was committed while the person was serving as a director.  
                                                 
511 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies and Others [1996] 4 All ER 289 at 297. 
 
512 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies and Others [1996] 4 All ER 289 at 297. See further Re 
Noble Trees Ltd [1993] BCC 318 at 322 where the Chancery Division had proclaimed that it is wrong that a person 
whom the Secretary of State considers to be unfit to act as a director should be left free to be a director any longer 
than is necessary.  
 
513 [1992] BCC 110 at 118.  
 
514 These factors have been approved by several subsequent decisions. See for instance Re Polly Peck International 
plc (In Administration) (No 3), Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Ellis [1993] BCC 890 at 893-894 and 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies and Others [1996] 4 All ER 289 at 296. See further CM Van 
Stillevoldt BV v El Carriers Inc [1983] 1 All ER 699 at 704 where these factors were derived. 
 
515 [1996] 4 All ER 289 at 298. 
 
516 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35” 16. 
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It is submitted that a statutory time limit of three years should be imposed with regard to 
applications to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation. It is submitted 
further that the twenty four month prescription period imposed for a director who ceases to be 
a director of a company should be extended to three years, so as to have consistency and 
harmony with the three-year prescription period that applies to section 77 of the Companies 
Act, particularly since there is some overlap between the offences in section 77 and those set 
out in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act.517 Imposing a three-year statutory time limit to 
apply to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation would ensure that 
directors are not left in a state of uncertainty, and that they are able to organise their affairs 
once the statutory time bar has passed; free of the risk of a future delinquency or probation 
order. It would also ensure that a director who is delinquent is not left to be a director of a 
company for longer than necessary, thus protecting the public. In order to ensure that in those 
instances where an application to declare a director delinquent cannot be lodged within the 
three-year time period, it is submitted that, as is the case under section 7(2) of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986, with the leave of the court, an application to declare a 
director delinquent after the three-year period may be made. This would ensure that delinquent 
directors are not immune from applications to declare them delinquent after three years, but in 
order to bring such an application after three years, leave of the court must be sought. This 
would further serve to balance the public interest and the legitimate interests of the director. 
 
3.9  Discretion of the Court in Making a Declaration of Delinquency and a Probation 
Order 
 
The word “must” in section 162(5) of the Companies Act makes it clear that a court is obliged 
to make an order declaring a person a delinquent director if any of the grounds set out in that 
section are satisfied. A court does not have any discretion in this regard.  In Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission v Cresswell and Others518 the High Court intimated that 
while sections 162(5)(a) and (b) do not give a court a discretion whether to grant a declaration 
of delinquency due to the word “must” in section 162, section 162(5)(c) “requires this court to 
                                                 
517 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35” 16.  
 
518 (21092/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC 38 (27 March 2017) para 26. 
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exercise a discretion in deciding whether to grant an order.” The court did not suggest any 
reason why a discretion should apply in respect of section 162(5)(c). This view of the court is, 
with respect, questionable. It is submitted with respect that the word “must” in section 162(5) 
of the Companies Act applies to section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act as well. Therefore a 
court does not in fact have a discretion under section 162(5)(c) either whether to grant a 
declaration of delinquency if the provisions of section 162(5)(c) are satisfied. 
 
In Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others519 the appellants had argued that 
section 162(5)(c)520 of the Companies Act as read with section 162(6)(b)(ii) is unconstitutional 
because there is no discretion vested in the court to refuse to make a delinquency order or to 
moderate the period of such order to less than seven years. The court found that the appellants 
had not attacked section 162(5)(c) on the basis that it was irrational, which was detrimental to 
their argument regarding the constitutionality of section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act.521 
The Supreme Court of Appeal had little difficulty in dismissing this argument on the ground 
that section 162(5) is a rational and proportionate response by the legislature to the problem of 
delinquent directors.522 The court found it to be rational to remove a person from serving as a 
director on the ground that he was guilty of conduct falling within the categories specified in 
section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act.523   
 
A further basis on which the appellants argued that section 162(5) of the Companies Act is 
unconstitutional is that it infringed the right to choose a trade, occupation or profession (section 
22 of the Constitution), the right of access to courts (section 34 of the Constitution) and the 
right to dignity (section 10 of the Constitution).524 With regard to the constitutional challenge 
                                                 
519 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 140. 
 
520 It should be noted that this case specifically dealt with s 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act and not with s 162(5) 
in general. 
 
521 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 145. Legislation must 
serve a rational purpose and there must be a rational connection between the purpose of the legislation and the 
provision under consideration. The absence of such a rational connection would result in the provision being 
unconstitutional (New National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 
191 (CC) paras 19 and 24; Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) 
para 145). 
 
522 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 145. 
 
523 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 145.  
 
524 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 141. 
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on section 22 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court of Appeal525 relied on the following 
dictum of the Constitutional Court in Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of 
Health and Others526 in which Ngcobo J had stated the following: 
 
 “But we live in a modern and industrial world of human interdependence and mutual 
responsibility. Indeed we are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality. Provided it is 
in the public interest and not arbitrary or capricious, regulation of vocational activity for 
the protection both of the persons involved in it and of the community at large affected by 
it is to be both expected and welcomed. These considerations are reflected in the text of 
s 22.” 
 
Based on the assumption in favour of the appellants that being a director of a company is an 
occupation, trade or profession (which the Supreme Court of Appeal said was by no means an 
obviously correct proposition), the court held that the appellants had not suggested that section 
162(5) is either capricious or arbitrary.527 On this ground the constitutional challenge on section 
22 of the Constitution failed. The challenge under section 34 of the Constitution also failed. 
The court held that an errant director has an entirely fair hearing before a court, and that a court 
is involved in every stage of an enquiry under section 162(5).528 The Supreme Court of Appeal 
found that the challenge under section 34 was in fact misconceived since it was not the absence 
of a fair hearing which was in issue but the consequences of an adverse decision.529 The court 
held that this consequence cannot be challenged under section 34 of the Constitution on the 
ground that the delinquent director has been deprived of a right of access to court, but may only 
be challenged on the ground that section 162(5) is an irrational legislative response to the 
particular problem.530 The constitutional challenge that section 162(5) infringed the right to 
dignity under section 10 of the Constitution was reduced to saying that the terms of section 
162(5) of the Companies Act do not permit the court to take into account the individual 
director’s circumstances and degree of blameworthiness.531 The Supreme Court of Appeal 
                                                 
525 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 146. 
 
526 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) para 60. 
 
527 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 146. 
 
528 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 147. 
 
529 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 147. 
 
530 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 147. 
 
531 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 150. 
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stated that section 162 of the Companies Act was not about the “individualisation of 
punishment” but about the appropriateness of the protective measures the legislature had 
prescribed to deal with delinquent directors.532 The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
constitutional challenge on the infringement of the right to dignity could only be pursued by 
attacking the rationality of section 162 of the Companies Act, which the appellants had failed 
to do.533 The Supreme Court of Appeal accordingly held that the court a quo had correctly 
rejected the attacks on the constitutionality of section 162(5) of the Companies Act.534 The 
appeal against the delinquency orders was consequently dismissed.535 
  
In terms of section 162(7) of the Companies Act a court has been given a discretion to decide 
whether or not to place a director under probation. This is made clear by the use of the word 
“may” in section 162(7) of the Companies Act. Regarding the disqualification of a director, a 
court has again been given a discretion, under section 69(11) of the Companies Act, to exempt 
a person from the application of any provision of section 69(8)(b) of the Companies Act which 
sets out the instances when a person would be disqualified from being a director. It is 
questionable why the court has been given a discretion whether to remove a director from office 
(under section 71(6) of the Companies Act), whether to place a director under probation (under 
section 162(7) of the Companies Act), and whether to disqualify a person from being a director 
(under section 69(11) of the Companies Act), but has not been given such a discretion under 
section 162(5) of the Companies Act, when the effect of all of these provisions is that the 
director in question is not permitted to serve as a director.536  
 
It may be argued that the court was denied a discretion under section 162(5) of the Companies 
Act in light of the seriousness of the offences listed in that section. Fault in the form of intent 
                                                 
532 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 148. 
 
533 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 150. 
 
534 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 150. 
 
535 Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 150. For a further 
discussion of the constitutional challenge of s 162 of the Companies Act in this case see R Cassim “Delinquent 
Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35” 3-7 and J 
Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African Approach 
Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 287-292. 
 
536 R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property Limited 
2016 ZASCA 35” 17. 
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or gross negligence is required for an order in terms of section 162(5)(c) of the Companies 
Act.537 As the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited 
and Others538 stated, the categories of conduct listed in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act 
deal with instances of serious misconduct constituting a gross abuse of the office of a director 
of a company. The lack of a discretion may also serve to promote consistency and certainty 
with regard to declaring delinquent directors who are in breach of section 162(5) of the 
Companies Act.539 Nevertheless, the fact that a court has not been given a discretion whether 
or not to remove a director from office under section 162 of the Companies Act results in a 
clear interference by the judiciary with the internal affairs of a company.540 It further has the 
effect that under section 162(5) of the Companies Act courts are not empowered to consider 
any relevant mitigating factors in declaring directors delinquent. For instance, courts are not 
empowered to consider the remorse shown by the director, the need to balance the personal 
hardship to the director against the public interest and the need for the protection of the public 
from any repetition of the conduct, the potential of the director to reform, or the likelihood of 
the director refraining from any future misconduct in exercising his functions and duties. 
 
It should, however, be noted that with regard to the ground of delinquency in section 162(5)(f) 
which may be raised by an organ of state only,541 a court has some discretion whether or not to 
grant a declaration of delinquency since the order will be granted only if “the court is satisfied 
that the declaration of delinquency is justified”. In determining whether the declaration of 
delinquency is justified a court must have regard to the nature of the contravention(s), and the 
“person’s conduct in relation to the management, business or property” of any company, close 
corporation or juristic person at the time. This wording mirrors section 206C of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001, discussed below. 
 
                                                 
537 Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 566. 
 
538 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) paras 143-144. 
 
539 Griffin argues that the value of a mandatory disqualification order is that it promotes consistency and certainty 
in respect of a positive requirement on the part of the courts to disqualify directors in circumstances where their 
conduct in the management of a company is considered to have been unfit (Griffin “The Disqualification of Unfit 
Directors and the Protection of the Public Interest” 210).  
 
540 See further chapter 2, paras 6 and 7 and para 3.10 below where the interference by the judiciary in the internal 
affairs of a company has been discussed in more detail. 
 
541 This ground of delinquency is discussed in para 3.4.10 above. 
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Section 206C(1)(b) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 states that a court “may” 
disqualify a person from managing corporations for a period that the court considers 
appropriate if a civil penalty provision in section 1317E has been contravened and if the court 
“is satisfied that the disqualification is justified.” In determining whether the disqualification is 
justified, section 206C(2)(a) requires a court to have regard to the “person’s conduct in relation 
to the management, business or property” of any corporation. A court may however also take 
into account any other issues that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.542 Thus the 
matters that may be considered by the court are not limited to the director’s conduct in relation 
to the management of the company.543 As discussed544 the grounds listed in section 1317E are 
very similar to the grounds of delinquency listed in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act. 
Yet the Companies Act does not give courts a discretion under section 162(5)(c) whether or 
not to declare a director delinquent if these provisions are contravened, while under section 
206C of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 a court is given a high level of discretion 
under similar grounds to determine whether or not to disqualify a person from managing a 
company. The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 further gives a court a discretion whether 
to disqualify a director from managing corporations in respect of all the other grounds of 
disqualification that may be raised by ASIC in a court application.545  
 
The UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 also confers on the court a discretion 
whether or not to grant a disqualification order against a director.546 The only instance when 
disqualification is mandatory under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is 
under section 6 of this Act, which relates to the disqualification of unfit directors of insolvent 
companies. 
 
                                                 
542 See s 206C(2)(b) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
543 Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.191 at 266. 
 
544 See para 3.4.4 above. 
 
545 See s 206D(1) (involvement in two or more failed corporations in the previous seven years), s 206E(1) (court 
power of disqualification with regard to repeated contraventions of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001) and 
s 206EAA (court’s power of disqualification with regard to disqualification under a law of a foreign jurisdiction). 
 
546 See s 2 (disqualification on conviction of indictable offence), s 3 (disqualification for persistent breaches of 
companies legislation), s 4 (disqualification for fraud in winding-up of a company) and s 5 (disqualification on 
summary conviction) which all state that a court “may” make a disqualification order. 
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Under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA the courts likewise have a discretion whether to remove a 
director from office, even if the grounds to do so have been satisfied. This is made clear from 
the use of the words “may remove a director from office” in section 8.09(a) of the MBCA. 
Similarly, the DGCL547 as well as the corporate legislation of the USA States which permit the 
judicial removal of directors, confer a discretion on a court whether or not to remove a director 
from office.548  
 
It is evident from the above comparisons that section 162(5) of the (South African) Companies 
Act is far stricter than the equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions reviewed in that, 
save for the ground of delinquency in section 162(5)(f), the South African courts have not been 
given any discretion to decide whether or not to grant a declaration of delinquency and thus 
remove a director from office.  
 
3.10  Interference by the Judiciary with the Internal Affairs of a Company 
 
Section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act does not contain provisions designed to 
minimise the interference by the judiciary in the internal affairs of a company. In contrast, 
section 8.09 of the MBCA is designed to interfere as little as possible with the usual 
mechanisms of corporate governance.549 For instance, under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA not 
only has a court been conferred a discretion whether or not to remove a director from office 
based on a contravention of any of the grounds listed in that provision (which are similar to the 
grounds set out in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act), but it may do so only if, considering 
the director’s course of conduct and the inadequacy of other available remedies, removal would 
                                                 
547 Section 225(c) of the DGCL states that a court “may” remove a director from office if the grounds set out in 
that section have been satisfied. These grounds are a conviction of a felony in connection with the duties of a 
director or a breach of the duty of loyalty in connection with the duties of such director. 
 
548 The relevant provisions of the corporate legislation of the respective USA States which permit the judicial 
removal of a director state that a court “may” remove from office a director if the grounds set out in the respective 
provisions of such statutes have been satisfied. See for example s 10-809(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes; 
s 10A-2-8.09(a) of the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entities Code; s 10.06.463 of the Alaska Corporations 
Code; s 304 of the California Corporations Code; s 33-743(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes; s 29-306.09(a) 
of the District of Columbia Code; s 30-29-809(1) of the Idaho Code; s 490.809(1) of the Iowa Code; s 450.1514(1) 
of the Michigan Business Corporation Act; s 1726(c) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law; s 33-8-
109(a) of the South Carolina Code of Laws; s 47-1A-809 of the South Dakota Business Corporation Act; s 48-18-
109(a) of the Tennessee Code; s 23B.08.090(1) of the Washington Business Corporation Act and s 17-16-809(a) 
of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act. 
 
549 Model Business Corporation Act with Official Comments and Reporter’s Annotations 8-95. 
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be in the best interest of the corporation. A court is thus required to consider whether any 
remedies other than removal would be adequate and further whether removal of the director 
concerned would be in the best interests of the company, before removing a director from 
office.  
 
Notably, section 8.09(a) of the MBCA states that a court may remove a director from office or 
“may order other relief”. Several other USA States permit a court to order other relief instead 
of removing a director from office.550  Section 225(c) of the DGCL goes further in that it states 
that a court may remove a director from office if judicial removal is necessary to avoid 
irreparable harm to the corporation. The section also states that a court may make such orders 
as are necessary to effect the removal of a director. The legislation of many of the USA States 
which permit judicial removal state that a court may remove a director from office only if the 
removal is in the best interest of the corporation.551 These provisions serve to ensure that a court 
does not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of a company. 
 
In sharp contrast, under section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act, as discussed above, 
a court has no discretion whether or not to remove a director from office if any of the grounds 
under that provision are satisfied. A court is not required to consider whether any other 
remedies are adequate before declaring a director delinquent and hence removing him from 
office. The judicial removal of a director from office is not a remedy of last resort. A court is 
also not required to consider whether declaring a director delinquent is in the best interest of 
the company. A court moreover is not given any discretion to grant any other relief, save for 
making the declaration of delinquency subject to any conditions that the court considers 
appropriate.552 It is clear that section 162(5)(c) of the (South African) Companies Act is much 
                                                 
550 See for example ss 33-743(a) and (d) of the Connecticut General Statutes; ss 29-306.09(a)(2) and (d) of the 
District of Columbia Code; ss 30-29-809(1)(b) and (4) of the Idaho Code; ss 490.809(1)(b) and (4) of the Iowa 
Code; s 47-1A-809 of the South Dakota Business Corporation Act and ss 17-16-809(a)(ii) and (d) of the Wyoming 
Business Corporation Act. These provisions provide that a court may remove a director only if, considering the 
director’s course of conduct and the inadequacy of other available remedies, removal would be in the best interest 
of the corporation, and further, that the equitable powers of the court to order other relief is not limited. 
 
551 See for example s 10A-2-8.09(a) of the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entities Code; s 10-809(A)(2) of the 
Arizona Revised Statutes; s 8.35(b) of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983; s 450.1514(1) of the 
Michigan Business Corporation Act; s 33-8-109(a) of the South Carolina Code of Laws; s 48-18-109(a)(2) of the 
Tennessee Code and s 23B.08.090(1) of the Washington Business Corporation Act. 
 
552 See s 162(6) of the Companies Act. 
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stricter than the equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions considered that have 
influenced the Companies Act. 
 
In Gihwala and Others v Grancy Property Limited and Others553 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
proclaimed that the fact that foreign legislation gives courts a wider discretion to remove 
directors from office does not render section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act constitutionally 
problematic, and that the provision remains a rational one. It is imperative to note, however, 
that section 5(2) of the Companies Act states that a court interpreting or applying the 
Companies Act may consider foreign company law to the extent appropriate. It would have 
been useful and instructive for the Supreme Court of Appeal to have considered the equivalent 
provisions of the foreign jurisdictions discussed above, in ascertaining the rationality of section 
162(5)(c) of the Companies Act.554  
 
It is submitted that the approach adopted to the removal of a director under section 8.09 of the 
MBCA and the equivalent provisions under the DGCL and the corporate legislation of the USA 
States that permit the judicial removal of a director is commendable and has the effect of 
limiting the extent of the judicial interference in the internal affairs of the company.555 As 
discussed, the threshold for the misconduct of a director before a court will remove him from 
office is set much higher in the MBCA and the legislation of several USA States compared to 
section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act, where the threshold for misconduct before 
a court will remove a director from office is set much lower. The reason for the high threshold 
under the MBCA is in recognition of the primacy of the voting rights of the shareholders who 
elected the director to office, and the notion that the exercise of shareholders’ voting power 
should not easily be undone by a court.556  
 
                                                 
553 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 145. 
 
554 See also R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v Grancy Property 
Limited 2016 ZASCA 35” 19 for a discussion of this issue. 
 
555 See chapter 2, para 6 where the impact of the court’s power to remove a director from office is discussed, and 
chapter 2, para 7 where suggestions are made to maintain the balance of powers with regard to the removal of a 
director from office by the court.  
 
556 Cox & Hazen Corporations 171. 
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While the removal of directors by the judiciary is important and appropriate in instances when 
the shareholders or the board of directors are unable to remove a director from office (as 
discussed in paragraph 6 of chapter 2), at the same time the removal of directors by the judiciary 
impacts on the internal structure of the company, and alters the composition of the board of 
directors elected by the shareholders to represent their interests. As discussed,557 in light of 
section 7(i) of the Companies Act, which states that one of the purposes of the Companies Act 
is to balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies, there 
must be a balance between the removal of a director by a court and the shareholders’ or board 
of directors’ privilege to remove a director from office. It is submitted that in order to strike a 
proper balance and to limit judicial interference in the internal affairs of a company, section 
162 of the Companies Act should incorporate the following provisions based on the legislation 
of foreign jurisdictions with regard to the judicial removal of directors from office: 
 
   Courts should have a discretion whether or not to declare directors delinquent and hence 
remove them from office; 
  Courts should be required to consider whether the declaration of delinquency and removal 
of the director would be in the best interests of the company; 
  Courts should consider whether any other remedies besides a declaration of delinquency 
and removal of the director from office are adequate; and 
  In addition to imposing any conditions ancillary to a declaration of delinquency or 
probation, courts should have the power to order any other relief under section 162 of the 
Companies Act. 
 
It is submitted that if these considerations formed part of the remedy of the judicial removal of 
directors as contained in section 162 of the Companies Act, due consideration would be given by 
the courts to the inherent right of shareholders to remove directors and to the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of the company.558  
 
                                                 
557 See chapter 2, para 7.  
 
558 See chapter 2, para 7 where some of these factors are discussed.  
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3.11  Application To Suspend Or Set Aside A Delinquency Order Or Probation Order  
 
Under section 162(11)(a) of the Companies Act, a delinquent director may, at any time more 
than three years after the order of delinquency was made, apply to court to suspend the order 
of delinquency and to substitute it for an order of probation, with or without conditions. A 
person who is subsequently placed under a probation order by way of substitution of the 
delinquency order may apply to court at any time more than two years thereafter for an order 
setting aside the probation order.559 A person who was originally placed under a probation order 
may apply to court for the probation order to be set aside after at least two years have elapsed 
since the probation order was made.560  
 
It follows from the above that even though, in terms of section 162(6)(b)(ii) of the Companies 
Act,561  a delinquency order may be imposed on a director for a period of seven years or longer, 
a director may apply to court to reduce this period by first applying to court after three years 
for the suspension of the delinquency order and substitution thereof with a probation order, and 
thereafter applying to court, after two years, to set aside the substituted probation order. The 
implication of section 162(11) of the Companies Act is that in effect the minimum period of a 
delinquency order and a probation order, assuming that the application under section 162(11) 
of the Companies Act is successful, is in fact three years and two years respectively. Section 
162(11) of the Companies Act serves to alleviate the severity of a delinquency order and a 
probation order.  
 
Under section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 a disqualified person 
may apply for leave to act as a director.562 In terms of this provision a court may waive the 
                                                 
559 Section 162(11)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
560 Section 162(11)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
 
561 In terms of s 162(6)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act a declaration of delinquency in terms of ss 162(5)(c) to (f) 
subsists for seven years from the date of the order or such longer period as determined by the court at the time of 
making the declaration, subject to ss 162(11) and (12). Section 162(6)(b)(ii) is discussed in para 3.6.2 above. 
  
562 The relevant sections in this regard are s 17(1) read with s 1(1)(a) of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986. Section 1(1)(a) defines a disqualification order as one which provides that the person 
subject to it shall not act in certain ways, including being a director of a company or taking part in its management, 
without the leave of the court. Section 17(1) deals with the procedure governing such an application and the court 
to whom the application is to be made. In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 
998 at 1003 the UK Court of Appeal commented that even though applications in terms of s 17 of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 are generally known as “section 17 applications” this is a misnomer since the 
application is properly regarded as made under s 1 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
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disqualification of a director to a certain extent and permit a disqualified director to act as a 
director of specific companies.563 A court has a discretion whether or not to grant the 
application. Should the court grant leave to the applicant to act as a director it may do so subject 
to conditions.  
 
The application by a disqualified director in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 for leave to act as a director may be equated to an application by a 
director in terms of section 162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act for his delinquency 
order to be suspended. If an application in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 is successful, the applicant would be empowered to act as a director 
of a company subject to the conditions imposed by the court. Likewise, if an application in 
terms of section 162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act is successful, the applicant’s 
delinquency order would be suspended and replaced with a probation order, with or without 
conditions. The effect of a probation order is that the person may serve as a director but subject 
to the extent permitted by the probation order.564 It follows that the effect of a successful 
application in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and 
in terms of section 162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act is that a person may act as a 
director but only to the extent permitted by the court and subject to the conditions imposed by 
the court. In light of the similarities between section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 and section 162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act this 
chapter draws on the jurisprudence in the UK under section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, which may provide guidance to interpreting section 162(11) of the 
(South African) Companies Act. 
 
Under section 206G(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 a court may grant leave to 
a person who is disqualified from managing corporations, to manage corporations, to manage 
a particular class of corporations, or to manage a particular corporation. Such leave may not be 
granted if the person was disqualified by ASIC.565 If the application is successful, the court 
                                                 
563 See Milman “Partial Disqualification Orders” 224. 
 
564 Section 69(5) of the Companies Act. See para 3.6.1 above for a discussion on the effect of a probation order. 
 
565 Under s 206F(1)(a) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 ASIC may disqualify a person from managing 
corporations for up to five years if, within seven years before ASIC notifies the person that they may be 
disqualified (1) the person has been an officer of two or more corporations and (ii) while the person was an officer, 
or within twelve months after the person ceased to be an officer of those corporations, each of the corporations 
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may permit the applicant to manage corporations, to manage a particular class of corporations, 
or to manage a particular corporation.566 The applicant is required to lodge a notice with ASIC 
at least twenty one days before commencing the proceedings for leave to manage a 
corporation.567 If the order granting leave to manage a particular corporation or corporations is 
granted it may allow unrestricted access to direct a particular company or companies or it may 
be made subject to conditions as determined by the court.568 In light of the similarities between 
section 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 and section 162(11) of the (South 
African) Companies Act, the jurisprudence in Australia on section 206G of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 may provide further guidance to interpreting section 162(11) of the 
(South African) Companies Act.569 
 
Section 162(11) of the Companies Act does not make provision for any third party to intervene 
in the application to suspend or set aside a delinquency order or a probation order. Even though 
a very wide range of persons has been conferred with locus standi in terms of sections 162(2), 
(3) and (4) of the Companies Act to apply to court for an order declaring a director delinquent 
or under probation, the (South African) Companies Act has not conferred on such persons any 
standing to intervene in the proceedings in terms of section 162(11) to suspend or set aside the 
delinquency order or probation order.570 In contrast, section 17(5) of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to appear on an 
application of a person for leave to act as a director, and to call the attention of the court to any 
relevant matters.571 This may be done by giving evidence himself or calling witnesses to do 
                                                 
was wound up and a liquidator lodged a report under s 533(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 about 
the corporation’s inability to pay its debts.  
 
566 Section 206G(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
567 Section 206G(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
568 Section 206G(3) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
569 While the MBCA and some States in the USA provide for the judicial removal of directors, they do not contain 
a provision akin to that contained in s 162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act, on which directors may rely 
to apply to court for the suspension of their disqualification orders, as is the case in the UK and Australia.  
 
570 The locus standi to institute an application under s 162 of the Companies Act is discussed in para 3.3 above. 
 
571 In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 the Secretary of State appealed 
to the UK Court of Appeal against the granting of leave in terms of s 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 to an applicant to act as a director. The UK Court of Appeal remarked that in the 
ordinary case it would expect the Secretary of State to accept the determination of the judge to grant leave to an 
applicant to manage a company since the discretion to do so vests in the judge considering the application. But in 
an unusual case, as in the one before the UK Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State was of the view that the court 
had erred by granting leave. In such a case, the UK Court of Appeal held, it is open to the Secretary of State, who 
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so.572 In Australia, ASIC may intervene in proceedings in terms of section 206G of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001 for leave to manage a corporation or corporations, and it 
is empowered to oppose the application as well.573 The fact that section 162(11) of the 
Companies Act does not empower any person to intervene in the proceedings has the effect of 
weakening the power conferred on those persons with locus standi in terms of sections 162(2), 
(3) and (4) to apply to court to have a director declared delinquent or placed under probation. 
This is because a court may suspend or set aside the delinquency order or probation order under 
section 162(11) of the Companies Act without any input from the person that had initially 
successfully applied to court to have the director declared delinquent or placed under probation.  
 
3.11.1  Application of Section 162(11) of the Companies Act 
 
Section 162(11) of the Companies Act may be relied on by a director who has been declared 
delinquent by a court or who is subject to an order of probation.574 This provision does not 
apply to directors who have been declared delinquent in terms of sections 162(5)(a) or (b) of 
the Companies Act, that is, on account of (i) having consented to act as a director or having 
acted in the capacity of a director while ineligible or disqualified, or (ii) on account of having 
acted as a director while under a probation order in a manner that contravened that probation 
order.575  In such instances, the declaration of delinquency subsists for such person’s lifetime 
and may not be suspended or set aside.   
 
Section 162(11) of the Companies Act may not be invoked unless the applicant has served at 
least three years of the delinquency order. With regard to a probation order, the provision may 
be invoked only after a period of two years has passed since the order was made. As 
                                                 
had obtained the disqualification order, to appeal against the decision on leave (at 1008).  This case was the first 
appeal to come to the UK Court of Appeal in respect of an order granting leave in terms of s 17 of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  
 
572 Section 17(5) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
573 Section 1330 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
574 Section 162(11) of the Companies Act. 
 
575 Section 162(11) of the Companies Act provides that a person who has been declared delinquent in terms of 
s 162(6)(a) of the Companies Act may not apply to court to suspend the order of delinquency and substitute it with 
an order of probation. Section 162(6)(a) refers to a declaration of delinquency in terms of ss 162(5)(a) and (b), 
and states that such a declaration is unconditional and subsists for the lifetime of the person declared delinquent.  
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indicated,576 a probation order may be imposed for a period not exceeding five years, as 
determined by the court.577 In the event that a probation order of two years or less is imposed 
on a director, the provisions of section 162(11) of the Companies Act would not come to the 
assistance of a director.  He would have no choice but to serve the full period of his probation 
order.  
 
In contrast, the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 does not specify any time 
period after which an applicant may apply for leave to act as a director. In fact, a person who 
faces the possibility of a disqualification order is encouraged to immediately seek leave in terms 
of section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 to act as a director. In 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors578 the UK Court of Appeal stated as 
follows: 
 
“[I]t is highly desirable that a person who faces the possibility of a disqualification order 
but who in the event of such an order wishes to seek leave should make that application 
early enough so that the same judge should consider both the application for disqualification 
and the application for leave.” 
 
This does not mean that an applicant may not apply for leave to act as a director after a number 
of years have passed since the disqualification order was made. In Hennelly v Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry579 a director had been disqualified to act as such for a period of eight 
years. He successfully applied for leave to act as a director, in terms of section 17 of the UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, after a period of five years had elapsed. In Re 
Westmid Packing Services Ltd Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Griffiths and 
Others580 the UK Court of Appeal emphasised that when a court knows or expects that an 
application under section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 will be 
                                                 
576 See para 3.6.1 above. 
 
577 Section 162(9)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
578 [2000] BCC 998 at 1010.  
 
579 [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch). The applicant had been disqualified as a director for a period of eight years in terms of 
s 6 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. He had been disqualified because of his conduct in 
relation to five companies, of which he had been the sole effective director. All five companies had gone into 
insolvent liquidation with large debts. Together the five companies owed approximately ten million pounds to 
creditors and approximately five million pounds to the Crown. All five companies also had a history of the late 
filing of returns. 
 
580 [1998] 2 All ER 124 at 131. 
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made immediately after the making of a disqualification order or soon thereafter, and the court 
is inclined to grant such leave, it should not impose the minimum period of disqualification 
since the power to grant leave under section 17 is irrelevant to determining the proper period 
of disqualification.  
 
Setting aside a delinquency order is a two-stage process under section 162(11) of the (South 
African) Companies Act. The applicant must first apply to have the delinquency order 
suspended and substituted with an order of probation, and thereafter, after a period of at least 
two years, he may apply for the probation order to be set aside.581 It is submitted that the 
mandatory two-stage approach adopted under the Companies Act is commendable because it 
affords a court time and opportunity to monitor and assess the conduct of the delinquent director 
during the period that the order is substituted with a probation order. If a court is not satisfied 
with the conduct of the delinquent director during this period, it may decline to set aside the 
substituted probation order. Monitoring the delinquent director’s conduct during the suspension 
of the delinquent order is critical in light of the fact that a delinquency order is aimed at 
protecting companies and corporate stakeholders against directors who have proven themselves 
unable to manage the company’s business or who have neglected their duties and obligations 
as company directors.582 It is submitted that a two-stage process to have a delinquency order 
set aside facilitates this object. 
 
3.11.2  Discretion of the Court to Suspend or Set Aside the Delinquency Order or 
Probation Order  
 
A court has a discretion whether or not to grant the application to suspend the delinquency 
order or to set aside the probation order. This is made clear by section 162(12) of the Companies 
Act, which states that in considering an application in section 162(11) “the court may” grant 
the order if “the court is satisfied” that the requirements in section 162(12)(b) are met.  
 
Neither the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 nor the Australian Corporations 
Act of 2001 provide explicit statutory guidance to the courts on the manner in which they 
                                                 
581 Section 162(11)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act. 
 
582 Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and Others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 29; Gihwala and Others v 
Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 144. The purpose of a delinquency order is 
discussed in para 3.2 above. 
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should exercise their discretion to grant leave to a disqualified director to act as a director. 
Accordingly in these jurisdictions the courts’ “discretion [is] unfettered by any statutory 
condition or criterion”.583 The courts in these jurisdictions have accordingly developed criteria 
for determining whether to grant such leave, and are guided by case law with regard to the 
overall approach to be adopted.584 In contrast, the (South African) Companies Act has, in 
section 162(12), usefully provided statutory criteria to be considered by the courts in exercising 
their discretion whether to suspend an order of delinquency or to set aside an order of probation. 
The criteria are that (i) any conditions attached to the delinquency order or probation order must 
be satisfied; (ii) the court must be satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory 
progress towards rehabilitation; and (iii) the court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable 
prospect that the applicant would be able to serve successfully as a director of the company in 
the future.585  
 
In Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Vane586 the Chancery 
Division, per the Honourable Mrs Justice Arden, remarked that in exercising its discretion 
under section 17(1) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 whether to grant 
leave to a director to act as a director, the end which a disqualification order seeks to achieve 
is particularly relevant. The starting point, the court opined, is to bear in mind that the purpose 
of a disqualification order is protective. The court stated as follows: 
 
“Leave, however, in my view, is not to be too freely given. Legislative policy requires the 
disqualification of unfit directors to minimise the risk of harm to the public, and the courts 
must not by granting leave prevent the achievement of this policy objective. Nor would the 
court wish anyone dealing with the director to be misled as to the gravity with which it 
views the order that has been made.”587  
                                                 
583 Re Dawes and Henderson (Agencies) Ltd [2000] 2 BCC 204 at 211. 
 
584 Belcher “What Makes a Director Fit: An Analysis of the Workings of Section 17 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986” 387 and 400. 
 
585 These criteria are discussed below in paras 3.11.3 and 3.11.4. 
 
586 [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 267. 
 
587 Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Vane [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 267. See further 
Re Britannia Homes Centres Ltd, Official Receiver v McCahill [2001] 2 BCLC 63 at 71; Hennelly v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 65; Walters “Leave to Act as a Company Director 
following Disqualification” 240 and Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 240 
where it was emphasised that in granting leave to a disqualified director to act as a director the purpose of the UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 must not be undermined, and that a cautious approach should be 
adopted by courts. 
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Griffin also submits that since section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986 has the effect of permitting a director with a dubious past history in the management of a 
company to partly escape the consequences of his past indiscretions, granting leave to the 
director to manage a corporation must be done with caution.588  
 
It is of interest that a concern has been raised by the UK Courts of Appeal that in some instances 
leave is in fact granted too easily by the courts of first instance. For instance in Re Westmid 
Packing Services Ltd Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Griffiths and Others589 the 
UK Court of Appeal expressed the view that the directors concerned had been “fortunate” in 
that the court of first instance had granted leave to them under section 17 of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The UK Court of Appeal stated:590  
 
 “The appellants may have been dazzled, manipulated and deceived by [their fellow 
director] but they were in breach of their own duties in allowing this to happen. They can 
count themselves fortunate to have received the minimum period of disqualification and 
to have had the benefit of immediate orders under s 17 of the Act.” 
 
Similarly, in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors591 the UK Court of 
Appeal found that it was “very doubtful” that it would have granted leave to the applicant under 
section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, and that the applicant had 
been “fortunate”592 that leave had been granted by the court of first instance.  
 
                                                 
588 Griffin Company Law Fundamental Principles 360. 
 
589 [1998] 2 All ER 124 at 131. 
 
590 Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Griffiths and Others [1998] 2 
All ER 124 at 131. 
 
591 [2000] BCC 998 at 1012.  
 
592 [2000] BCC 998 at 1015. Even though the UK Court of Appeal doubted that it would have granted leave to the 
applicant to manage a company, it did not overturn the decision of the court a quo. It found that the discretion 
whether or not to grant leave was that of the judge of the court a quo and that it was not open to the UK Court of 
Appeal to interfere with the judge’s exercise of his discretion unless he had misdirected himself about material 
considerations, or had come to a plainly erroneous conclusion (at 1012 and 1015). Since it had not been shown to 
the satisfaction of the UK Court of Appeal that the judge in the court a quo had been plainly wrong, the court 
dismissed the appeal by the Secretary of State (at 1014). Belcher reviewed the statistics between 1 November 2001 
and 12 January 2010 reflecting instances when UK courts granted leave to directors in terms of s 17 of the UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Belcher argues that there is evidence of leniency in the granting of 
leave which suggests that leave may be granted by the UK courts too often (Belcher “What Makes a Director Fit: 
An Analysis of the Workings of Section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986” 389).  
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In considering an application under section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986, a court will generally have regard to two factors in particular: (i) the protection of 
the public; and (ii) the need for the applicant to be a director.593 The courts balance the need for 
a director to act as such against the protection of the public from the conduct that had led to the 
disqualification order.594 With regard to the second factor of “need”, in Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors595 the UK Court of Appeal stated that there are two distinct 
needs which must be considered. The first is the need of the disqualified person to earn a living 
and the second is the need of the company to have the work done for the purposes of its 
business.596 Each factor carries some weight, but the second factor is more influential in an 
application in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.597 
With regard to the need for the company to have the work done for the purposes of its business, 
a further distinction must be made between a case where the company simply needs to have the 
job done by somebody and a case where the company needs to have the job done by the 
particular applicant.598 The UK Court of Appeal stated that the argument for leave to act as a 
director is more cogent where the company needs to have the job done by the particular 
applicant.599 In Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills600 the Chancery 
Division made it clear that convenience and need are not the same things. 
 
                                                 
593 Re Cargo Agency Ltd [1992] BCC 388 at 393; Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11; Re Grayan Building 
Services Ltd [1995] Ch 241 at 253-254; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Palfreman [1995] BCC 193 
at 195; Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Vane [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 267; Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry v Barnett [1998] 2 BCLC 64 at 68-70; Re Dawes and Henderson (Agencies) Ltd 
[2000] 2 BCC 204 at 210; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 at 1003; Re 
Britannia Homes Centres Ltd, Official Receiver v McCahill [2001] 2 BCLC 63 at 71-74; Hennelly v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 63; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Swan 
(No 2) [2005] EWHC 2479 para 10; Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] BCC 
283 at 297; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 721; Hannigan Company Law 
378; Belcher “What Makes a Director Fit: An Analysis of the Workings of Section 17 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986” 402.   
 
594 Hennelly v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 63. 
 
595 [2000] BCC 998 at 1003. 
 
596 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 at 1003. 
 
597 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 at 1003. 
 
598 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 at 1003. 
 
599 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 at 1003. 
 
600 [2015] BCC 283 at 299. 
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Turning to Australian law, in exercising its discretion under section 206G of the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 whether to grant leave to an applicant to manage a corporation, the 
Australian courts generally take into account the following factors: (i) the nature of the offence; 
(ii) the nature of the applicant’s involvement in the offence; (iii) the applicant’s general 
character; (iv) the structure of the companies in which the applicant may be a director; and (v) 
the assessment of the risk of those connected with the company and the public involved in the 
applicant assuming a position on the board.601 The importance of protecting the public has been 
emphasised on the ground that those who have dealings with the company are entitled to find 
that they are dealing with persons of integrity and that the funds of the company are not 
dissipated by dishonest activities.602 In the leading case of Re Magna Alloys & Research Pty 
Ltd603 the Supreme Court of New South Wales stated as follows with regard to section 122 of 
the Companies Act, 1961 (the predecessor to section 206G of the Australian Corporations Act 
of 2001): 
 
“It is designed to protect the public and to prevent the corporate structure from being used 
to the financial detriment of investors, shareholders, creditors and persons dealing with the 
company. In its operation it is calculated to act as a safeguard against the corporate structure 
being used by individuals in a manner which is contrary to proper commercial standards.” 
In exercising their discretion to grant leave to an applicant to act as a director of a corporation 
in terms of section 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the Australian courts also 
                                                 
601 These factors were first laid down in Re Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 28353 at 28354 
and were adopted by subsequent courts. See for instance Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd (1977) ACLC 29556 at 
29557-29559 (decided under s 122 of the Companies Act 1961 (Victoria), the equivalent provision to s 206G of 
the Australian Corporations Act of 2001); In Re Marsden (1981) 29 SASR 454 at 459-460; Re Minimix Industries 
Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 at 512; Re Hamilton-Irvine (1990) 8 ACLC 1067 at 1071; Murray v Australian Securities 
Commission (1994) 12 ACLC 11 at 13-14; Re Jarret [1999] FCA 503 para 7; Adams v Australian Securities & 
Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557 para 8 and Re Chapman [2006] NSWSC 99 paras 7-10. For a further 
discussion of these factors see J Cassidy “Disqualification of Directors Under the Corporations Law” 228-234 and 
Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.191 at 279. 
 
602 Re Minimix Industries Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 at 512. See further Re Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd (1975) 
1 ACLR 28353 at 28354; Re Van Reesema (1975) 11 SASR 28249 at 28255; Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd 
(1977) ACLC 29556 at 29557; Zuker v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1980] ACLC 34334 at 34338; In Re 
Marsden (1981) 29 SASR 454 at 459; Re Hamilton-Irvine (1990) 8 ACLC 1067 at 1070; Re C & J Hazell Holdings 
Pty Ltd and Related Companies [1991] TASSC 11 paras 4-5; Murray v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 
12 ACLC 11 at 13; Hosken v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [1998] TASSC 101 para 15; Re 
Jarret [1999] FCA 503 para 7 and Re Chapman [2006] NSWSC 99 paras 7 to 11 where the respective courts 
stressed the importance of protecting the public in considering whether to grant leave to a disqualified applicant 
to manage a corporation.  
  
603 (1975) 1 ACLR 28353 at 28354.  
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take into account the hardship on the company if leave were to be denied.604 In Re C & J Hazell 
Holdings Pty Ltd and Related Companies605 the Supreme Court of Tasmania held that there 
was substance in the contention that if the applicant (who had been convicted of contravening 
traffic legislation) were not granted leave to act as a director of various companies, the group 
would suffer detriment and the security of the employees would be weakened. The court found 
that while these matters are by no means decisive “they are material considerations”.606 The 
court subsequently granted the applicant’s request for leave to act as a director of various 
companies.  
 
Since the disqualification order contemplates that there will be hardship to the offender, 
hardship is not generally a compelling factor that is taken into account by Australian courts in 
exercising their discretion under section 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.607 
In Re Van Reesema608 the Supreme Court of South Australia gave little weight to the suggestion 
made on behalf of the applicant that hardship to him should be taken into account when 
                                                 
604 Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd (1977) ACLC 29556 at 29559; Zuker v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs 
[1980] ACLC 34334 at 34340; Re Minimix Industries Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 at 513; Re Hamilton-Irvine (1990) 
8 ACLC 1067 at 1074; Hosken v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [1998] TASSC 101 para 15; 
J Cassidy “Disqualification of Directors Under the Corporations Law” 232-233. For example, in Murray v 
Australian Securities Commission (1994) 12 ACLC 11 the applicant was convicted of aiding and abetting an 
accountant to falsify books of a company whilst he was a director of the company. In light of the hardship that 
would be caused to the existing directors, the shareholders, the employees and customers of the company if the 
applicant were not granted leave to act as a director of the corporation, the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
exercised its discretion in favour of the applicant (at 14). The court held that the risk to the public could be 
minimised in this case by the imposition of appropriate conditions (at 14). One condition imposed by the court 
was that the company should be subject to audits during the period while the applicant was a director (at 14).  
 
605 [1991] TASSC 11 para 13. 
 
606 Re C & J Hazell Holdings Pty Ltd and Related Companies [1991] TASSC 11 para 13. 
 
607 Re Van Reesema (1975) 11 SASR 28249 at 28256; Murray v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 12 
ACLC 11 at 14; Adams v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557 para 8; Re Chapman 
[2006] NSWSC 99 para 9; J Cassidy “Disqualification of Directors Under the Corporations Law” 232-233; Austin 
& Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.191 at 279. In Adams v Australian 
Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557 the Federal Court of Australia refused to grant leave to an 
applicant to manage a corporation even though a mere seven months of the original five year period of 
disqualification remained. The applicant had been convicted of defrauding the Commonwealth of sales tax 
revenue. The court was not persuaded by the director’s evidence that it was essential that he be appointed a director 
of five companies in order for those companies to enter into a significant transaction (paras 25 and 32). 
 
608 (1975) 11 SASR 28249 at 28255. This case was decided under s 122 of the Companies Act 1962 (South 
Australia), which was the equivalent section to what is now s 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
In terms of s 122(2) of the Companies Act 1962 (South Australia) a person who was convicted of an offence in 
connection with the promotion, formation or management of a corporation or an offence involving fraud or 
dishonesty could apply to court for leave to act as a director to take part in the management of a company. 
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exercising its discretion whether to grant leave to him to act as a director on the ground that 
any hardship was “self created” and that it was envisaged by the statute.  
 
While the factors referred to above are generally taken into account by the courts in Australia 
in exercising their discretion under section 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, 
they are not exhaustive.609 The Supreme Court of Victoria stated in Zuker v Commissioner for 
Corporate Affairs610 that these statements of principle do not seek to set out all the matters 
which a judge must take into account in determining whether to grant leave to an applicant to 
act as a director. They serve only to fix the area of enquiry.611 Following the stance adopted in 
the UK, the Supreme Court of Victoria in Zuker v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs612 
cautioned that leave of the court to act as a director is not to be granted lightly. 
 
It is submitted that in exercising its discretion in terms of section 162(12) of the (South African) 
Companies Act, South African courts should, as the UK courts do, in respect of their equivalent 
provision, bear in mind that the section is a protective remedy in the public interest.613 Thus, in 
considering whether to suspend a delinquency order or to set aside a probation order, the courts 
must exercise caution. They should not, by suspending or setting aside the relevant order, 
prevent the achievement of this objective. The protection of the public includes all relevant 
interest groups, such as shareholders, employees, investors, customers, creditors and all those 
with whom the company will do business.614 The protection of the public in this context is not 
explicitly specified in section 162(12) as a factor to be taken into account by a court in 
considering an application in terms of section 162(11) of the Companies Act. It is however 
                                                 
609 Adams v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557 para 8. In Re Chapman [2006] 
NSWSC 99 para 9 the Supreme Court of New South Wales agreed that these factors are not exhaustive.  
 
610 [1980] ACLC 34334 at 34339. 
 
611 In Re C & J Hazell Holdings Pty Ltd and Related Companies [1991] TASSC 11 para 5 the Supreme Court of 
Tasmania approved of this statement. 
 
612 [1980] ACLC 34334 at 34340. 
 
613 Msimang NO and Another v Katuliiba and Others [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 29; Gihwala and Others v 
Grancy Property Limited and Others 2017 (2) SA 337 (SCA) para 144; Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) 
SA 547 (WCC) para 40. See para 3.2 above where the purpose of s 162 of the Companies Act is discussed. 
 
614 Re Minimix Industries Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 at 512; Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry v Vane [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 268; Murray v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 12 ACLC 11 at 
13; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 at 1011; Hennelly v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 63.   
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submitted that the purpose of a court in considering whether the applicant has demonstrated 
satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation and whether there is a reasonable prospect that the 
applicant would be able successfully to serve as a director in the future, is to ensure that the 
applicant does not pose a risk to the public if the delinquency order were to be suspended or if 
the probation order were to be set aside. It follows that a court would implicitly take into 
account the protection of the public in exercising its discretion in terms of section 162(12) of 
the Companies Act, even if this factor is not explicitly specified in the provision.   
 
It is further submitted that in accordance with the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, 
the hardship on the applicant should not weigh too heavily as a factor to be considered by a 
court in exercising its discretion in terms of section 162(12) of the Companies Act. As Zelling 
J asserted in the Supreme Court of South Australia in Re Van Reesema,615 the protection of the 
public outweighs any hardship to the applicant since such hardship is self created.  
 
3.11.3  Conditions 
 
In Re Brian Sheridan Cars Ltd Official Receiver v Sheridan616 the Chancery Division found 
that the approach of courts in the UK is not to tolerate imperfect compliance with conditions 
attached to a disqualification order. A similar approach has been adopted with regard to 
applications in terms of section 162(11) of the South African Companies Act. Section 
162(12)(a) of the Companies Act prohibits a court from granting the order applied for under 
section 162(11) of the Companies Act unless the applicant has satisfied any conditions that 
were attached to the original order, or which are imposed on him when the court suspended the 
delinquency order and substituted it with a probation order. If an applicant has not satisfied 
such conditions, his application to suspend the delinquency order or to set aside the probation 
order would not be granted. A court does not have any discretion in this regard. It is submitted 
that section 162(12)(a) highlights the importance of the conditions imposed by a court on a 
delinquency order and a probation order. The monitoring of conditions, the determination of 
the conditions, the type of conditions and the breach of the conditions are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
615 (1975) 11 SASR 28249 at 28256. 
 
616 [1996] 1 BCLC 327 at 342. 
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3.11.3.1  Monitoring of Conditions 
 
An applicant must, in his application under section 162(11) of the Companies Act, prove that 
he has satisfied the conditions that were attached to the delinquency order or the probation 
order. For instance, if a court had imposed as a condition to the delinquency order that the 
director must undertake a designated programme of remedial education or carry out a 
designated programme of community service, the applicant must prove to the court that he has 
complied with this condition. It is advisable for directors who have had a delinquency order or 
probation order imposed on them to ensure that they retain evidence of compliance with the 
conditions imposed by the court. This would facilitate their application under section 162(11) 
of the Companies Act, should they decide to utilise this provision once the applicable period of 
time has elapsed.  
 
The UK Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors617 
cautioned against courts imposing conditions which are of such a nature that they are too easily 
disregarded and almost impossible to police. The court’s concern was that a breach of a 
condition might well not come to light unless and until the company or another company 
managed by the disqualified director “has come to grief”,618 by which stage it would be too late 
to secure the intended protection for the public. 
 
Since the compliance by the applicant with the conditions imposed by the court is 
fundamentally important in order to protect the public, it is advisable for a court to appoint 
someone to monitor whether the applicant does in fact comply with such conditions. This was 
done in Hennelly v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry619 where the Chancery Division 
appointed the finance director of the company to provide quarterly reports to the Department 
of Trade and Industry on the level of compliance by the disqualified director with the conditions 
imposed by the court. Appointing someone to monitor the compliance by the applicant of the 
                                                 
617 [2000] BCC 998 at 1018. 
 
618 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 at 1019. Hannigan also opines that 
there is little policing of disqualification orders in the UK once they have been put in place (Hannigan Company 
Law 386). Enforcement action is likely to arise only when the conduct of the disqualified director has been brought 
to the attention of the Secretary of State in some way. For instance, when another venture in which the disqualified 
director is involved collapses, or when a member of the public complains (Hannigan Company Law 386). 
 
619 [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 68. The applicant had been a director of five companies and each of them had a 
history of the late filing of returns and a failure to pay money owed to the Crown.  
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conditions imposed by the court would facilitate an application under section 162(11) of the 
(South African) Companies Act since the appointed person would be in a position to report to 
the court on the extent of the applicant’s compliance with the conditions imposed by the court.  
 
An alternative suggestion to monitor compliance with the conditions by a director would be to 
require the director to lodge an affidavit with the court after a specified period of time 
confirming that he has complied with the conditions laid down by the court. Such a requirement 
was imposed in Re Brian Sheridan Cars Ltd Official Receiver v Sheridan620 where the Chancery 
Division imposed a condition to the effect that within twenty one days of the date of the court 
order, the director must lodge an affidavit with the court confirming that all the conditions laid 
down by the court had been satisfied. Such a condition, the Chancery Division asserted, would 
serve to concentrate the mind of the director on the necessity to comply strictly with the terms 
of the court order.621 
 
Another suggestion to monitor the compliance by the director would be to provide a copy of 
the court order and conditions imposed on the director on all parties affected by any failure of 
the director to comply with the conditions imposed. Such parties could be the shareholders and 
creditors of the company and, if applicable, the company’s bank and the South African Revenue 
Services. It is submitted that if the fact that a delinquent director is functioning as a director 
under the terms of a suspended delinquency order were to be publicised to relevant parties, this 
would limit the risk of the director failing to fully comply with the conditions imposed by a 
court on him. 
 
                                                 
620 [1996] 1 BCLC 327 at 343. 
  
621 Re Brian Sheridan Cars Ltd Official Receiver v Sheridan [1996] 1 BCLC 327 at 346. The applicant in this case 
had been disqualified under s 6 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 for a period of three 
years. The court a quo had permitted him to continue to act as a director of certain companies for twelve months 
subject to specific conditions. The director had not complied strictly with the conditions relating to the appointment 
of auditors to the company and to the service of the court’s judgment on various interested parties. He applied to 
court for leave to continue to act as a director of the company for a further period, with retrospective effect. The 
Chancery Division found that the director had been unacceptably casual in his attitude to complying with the 
conditions imposed on him. However since the two companies in respect of which the director had been granted 
leave to act as a director had, through his efforts, traded successfully, the court granted leave to the director to 
continue to act as such for a further year. But because of the non-compliance by the director with the conditions 
imposed on him by the court a quo, the Chancery Division refused to back date the new court order, as requested 
by the applicant. It also imposed a new condition that the applicant lodge an affidavit with the court within twenty 
one days confirming that every condition laid down by the court had been satisfied. 
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3.11.3.2  Determination of the Conditions  
 
Section 162(11) of the Companies Act leaves it unclear whether, in his application to suspend 
the delinquency order and substitute it with a probation order, it is the applicant that must 
request the court to determine the conditions that should be imposed, or whether the court 
would of itself determine what these conditions should be.622  
 
The approach adopted in the UK with regard to the imposition of conditions, as affirmed in Re 
Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Vane623 is that in many instances 
the applicant proposes in his application for leave in terms of section 17 of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 the conditions that a court may put in place in order to 
protect the public. Bristoll states that most applicants offer fairly standard conditions drawn 
from the Secretary of State’s guidelines which are tailored to the facts of their case.624 In other 
instances the court sets the conditions itself.625 Often the conditions of leave are a combination 
of those proposed by the applicant and those imposed by the court.626  
 
For example, in Re Gibson Davies Ltd627 the applicant applied to court in terms of section 17 
of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 for leave to act as a director. He 
proposed ten conditions that a court could consider imposing if it decided to grant the 
application. The Chancery Division duly granted the application for leave for the applicant to 
act as a director, subject to the ten conditions that were proposed by him.628 In Harris v 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills629 the applicant had also proposed 
                                                 
622 J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African 
Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 283. 
 
623 [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 268.  
   
624 Bristoll “Permission to Act whilst Disqualified” 52. The guidelines issued by the Secretary of State include a 
list of information which should generally be included in an application for leave to act as a director, although the 
evidence must be tailored to the facts of the particular case (for a discussion of the Secretary of State’s guidelines 
see Bristoll “Permission to Act whilst Disqualified” 53).  
 
625 Belcher “What Makes a Director Fit: An Analysis of the Workings of Section 17 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986” 404. 
 
626 Belcher “What Makes a Director Fit: An Analysis of the Workings of Section 17 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986” 404. 
 
627 [1995] BCC 11. 
 
628 Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 at 17-18. 
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conditions to the court which it could consider imposing if his application for leave to act as a 
director were granted. The court granted the applicant’s application in respect of one company 
on the basis of the conditions imposed by him, but imposed its own additional conditions with 
regard to his appointment as a director of the second company. This was done in order to 
minimise the risk of harm to the public.630 A similar approach is adopted by the courts in 
Australia with regard to the consideration of applications under section 206G of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001. In Hosken v Australian Securities and Investments Commission631 
the Supreme Court of Tasmania granted leave to the applicant to manage a corporation but 
imposed its own conditions with which it required the applicant to comply.  
 
While the decision whether to impose conditions as well as the type of conditions to be 
proposed is in the discretion of the court that is considering the application under section 
162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act, it is submitted that, in accordance with the 
approach adopted in the UK and Australia, it would be advisable for an applicant to propose 
appropriate conditions that a court may consider imposing, should it exercise its discretion to 
suspend the delinquency order. This would guide the court on the conditions to be imposed 
should the application succeed, in order to guard against a recurrence of the applicant’s 
misconduct. A court may also be more inclined to suspend a delinquency order if the applicant 
is able to demonstrate that the conditions proposed by him would serve to protect the public 
from a recurrence of his misconduct.  
 
                                                 
629 [2015] BCC 283. 
 
630 Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] BCC 283 at 295. These conditions are 
discussed in para 3.11.3.3 below. 
 
631 [1998] TASSC 101. This case was decided under s 229 of the Australian Corporations Act, 1989. This section 
was substantially in the same terms as s 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. In terms of s 229 of the 
Australian Corporations Act, 1989 where a person had been convicted of various offences he was disqualified 
from managing a corporation for a period of five years save with the leave of the court.  The applicant in this case 
had been convicted of offences involving the improper use of his position as an officer of the corporation and for 
incurring a debt by the company at a time when it was improper to do so. The court granted leave to the applicant 
to manage the corporation subject to various conditions. Some of the conditions were that an accountant be 
appointed to supervise the business of the company, conditions restricting the amount of money that could be 
spent by the company without the prior consent of the accountant, and a condition that the applicant provide the 
accountant, on a monthly basis, with a list of all receipts and payments of the company and copies of all bank 
statements.  
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3.11.3.3  Type of Conditions 
 
It is useful to examine the sort of conditions imposed by courts in the UK and Australia on 
disqualified directors to act as directors. This may provide guidance to South African courts on 
the appropriate conditions to impose in the event of a delinquency order being suspended in 
terms of section 162(12) of the (South African) Companies Act. 
 
Some of the conditions generally imposed by courts in the UK in the context of an application 
in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, are to appoint 
a third party to provide control or supervision over the director, to limit the roles which the 
director may undertake, conditions regarding the composition of the board of directors in the 
particular company, and conditions relating to accounting controls.632 Examples of such 
conditions are that an independent chartered accountant or solicitor approved by the court acts 
as a co-director;633 a director’s loan owed by the company to the applicant not be repaid unless 
all the creditors of the company are first paid;634 the applicant not be granted any security over 
the company’s assets;635 conditions relating to the countersigning of cheques;636 conditions 
restricting the total emoluments that may be paid by the company to the applicant,637 and an 
undertaking that the company would convene monthly board meetings and that these would be 
attended by a representative of the auditors.638  
                                                 
632 See Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 at 17-18; Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry v Vane  [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 268; Re Dawes and Henderson (Agencies) Ltd [2000] 2 BCC 204 at 213; 
Hicks “Director Disqualification: Can it Deliver?” 447; Belcher “What Makes a Director Fit: An Analysis of the 
Workings of Section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986” 404; Bristoll “Permission to Act 
whilst Disqualified” 52 and Hannigan Company Law 378. 
 
633 Re Majestic Recording Studios Ltd and Others [1989] BCLC 1 at 7; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
v Palfreman [1995] BCC 193 at 196; Re Brian Sheridan Cars Ltd Official Receiver v Sheridan [1996] 1 BCLC 
327 at 337; Hennelly v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 67. 
 
634 Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 at 17. 
 
635 Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 at 17; Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
[2015] BCC 283 at 292. 
 
636 Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 at 17; Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v 
Vane [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 272. 
 
637 Re Gibson Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11 at 17; Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
[2015] BCC 283 at 292. 
 
638 Re Chartmore Ltd [1990] BCLC 673 at 676; Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v 
Vane [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 272; Hennelly v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) 
para 67. 
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In some instances UK courts have imposed conditions which are unusual and very specific to 
the offences committed by the applicant. Thus in Harris v Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills639 the applicant had applied for leave to be a director of three companies, 
which he claimed were inter linked. Some of the conditions which the applicant proposed to 
the court, in the context of his application in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, were that without the court’s permission he would not act as a 
director of any other company, he would not borrow money from the companies or accept 
security over their assets, and that he would receive only a board-approved salary.640 The court 
granted his application for leave to be a director of one of the companies. In relation to the 
second company the court imposed additional specific conditions in order to minimise the risk 
of harm to the public. These conditions were that the applicant convert his loan into preference 
shares, an annual review of the company’s assets and liabilities be undertaken by experienced, 
independent auditors, and that no dividends be paid that would have the effect of reducing the 
company’s distributable profits to less than fifty thousand pounds.641 The court did not grant 
the applicant’s application with regard to the third company on the ground that his need to be 
reappointed as a director of that company was outweighed by the risks accompanying such an 
appointment.642  
 
Turning to Australia, some of the conditions imposed by courts in terms of section 206G of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001 in granting leave to an applicant to manage a corporation, 
are conditions relating to the financial authority of the applicant,643 and the appointment of an 
independent person to supervise the business of the company while the applicant was involved 
                                                 
639 [2015] BCC 283.  
 
640 Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] BCC 283 at 292. 
 
641 Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] BCC 283 at 294. 
 
642 Harris v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] BCC 283 at 299-300. 
 
643 Hosken v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [1998] TASSC 101 para 15. The Supreme Court 
of Tasmania imposed conditions restricting the amount of money that could be spent by the company without the 
prior consent of the accountant who was appointed to supervise the business of the company. 
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in management.644 In Re Minimix Industries Ltd645 the Australian High Court granted leave to 
the applicant to be employed as a manager of a corporation on condition that he had no authority 
to sign cheques on the company’s bank account for the remainder of his disqualification period. 
In Re Chapman646 the Supreme Court of New South Wales granted the applicant’s application 
in terms of section 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 to be a director subject to 
the condition that he could not be the sole signatory on any account maintained by the company 
with any bank or financial institution. A further example of a condition imposed by an 
Australian court (the Federal Court of Australia), provided in Re Jarret,647 is that as a condition 
of permitting the disqualified applicant to be a director of a company, a registered auditor be 
appointed as the auditor of the company, and, in addition the company lodge audited accounts 
with ASIC while the applicant was acting as a director of the company. In Re Hamilton-
Irvine648 the Supreme Court of Norfolk Island (Australia) granted leave to the applicant to act 
as a director but only under the scrutiny of a chartered secretary or a registered auditor. The 
court ordered the applicant to personally bear the costs of retaining the services of the chartered 
secretary or the registered auditor.649  
 
                                                 
644 Hosken v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [1998] TASSC 101 para 15. The Supreme Court 
of Tasmania appointed an accountant to supervise the business of the company. 
 
645 (1982) 1 ACLC 511 at 513. This case was decided under s 188A, a section which was introduced by the 1980 
Amendment Act. Section 188A was substantially in the same terms as s 206G of the Australian Corporations Act 
of 2001. In terms of s 188A, where a person had been convicted of any offence in connection with the promotion, 
formation or management of a company he was disqualified from being a director of a company for a period of 
five years save with the leave of the court, which could be given on such terms and conditions as the court 
considered fit. The applicant’s offences in this case related to procuring goods by the use of a false name, a false 
address and valueless cheques. 
 
646 [2006] NSWSC 99 paras 18-19. The applicant had been automatically disqualified to act as a director in terms 
of s 206B(4) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 on the ground that he had executed a personal insolvency 
agreement under part X of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. 
 
647 [1999] FCA 503 para 9. The applicant in this case had been convicted of failing to act honestly in the exercise 
of his powers and discharge of his duties as a director with intent to deceive and defraud. The applicant had 
concealed the true nature of equitable interests which he held in a group of companies, and had in addition 
concealed the true reasons for payments made to a third party which were disguised as being genuine foreign 
exchange hedging transactions.  
 
648 (1990) 8 ACLC 1067 at 1075. 
 
649 Re Hamilton-Irvine (1990) 8 ACLC 1067 at 1075. The applicant had been convicted of charges in relation to 
the import of cargo into Norfolk Island. The court required the chartered secretary or the registered auditor to 
report periodically to the Controller of Customs whether the company had complied with the relevant provisions 
of the customs legislation. In Hosken v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [1998] TASSC 101 
para 15 the Supreme Court of Tasmania affirmed that the power exists to require an applicant to bear the costs of 
the services of an independent scrutineer of the company.  
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It is submitted that the nature of the conditions to be imposed on a suspension of a delinquency 
order should be determined by the nature of the particular case. Courts must of course impose 
conditions that are enforceable and realistic.650 It is evident that the conditions imposed by 
courts in the UK and Australia are specifically tailored to protect the public from the nature of 
the misconduct committed by the director, and to ensure that the public would be protected if 
the director were permitted to act as a director again or to manage a company.  It is submitted 
that the South African courts should likewise impose conditions on the suspension of a 
delinquency order which relate specifically to the misconduct committed by the director, which 
had resulted in the original delinquency order being granted. The conditions imposed should 
ensure that the public would be protected if the delinquency order were suspended. For 
instance, if a director were declared delinquent because he had signed documents on behalf of 
the company despite knowing that he had lacked the authority to do so,651 a condition that a 
court could appropriately impose, should it decide to suspend the declaration of delinquency, 
is that the director may not sign any documents, including cheques on the company’s bank 
account, on behalf of the company. This would ensure that during the suspension of the 
delinquency order the risk of the director committing the same offence again would be 
minimised.  
 
3.11.3.4  Breach of Conditions  
 
Under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 if a person contravenes a 
disqualification order (and by implication contravenes the conditions of a disqualification 
order) he commits both a criminal offence and a civil offence. In terms of section 13 of the UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 if a person acts in contravention of a 
disqualification order he is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for not more 
than two years or a fine, or both, and on summary conviction to imprisonment for more than 
six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both. Accordingly, the sanction 
for breach of a condition is severe in that the person would be acting in breach of a 
                                                 
650 Hennelly v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 70. 
 
651 This is a ground of delinquency in terms of s 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) of the Companies Act read with s 77(3)(a) of 
the Companies Act. 
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disqualification order and would commit a criminal offence.652 In addition, a breach of a 
disqualification order in the UK exposes the director to potential personal liability.653 Sections 
15(1) and 15(2) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 state that a 
disqualified person involved in the management of a company in contravention of a 
disqualification order is personally liable, jointly and severally with the company, for the debts 
of the company incurred at that time.  
 
It is of interest that Griffin states that the criminal sanction of imprisonment of two years or a 
fine, or both, is much too lenient in that it may encourage disqualified directors to continue to 
act in a managerial position in contravention of the terms of the disqualification order.654 His 
concern is that a disqualified director may regard the financial reward of participating in a 
managerial capacity in a company as outweighing the risk of detection and the possibility of 
imprisonment or a fine.655 Griffin suggests that a breach of a disqualification order (and by 
implication, a breach of the conditions of a disqualification order) should be punished by a 
criminal sanction of a minimum term of imprisonment of one year and a fine and a maximum 
term of imprisonment of five years and a fine.656  
 
The (South African) Companies Act is silent on the consequences of a director failing to comply 
with the conditions imposed on him while his delinquency order is suspended. It is submitted 
that the word “suspended” in section 162(11) of the Companies Act implies that the 
“suspension” of the delinquency order may be revoked, and that the original delinquency order 
may be reinstated. On this basis, it is arguable that if a director were to breach any of the 
conditions imposed on him in terms of section 162(11) of the Companies Act, the original 
delinquency order could be reinstated in full. The director would thus have to serve out the full 
term of the original delinquency order imposed on him. If a director breaches the conditions 
                                                 
652 Re Brian Sheridan Cars Ltd Official Receiver v Sheridan [1996] 1 BCLC 327 at 346; Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors [2000] BCC 998 at 1018; Griffin “The Disqualification of Unfit Directors 
and the Protection of the Public Interest” 220; Hannigan Company Law 378. 
 
653 Re Brian Sheridan Cars Ltd, Official Receiver v Sheridan [1996] 1 BCLC 327 at 346; Davies & Worthington 
Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 239. 
 
654 Griffin “The Disqualification of Unfit Directors and the Protection of the Public Interest” 228. 
 
655 Griffin “The Disqualification of Unfit Directors and the Protection of the Public Interest” 228. 
 
656 Griffin “The Disqualification of Unfit Directors and the Protection of the Public Interest” 228. 
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imposed on him while under a probation order, he must in terms of section 162(5)(b) of the 
Companies Act be declared a delinquent director.657  
 
The delinquency remedy under the (South African) Companies Act is a civil remedy.658 It 
follows that the breach of a delinquency order or of a suspended delinquency order would be a 
civil, and not a criminal, offence. Nevertheless, if a delinquency order were suspended by a 
court and the conditions attached to it were thereafter breached by a director, it is submitted 
that the director ought to be severely punished by a court. The suspension of a delinquency 
order is an indulgence granted by a court to a delinquent director. Any conditions attached to 
the suspension of a delinquency order must be scrupulously observed and fully respected and 
complied with by a director. As the Chancery Division in Re Brian Sheridan Cars Ltd Official 
Receiver v Sheridan659 emphasised, it is of “cardinal importance” that any conditions imposed 
by a court on a disqualified director are strictly observed.  It is not clear from the (South 
African) Companies Act whether a court would be empowered to extend the delinquency 
period to a term longer than the original period of delinquency, in the event of a director 
breaching the conditions of a suspended delinquency order. This must be clarified by the 
legislature by amending legislation. 
 
3.11.4  The Statutory Requirements in Considering a Section 162(11) Application 
 
Section 162(12)(b) of the Companies Act provides statutory guidance to the courts in exercising 
their discretion in considering an application in terms of section 162(11), as follows: 
 
“On considering an application contemplated in subsection (11), the court may- 
(a) . . .  
(b) grant an order if, having regard to the circumstances leading to the original order, and 
the conduct of the applicant in the ensuing period, the court is satisfied that –  
(i) the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation; 
and 
                                                 
657 Section 162(5)(b) of the Companies Act states that a court must make an order declaring a person a delinquent 
director if, while under a probation order, the person acted as a director in a manner that contravened the probation 
order. If a director were to breach the conditions imposed to a probation order, this would arguably constitute a 
breach of the probation order itself.  
 
658 In Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 155 the Western Cape Division, Cape 
Town affirmed that the innovation in s 162 of the Companies Act is that it introduces a new civil remedy for those 
harmed by the conduct of delinquent directors.   
 
659 [1996] 1 BCLC 327 at 346. 
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(ii) there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant would be able to serve 
successfully as a director of a company in the future.” 
 
The word “and” in section 162(12)(b)(i) makes it clear that both the requirements in section 
162(12)(b)(i) and 162(12)(b)(ii) must be satisfied before a court may consider suspending or 
setting aside a delinquency order or probation order. The applicant bears the onus of convincing 
a court that the requirements in section 162(12)(b) of the Companies Act have been fulfilled. 
These requirements are discussed below.  
 
3.11.4.1  The Circumstances Leading to the Original Order  
 
This factor requires a court to consider the reason why the director was initially declared 
delinquent or placed under probation. The importance of considering the circumstances leading 
to the original order is also a factor which is taken into account by courts in the UK in 
considering whether or not to grant leave in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986. In Re Barings plc and Others (No 3), Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry v Baker and Others660 the Chancery Division stated that the improprieties that had 
led to and had required the making of a disqualification order must be kept clearly in mind 
when considering whether to grant leave in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986. The court asserted as follows: 
 
“The court in considering whether or not to grant leave should, in particular, pay 
 attention to the nature of the defects in company management that led to the 
 disqualification order and ask itself whether, if leave were granted, a situation might arise  
in which there would be a risk of recurrence of those defects.”661 
  
In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Collins & Ors662 the UK Court of Appeal 
emphasised that in considering whether to grant leave to a disqualified director to act as a 
director, due weight must be given to the seriousness of the conduct which had led to the 
disqualification order. In Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v 
Vane663 the Chancery Division regarded the misappropriation of assets and acting knowingly 
                                                 
660 [1999] 1 All ER 1017 at 1020. 
 
661 Re Barings plc and Others (No 3), Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker and Others [1999] 1 All 
ER 1017 at 1024. 
 
662 [2000] BCC 998 at 1017. 
 
663 [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 268. 
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in breach of duty as factors that would weigh more heavily against an applicant in terms of an 
application under section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  In Re 
Barings plc and Others (No 3), Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker and Others664 
the Chancery Division stated that some of the factors that UK courts consider to “loom very 
large” in an application in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986 are if the conduct of the director involved dishonesty, if the company had been 
allowed to continue trading while it was insolvent, and if a director had been withdrawing 
excessive amounts of remuneration in anticipation of the collapse of the company and in effect 
living off the company’s creditors. In Hennelly v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry665 
the Chancery Division affirmed that a heavier burden of convincing the court to grant an 
application for leave to act as a director fell on the applicant in light of the gravity of the 
allegations against him. The Chancery Division was however persuaded to grant leave to the 
applicant to be appointed a director, in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, because he had been disqualified for serious mismanagement and 
for want of commercial probity, but not for dishonesty.666  The presence of dishonesty generally 
makes it unlikely that leave in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 would be granted.667 
 
In considering an application in terms of section 206G(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 
of 2001 for leave to manage a corporation, Australian courts also take into account the nature 
                                                 
664 [1999] 1 All ER 1017 at 1020. 
 
665 [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 62. The applicant had been disqualified to act as a director because five companies 
of which he had been the sole effective director had gone into insolvent liquidation with large debts. Together the 
five companies owed approximately ten million pounds to creditors and approximately five million pounds to the 
Crown. All five companies also had a history of the late filing of returns. 
 
666 [2004] EWHC 34 (Ch) para 74. For a discussion of this case see Goddard “Leave to Act and the Disqualified 
Director: Re Hennelly’s Utilities Ltd” 222-223. 
 
667 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Barnett [1998] 2 BCLC 64 at 72; Goddard “Leave to Act and the 
Disqualified Director: Re Hennelly’s Utilities Ltd” 222; Bristoll “Permission to Act whilst Disqualified” 51. 
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of the offence committed by the applicant.668 In Re Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd669 the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales remarked that in a case which involves dishonesty in the 
handling of money a court would be particularly reluctant to grant leave to an applicant to 
manage a corporation because it would not want to afford the person “an opportunity of 
renewing his depredations”. Where the offence pertains to promoting or conducting company 
affairs, a company is less likely to grant leave to the applicant to manage a company.670 In Re 
Van Reesema671 the Supreme Court of South Australia declined to grant leave to an applicant 
to manage two companies on the ground that the offences involved dishonesty and a degree of 
premeditation.672 On the other hand, where the offence is not connected with the conduct of a 
company’s affairs, Australian courts are more likely to grant leave to an applicant to manage a 
corporation.673 For example in Re Zim Metal Products674 the applicant had been convicted of 
an offence of having received stolen goods knowing or believing them to have been stolen. One 
of the factors which persuaded the Supreme Court of Victoria to grant leave to the applicant to 
take part in the management of the company was that the offences did “not really arise out of 
                                                 
668 Re Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 28353 at 28354; Re Van Reesema (1975) 11 SASR 
28249 at 28256; Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd (1977) ACLC 29556 at 29559; Zuker v Commissioner for 
Corporate Affairs [1980] ACLC 34334 at 34340; In Re Marsden (1981) 29 SASR 454 at 459; Re C & J Hazell 
Holdings Pty Ltd and Related Companies [1991] TASSC 11 para 4; Murray v Australian Securities Commission 
(1994) 12 ACLC 11 at 13; Re Chapman [2006] NSWSC 99 paras 9 and 13; J Cassidy “Disqualification of 
Directors Under the Corporations Law” 229; Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of 
Corporations Law para 7.191 at 279.  
 
669 (1975) 1 ACLR 28353 at 28355. In this case the applicant had been convicted of conspiring to offer agents 
valuable consideration in the nature of a secret commission. Even though the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
found that the offence was “reprehensible” (at 28356) it granted leave to the applicant to be involved in the 
management of the company. The court was persuaded to grant leave to the applicant based on the fact that the 
offence did not involve dishonesty in the handling of money. The court found that the offence was of such a 
character and had occurred in such circumstances that it believed that the offence was unlikely to be repeated by 
the applicant (at 28355). 
 
670 Re Van Reesema (1975) 11 SASR 28249 at 28256; J Cassidy “Disqualification of Directors Under the 
Corporations Law” 229. 
 
671 (1975) 11 SASR 28249 at 28256. 
 
672 The offences committed by the applicant were that while he was a director and involved in the management of 
investment companies, he had received money on trust from public investors contrary to various laws; he had 
falsely told such investors that their moneys had been secured over certain property; he had falsified documents, 
and he had represented such documents to be court judgments as a means of extracting the payment of overdue 
debts.  
 
673 Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd [1977] ACLC 29556 at 29559 (decided under s 122 of the Companies Act 1961 
(Victoria), the equivalent provision to s 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001); Re Minimix Industries 
Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 at 512; Re C & J Hazell Holdings Pty Ltd and Related Companies [1991] TASSC 11 para 
13; J Cassidy “Disqualification of Directors Under the Corporations Law” 230.  
 
674 [1977] ACLC 29556. 
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or relate to the management or conduct of the company.”675 The court found that the offences 
had occurred on the premises of the company but were related more to the fact that the applicant 
was doing work at the company than to the fact that he was a director of the company.676 In a 
similar vein, in Re Minimix Industries Ltd677 the applicant’s offences related to procuring goods 
by the use of a false name, a false address and valueless cheques. The court found that these 
offences were not connected in any way to the applicant’s position in the company.678 This 
factor influenced the company in its decision to grant leave to the applicant to manage the 
corporation. In Re C & J Hazell Holdings Pty Ltd and Related Companies679 the applicant had 
been convicted of infringing certain offences in terms of traffic legislation. As a consequence 
of the conviction the applicant was disqualified from being a director. In granting the 
applicant’s application for leave to act as a director of various companies the Supreme Court 
of Tasmania held that there was no risk that the applicant’s reinstatement as a director would 
pose any danger to shareholders, employees, competitors, customers or anyone including 
Government departments with whom he or any of the companies was likely to have dealings.680 
 
In accordance with the approach adopted by the UK courts, it is submitted that in considering 
the circumstances leading to the original delinquency or probation order, a court should take 
into account the gravity of the misconduct which led to the original order. A heavier burden of 
convincing the court to grant an application in terms of section 162(11) of the Companies Act 
should lay on an applicant who has committed a more serious offence which resulted in the 
original order. For instance, if the applicant had intentionally inflicted harm upon the company, 
as opposed to doing so by gross negligence681 this factor should weigh more heavily against 
the applicant since an intentional infliction of harm is more serious than an infliction of harm 
by gross negligence.  
 
                                                 
675 Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd [1977] ACLC 29556 at 29559. 
 
676 Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd [1977] ACLC 29556 at 22559. 
 
677 (1982) 1 ACLC 511. 
 
678 Re Minimix Industries Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 at 512. 
 
679 [1991] TASSC 11. 
 
680 Re C & J Hazell Holdings Pty Ltd and Related Companies [1991] TASSC 11 para 10. 
 
681 This ground of delinquency is set out in s 162(5)(c)(iii) of the Companies Act. 
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It is further submitted that in considering the circumstances leading to the original order, in 
accordance with the approach adopted in Australia, a distinction should be made between 
offences which are connected with the conduct of a company’s affairs and those which are 
unrelated to the company’s affairs. The grounds of delinquency listed in sections 162(5)(b),682 
(c)683 and (f)684 of the Companies Act relate to offences committed by a director while he was 
a director of the company and relate to the company’s affairs. The grounds of delinquency 
referred to in sections 162(5)(d)685 and (e)686 of the Companies Act do not necessarily relate to 
offences committed by a director in connection with the conduct of the company’s affairs. If 
for example an applicant were declared delinquent on the basis that he had twice been 
personally convicted of an offence in terms of legislation which does not relate to his position 
as a director in a company, it is submitted that this factor should be taken into account by a 
court, in favour of the applicant, in considering whether to suspend the delinquency order in 
terms of section 162(12) of the Companies Act.  
 
3.11.4.2  The Conduct of the Applicant in the Ensuing Period  
 
This element of section 162(12)(b) of the Companies Act relates to the manner in which the 
applicant has conducted himself from the time that the delinquency order or probation order 
was made to the time of the application under section 162(11) of the Companies Act. The term 
“conduct” is a broad one. The Companies Act provides no guidance on whether a court should 
only take into account the applicant’s conduct in relation to his dealing with companies, or 
whether his conduct generally is to be taken into account. In the absence of any statutory 
guidance on this point, it is submitted that a court should take into account both the conduct of 
the applicant in relation to his dealings with companies, as well as the general conduct of the 
                                                 
682 This offence relates to acting as a director in a manner that contravenes a probation order. 
 
683 These offences relate to a director grossly abusing his position, taking personal advantage of information or an 
opportunity, intentional or gross negligence, infliction of harm upon the company, committing gross negligence, 
wilful misconduct or breach of trust and fraudulent conduct. See para 3.4 above where the grounds of delinquency 
are discussed in detail.  
 
684 This offence relates to being a director of one or more companies which were convicted of an offence or 
subjected to an administrative fine or similar penalty.  
 
685 This offence relates to a director being personally subject to a compliance notice or similar enforcement 
mechanism for substantially similar conduct in terms of any legislation.  
 
686 This offence relates to a director being at least twice personally convicted of an offence or subjected to an 
administrative fine or similar penalty, in terms of any legislation. 
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applicant which may demonstrate progress of rehabilitation and the applicant’s prospects of 
being able to serve successfully in the future as a director of a company. 
 
In considering an application in terms of section 17 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, a director’s conduct in relation to his dealings with companies is 
taken into account by the UK courts.  In Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry v Vane687 the Chancery Division remarked, in relation to this factor, that if a director 
had acted as a director whilst the disqualification proceedings were pending, it would be 
relevant for the court to determine whether the company or companies had carried on business 
satisfactorily. Relevant factors to consider are whether the companies were trading profitably, 
whether they had complied with their obligations under the relevant company legislation, fiscal 
legislation and other applicable legislation, and whether the companies had paid their liabilities 
in full.688  
 
Australian courts likewise, in considering whether or not to grant leave to a disqualified director 
to act as a director, take into account the conduct of the applicant in the period from the time 
of the disqualification order to the time of the application for leave to act as a director.689 This 
factor has been particularly persuasive in cases where leave has been successfully granted to 
an applicant to act as a director.690 For example, in granting leave to the applicant to act as a 
director in Zuker v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs,691 the Supreme Court of Victoria 
attached much significance to the applicant’s good behaviour since the time of his 
disqualification to act as a director. The court regarded the applicant’s good behaviour as 
“strong positive reasons”692 for exercising its discretion in the applicant’s favour. In In Re 
                                                 
687 [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 269. 
 
688 In Re Tech Textiles Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Vane [1998] 1 BCLC 259 at 269. 
 
689 Re Van Reesema (1975) 11 SASR 28249; Re Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd [1977] ACLC 29556 at 29558; Zuker 
v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1980] ACLC 34334 at 34340; In Re Marsden (1981) 29 SASR 454 at 466; 
Hosken v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [1998] TASSC 101 para 15; Re Chapman [2006] 
NSWSC 99 para 9. 
 
690 J Cassidy “Disqualification of Directors Under the Corporations Law” 231. 
 
691 [1980] ACLC 34334 at 34340. 
 
692 Zuker v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1980] ACLC 34334 at 34340. The applicant had been convicted 
of conspiring with certain persons to utter forged documents purporting to be genuine Federal Reserve Notes of 
the USA with intent to defraud. After his release from prison five years later, the applicant applied for leave to act 
as a director of a small, family tannery business. His application was successful. The tannery business was 
thereafter sold, and the applicant sought leave again to take part in the management of the purchaser’s business. 
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Marsden693 the applicant had been convicted of the offences of breaching his duty to act 
honestly and failing to exercise due diligence and care in the discharge of his powers as a 
director. The applicant had misappropriated a portion of the company’s funds and had 
attempted to cover this up by means of a false auditor’s report to the shareholders and the stock 
exchange. The fact that the applicant had subsequently been involved in the management of 
two companies for a period of twelve months without any complaint persuaded the Supreme 
Court of South Australia to grant leave to the applicant to act as a director.694 
 
In considering an application in terms of section 162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act 
it is submitted that, following the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, a court should 
take into account whether the applicant has successfully acted as a director of any other 
companies while the original delinquency or probation proceedings were pending, and 
thereafter. It should assess whether the companies were trading profitably, whether they had 
complied with their obligations under the relevant company legislation, income tax and other 
applicable legislation, whether the companies had paid their liabilities in full and whether there 
had been any complaints against the applicant during the period that he had been acting as a 
director of a company.  Of course, if the delinquency order had prohibited the applicant from 
acting as a director of any company at all, these factors would not be relevant to the applicant’s 
application in terms of section 162(11) of the Companies Act. In such event, it is submitted that 
a court should take into account the applicant’s general conduct in the ensuing period and 
consider whether his general conduct was respectable. For instance, dishonest conduct by an 
applicant in the period since the delinquency order or probation order was made would be a 
relevant factor for a court to take into account in considering an application in terms of section 
162(11) of the Companies Act. If the applicant had tried to mislead the court in his application 
in terms of section 162(11), this would be a factor that ought to weigh heavily against the 
applicant. For example, in Re Van Reesema,695 one of the grounds on which the Supreme Court 
                                                 
The application was brought under s 122 of the Companies Act 1961 (Victoria) (the equivalent section to what is 
now s 206G of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001).While the court believed that the gravity of the crime 
was a matter to be taken into account, the applicant’s good behaviour since his release from prison and the fact 
that he had been acting as a director of the tannery business for the previous twelve months without complaint, 
influenced the court to grant the applicant’s application. 
 
693 (1981) 29 SASR 454. 
 
694 In Re Marsden (1981) 29 SASR 454 at 466. 
 
695 (1975) 11 SASR 28249 at 28252. 
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of South Australia refused to grant leave to a disqualified director to manage a corporation was 
that his affidavit in court had been misleading and “less than frank”. In Re Zim Metal Products 
Pty Ltd696 the Supreme Court of Victoria emphasised that had it been satisfied that the applicant 
had sought to mislead the court in his application to act as a director, it would “be difficult to 
conceive of circumstances which would warrant the court granting him the leave he now seeks.” 
 
In order for a court to assess the conduct of the applicant in the ensuing period, a reasonable 
period of time must have elapsed since the delinquency or probation order was made. In Re 
Zim Metal Products Pty Ltd697 the Supreme Court of Victoria found that the period of time 
from the disqualification order to the time of the application for leave to act as a director, which 
was one month, was too short for it to attach much weight to the applicant’s conduct. Since an 
application in terms of section 162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act to suspend an 
order of delinquency or to set aside an order of probation may not be made until at least three 
years or two years have respectively passed, it is submitted that this would be sufficient time 
for a court to assess the conduct of the applicant in the ensuing period, and to determine whether 
it indicates that the applicant has made satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation.  
 
3.11.4.3  Rehabilitation of the Director  
 
This factor in section 162(12)(b)(i) of the Companies Act requires a court to determine whether, 
based on the circumstances leading to the original order and the conduct of the applicant in the 
ensuring period, the court is satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory progress 
towards rehabilitation. The Companies Act does not define the term “rehabilitation” in the 
context of section 162(12)(b)(i), nor does it provide any guidance on the factors a court should 
take into account to assess whether the applicant has made satisfactory progress towards 
“rehabilitation”. This means that courts would have to develop criteria or standards for 
determining whether the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory progress towards 
“rehabilitation”.  In terms of section 162(12)(b)(i) of the Companies Act, the applicant need 
not have been fully rehabilitated for a court to suspend a delinquency order or set aside a 
probation order – he merely needs to demonstrate “satisfactory progress” towards 
                                                 
696 [1977] ACLC 29556 at 29558. 
 
697 [1977] ACLC 29556 at 29558. 
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rehabilitation. 
 
As discussed,698 the term “rehabilitation” is akin to the term “reformation,”699 which term was 
found by the High Court of Australia in Rich v Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission700 to resemble sentencing principles under the criminal law.701 In criminal law the 
concept of being rehabilitated means that the offender has learnt new values, he has reformed 
and is now fit to take his place in society.702 The term “rehabilitation” or “reformation” 
connotes positive impressions of the betterment of individuals.703 In criminal law rehabilitation 
seeks to modify behaviour by changing the moral outlook of the offender.704 The notion of 
whether an offender is rehabilitated or has reformed focuses attention on the offender as an 
individual, as opposed to the offence itself or the harm caused by the offence.705  In the penal 
context the rehabilitation of a criminal is achieved either while the offender is incarcerated in 
prison, through rehabilitation programmes, or through making the completion of some 
rehabilitation programme a condition of the suspension of a punishment of imprisonment.706 
                                                 
698 See para 3.2 above. 
 
699 S v Nkambule [1993] 1 All SA 485 (A) at 491; Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 163. Ashworth 
states that in the criminal law context the term “reform” which is used as a synonym for “rehabilitation”, tends to 
be written more fully as “reformation of character”, thereby indicating the true target of methods employed to 
reform an offender (see Ashworth “Rehabilitation” in Von Hirsh, Ashworth & Roberts Principled Sentencing: 
Readings on Theory and Policy 2).  
 
700 [2004] 220 CLR 129 para 52. 
 
701 J Du Plessis and Delport also maintain that the term “rehabilitation” used in s 162(12)(b)(i) of the Companies 
Act sounds like a criminal-law issue (J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under 
Probation’: A Unique South African Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 284). 
 
702 S v Nombewu 1996 (12) BCLR 1635 (E) at 1647; Gillies Criminal Law 7; Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in 
South Africa 163; Ashworth “Rehabilitation” in Von Hirsh, Ashworth & Roberts Principled Sentencing: Readings 
on Theory and Policy 2; Easton & Piper Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice 112; Kemp et al 
Criminal Law in South Africa 23. 
  
703 Bronitt & McSherry Principles of Criminal Law 22; Kemp et al Criminal Law in South Africa 23. 
 
704 Bronitt & McSherry Principles of Criminal Law 22; Ashworth “Rehabilitation” in Von Hirsh, Ashworth & 
Roberts Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 2 and 4. 
 
705 Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice 86. 
 
706 Gillies Criminal Law 7; Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 163; Ashworth “Rehabilitation” in 
Von Hirsh, Ashworth & Roberts Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 6; Ashworth Sentencing 
and Criminal Justice 86. 
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The notion of rehabilitation is thus based on the premise that the delinquent may be re-educated 
to become a useful member of society.707 
  
The completion of rehabilitation programmes in the penal context is relevant as evidence of a 
reduced need for public protection from the offender.708 If an applicant is rehabilitated or 
reformed the implication is that he is unlikely to commit the misconduct again. In Re Grayan 
Building Services Ltd709 the UK Court of Appeal stressed that the question of whether a director 
has shown himself unlikely to offend again is highly material to whether he should be granted 
leave to act as a director. It is imperative to guard against a recurrence of the misconduct by the 
director in order to protect the public from the misconduct that had led to the original order.  
 
In Grancy Property Limited v Gihwala710 the Western Cape Division, Cape Town stated that 
an applicant would most probably not be able to demonstrate satisfactory progress towards 
rehabilitation in a period shorter than three years. An applicant under section 162(11) of the 
Companies Act would have to present evidence to the court over a period of at least three years 
demonstrating that he has made satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation. The applicant 
could, for instance, present evidence to the court showing that he has complied satisfactorily 
with all the conditions imposed by the court on the order of delinquency. While the compliance 
with the conditions imposed by a court is one of the factors that a court would take into account 
in considering the application to suspend or set aside the order of delinquency or probation,711 
compliance with the conditions imposed by a court may also serve to demonstrate that an 
applicant has made satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation. For instance, compliance by 
an applicant with a condition that he undertakes a designated programme of remedial education 
relevant to his conduct as a director, or that he carries out a designated programme of 
                                                 
707 S v Nombewu 1996 (12) BCLR 1635 (E) at 1647; Ashworth “Rehabilitation” in Von Hirsh, Ashworth & Roberts 
Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 2; Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice 86; Easton 
& Piper Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice 112; Kemp et al Criminal Law in South Africa 23. 
 
708 S v Matthee 1971 (3) SA 769 (A) at 771; S v Nkambule [1993] 1 All SA 485 (A) at 491; Ashworth 
“Rehabilitation” in Von Hirsh, Ashworth & Roberts Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 6. 
 
709 [1995] Ch 241 at 254. 
 
710 2014 JDR 1292 (WCC) para 195. 
 
711 Section 162(12)(a) of Companies Act, discussed in para 3.11.3 above. 
 
457 
 
community service712 may indicate to a court that the applicant has made progress towards 
rehabilitation, and that there is a reduced need for public protection from the applicant.  As 
suggested,713 courts ought to make more effective use of their power to impose appropriate 
ancillary conditions to declarations of delinquency so as to facilitate the rehabilitation of 
delinquent directors. 
 
If an applicant were permitted to be a director of another company he would be able to present 
evidence to the court of his conduct as a director in the other company during the delinquency 
order that demonstrates his progress towards rehabilitation. Likewise, if the applicant were 
under a probation order and was permitted to act as a director subject to the conditions imposed 
by the court, he could again present evidence to the court of his conduct as a director during 
the probation order that demonstrates his progress towards rehabilitation. 
 
Presenting evidence of rehabilitation would be more challenging in the case of an applicant 
who has been absolutely prohibited from being a director of any company during the 
delinquency period. Such an applicant may present evidence to the court demonstrating that his 
conduct in the previous three years in a position other than a director, indicates that he is on the 
path towards rehabilitation. For instance, if the applicant were appointed as a manager of a 
company (in the position of an employee, as opposed to a director) and has satisfactorily 
complied with all his duties without any complaint from any party, this would indicate 
satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation. Alternatively, if the applicant had successfully 
carried on a business as a sole trader (with unlimited liability) during the delinquency period, 
this may serve as evidence to a court that the applicant has made satisfactory progress towards 
rehabilitation. It would be important for an applicant who intends to apply to court for his 
delinquency order or probation order to be suspended or set aside to ensure that during the 
period of delinquency or probation, he takes steps towards rehabilitation, and that he is able to 
present the court with sufficient evidence demonstrating satisfactory progress towards his 
rehabilitation.  
                                                 
712 These conditions may be imposed by a court to a delinquency order or a probation order in terms of 
ss 162(10)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act. 
 
713 See para 3.6.3 above and R Cassim “Delinquent Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Gihwala v 
Grancy Property Limited 2016 ZASCA 35”at 25. 
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3.11.4.4  Reasonable Prospect of Serving Successfully as a Director in the Future  
 
This factor requires the court to consider whether the applicant is likely to be a future risk to 
the public, as opposed to focusing on the director’s past misconduct. The court would have to 
determine whether, based on the circumstances leading to the original order and the conduct of 
the applicant in the ensuing period, it is satisfied that there is a “reasonable prospect” of the 
applicant being able to serve successfully as a director of a company in the future. It is not clear 
what a “reasonable prospect” would comprise since the Companies Act does not define this 
term in the context of section 162(12)(b)(ii). Its meaning has been left to the courts to 
determine.  
 
In Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd714 the 
Western Cape Division, Cape Town examined the meaning of the phrase “reasonable prospect” 
in section 131(4)(a) in the context of business rescue proceedings.715  The court stated that a 
“reasonable prospect” indicates that something less is required than a reasonable probability.716 
In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd 
and Others717 the Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with this interpretation of the phrase 
“reasonable prospect”. It proclaimed that the concept of a “reasonable prospect” is a lesser 
requirement than a “reasonable probability” but more than a mere prima facie case or an 
arguable possibility.718 The Supreme Court of Appeal placed emphasis on the fact that the 
prospect must be “reasonable”, which it said means that it must be a prospect based on 
                                                 
714 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC). 
 
715 Section 131(4)(a) of the Companies Act deals with a court order to commence business rescue proceedings. In 
terms of s 131(1) an affected person may apply to court for an order placing a company under supervision and 
commencing business rescue proceedings. After considering the application a court may make an order placing 
the company under supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings if it is satisfied that (i) the company 
is financially distressed; (ii) the company has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation or in terms 
of a public regulation or contract with respect to employment matters; or (iii) it is otherwise just and equitable to 
do so for financial reasons, and there is a “reasonable prospect” for rescuing the company (s 131(4)(a)). 
 
716 Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) 
para 21. In Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (5) 
SA 497 (WCC) para 39 the court agreed with this interpretation of the phrase “reasonable prospect”. 
 
717 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) para 29. 
 
718 Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 
(4) SA 539 (SCA) para 29. 
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reasonable grounds – a mere speculative suggestion would not suffice.719 In Prospec 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd and Another720 the Free State High 
Court, Bloemfontein asserted that a “prospect” means an expectation, which may or may not 
come true, and therefore signifies a possibility. A possibility is reasonable if it rests on a ground 
that is objectively reasonable.721 Consequently, the court reasoned, a “reasonable prospect” 
means no more than a possibility that rests on an objectively reasonable ground or grounds.722 
In Koen and Another v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others723 the 
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town stated that a cogent evidential foundation must be placed 
before the court to support the existence of a reasonable prospect that the desired object can be 
achieved. In Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd and Others v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd 
(Esterhuizen and Another Intervening)724 the Western Cape Division, Cape Town affirmed that 
the existence of a “reasonable prospect” is a factual question, albeit involving a value judgment.  
 
While the interpretation of a “reasonable prospect” as propounded by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and various High Courts was advocated in the context of business rescue proceedings, 
it may provide some guidance in interpreting the phrase “reasonable prospect” in section 
162(12)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act.725 Applying the interpretation of a “reasonable prospect” 
in the context of section 131(4)(a) of the Companies Act to section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the 
Companies Act, in an application to suspend a delinquency order or to set aside a probation 
order, the applicant would have to satisfy a court that based on objectively reasonable grounds, 
there is a possibility that he would be able to serve successfully as a director of a company in 
the future. While vague averments and mere speculative suggestions would not suffice, an 
                                                 
719 Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 
(4) SA 539 (SCA) para 29. In Koen and Another v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) para 20 and Prospec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd 
and Another 2013 (1) SA 542 (FB) para 11 the respective High Courts also stated that vague averments and mere 
speculative suggestions would not suffice to establish that there is a “reasonable prospect”. 
 
720 2013 (1) SA 542 (FB) para 12. 
 
721 Prospec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd and Another 2013 (1) SA 542 (FB) para 12. 
 
722 Prospec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd and Another 2013 (1) SA 542 (FB) para 12. 
 
723 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) para 17. 
 
724 2017 (3) SA 74 (WCC) para 76. 
 
725 See J Du Plessis & Delport “‘Delinquent Directors’ and ‘Directors under Probation’: A Unique South African 
Approach Regarding Disqualification of Company Directors” 284. 
 
460 
 
applicant need not go so far as to establish a reasonable probability that he would be able to 
serve successfully as a director of a company in the future. Based on the evidential foundation 
put before the court by the applicant, the court would have to make a value judgment whether 
the applicant would be able to serve successfully as a director in the future.   
 
In those instances where the delinquency order completely excludes the applicant from being 
a director of any company it would be challenging for a director to be able to present to court 
evidence of a reasonable prospect of him being able to serve successfully as a director in the 
future.726 If the declaration of delinquency permits a director to serve as a director of another 
company, he would have to present evidence to the court of having successfully served on the 
board of directors of the other company or companies. He may for instance present to the court 
affidavits from his fellow board members attesting to his ability to successfully serve as a 
director of such companies.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Sections 71(6) and 162 of the Companies Act empower a court to remove a director from office. 
Under section 71(6) the court’s power to remove a director from office is a direct power,727 
while under section 162 the court’s power to do so is an indirect power.728 Under section 71(6) 
of the Companies Act a court is empowered to remove a director from office only if the board 
of directors has voted not to remove the director from office and a disgruntled director or holder 
of voting rights in the election of that director applies to court for the board’s decision to be 
reviewed. Under section 162 of the Companies Act a court is empowered to remove a director 
from office if a person with locus standi applies to court to have the director declared 
delinquent, which has the effect of removing the director from office. An application by a 
person with locus standi may also be made to place the director under probation, which has the 
effect that the director may not serve as a director except to the extent permitted by the 
probation order. The UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 have likewise empowered courts to disqualify directors under various 
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grounds, which has the effect that such persons are removed from office.729 In contrast, the 
MBCA and the corporate legislation of various USA States have conferred on courts a direct 
power to remove directors from office.730  
 
This chapter examined the powers of review conferred on a court under a section 71(6) court 
application. It found that the court’s powers are not confined to the procedure in which the 
decision was made but extend to considering the merits of the decision.731 For this reason it 
was argued that the court’s review powers under section 71(6) may be described as a 
“substantive” or a “wide review”.732 Alternatively, the powers may be construed to be a special 
statutory power of review.733 Compounding the wide review powers conferred on the court is 
the fact that a court is empowered to remove the director from office and is not required to 
remit the matter to the board of directors so that the board may reconsider the matter and make 
a new decision.734  
 
It was noted that a shareholder may make an allegation under section 71(3) of the Companies 
Act but is not necessarily empowered to institute a review application under section 71(6) of 
the Companies Act because only a holder of voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election 
of the particular director, has been granted locus standi to institute a section 71(6) review 
application.735 It was argued that it is anomalous to provide a shareholder with the right to make 
an allegation against a director under section 71(3) but not to provide him with a remedy to 
apply to court to review the board’s decision not the remove the director from office.736 A 
director who voted in favour of the removal of the director is also empowered to launch a 
section 71(6) review application.737  
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It was noted that there is no time limit in which a director or a shareholder is required to apply 
to court under section 71(6) to review the board’s decision not to remove the director from 
office.738 In order to bring the matter to a finality and in order to have consistency with the time 
limit of twenty business days prescribed in section 71(5) of the Companies Act (for a director 
to challenge his removal from office by the board of directors), it was argued that a time limit 
of twenty business days ought to be imposed in section 71(6) of the Companies Act.739 It was 
suggested that the period of twenty business days should commence from the date of the board’s 
decision not to remove the director from office.740 
 
It was further noted that section 71(7) of the Companies Act has excluded the common law 
discretion conferred on courts with regard to the making of a costs order.741 Courts therefore 
have no discretion to make a costs order with regard to a section 71(6) review application 
because costs must in all instances be awarded against the applicant, save where the court 
reverses the board’s decision not to remove the director from office. It was argued that courts 
should be conferred a discretion to make an appropriate costs order under section 71(6) so as 
to strike the right balance in ensuring, on the one hand, that directors and holders of voting 
rights are not discouraged from instituting bona fide and genuine review applications and that, 
on the other hand, they do not institute vexatious and frivolous review applications.742 It was 
argued that section 71(7) of the Companies Act should be deleted and replaced with a provision 
conferring on a court the discretion to “make any order it considers appropriate on the costs”.743 
Alternatively, it was argued that the approach adopted by the High Court in Lynmar Investments 
(Pty) Ltd v South African Railways and Harbours744 ought to be adopted to the award of a cost 
order under section 71(7) of the Companies Act in that courts should still have a residual 
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discretion, if valid reasons and justice so require, to depart from the rule in section 71(7) of the 
Companies Act.745  
 
This chapter argued further that section 71(6) offends the principle of non-interference by 
courts in the internal affairs of the company.746 It argued that in certain instances such as 
illegality, oppressive conduct or fraudulent conduct by the board of directors in failing to 
remove a director from office, judicial interference is justified.747 However, in order to ensure 
that in other instances a court does not unduly interfere in the internal affairs of the company, 
it was argued in this chapter that before a court exercises its discretion to remove a director 
from office under a section 71(6) review application, it should give due consideration to the 
reasons why the board of directors did not remove the director from office, whether the board 
of directors had complied with its fiduciary duties in not removing the director from office, and 
whether it had acted openly and transparently and in the best interests of the company in not 
removing the director from office.748  
 
It was suggested in this chapter that while section 162 of the Companies Act may have a 
protective purpose, there is also a penal element to the section in that declaring a director 
delinquent inevitably involves a substantial and significant interference with the individual’s 
freedom.749 It furthermore carries a stigma and reputational damage for the director.750 For this 
reason it was argued that declaring a director delinquent must not be done without due and 
proper consideration by a court.751 In many respects, section 162 of the Companies Act is much 
wider, stricter and far-reaching than the equivalent provisions in the UK, Australia and the 
USA. Some examples of this are as follows: 
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 The range of persons who have locus standi to apply to court to remove a director from 
office are much wider under section 162 of the Companies Act compared to the 
equivalent provisions under the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and the corporate 
legislation of many other USA States. Section 162 of the Companies Act permits a 
single shareholder and a single director to institute a section 162 application.752 The UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 does not confer this power on directors, 
and permits shareholders to institute an application to disqualify a director in limited 
instances only.753 The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 does not empower a director 
or a shareholder to apply to court to disqualify a director.754 Likewise, the MBCA, the 
DGCL and the applicable legislation in the majority of the USA States which permit 
the judicial removal of directors do not empower a single director or a single 
shareholder to apply to court to remove a director.755 Instead, the application must be 
brought by the corporation or derivatively in the right of the corporation.756 None of the 
foreign jurisdictions referred to above confer locus standi on a company secretary, 
prescribed officer, trade union or employee representative to apply to court to remove 
a director, as section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act does.757 It was argued 
in this chapter that it is important to guard against abuse by this wide group of persons 
with locus standi to declare a director delinquent.758 It was further contended that 
section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act does not contain safeguards or filters 
to guard against vexatious and frivolous applications.759 It was submitted that if 
shareholders were to institute delinquency proceedings by means of the derivative 
action this would have the advantage of curbing the abuse of section 162.760  
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 In general the grounds to declare a director delinquent and hence remove him from 
office are much wider and far-reaching under section 162 of the (South African) 
Companies Act, and the threshold of misconduct set lower, compared to the equivalent 
provisions in foreign legislation. Some examples of this are as follows: 
 
o Under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA a director may be judicially removed from 
office if he intentionally inflicted harm on the corporation. Under section 
162(5)(c)(iii) of the (South African) Companies Act mere gross negligence in 
inflicting harm upon the company would suffice for a director to be declared 
delinquent. It would also suffice under section 162(5)(c)(iii) of the (South 
African) Companies Act if the director inflicted the harm not on the corporation, 
but on a subsidiary of the corporation.761  
 
o Under section 8.09(a) of the MBCA for a director to be judicially removed from 
office there must have been some fraudulent conduct by him with respect to the 
company or its shareholders. In contrast, under section 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) read 
with section 77(3)(c) of the (South African) Companies Act, for a director to be 
judicially removed from office, the fraudulent conduct may extend not only to 
a shareholder of the company, but also to a creditor or an employee of the 
company. Even if the fraudulent conduct does not extend to a shareholder, a 
creditor or employee, a court may nevertheless declare a director delinquent 
under section 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb) read with section 77(3)(c) of the (South African) 
Companies Act if the conduct had another fraudulent purpose.762  
 
o Under section 162(5)(c)(i) of the (South African) Companies Act a director may 
be declared delinquent if he has grossly abused the position of director. In 
contrast, under section 8.35(b) of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 
in order for a director to be judicially removed from office on the ground of 
gross abuse of the position of director, the gross abuse must have been to the 
detriment of the corporation. It is irrelevant under section 162(5)(c)(i) of the 
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(South African) Companies Act whether or not the director’s gross abuse of his 
position was to the detriment of the company.763  
 
o Under section 6 of the UK Directors Disqualification Act 1986 a director may 
be declared to be “unfit” to be concerned in the management of the company 
provided that the company became insolvent while he was a director or 
subsequently. A breach of a fiduciary duty is a relevant factor to determine 
whether a director is unfit to be concerned in the management of the company. 
In contrast, under section 162(5)(c) of the (South African) Companies Act a 
breach of the fiduciary duties in section 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act would 
suffice to declare a director delinquent, regardless of whether or not the 
company has become insolvent.764  
 
o In terms of section 162(5)(e) of the (South African) Companies Act a court must 
make an order declaring a person a delinquent director if the person has at least 
twice been personally convicted of an offence or subjected to an administrative 
fine or penalty in terms of any legislation. In contrast, the equivalent provision 
in section 206E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 confines this ground 
of disqualification to a contravention of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 
– it does not extend to a contravention of any legislation, as is the case under the 
more far-reaching section 162(5)(e) of the (South African) Companies Act.765 
“Legislation” is defined broadly in section 162(1) of the (South African) 
Companies Act.766 The implication is that an applicant with locus standi may 
institute an application to declare a director delinquent if the director has twice 
been subject to an administrative fine under that legislation notwithstanding that 
the legislation in issue has no connection to the director’s position as a director 
or to his functions as a director.767 It is submitted that this ground is 
unnecessarily wide. 
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 While the grounds for the judicial removal of a director are wider under section 162 of 
the (South African) Companies Act and the threshold for the misconduct of a director 
set lower compared to the laws of the foreign jurisdictions compared, section 162(5) of 
the (South African) Companies Act does not list as a ground of delinquency a conviction 
of a foreign offence, as is the case under section 5A(3) of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 and under section 206EAA(3) of the Australian Corporations 
Act of 2001, which empowers ASIC to apply to court to disqualify a director who has 
been disqualified under the law of a foreign country.768 The specified list of grounds of 
delinquency in section 162(5) of the (South African) Companies Act is a closed one, 
unlike some USA States (such as New York, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania) which 
give courts the power to remove directors from office for any proper cause.769  
 
 Under section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act courts do not have a discretion 
to determine the minimum period of the declaration of delinquency.770 In contrast, the 
UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 does not, in most instances, prescribe 
a minimum period of disqualification, but instead it prescribes maximum periods of 
disqualification.771 It is only with regard to a disqualification of unfit directors of 
insolvent companies, in terms of section 6 of the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, that a minimum period of disqualification (of two years) has 
been prescribed.772 Courts in the UK, unlike South African courts, are accordingly given 
a discretion in most instances to determine the minimum period of disqualification of a 
director. The Australian Corporations Act of 2001 gives courts a high degree of 
discretion to determine the disqualification period of directors. Courts in Australia are 
empowered to disqualify directors for the period that they consider appropriate.773 
Section 8.09(a) of the MBCA and the legislation of most of the USA States which 
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permit the judicial removal of directors likewise confer on courts a discretion to 
determine the period of time for which a director will be removed from office.774 Section 
162 of the (South African) Companies Act is therefore much stricter than the equivalent 
provisions in foreign legislation because courts do not have any discretion to deviate 
from the minimum period of delinquency prescribed by the (South African) Companies 
Act.775  
 
 There is no prescription period imposed on instituting an application to declare a 
director delinquent or placing him under probation under section 162 of the (South 
African) Companies Act.776 In contrast, under the UK Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 legal proceedings to apply for the disqualification of an unfit 
director of an insolvent company must be commenced within three years of the date on 
which the company of which that person is or has been a director became insolvent.777 
It is only with the leave of the court that an application for the disqualification of an 
unfit director of an insolvent company may be made more than three years after the 
company becomes insolvent.778 It was argued that in South African law a statutory time 
limit of three years should be imposed with regard to launching applications to declare 
a director delinquent or to place him under probation.779 It was submitted further that 
the twenty four month prescription period imposed on a director who ceases to be a 
director of a company should be extended to three years, so as to have consistency and 
harmony with the three-year prescription period imposed by section 77 of the (South 
African) Companies Act, particularly since there is some overlap between the offences 
in section 77 and those set out in section 162(5)(c) of the (South African) Companies 
Act.780 Imposing a three-year statutory time limit to apply to declare a director 
delinquent or to place him under probation would ensure that directors are not left in a 
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state of uncertainty, and that they are able to organise their affairs once the statutory 
time limit has passed free of the risk of future delinquency proceedings being instituted 
against them.781 It would also ensure that a director who is delinquent is not left to be a 
director for longer than necessary, thus protecting the public.782 In order to ensure that 
in those instances where an application to declare a director delinquent or to place him 
under probation is not able to be lodged with the three-year time period, it was submitted 
that, as is the case under section 7(2) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986, with the leave of the court, an application to apply to court to declare a 
director delinquent or to place him under probation after the three-year period may be 
made.783 This would ensure that delinquent directors are not protected from applications 
to declare them delinquent after three years, but in order to bring such an application 
after three years, the leave of the court must be sought.784 It will further serve to balance 
the public interest and the legitimate interests of the director.785 
 
 Unlike the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and the corporate legislation of 
various USA States, section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act does not confer 
on courts any discretion whether or not to declare a director delinquent.786 It was argued 
that it is anomalous that a court has been given a discretion whether to remove a director 
from office (under section 71(6) of the Companies Act), whether to place a director 
under probation (under section 162(7) of the Companies Act) and whether to disqualify 
a person from being a director (under section 69(11) of the Companies Act) but has not 
been given a discretion under section 162(5) whether to declare a director delinquent 
when the effect of all of these provisions is that the director in question is not permitted 
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to serve as a director.787 It was contended that the absence of such a discretion results 
in an interference by the judiciary in the internal affairs of a company.788 
 
 Section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act does not contain provisions designed 
to minimise the interference by the judiciary in the internal affairs of the company.789 
In contrast, not only does section 8.09(a) of the MBCA confer a discretion on a court to 
remove a director from office, but it also requires a court to consider whether any 
remedies other than removal would be adequate, and, further, to consider whether 
removal would be in the best interests of the company.790 Moreover, in terms of section 
8.09(a) of the MBCA, a court is empowered to remove a director from office or to order 
other relief.791 As discussed, the laws of several USA States also provide that a court 
may remove a director from office only if the removal is in the best interests of the 
corporation.792 Section 225(c) of the DGCL goes even further in that it provides that a 
court may remove a director from office if judicial removal is necessary to avoid 
irreparable harm to the corporation.793 These provisions serve to ensure that a court does 
not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of a company.  
 
 It was contended794 that section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act should 
incorporate the following provisions of the legislation of foreign jurisdictions in order 
to limit the extent of the judicial interference in the internal affairs of a company: 
 
o Courts should have a discretion whether or not to declare directors delinquent and 
hence remove them from office; 
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o Courts should be required to consider whether the declaration of delinquency and 
removal of the director would be in the best interests of the company; 
 
o Courts should consider whether any other remedies besides a declaration of 
delinquency and removal of the director from office are adequate; and 
 
o In addition to being able to grant any conditions ancillary to a declaration of 
delinquency or probation, courts should have the power to order any other relief 
under section 162 of the Companies Act. 
 
Finally, this chapter discussed the provisions of section 162(11) of the Companies Act, in terms 
of which a delinquent director or a director under probation may apply to court, after three years 
or two years respectively, for the delinquency order or probation order to be suspended or set 
aside.795 A court has a discretion whether or not to grant the application.796 Courts are however 
bound by the statutory guidelines provided in section 162(12) of the Companies Act in 
exercising their discretion whether or not to grant the application in terms of section 162(11).797 
 
Some challenges that may be faced by an applicant under section 162(11) were identified. Such 
challenges would include demonstrating to a court satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation, 
over a period of at least three years, and convincing a court that there is a reasonable prospect 
of being able to serve successfully as a director in the future.798 These challenges are augmented 
if a director had been absolutely prohibited from being a director of any company for the 
duration of the delinquency order.799 The circumstances leading to the original delinquency 
order or probation order,800 and the director’s conduct in the ensuing period would also be taken 
into account by a court.801 Consequently a director must present to a court evidence of any 
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favourable conduct in the ensuring period.802 If the director has not satisfied any conditions that 
were imposed on him by the court at the time the original delinquency or probation order was 
made, his application to suspend the delinquency order or to set aside the probation order would 
be refused by a court.803  
 
The following recommendations were made with regard to interpreting, applying and 
enhancing section 162(11) of the Companies Act: 
 
 In exercising its discretion whether or not to grant the application in terms of section 
162(11) of the (South African) Companies Act a court should, in accordance with the 
approach adopted in the UK and Australia, bear in mind that section 162 of the 
Companies Act is a protective remedy in the public interest; suspending or setting aside 
a delinquency order or a probation order must not frustrate the achievement of this 
object.804 This is important in order to accord with the purpose of the Companies Act in 
section 7(j) of encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies. 
 
 In accordance with the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, the hardship on the 
applicant should not weigh too heavily as a factor to be considered by the court.805  
 
 Courts should ensure that the conditions imposed on a suspended delinquency order are 
capable of being monitored and are not easily disregarded by a director.806 This is 
important to ensure the protection of the public.807 Suggestions were made on how the 
conditions could be monitored.808 Appointing someone to monitor the compliance with 
the conditions would facilitate an application under section 162(11) since the appointed 
person would be in a position to report to the court on the extent of the applicant’s 
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compliance with the conditions imposed by the court.809 Monitoring the conditions 
imposed on a delinquency order or a probation order accords with the purpose of the 
Companies Act of encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies, 
as contained in section 7(j) of the Companies Act. 
 
 It would be advisable for the applicant to propose to the court appropriate conditions 
which it may consider imposing, should it exercise its discretion to suspend the 
delinquency order.810 This would guide the court on the conditions to be imposed on the 
applicant in order to guard against a recurrence of the applicant’s misconduct.811 It may 
also serve to convince a court to grant the application in terms of section 162(11) of the 
Companies Act if the conditions proposed by the applicant would serve to protect the 
public from a recurrence of his misconduct.812 
 
 The conditions to be imposed by a court on a suspended delinquency order should be 
specifically tailored to the misconduct committed by the director which had resulted in 
the original delinquency order being granted.813 This would ensure that during the 
suspension of the delinquency order the risk of the director committing the same offence 
again would be minimised.814 
 
 It was suggested that if an applicant breaches any of the conditions imposed by the court 
during the suspended delinquency order, the original delinquency order should be 
reinstated in full.815 It is not clear from the legislation whether or not a court may extend 
the delinquency period if the conditions are breached by the applicant.816 This should be 
clarified by the legislature by amending legislation.  
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 In considering the circumstances leading to the original delinquency or probation order 
in terms of section 162(12)(b) of the (South African) Companies Act, in accordance with 
the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, a court should take into account the gravity 
of the misconduct which had led to the original order.817 A distinction should also be 
drawn between offences that are connected with the conduct of the company’s affairs and 
those that are unrelated to the company’s affairs (following the approach adopted in 
Australia).818 
 
 Clarity is required on the meaning of the term “conduct” as used in section 162(12)(b) of 
the Companies Act.819 It was suggested that in considering the conduct of the applicant 
in the ensuing period, a court should take into account both the specific conduct of the 
applicant in relation to his dealing with companies as well as his general conduct which 
may demonstrate progress towards rehabilitation.820 
 
 The meaning of the term “rehabilitation” as used in section 162(12)(b)(i) of the 
Companies Act should be clarified.821 It was suggested that guidance on the meaning of 
these terms may be sought in the criminal law context, where the term “rehabilitation” is 
used in sentencing proceedings.822 In the criminal law context, the term “rehabilitation” 
connotes positive impressions of the betterment of the offender, and connotes that the 
offender has learnt new values, has reformed and is now fit to take his place in society.823 
 
 Certainty is also required on the meaning of the phrase “reasonable prospect” of serving 
successfully as a director in the future, as used in section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the Companies 
Act. The Companies Act does not define this term in the context of section 162(12)(b)(ii). 
Its meaning has been left to the courts to determine.824 Since the phrase “reasonable 
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prospect” is used in the context of business rescue proceedings in section 131(4)(a) of 
the Companies Act, reference to the numerous judicial decisions on section 131(4)(a) 
would provide useful guidance on the meaning of the phrase in section 162(12)(b)(ii) of 
the Companies Act.825 Drawing on the interpretation of the phrase “reasonable prospect” 
in the context of business rescue proceedings, it is submitted that the phrase “reasonable 
prospect” in section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act means a possibility based on 
objectively reasonable grounds, that the director will be able to serve successfully as a 
director in the future. While vague averments and mere speculative suggestions would 
not suffice, an applicant need not go so far as to establish a reasonable probability that he 
would be able to serve successfully as a director of a company in the future.  
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CHAPTER 7 REMEDIES WITH REGARD TO THE REMOVAL OF 
DIRECTORS FROM OFFICE BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. SECTION 71(5) REVIEW 
3. APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES OR OTHER COMPENSATION 
FOR LOSS OF OFFICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 71(9) OF THE 
COMPANIES ACT 
4.   OPPRESSION REMEDY 
5.   DEFAMATION 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the remedies which may be relied on by a (former) director who has 
been removed from office by the board of directors. The focus of this chapter is on these 
remedies under both the (South African) Companies Act and at common law but where 
relevant, this chapter draws on the remedies with regard to the removal of directors from office 
under the UK Companies Act of 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.1 Some 
improvements to the existing remedies are proposed.  
 
Prior to the board of directors voting on the removal of the director, a director is entitled to 
protest his proposed removal from office. Under section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act, a 
                                                 
1 Some of the statutory remedies in the UK and Australia for a removal of a director from office are similar to 
those in the (South African) Companies Act. A comparison with these jurisdictions is therefore useful since 
guidance may be obtained from these jurisdictions in interpreting and applying the relevant remedies contained in 
the (South African) Companies Act. This approach is justified by s 5(2) of the (South African) Companies Act 
which provides that to the extent appropriate, a court interpreting or applying the Companies Act may consider 
foreign law. The MBCA and the law of the various States in the USA do not contain comparable remedies for the 
removal of a director. This is because the MBCA does not make provision for the board of directors to remove a 
director from office (see chapter 3, para 2.4 where the removal of directors under the MBCA is discussed). Most 
States in the USA, including the State of Delaware, have not conferred on the board of directors the power to 
remove fellow board members (see chapter 3, para 2.4 where the removal of directors in the State of Delaware 
and various States in the USA is discussed). Of those few States in the USA which permit the board of directors 
to remove directors from office, the legislation does not make provision for remedies on which directors may rely 
to contest their removal from office. For this reason this chapter focuses on the remedies for the removal of a 
director by the board of directors in the UK and Australia, but not the USA.  
 
477 
 
director must be given a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation to the board meeting 
before the resolution is put to the vote. The presentation is discussed in chapter 3.2 
 
The consequences of the board of directors removing a director from office in breach of the 
board’s fiduciary duties are discussed in chapter 4.3 It must be pointed out that such a director 
may have a remedy under section 218(2) of the Companies Act for any loss or damages suffered 
by him as a result of the contravention of the Companies Act.4  
 
Section 158 of the Companies Act provides guidance to a court in determining any matter 
brought before it in terms of the Act. The section is titled “Remedies to promote purpose of the 
Act” and it states as follows: 
 
 “When determining a matter brought before it in terms of this Act, or making an order 
 contemplated in this Act – 
(a) a court must develop the common law as necessary to improve the realisation  and 
enjoyment of rights established by this Act; 
(b) the Commission, the Panel, the Companies Tribunal or a court – 
(i)   must promote the spirit, purpose and objects of this Act; and 
(ii)  if any provision of this Act, or other document in terms of this Act, read in its 
context, can be reasonably construed to have more than one meaning, must prefer 
the meaning that best promotes the spirit and purpose of this Act, and will best 
improve the realisation and enjoyment of rights.” 
 
It is submitted that some of the important underlying purposes of the Companies Act which the 
courts should take into account in adjudicating on a remedy sought by a director who has been 
removed from office, are as follows: (i) to encourage transparency;5 (ii) to promote compliance 
with the Bill of Rights as provided in the Constitution, in the application of company law;6 (iii) 
to balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies;7 (iv) to 
                                                 
2 See chapter 3, para 8.4. 
  
3 See chapter 4, para 4. 
 
4 See chapter 4, para 4.3 for a discussion of the liability of directors under s 218(2) of the Companies Act. 
 
5 Section 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act states that one of the purposes of the Companies Act is to encourage 
transparency and high standards of corporate governance as appropriate, given the significant role of enterprises 
within the social and economic life of the nation. This provision is discussed in chapter 3 paras 6.1.2.1 and 8.3 
and chapter 7, para 3. 
 
6 Section 7(a) of the Companies Act. This provision is discussed in chapter 3, para 9. 
 
7 Section 7(i) of the Companies Act. This provision is discussed in chapter 2, paras 7 and 8, chapter 3, paras 3, 9 
and 10 and chapter 6, para 3.10.  
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encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies;8 and (v) to provide a 
predictable and effective environment for the efficient regulation of companies.9 As 
discussed,10 the “spirit” and “objects” of the Companies Act have not been defined.11 The 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 sets out specific objectives and goal 
statements of the new Companies Act, being simplification, flexibility, corporate efficiency, 
transparency and predictable regulation.12 These considerations should also be taken into 
account by courts when adjudicating on a remedy instituted by a director who has been removed 
from office by the board of directors. 
 
2.  SECTION 71(5) REVIEW 
 
Under section 71(5) of the Companies Act a director who has been removed by the board of 
directors may apply within twenty business days to court to review the determination of the 
board.13 Section 71(5) of the Companies Act also applies to the review of a decision of the 
Companies Tribunal to remove a director from office.14  If a director appointed by a person 
named in or determined in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation as contemplated in 
section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act15 is removed by the board of directors, section 71(5) 
also confers on this person the power to apply to court to review the board’s decision. This 
strengthens the power conferred on a person named in or determined in terms of the 
Memorandum of Incorporation to ensure that the director appointed by him is not improperly 
removed from office. These are the only persons who have locus standi to institute a review 
                                                 
8 Section 7(j) of the Companies Act. This provision is discussed in chapter 3, paras 8.3 and 9, chapter 6, para 4 
and chapter 7, paras 2.3 and 6. 
 
9 Section 7(l) of the Companies Act. This provision is discussed in chapter 3, para 9. 
 
10 See chapter 3, para 9. 
 
11 See Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 550. 
 
12 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, Companies Bill [B 61D-2008] para 1. 
 
13 The period of twenty business days given to a director to apply to court to review the determination of the board 
in terms of s 71(5) of the Companies Act is discussed further in chapter 4, para 4.1. 
 
14 Section 71(8)(c) provides that s 71(5), read with the changes required by the context, applies to the determination 
of the matter of the removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal. The review of a decision by the Companies 
Tribunal is discussed in chapter 3, para 9. 
 
15 In terms of s 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may provide for the 
direct appointment and removal of a director by any person who is named in or determined in terms of the 
Memorandum of Incorporation. 
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application in terms of section 71(5) of the Companies Act. Section 71(5) does not confer locus 
standi on a shareholder to institute a review application under section 71(5). In contrast to 
section 71(6),16 section 71(5) also does not confer standing on a holder of voting rights entitled 
to be exercised in the election of that director.  
 
Unlike section 71(7) of the Companies Act which requires the applicant in a section 71(6) 
review to compensate the company and any other party for the costs incurred in relation to the 
application (unless the court reverses the decision of the board), section 71(5) is silent on the 
payment of the costs of a section 71(5) review application.17 Presumably, the common law civil 
procedure rule that costs follow the event would be followed.18 As discussed above,19 the courts 
may in their discretion depart from this principle as each case must be decided on its own facts. 
The issue in essence is a matter of fairness to both sides.20 On this basis, a successful applicant 
in a section 71(5) review application could be awarded costs in his favour and an unsuccessful 
applicant may be required to pay the costs of the other party or parties to the review application.  
 
As discussed,21 section 71(5) does not specify when the period of twenty business days would 
commence. Presumably the period of twenty business days would commence from the date that 
the board of directors makes the decision to remove the director from office. In the interests of 
clarity, it is submitted that section 71(5) should specify when the time period of twenty business 
days commences. During the twenty business day period the director who was removed from 
                                                 
16 Section 71(6) of the Companies Act, which deals with a review in circumstances where the board of directors 
decides not to remove a director from office, is discussed in chapter 6, para 2. The locus standi to apply to court 
to review the board’s decision is discussed in chapter 6, para 2.1. 
  
17 See chapter 6, para 2.4 where the provisions of s 71(7) of the Companies Act are discussed. 
 
18 See chapter 6, para 2.4 where this rule is discussed. 
 
19 See chapter 6, para 2.4. 
 
20 See for instance Gelb v Hawkins 1960 (3) SA 687 (A) at 694; Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of 
Mines v General Electric Co 1967 (2) SA 32 (T) at 72; Ward v Sulzer 1973 (3) SA 701 (A) at 706; Nieuwoudt v 
Joubert 1988 (3) SA 84 (SE) at 88; Joubert T/A Wilcon v Beacham and Another 1996 (1) SA 500 (C) at 502; 
Malangu v De Jager 1996 (3) SA 235 (LCC) at 246-247; McDonald t/a Sport Helicopter v Huey Extreme Club 
2008 (4) SA 20 (C) at 22 and Antoy Investments v Rand Water Board (159/2007) [2008] ZASCA 10 (20 March 
2008) para 9. In Ward v Sulzer 1973 (3) SA 701 (A) at 706 the Appellate Division stated that, “[i]n awarding costs 
the Court has a discretion, to be exercised judicially upon a consideration of all the facts; and, as between the 
parties, in essence it is a matter of fairness to both sides.” 
 
21 See chapter 4, para 4.1. 
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office by the board of directors is suspended from office.22 A vacancy would not arise on the 
board until the twenty business day period to file a review application expires, or a court grants 
an order on a section 71(5) review application, whichever occurs later.23 It follows that once 
the board of directors removes a director from office, it may not fill the vacancy until the expiry 
of the period of twenty business days or until the court grants an order on a section 71(5) review 
application if such an application is instituted. 
 
Section 1726(d) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law provides that if a director has 
been suspended or removed for cause and the suspension or removal is thereafter rescinded by 
the shareholders, by the board or by the final judgment of a court, an act of the board of directors 
done during this period will not be impugned or invalidated. Drawing on section 1726(d) of the 
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, it is submitted that section 70(2) of the (South 
African) Companies Act should incorporate a provision to the effect that any acts of the board 
during the period of suspension of a director who is later reinstated by a court under a section 
71(5) review, may not be impugned or invalidated. The rationale of section 1726(d) of the 
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law could not be ascertained, but it is submitted that such 
a provision would ensure that there will be a minimal disruption to the running of the company 
if the suspended director were to be reinstated to the board by a court. Such a provision would 
also remove any doubt whether decisions taken by the board of directors in the absence of the 
suspended director, once he is reinstated to the board, remain valid. It would furthermore ensure 
that any decisions taken by the board of directors in the absence of the suspended director would 
not be subject to challenge by third parties when the suspended director is reinstated to the 
board. The provision would also accord with the purpose of the Companies Act in section 7(j) 
of encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies.  
 
Section 71(5) of the Companies Act is silent on two specific matters. First, the powers of a 
court under a section 71(5) review application are uncertain in that it is not clear whether a 
court would be empowered to review the substance and merits of the board’s decision to remove 
a director from office, or whether it is empowered to only review the procedural aspects of the 
decision. Secondly, the provision does not specify the orders that a court may make under 
                                                 
22 Section 70(2) of the Companies Act. 
 
23 Section 70(2) of the Companies Act. 
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section 71(5) of the Companies Act if it finds that a director was improperly removed by the 
board of directors. These matters are next discussed. 
 
2.1  Powers of the Court 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, a distinction is drawn between an appeal and a review.24 It was 
submitted that a “review” under section 71(6) of the Companies Act may be construed to be a 
substantive or wide review because the provision empowers a court to review the substance 
and merits of the board’s decision not to remove a director from office.25 It was submitted 
further that the “review” under section 71(6) may also be construed to be a special statutory 
power of review since the powers given to courts under a section 71(6) review extend further 
than a review of the procedural aspects of the decision, and combine aspects of both a review 
and an appeal.26  
 
In contrast, it is not clear from the wording of section 71(5) whether a court is empowered to 
review the substance and merits of the board’s decision to remove a director from office, or 
whether it may enquire only into the procedural correctness of the decision. As discussed, a 
review involves an enquiry into the procedural aspects of a decision.27 Since section 71(5) uses 
the word “review” and there are no indications in the provision pointing towards a court being 
empowered to review the substance and merits of the decision, on a strict reading of section 
71(5) a court reviewing the decision of the board of directors to remove a director from office 
is empowered only to enquire into the procedural correctness of the decision.28 The procedural 
elements would be whether the board had fully and correctly complied with the requirements 
set out in section 71(4) of the Companies Act. These requirements relate to the notice of the 
meeting, giving the director in question the reasons for the proposed removal resolution and 
providing him with a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation to the board of directors 
                                                 
24 See chapter 6, para 2.2 for a discussion on the difference between an appeal and a review. 
 
25 See chapter 6, para 2.2. 
 
26 See chapter 6, para 2.2. 
 
27 See chapter 6, para 2.2. 
 
28 In contrast, an indication in s 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act that a court is empowered to review the substance 
and merits of the board’s decision, is that the section states that a court may remove the director from office if it 
is “satisfied” that the director is ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated or has been negligent or derelict (see further 
chapter 6, para 2.2). 
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before the resolution is voted on.29 On this basis a court is not empowered to take into account, 
on a section 71(5) review, whether the board of directors had acted in breach of its fiduciary 
duties in removing a director from office.  
 
It is submitted that, in order for there to be consistency with section 71(6) of the Companies 
Act, a court should be empowered, under a section 71(5) review, to enquire into the merits of 
the board’s decision to remove a director from office. As is the case with the review power 
under section 71(6) of the Companies Act,30 the review power under section 71(5) is also a 
statutory power of review. A statutory power of review confers on the court powers of both 
appeal and review with the additional power, if required, of receiving new evidence and of 
entering into and deciding the whole matter de novo.31 It is consequently arguable that since 
the review power conferred on a court in section 71(5) of the Companies Act is a statutory 
power of review, a court is empowered to consider both the procedural aspects of the decision 
as well as the substance and merits of the decision to remove a director from office.  
 
It is of particular importance that a court be empowered under a section 71(5) review to consider 
the substance and merits of the board’s decision to remove a director in order to ensure that the 
board has not acted with ulterior motives and thereby in breach of its fiduciary duty. It would 
be anomalous if a court were to review a decision of the board of directors to remove a director 
from office where the board had acted in breach of its fiduciary duties only to find that it is 
powerless to set aside that decision because the relevant procedures had been duly complied 
with by the board of directors. Conferring on a court the power to consider, in a section 71(5) 
review, the merits of the board’s decision to remove a director from office is a significant and 
essential safeguard against the abuse of the board’s power of removal of a fellow director. 
Clarity is however required on the court’s review powers under section 71(5) of the Companies 
Act.  
                                                 
29 The procedural requirements for the board of directors to remove a director from office are discussed in chapter 
3, para 8. 
 
30 See chapter 6, para 2.2 where the statutory review power is discussed.  
 
31 Nel and Another NNO v The Master (Absa Bank Ltd and Others Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 23. 
See further Simelane v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (5) SA 485 (C) para 10; Al-
Kharafi & Sons v Pema and Others NNO 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) paras 22-23; Tongaat Paper Co (Pty) Ltd v The 
Master and Others 2011 (2) SA 17 (KZP) para 27 and Van Zyl and Others NNO v The Master, Western Cape 
High Court and Another 2013 (5) SA 71 (WCC) para 19.  
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Assuming that a court is empowered to consider the merits of the board’s decision under a 
section 71(5) review, the director concerned would have to prove that he was improperly 
removed from office on the basis that the alleged grounds for his removal were not satisfied. 
For instance, the affected director would bear the onus of proving, on a balance of probabilities, 
that the board of directors had made its decision to remove him from office with ulterior 
motives and in breach of its fiduciary duties. It is submitted that a mere suspicion in this regard 
would not be sufficient.32 This may be difficult for the affected director, particularly 
considering that the board may frame the grounds for his removal as neglect of his functions or 
having been derelict in the performance of his functions, or that he failed to meet any other 
broadly expressed or subjective standard.33  
 
2.2  Permissible Court Orders 
 
Unlike section 71(6)(b) of the Companies Act which sets out the court’s powers on a section 
71(6) review application,34 section 71(5) is silent on the orders that a court may make on a 
review in setting aside the board’s decision to remove a director from office.  
 
It is not clear whether a court would be empowered to reinstate a director to office under section 
71(5) of the Companies Act if it finds that the director was improperly removed. In PG Group 
(Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO & Others35 the Labour Court cast doubt on whether an executive 
director is entitled to reinstatement because of the dual capacities in which he holds office. 
While reinstatement may be more difficult with regard to executive directors, it was indicated 
above36 that this does not mean that a court would not order reinstatement in appropriate 
circumstances. It is submitted that a court ought to have the power to order an improperly 
                                                 
32 R Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act” 154. 
 
33 Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.240 at 289. 
  
34 In terms of s 71(6)(b) a court may either confirm the determination of the board of directors not to remove the 
director from office, or it may remove the director from office if it is satisfied that the director is ineligible or 
disqualified, incapacitated, or has been negligent or derelict. 
 
35 [2005] 1 BLLR 71 (LC) para 29, discussed in chapter 5, para 2.2 above.  
36 The reinstatement of executive directors and the circumstances in which an executive director may be reinstated 
as an employee are discussed in chapter 5, para 2.2. 
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removed director to be reinstated to the board of directors, where this would be appropriate, 
and that section 71(5) should be amended to indicate this. 
 
It is also not clear whether a court is empowered under section 71(5) of the Companies Act to 
order compensation to be paid to a director who was improperly removed, and if so, the basis 
upon which the compensation would be calculated. Such compensation is not to be confused 
with damages or compensation for loss of office which may be claimed by a director under 
section 71(9) of the Companies Act. Damages or compensation for loss of office under section 
71(9) of the Companies Act arise from a breach of contract by the company (discussed in 
paragraph 3 below), while compensation which may be payable under section 71(5) would arise 
from the improper removal of a director from office by the board of directors under section 
71(3) of the Companies Act. It is submitted that, where appropriate, a court ought to order 
compensation to be paid to a director who was improperly removed from office by the board 
of directors under section 71(3) of the Companies Act. If a court were to order compensation 
to be paid under section 71(5) of the Companies Act, one form of compensation it could order 
is that the improperly removed director be compensated for the loss of board fees during his 
suspension from office in terms of section 70(2) of the Companies Act.37 Clarity, perhaps by 
legislative amendment, is required on the orders that a court may make under section 71(5) of 
the Companies Act.38 
   
3.  APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF 
OFFICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 71(9) OF THE COMPANIES ACT 
 
Section 71(9) of the Companies Act states as follows: 
 “Nothing in this section deprives a person removed from office as a director in terms of 
this section of any right that person may have at common law or otherwise to apply to a 
court for damages or other compensation for – 
(a) loss of office as a director; or 
(b) loss of any other office as a consequence of being removed as a director.” 
 
                                                 
37 Under s 70(2) of the Companies Act if the board of directors has removed a director from office a vacancy on 
the board would not arise until the later of the expiry of the time for filing a review application in terms of s 71(5) 
or the granting of an order by the court on such an application, but the director is suspended from office during 
that time. 
 
38 See chapter 3, para 8.6 for a discussion of the court’s power under s 71(5) of the Companies Act to award 
compensation and to order reinstatement of a director in instances where the prescribed procedures to remove him 
from office were not followed. 
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The right to claim compensation or damages in respect of the termination of his appointment 
as a director or of any appointment terminating as a consequence of being removed as a director 
was conferred on directors under section 220(7) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.39 Section 
71(9) of the Companies Act preserves this right. A distinction must however be drawn between 
a director’s role as a director and his role as an employee. Section 71(9) relates to a director’s 
loss of office as a director of the company and to the loss of any other office as a consequence 
of being removed as a director. If an executive director’s contract of employment is breached 
as a result of his removal from office, he would have a separate claim for damages or other 
compensation under the LRA. This is discussed in chapter 5.40 
 
For a director to have a remedy under section 71(9) of the Companies Act his removal from 
office must constitute a breach of contract on the part of the company.41 A director must have 
a contract with the company or it must be stated in the Memorandum of Incorporation of the 
company that the company will not for a specified period of time terminate his office of 
directorship, or any appointment terminating with the termination of his office as a director. 
Thus where a company has appointed a director for a fixed period in terms of a contract or in 
terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation and that period has not expired at the time the 
director is removed from office, the affected director is entitled to claim damages or other 
compensation from the company for a breach of that contract by the company.42 The director’s 
contract with the company or the Memorandum of Incorporation may also provide that the 
director will be entitled to a contractual termination payment upon termination of his service 
                                                 
39 Section 220(7) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provided as follows: 
 
“Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a person removed thereunder of 
compensation or damages which may be payable to him in respect of the termination of his 
appointment as director or of any appointment terminating with that of director or as derogating 
from any power to remove a director which may exist apart from this section.” 
 
40 See chapter 5, para 2.2. 
 
41 See Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-285; Griffin Company Law Fundamental Principles 
287; Dignam Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 338; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French 
& Ryan on Company Law 447; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 382-383; 
Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases and Materials in Company Law 303-304. 
 
42 Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701; Read v Astoria Garage (Streatham) Ltd [1952] 2 All 
ER 292; De Villiers v Jacobsdal Saltworks (Michaelis & De Villiers) (Pty) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 873 (O); Blackman et 
al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-285-286; Griffin Company Law Fundamental Principles 287; Dignam 
Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 338; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law 447; Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases and Materials in Company Law 304; Davies 
& Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 382-383; Hannigan Company Law 299. 
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contract, in which event the director would be entitled to such agreed compensation upon his 
removal from office.43   
 
Even if the removal of a director does constitute a breach of contract by the company this will 
not prevent the director from being removed from office. This is because the nature of a 
director’s office is such that courts will not force a company to have a director it does not 
want.44 In order to sustain an action for damages or compensation against the company for his 
loss of office as a director, the director must not have breached the Memorandum of 
Incorporation or his contract of service such that he has given cause to the company to cancel 
its contract with him.45 In the event of such a breach by a director, he would not be entitled to 
damages or compensation for loss of office.46 
 
Under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 the memorandum and articles of association of a company 
did not constitute a contract between the company and a director in his capacity as a director.47 
Instead, they constituted a contract between the company and its shareholders to the extent that 
the provisions affected the shareholders in their capacity as shareholders.48 A director could 
therefore not rely on the terms of the articles of association to claim damages from the company 
as a consequence of being removed from office.49 It was necessary for the director to have had 
a separate contract of service with the company binding the company to hold the director’s 
                                                 
43 Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 382-383. 
 
44 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-284; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern 
Company Law 383.  
 
45 Farmers’ Associated Dairies Ltd v Goldstein 1924 WLD 181 at 183; Blackman et al Commentary on the 
Companies Act 8-286; Keay “Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders” 673; 
Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 559. 
 
46 Knopp v Thane Investments Ltd and Another, Knopp v Tomlinson [2003] 1 BCLC 380 para 131; Item Software 
(UK) Ltd v Fasshihi and Others [2003] 2 BCLC 1 para 97; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-
286; Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 559. 
  
47 De Villiers v Jacobsdal Saltworks (Michaelis and De Villiers) (Pty) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 873 (O). 
 
48 Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep Breeders’ Association [1915] 1 Ch 881 at 900; Rayfield v Hands 
[1958] 2 All ER 194 (CA); De Villiers v Jacobsdal Saltworks (Michaelis and De Villiers) (Pty) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 
873 (O) at 874; Gohlke & Schneider v Westies Minerale (Edms) Bpk 1970 (2) SA 685 (A) at 692; Henochsberg 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 123-124; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 79-80; Blackman et al 
Commentary on the Companies Act 4-156. 
 
49 D Botha “Some Aspects Concerning the Removal of Directors” 465; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 81. 
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position for a fixed term, or not to terminate his office, or to compensate him if he were removed 
from office.50  
 
This position changed under the Companies Act (71 of 2008) since, in terms of section 
15(6)(c)(i), the Memorandum of Incorporation is binding between the company and each 
director of the company.51 It follows that a director who is removed from office under section 
71 of the Companies Act now has a remedy based on a breach of a provision of the 
Memorandum of Incorporation. It is no longer essential for a director to have a separate contract 
of service in order to claim damages or other compensation from the company for loss of office 
as a director.52   
 
If a company has agreed to compensate a director in the event of his removal from office prior 
to the expiry of his term of office, a director who has so been removed from office may claim 
compensation from the company.53 Where the contract does not contain any specific provision 
for compensation, the director would have to prove that he has suffered damages as a result of 
the termination of his appointment.54 The damages would be the amount of remuneration which 
the director would have received had he not been removed from office.55  These damages could 
potentially be quite high. They may even include damages for loss of collateral benefits. For 
example, in Bold v Brough, Nicholson & Hall Ltd56 a director who had served the company for 
                                                 
50 Beattie v E & F Beattie Ltd [1938] Ch 708; Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701; De Villiers 
v Jacobsdal Saltworks (Michaelis and De Villiers) (Pty) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 873 (O); Shindler v Northern Raincoat 
Co Ltd [1960] 2 All ER 239. 
 
51 Section 15(6)(c) of the Companies Act is discussed in chapter 5, para 2.1. 
 
52 R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 452; R 
Cassim “Contesting the Removal of a Director by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act” 155; Delport 
New Entrepreneurial Law 126-127; Esser & Havenga “Directors and Other Officers” in Loubser & Mahony 
Company Secretarial Practice 8-17. 
   
53 Henochsberg Henochsberg on the Companies Act 422(3). A company may insert a liquidated damages provision 
in its service contract with a director to the effect that if the director is removed from office by the board of 
directors he will be entitled to a set amount of compensation (Bourne “The Removal of Directors” 194). See also 
Beach v Reed Corrugated Cases, Ltd [1956] 2 All ER 652 at 659 and Yetton v Eastwoods Froy Ltd [1966] 3 All 
ER 353 on the calculation of damages when a director’s service agreement is terminated in circumstances which 
amount to a wrongful dismissal.  
 
54 Hayes v Bristol Plant Hire Ltd and Others [1957] 1 All ER 685; Henochsberg Henochsberg on the Companies 
Act 422(3). 
 
55 Henochsberg Henochsberg on the Companies Act 422(3). 
 
56 [1963] 3 All ER 849.  
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forty years had been wrongfully dismissed both as a director and as the managing director of 
the company. The company had agreed to appoint the director as a managing director for ten 
years, but after approximately three years, the company had summarily and wrongfully 
removed the director from this position. The damages awarded by the Queens Bench Division 
to the director included loss of salary, loss of commission on the profits of the company, 
diminution in the pension the director would have received under the company’s staff pension 
and assurance scheme, loss of life insurance cover under the scheme, the amount of premiums 
payable under the company’s discretionary pension and life assurance scheme which the 
company had undertaken to pay on behalf of the director, as well as interest on the total amount 
of damages awarded.57 
 
A director is under a duty to mitigate his loss by looking for and taking alternative employment 
where this is reasonably expected.58 His damages would generally be reduced by the value of 
any such alternative employment which he could have taken. In Bold v Brough, Nicholson & 
Hall Ltd59 the Queens Bench Division found that the director in question, at the age of fifty 
five, had a very small chance of finding a higher executive position in the textile trade in a 
depressed market. For this reason the court found that the director had complied with his duty 
to mitigate his damages by trying to find employment as a consultant even though he had not 
been successful. In mitigating his damages, a director is entitled to seek employment in a 
position which is reasonably commensurate with his status. In Yetton v Eastwoods Froy Ltd60 
the Queens Bench Division held that a managing director was justified in refusing a job as an 
assistant managing director at the same salary. The court held that the director had not acted 
unreasonably in seeking employment at a level comparable to that of his previous salary. His 
refusal of re-employment as an assistant managing director was found to be reasonable in view 
of the loss of status involved.61  
 
                                                 
57 Bold v Brough, Nicholson & Hall Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 849 at 850 and 858. 
 
58 Bold v Brough, Nicholson & Hall Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 849 at 853; Yetton v Eastwoods Froy Ltd [1966] 3 All 
ER 353 at 365; Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 559; Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases 
and Materials in Company Law 304. 
 
59 [1963] 3 All ER 849 at 853. 
 
60 [1966] 3 All ER 353. 
 
61 Yetton v Eastwoods Froy Ltd [1966] 3 All ER 353 at 365. 
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A director may in addition have a claim for damages for the loss of any other office as a 
consequence of being removed as a director.62 For instance, if the removal of the director from 
office breaches a second contract, such as that of a managing director, which the person could 
perform only by being a director, a claim for the loss of the office of managing director may 
also be brought under section 71(9)(b) of the Companies Act.63 Under section 71(9)(b) a 
director who holds an ex officio directorship in any other company by virtue of his directorship 
in the company from which he is removed may also claim damages for the loss of the ex officio 
directorship.64 
 
The board of directors should bear in mind when removing a director from office that he may 
have a claim against the company for payment for damages or other compensation for the loss 
of his office and that these damages may be substantive. The measure of the damages resulting 
from the removal of the director from office may be prohibitive to the extent that the removal 
could become impractical for the company.65 The longer the period of the service contract, the 
greater the damages that are payable to a director who has been removed before the expiry of 
                                                 
62 Section 71(9)(b) of the Companies Act.  
 
63 Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd and Federated Foundries Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701; Read v Astoria Garage 
(Streatham) Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 292; Shindler v Northern Raincoat Co Ltd [1960] 2 All ER 239;  Henochsberg 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 422(3); D Botha “Some Aspects Concerning the Removal of Directors” 468; 
Beuthin & Luiz Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 211; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 8-286;  
Kershaw Company Law in Context 222; Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 558-559; French, Mayson & 
Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 447; Worthington Sealy & Worthington’s Text, Cases and 
Materials in Company Law 304; Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 381-382; 
Hannigan Company Law 264. Section 168(5)(a) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 likewise provides that if the 
shareholders remove a director from office the director would not be deprived of compensation or damages 
payable to him in respect of the termination of his appointment as director or of “any appointment terminating 
with that as director”.  
 
64 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 47. Refer to chapter 5, 
para 2.3.2 for a discussion on the removal of ex officio directors from office.  
 
65 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 128; Bourne “The Removal of Directors” 194; Davies & Worthington Gower 
Principles of Modern Company Law 383-384. To use an example, in 2015 MTN awarded its chief executive 
officer twenty three million seven hundred thousand Rand as compensation for loss of office. In 2016 MTN again 
awarded significant loss of office payments to its chief executive officer who left the company abruptly as a large 
fine was being negotiated with the Nigerian Government in settlement of events which had occurred during his 
tenure as the chief executive officer. This payment amounted to nineteen million six hundred thousand Rand. 
According to MTN the former chief executive officer was paid this amount as “compensation for loss of office, 
comprising notice pay and a restraint of trade payment” (see Tarrant “MTN slammed on remuneration” (29 May 
2017) available at http://citizen.co.za/business/1527577/mtn-slammed-remuneration/ (accessed on 19 June 2017) 
and Prinsloo “Ex-MTN boss paid R24 for ‘loss of office’” (25 April 2016) available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/ex-mtn-boss-paid-r24m-for-loss-of-office-2013990) (accessed 
on 19 June 2017). 
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the period specified in his service contract.66 The Companies Act does not specify a limit with 
regard to the number of years for which a director may be appointed.67 Under section 68(1) of 
the Companies Act a director of a profit company may be elected to serve for an indefinite 
term, or for a term set out in the Memorandum of Incorporation. If the Memorandum of 
Incorporation does not specify a term, a director may be appointed for an indefinite term. In 
such event if the board of directors removes a director from office, it may be required to pay 
damages to the director for loss of office as a director, and for the loss of any other office as a 
consequence of being removed as a director. It is advisable to refrain from stipulating lengthy 
terms of appointment for directors because of the potential financial implications involved in 
removing them from office prior to the expiry of their contractual terms. This is important to 
ensure that the removal of a director from office prior to the expiry of his fixed term contract 
does not lead to economically impractical or unsustainable consequences.  
 
The amount of compensation paid to a director for loss of office must be disclosed to the 
shareholders of the company. In terms of section 30(4)(c) of the Companies Act the annual 
                                                 
66 FHI Cassim “The Division and Balance of Power” 166. 
 
67 In the UK, the Model Articles for Private Companies do not specify a term of office, and accordingly a person 
appointed as a director of a private company with model articles would be appointed until he is removed or resigns 
(refer to articles 17 and 18 of the Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares, contained in Schedule 
1 of the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008. See further Kershaw Company Law in Context 221). With 
regard to public companies article 21 of the Model Articles for Public Companies (contained in Schedule 3 of the 
Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008) makes provision for the retirement of a third of the board of 
directors at each annual general meeting (also known as a classified or staggered board where only a fraction of 
the board is elected each year). This effectively provides each director with a three-year term (Kershaw Company 
Law in Context 221). A director may be reappointed at the end of this term. Under s 188 of the UK Companies 
Act of 2006 a company may not agree to a director’s employment under a service contract being for a period 
longer than two years unless it has been approved by a resolution of the shareholders of the company. This applies 
to all companies in the UK other than a company which is a wholly-owned subsidiary (s 188(6)). A director’s 
“service contract” is (i) a contract under which a director undertakes personally to perform services (as director or 
otherwise) for the company or for a subsidiary of the company; or (ii) services (as director or otherwise) that a 
director undertakes personally to perform are made available by a third party to the company or to a subsidiary of 
the company (s 227(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006). If a UK company agrees to a service contract which 
contravenes s 188 of the UK Companies Act of 2006, the provision will be void, to the extent of the contravention 
(s 189(a)). Furthermore, the contract will be deemed to contain a term entitling the company to terminate it at any 
time by the giving of reasonable notice (s 189(b)). This measure is designed to draw the shareholders’ attention to 
the compensation which may be payable should the director be dismissed (Hannigan Company Law 297). In 
Australia the term of office of directors is usually determined by the constitution. The constitution of a proprietary 
company may provide for the appointment of named individuals who are to hold office indefinitely (Austin & 
Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.160 at 253). Under the MBCA 
directors are appointed for a default period of one year and a maximum in most instances of three or four years 
for staggered or classified boards. Section 8.05(a) of the MBCA provides that the terms of the initial directors of 
a corporation expire at the first shareholders’ meeting at which directors are elected. The terms of all other directors 
expire at the next annual shareholders’ meeting following their election unless their terms of appointment are 
staggered (s 8.05(b) of the MBCA; Ferber Corporation Law 40; Bainbridge Corporate Law 79).   
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financial statements of a company required to have its annual financial statements audited,68 
must include, inter alia, particulars showing the amount of any compensation paid in respect 
of loss of office to current or past directors. However, the Companies Act does not require the 
termination payments to be approved by shareholders of the company. Thus, while the amount 
of compensation paid to directors for loss of office would be public knowledge, the disclosure 
thereof to shareholders need not take place prior to payment of the termination payment. 
 
In sharp contrast, in the UK a quoted company69 is, in terms of section 226C of the UK 
Companies Act of 2006, prohibited from making a payment for loss of office70 to a person who 
                                                 
68 The annual financial statements of a public company must be audited (s 30(2)(a) of the Companies Act). In the 
case of any other profit or non-profit company, the annual financial statements must be audited if so required by 
the regulations made by the Minister in terms of s 30(7), taking into account whether it is desirable in the public 
interest, having regard to the economic or social significance of the company, as indicated by any relevant factors, 
including its annual turnover, the size of its workforce, or the nature and extent of its activities (s 30(2)(b)(i)). A 
company may audit its financial statements voluntarily if the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or a 
shareholders’ resolution so requires or if the company’s board of directors has so determined (s 30(2)(b)(ii)(aa)). 
In terms of regulation 28(2) of the Companies Regulations, 2011, in addition to public companies and state-owned 
companies, any company that falls into the following categories in any financial year must have its annual financial 
statements for that financial year audited: (i) any profit or non-profit company if in the ordinary course of its 
primary activities, it holds assets in a fiduciary capacity for persons who are not related to the company and the 
aggregate value of such assets held at any time during the financial year exceeds five million Rand; (ii) any non-
profit company if it was incorporated directly or indirectly by the state, an organ of state, a state-owned company, 
an international entity, a foreign state entity or a foreign company, or if it was incorporated primarily to perform 
a statutory or regulatory function in terms of any legislation, or to carry out a public function at the direct or 
indirect initiation or direction of an organ of the state, a state-owned company, an international entity, or a foreign 
state entity, or for a purpose ancillary to any such function; or (iii) any other company whose public interest score 
in that financial year is three hundred and fifty or more, or is at least one hundred, if its annual financial statements 
were internally compiled. Regulation 26(2) of the Companies Regulations, 2011 sets out details on how the public 
interest score is to be calculated.  
 
69 A quoted company is a company whose equity share capital has been included in the official list in accordance 
with part 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, or is officially listed in a European Economic Area 
state, or is admitted to dealing on either the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq (s 385(2) of the UK Companies 
Act of 2006). The “official list” is the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) list of securities that have been 
admitted to listing. The Financial Conduct Authority is required to maintain the official list in accordance with 
Part VI of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (see s 103(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000). A quoted company is similar to, but not exactly the same, as a listed public company in South Africa. 
 
70 In terms of s 215 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 a “payment for loss of office” means a payment 
made to a director or past director of a company— 
(a) by way of compensation for loss of office as director of the company, 
(b) by way of compensation for loss, while director of the company or in connection with his 
ceasing to be a director of it, of— 
(i) any other office or employment in connection with the management of the affairs of the 
company, or 
(ii) any office (as director or otherwise) or employment in connection with the management 
of the affairs of any subsidiary undertaking of the company, 
(c) as consideration for or in connection with his retirement from his office as director of the 
company, or 
(d) as consideration for or in connection with his retirement, while director of the company or in 
connection with his ceasing to be a director of it, from— 
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has been a director of the company unless the payment is consistent with the approved directors’ 
remuneration policy or the payment has been approved by a resolution of the shareholders of 
the company.71 The approved directors’ remuneration policy is the most recent remuneration 
policy to have been approved by a resolution passed by the shareholders of the company in 
general meeting.72 The resolution of the shareholders approving the loss of office payment may 
not be passed unless a memorandum setting out the particulars of the proposed payment is made 
available for inspection by the shareholders of the company.73 The memorandum must be made 
available at the company’s registered office for not less than fifteen days prior to the date of 
the meeting at which the resolution is to be considered and it must also be available at the 
meeting itself.74 The memorandum must explain the ways in which the loss of office payment 
is inconsistent with the approved directors’ remuneration policy.75 In addition, the company 
must ensure that the memorandum is made available on its website from the first day on which 
the memorandum is made available for inspection until its next accounts meeting.76 These 
provisions ensure that shareholders are informed beforehand about the scale of the 
compensation payments to be made to directors in the event of loss of office and that such 
payments are approved by the shareholders.77 
                                                 
(i) any other office or employment in connection with the management of the affairs of the 
company, or 
(ii) any office (as director or otherwise) or employment in connection with the management 
of the affairs of any subsidiary undertaking of the company. 
 
71 These provisions were inserted by s 80 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 which introduced 
amendments to the UK Companies Act of 2006 with regard to payments to directors of quoted companies (see 
ss 79-82 of this Act). Section 80 of this Act introduced a new Chapter 4A into the UK Companies Act of 2006 
titled “Directors of quoted companies: special provision”. 
 
72 Section 226C(2) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
73 Section 226D(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
74 Section 226D(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
75 Section 226D(2) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. 
 
76 Section 226D(3) of the UK Companies Act of 2006. If a payment is made in contravention of s 226C of the UK 
Companies Act of 2006 that payment will be held by the recipient on trust for the company or other person making 
the payment (s 226E(2)(a)). In the case of a payment by a company, any director who authorised the payment will 
be jointly and severally liable to indemnify the company that made the payment for any loss resulting from it 
(s 226E(2)(b)). A court may however relieve the director, wholly or in part, from liability on such terms as the 
court thinks fit if the director shows that he acted honestly and reasonably and the court considers that, having 
regard to the circumstances of the case, the director ought to be relieved of liability (s 226E(5)). 
 
77 Madlela & R Cassim “Disclosure of Directors’ Remuneration Under South African Company Law: Is it 
Adequate?” 407. 
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Likewise, section 200E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 requires the shareholders 
to approve a payment given to a director by way of compensation for the loss of the office or 
position.78 Section 200E calls for a binding vote and not merely an advisory vote to be passed 
by the shareholders to approve the director’s compensation for loss of office.79 This section 
applies to all companies registered under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.80 The 
approval must be given by way of a resolution passed at a general meeting of the company.81 
The details of the compensation must be set out in the notice of the general meeting that is to 
consider the resolution.82 At the general meeting a vote on the resolution may not be cast in any 
capacity by or on behalf of the director whom it is sought to remove or by an associate of that 
director.83 The resolution passed at the general meeting of the company may approve a lesser 
amount than the amount proposed in the resolution.84 Section 200(4) of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 makes it clear that shareholder approval of compensation to be paid 
to directors for loss of office does not relieve a director from any duty to the company, whether 
under sections 180, 181, 182, 183 or 18485 or otherwise and whether of a fiduciary nature or 
                                                 
78 Section 200E must be read with ss 200A(1) and 200B(1) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
79 Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.365 at 318. An advisory 
vote is a qualitatively different vote from a binding vote in that, unlike a binding vote, an advisory vote does not 
bind the directors or the company (see s 250R(3) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 and Dr Nair v Arturus 
Capital Limited [2010] NSWSC 329 para 40). In Dr Nair v Arturus Capital Limited [2010] NSWSC 329 para 40 
the New South Wales Supreme Court remarked that the knowledge by shareholders that a resolution is advisory 
only and would not bind the company or the directors, might influence their approach to the resolution and the 
care that they might be expected to give to the matter under consideration. 
 
80 See Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 7.350 at 308. 
 
81 Section 200E(1B) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
82 Section 200E(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
83 Section 200E(2A) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. An associate is a person with whom the director 
is acting or proposes to act (s 15 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001). A person would not be an associate 
of another person if he gives advice to the other person, or acts on the other’s behalf, in the proper performance 
of the functions attaching to a professional capacity or a business relationship (s 16(1)(a) of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001). A person would also not be an associate of another person if, otherwise than for 
valuable consideration, he has been appointed to vote as a proxy or representative at a shareholders’ meeting 
(s 16(1)(d) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001).  
 
84 Section 200E(3) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
85 These duties are the duty to exercise powers and discharge duties with care and diligence (s 180), the duty to 
exercise powers and discharge duties in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper 
purpose (s 181), the duty not to improperly use their position to gain an advantage for themselves (s 182) and the 
duty not to improperly use information to gain an advantage for themselves (s 183). Section 184 sets out the 
offences for a contravention of these duties. 
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not, in connection with the giving of the compensation. These provisions were introduced in 
Australia in order to strengthen the regulations on termination benefits by “better empowering 
shareholders to disallow excessive termination benefits . . . improving the accountability of 
company management in setting remuneration and promoting responsible remuneration 
practices.”86 
 
Section 227(1)(a) of the previous South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 contained a 
provision akin to section 226C of the UK Companies Act of 2006 and section 200E of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001.87 Section 227(1)(a) prohibited a company from making 
any payment or granting any benefit or advantage to any director or past director of the 
company or of its subsidiary company or holding company or any subsidiary of its holding 
company by way of compensation for loss of office unless full particulars with respect to the 
proposed payment (including the amount thereof), benefit or advantage had been disclosed to 
the shareholders of the company and the making of the payment or the grant of the benefit or 
advantage had been approved by a special resolution of the company. This provision applied 
to both public and private companies. In view of the many initiatives to enhance corporate 
governance and transparent practices it is both surprising and disappointing that the Companies 
Act (71 of 2008) has failed to retain this provision and does not require compensation for loss 
of office to directors to be approved by the shareholders. Dispensing with such approval does 
not accord with the purpose of the Companies Act (71 of 2008) of encouraging transparency 
and high standards of corporate governance, as set out in section 7(b)(iii). 
 
The King IV Report requires the board of directors to ensure that the company remunerates 
directors fairly, responsibly and transparently so as to promote the achievement of strategic 
objectives and positive outcomes in the short, medium and long term.88 The Report states that 
the implementation report must disclose any payments made on termination of office and the 
                                                 
86 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Termination 
Payments) Bill 2009 para 2.7. The Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Termination 
Payments) Act 2009 amends the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 in order to strengthen the regulatory 
framework in Australia relating to termination benefits and to curb excessive termination benefits paid to directors 
of companies (see paras 2.1 and 2.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Improving 
Accountability on Termination Payments) Bill 2009). 
 
87 Section 227(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 dealt with payments to directors for loss of office or in 
connection with arrangements and take-over schemes. 
 
88 Principle 14 of the King IV Report. 
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reasons for such payment.89 The implementation report should be tabled every year for a 
separate non-binding advisory vote by shareholders at the annual general meeting.90 While the 
King IV Report makes provision for the disclosure of termination payments to be paid to 
directors, it does not require shareholder approval of such payments.91 The JSE Listings 
Requirements also do not make provision for binding shareholder approval of termination 
payments to directors for loss of office.92  
 
The advantage of requiring shareholders to approve the termination payments of directors is 
that it confers on shareholders some control over termination payments and results in enhanced 
transparency with regard to the termination payments of directors.93 It further serves to 
moderate the extent of the termination payments to be paid to directors for loss of office and 
prevents directors from abusing their influence and serving their own interests.94 It is submitted 
that for these reasons provisions akin to section 226C of the UK Companies Act of 2006 or 
section 200E of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 requiring shareholder approval for 
                                                 
89 King IV Report, principle 14, recommended practice 35c. The King IV Report (principle 14, recommended 
practice 32) recommends that remuneration of directors of a company be disclosed by means of a remuneration 
report in three parts. The first part is a background statement, the second part is an overview of the main provisions 
of the remuneration policy of the company, and the third part is an implementation report which contains details 
of all remuneration awarded to individual members of the board of directors during the reporting period. 
 
90 King IV Report, principle 14, recommended practice 37. 
 
91 The King IV Report provides that the remuneration policy should record the measures that the board commits 
to take in the event that either the remuneration policy or the implementation report or both are voted against by 
twenty five per cent or more of the voting rights exercised. These measures should provide for taking steps in 
good faith and with best reasonable effort towards an engagement process to ascertain the reasons for the 
dissenting votes and appropriately addressing legitimate and reasonable objections and concerns raised (King IV 
Report, principle 14, recommended practice 38).  
 
92 The Amendments to the JSE Listings Requirements of 1 November 2016, which came into force on 1 June 
2017, require the remuneration policy and the implementation report to be tabled every year for separate non-
binding advisory votes by shareholders of the issuer at the annual general meeting. The remuneration policy must 
record the measures that the board of directors of the issuer commits to take in the event that either the 
remuneration policy or the implementation report, or both, are voted against by twenty five per cent or more of 
the votes exercised. In order to give effect to the minimum measures referred to in the King IV Report (see 
principle 14, recommended practices 38 and 39) (referred to as the “King Code” in the JSE Listings Requirements), 
in the event that either the remuneration policy or the implementation report, or both are voted against by 
shareholders exercising twenty five per cent or more of the voting rights exercised, the issuer must in its voting 
results announcement provide an invitation to dissenting shareholders to engage with the issuer, and for the manner 
and timing of such engagement (para 3.84(k) of the JSE Listings Requirements).  
 
93 Madlela & R Cassim “Disclosure of Directors’ Remuneration Under South African Company Law: Is it 
Adequate?” 407. 
 
94 See Kunst, Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 437-441 and Cilliers & Benade Corporate 
Law 152 and on s 227(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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payment for loss of office must be included in the (South African) Companies Act. Such 
approval should be required with regard to both public and private companies. Doing so would 
accord with the purposes of the Companies Act of promoting the development of the South 
African economy by encouraging transparency,95 and encouraging the efficient and responsible 
management of companies.96 
 
4.  OPPRESSION REMEDY 
 
Section 163 of the Companies Act provides a remedy for directors and shareholders to apply 
for relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct. Under section 252 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973,97 the predecessor to section 163 of the Companies Act (71 of 2008), the oppression 
remedy was available to shareholders only. The remedy has traditionally served the purpose of 
protecting oppressed minority shareholders.98 Section 163 of the Companies Act now extends 
the oppression remedy to directors. Thus a person who is oppressed in his capacity as a director 
may now also rely on section 163 of the Companies Act.99 
  
Under section 163 an application for relief may be instituted in three instances: (a) if any act or 
omission of the company, or a related person, has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant;100 (b) the business of 
                                                 
95 Section 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act. 
 
96 Section 7(j) of the Companies Act. 
 
97 Section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provided as follows: 
 
“(1) Any member of a company who complains that any particular act or omission of a company 
is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being conducted 
in a manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or to some part of the members of the 
company, may, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), make an application to the Court for an 
order under this section.”  
 
98 Off-beat Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Shareblock Ltd and Others 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC) 
para 27. 
 
99 See s 163(1) of the Companies Act which expressly empowers a director to rely on the oppression remedy. A 
detailed analysis of s 163 of the Companies Act is beyond the scope of this study. For a detailed discussion of this 
remedy refer to Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 573-574(17); MF Cassim “Shareholder 
Remedies and Minority Protection” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 757-775; Sibanda “The 
Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South African Company Law” 70-76 and MF Cassim The New 
Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 179-217. 
 
100 Section 163(1)(a) of the Companies Act. 
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the company, or a related person, is being or has been carried on or conducted in a manner that 
is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the 
applicant;101 or (c) the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a person 
related to the company, are being or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to, or that  unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant.102  
 
An “act or omission of the company” encompasses the resolutions of the board of directors and 
the acts of the board of directors.103  In Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd 
and Others104 the High Court observed that in most cases the exercise by a director of a 
corporate power will also be an act of the company. To this extent, the court remarked that 
section 163(1)(c) may not add much to sections 163(1)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act.105 An 
“act or omission of the company” may also comprise an act or omission of the directors which 
is done in breach of a duty owed to the company.106 In Civils 2000 Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Black 
Empowerment Partner Civils 2000 (Pty) Ltd107 the High Court affirmed that a breach of 
fiduciary duty on the part of the directors amounted to conduct of a company as contemplated 
in section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.  
 
                                                 
101 Section 163(1)(b) of the Companies Act. 
 
102 Section 163(1)(c) of the Companies Act. 
 
103 Civils 2000 Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Black Empowerment Partner Civils 2000 (Pty) Ltd [2011] 3 All SA 215 
(WCC) paras 17-21. See further Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 9-9. 
 
104 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 53. 
 
105 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 53. 
 
106 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 9-9. 
 
107 [2011] 3 All SA 215 (CC) para 21. In this case the plaintiff, a shareholder of the company, contended that the 
affairs of the company were being conducted by the directors of the company in a manner which was unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable. The plaintiff alleged that the directors had committed a number of corporate 
misdemeanours (such as taking up office in a competitor company) which constituted fundamental breaches of 
their fiduciary duties towards the company (para 16). The plaintiff was unable to remove the directors from office 
due to the structure of the shareholders’ agreement. It therefore approached the court for an order under s 252 of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The directors raised an exception that success under s 252 of the Companies Act 
61 of 1973 could only follow if a plaintiff had established that the proscribed conduct complained of was that of 
the company itself, as opposed to the directors in their individual capacities (para 13). The court affirmed that the 
plaintiff’s allegation that a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors constituted conduct of the company as 
contemplated under s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, was legally sound (para 21). It held that the acts or 
omissions of the directors of a company are acts or omissions of the company even when they injure the company 
and constitute a breach of any duty owed to that company (para 17). The exception raised by the directors was 
accordingly dismissed. 
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Consequently, a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors may rely 
on section 163(1)(a) of the Companies Act on the basis that an act or omission of the company 
(being the board of directors) has had a result (his removal from office) that is oppressive, 
unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregards his interests. If the removal of the director from 
office was based on a valid ground as set out in section 71(3) of the Companies Act, the director 
will not be able to successfully rely on section 163 of the Companies Act since his removal will 
not have been unfair. Since a breach of fiduciary duty may amount to conduct that is oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial, if the board of directors removes a director from office in breach of its 
fiduciary duty,108 a director may apply to court for relief under section 163 of the Companies 
Act. A director may also rely on section 163(1)(c) of the Companies Act to contend that the 
powers of a director or directors have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to him or that unfairly disregards his interests. The director who has been removed 
from office must prove to the court that his removal from office is oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial or unfairly disregards his interests.109 On considering such an application, a court 
may make any interim or final order it considers fit.110   
 
The terms “oppressive”, “unfairly prejudicial” and “unfairly disregards” in respect of the 
interests of the applicant are open-ended terms that have not been defined in the Companies 
Act. The common law jurisprudence relating to section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
continues to be relevant in determining whether conduct is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial, 
given the similarities in wording of the two sections.111 The term “oppressive” has been defined 
                                                 
108 The removal of a director in breach of the fiduciary duties of directors is discussed in chapter 4. 
 
109 Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others 1968 (1) SA 517 (C) at 525; Louw and Others 
v Nel 2011 (2) SA 172 (SCA) para 23; De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) 
Limited and Others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) para 38. In Louw and Others v Nel 2011 (2) SA 172 (SCA) para 23 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal asserted that an “applicant for relief under s 252 cannot content himself or herself with 
a number of vague and rather general allegations.” In De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management 
(Proprietary) Limited and Others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) para 38 the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg stated 
as follows:  
 
 “The court’s jurisdiction to make an order does not arise until the statutory criteria have been 
 satisfied. The plaintiff (or applicant) bears the onus of satisfying the court that the particular act 
 or omission has been committed, or that the affairs of the company are being conducted in the 
 manner he alleges; and that such act or omission or conduct of the company’s affairs is unfairly 
 prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or to some part of the members of the company”. 
 
110 Section 163(2) of the Companies Act.  
 
111 Grancy Property Ltd v Manala and Others 2015 (3) SA 313 (SCA) para 22. See further Peel and Others v 
Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) para 43; Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical 
Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) para 4 and Geffen and Others v Martin and Others 
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as involving a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of the company.112 In Visser Sitrus 
(Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others113 the High Court remarked that the term 
“oppressive” appears to cover conduct of a more egregious kind than conduct which is “unfairly 
prejudicial to” or that “unfairly disregards the interests of” the applicant.114 In Grancy Property 
Ltd v Manala and Others115 the Supreme Court of Appeal commented that, following the 
approach adopted under section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, the terms “oppressive”, 
                                                 
[2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) para 23 where the respective courts stated that in interpreting s 163 of the Companies 
Act (71 of 2008) case law on s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 is instructive. For a detailed discussion on 
the meaning of these terms see Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 574(3)-574(12); MF 
Cassim “Shareholder Remedies and Minority Protection” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 769-
772; Sibanda “The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South African Company Law” 66-69 and MF Cassim 
The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 190-199. 
 
112 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer and Another [1958] 3 All ER 66 (HL) at 86; Aspek Pipe 
Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others 1968 (1) SA 517 (C) at 526; Donaldson Investments (Pty) 
Ltd and Others v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd: SA Mutual Life Assurance Society and Another Intervening 
1979 (3) SA 713 (W) at 722; Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 
146 (WCC) para 9; Grancy Property Ltd v Manala and Others 2015 (3) SA 313 (SCA) para 23; De Sousa and 
Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and Others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) para 40; 
Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) para 85. 
 
113 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 54. 
 
114 The terms “oppressive”, “unfairly prejudicial” and “unfairly disregards” may be construed as distinct 
alternatives in respect of the interests of the applicant, but may also be read as a compound expression directed at 
conduct that is unjustly detrimental to the interest of the applicant or conduct that is commercially unfair (MF 
Cassim The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 190-191). 
Australian law adopts the view that the words are to be viewed as a compound expression (see for instance Fexuto 
Pty Limited v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Limited Matter No 3799/97 [1998] NSWSC 413 (9 September 1998) where 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales stated that the different elements of the oppression remedy are to be 
looked at as a composite whole and that the individual elements in the section should be considered merely as 
different aspects of the essential criterion, which is commercial unfairness). For a discussion whether these words 
are to be read as a compound expression or as separate grounds under Australian law see Austin & Ramsay Ford, 
Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 10.450 at 746-747. Section 232 of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 states as follows: 
“The Court may make an order under section 233 if: 
(a) the conduct of a company’s affairs; or 
(b) an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company; or 
(c) a resolution, or proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of  a company;  
is either: 
(d) contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or 
(e) oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members 
whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.” 
Section 233 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 sets out the various orders a court may make if it finds 
that the affairs of the company have been conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or 
unfairly discriminatory against a shareholder. In Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) para 17.12 the High Court held that it was not necessary in the context of that 
case to decide whether the phrases in s 163(1) of the Companies Act must be read as a composite whole or not, 
but that the interests which are unfairly prejudiced must result in commercial unfairness affecting the applicant in 
such capacity. 
 
115 2015 (3) SA 313 (SCA) para 26. 
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“unfairly prejudicial” and “unfairly disregards” must be construed in a manner that will 
advance, rather than limit, the remedy.116  
 
The essential test of the oppression remedy is unfairness, not unlawfulness.117 In Off-beat 
Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Shareblock Ltd and Others118 the 
Constitutional Court stated as follows: 
 
 “Fairness is the criterion by which a court must decide whether it has jurisdiction to grant 
 relief. The test of fairness is an objective one.” 
 
Conduct may be unfair without necessarily being unlawful.119 Mere prejudice is not sufficient 
to succeed under section 163 of the Companies Act, but the conduct must be “unfairly” 
                                                 
116 In Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd: SA Mutual Life Assurance 
Society and Another Intervening 1979 (3) SA 713 (W) at 719 the High Court stated that in interpreting s 252 of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973, construction should be given to the words in the section that will advance the 
remedy rather than limit it, as was the case in matters dealt with under the previous s 111bis of the Companies Act 
46 of 1926. This was affirmed by the full court in Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others v Anglo-Transvaal 
Collieries Ltd and Others 1980 (4) SA 204 (T) at 209. See also Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern 
Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) para 60; Smyth and Others v Investec 
Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) para 49; Off-beat Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday 
Spa Shareblock Ltd and Others 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC) para 27 and Smyth and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 
[2018] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) para 20. In Harilal v Rajman and Others [2017] 2 All SA 188 (KZD) the court stated 
(para 86) that interpreting s 163 of the Companies Act in a way which advances the remedy rather than limits it, 
is consistent with the purposes of the Companies Act in s 7 of balancing the rights and obligations of shareholders 
and directors within the company, and encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies. In 
Peel and Others v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) para 52 the South 
Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg observed that a careful consideration of the interpretation given by our courts 
to the provisions of s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and the provisions of s 163 of the Companies Act 
shows a continuing intention by the legislature to broaden the relief in these provisions rather than to limit them. 
For a discussion of s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 see Kunst, Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 477-484(2); Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 313-319 and Blackman et al Commentary on the 
Companies Act 9-1–9-56.  
 
117 Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd: SA Mutual Life Assurance 
Society and Another Intervening 1979 (3) SA 713 (W) at 722; Re a Company (No 005134 of 1986), ex parte 
Harries [1989] BCLC 383 at 390; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 
179 (WCC) paras 57-59; De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and 
Others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) para 36; Off-beat Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Shareblock 
Ltd and Others 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC) para 28. “Unfairness” has been held to mean unreasonable (see Garden 
Province Investment and Others v Aleph (Pty) Limited and Others 1979 (2) SA 525 (D) at 531). 
 
118 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC) para 28. 
 
119 Re Ringtower Holdings plc (1989) 5 BCC 82 at 90; Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (CA) 
at 19 and 31. Conduct may be unfair without necessarily being unlawful where it does not violate any rights of the 
applicant, such as rights conferred by the Companies Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (see 
MF Cassim The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 191). In Re 
Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (CA) the UK Court of Appeal stated that conduct may be unfair 
without being unlawful in cases in which the letter of the articles of association does not fully reflect the 
understanding upon which the shareholders are associated (at 19). The court asserted that the personal relationship 
between a shareholder and those who control the company may entitle the shareholder to say that it would in 
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prejudicial, or must “unfairly” disregard the interests of the applicant.120 It must be conduct that 
departs from the accepted standards of fair play.121 “Fairness” depends on the context in which 
the word is being used.122 In Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others123 
the High Court remarked as follows, in the context of section 163 of the Companies Act: 
 
 “What is important to emphasise, however, is that it is not enough for an applicant to 
 show that the conduct of which he complains is ‘prejudicial’ to him or that it ‘disregards’ 
 his interests. The applicant must show that the prejudice or disregard has occurred 
 ‘unfairly’. ‘Oppression’ likewise connotes an element at least of unfairness if not 
 something worse.” 
 
Conduct may be oppressive even if it does not violate any rights of the applicant, such as rights 
conferred by the Companies Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.124 Under 
section 163(1) of the Companies Act, the oppression remedy may be relied on if the powers of 
a director unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant. The term “interests” is not defined 
in the Companies Act.  This term is wider than “rights”,125 and its inclusion in section 163 of 
the Companies Act highlights the principle that the oppression remedy is not limited to a strict 
infringement of legal rights but also extends to the protection of the interests of the applicant.126 
                                                 
certain circumstances be unfair for the board to exercise a power conferred on it by the articles of association (at 
19). 
 
120 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 55; Geffen and 
Others v Martin and Others [2018] 1 All SA 21 (WCC) paras 25 and 29. 
 
121 Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others 1968 (1) SA 517 (C) at 527-528; Donaldson 
Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd: SA Mutual Life Assurance Society and 
Another Intervening 1979 (3) SA 713 (W) at 722.  
 
122 De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and Others 2017 (5) SA 
577 (GJ) para 36.  
 
123 2015 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 55. 
 
124 MF Cassim “Shareholder Remedies and Minority Protection” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company 
Law 770. 
 
125 Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others [2012] 4 All 
SA 203 (GSJ) para 58; Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 
190 (GNP) paras 15 and 17.2; Grancy Property Ltd v Manala and Others 2015 (3) SA 313 (SCA) para 26; Smyth 
and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2016 (4) SA 363 (GP) para 45. For a discussion of the term “interests” 
see Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 574(12)-574(13); MF Cassim “Shareholder Remedies 
and Minority Protection” in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 770 and MF Cassim The New 
Derivative Action under the Companies Act: Guidelines for Judicial Discretion 192.  
 
126 Grancy Property Ltd v Manala and Others 2015 (3) SA 313 (SCA) para 26; Kershaw Company Law in Context 
682. 
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“Interests” may include wider equitable considerations, such as the petitioner’s legitimate 
expectations which go beyond his legal rights.127 In Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein 
Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others128 the High Court found that the concept of interests included 
interests not flowing from the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company but from an 
understanding or agreement between the parties.129 The court stated that the acts complained 
of consequently need not necessarily flow from the Companies Act or the Memorandum of 
Incorporation; they could arise from a breach of trust or some acrimony between the parties 
flowing from the fundamental understanding between them.130  
 
While it is not necessary for a director to prove that the board of directors acted with an 
underlying dishonest or ulterior motive in removing him from office in order to successfully 
rely on section 163 of the Companies Act, “in considering whether the conduct complained of 
reveals a lack of probity and fair dealing and is unfair, motive may not be without its 
relevance.”131 Thus the motive of the board of directors in removing a director from office may 
be of assistance to a court in deciding whether the act or the exercise of the power is oppressive, 
                                                 
127 Re Ringtower Holdings plc (1989) 5 BCC 82 at 90; Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (CA) 
at 31. Legitimate expectations emanate from a mutual understanding or agreement which form a basis on which 
the company’s affairs are conducted, even though they are not necessarily incorporated in the constitution of the 
company (Sibanda “The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South African Company Law” 73). In Re Saul 
D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (CA) at 19 Hoffmann LJ of the UK Court of Appeal explained that a 
“legitimate expectation” often arises out of a fundamental understanding between the shareholders which formed 
the basis of their association but was not put into contractual form, such as an assumption that each of the parties 
who had ventured his capital would also participate in the management of the company and receive the return on 
his investment in the form of a salary rather than a dividend. For a discussion of the concept of legitimate 
expectations in the context of the oppression remedy see Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 9-
30–9-34; Kershaw Company Law in Context 681-690; Sibanda “The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in 
South African Company Law” 73-74; Birds et al Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 687-689; Austin & Ramsay 
Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 10.450 at 749-750 and Davies & Worthington 
Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 665-670. 
 
128 [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) para 17.4. 
 
129 See further Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (CA) at 19. 
 
130 Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) para 
17.4. 
 
131 Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others 1968 (1) SA 517 (C) at 529. See further 
Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd: SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 
and Another Intervening 1979 (3) SA 713 (W) at 720-721; Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim and Others 2001 (3) SA 1074 
(C) at 1091 and Grancy Property Ltd v Manala and Others 2015 (3) SA 313 (SCA) para 27 where the respective 
courts stated that the motive of the conduct may be relevant in considering whether the conduct complained of 
constitutes oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. 
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unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the director’s interests in the context of section 163(1) 
of the Companies Act.  
  
It is well-established that the removal of a director in a small domestic company or a quasi-
partnership132 (where the shareholders are also directors) may amount to unfairly prejudicial 
conduct in the absence of a fair offer by the majority to purchase the director’s shares or some 
other fair arrangement. In O’Neill and Another v Phillips and Others133 Lord Hoffman of the 
House of Lords gave as a “standard case” of unjust, inequitable or unfair treatment in the 
context of section 459 of the UK Companies Act of 1985134 the example “in which shareholders 
have entered into association upon the understanding that each of them who has ventured his 
capital will also participate in the management of the company. In such a case it will usually 
be considered unjust, inequitable or unfair for a majority to use their voting power to exclude 
a member from participation in the management without giving him the opportunity to remove 
his capital upon reasonable terms.” In Barnard v Carl Greaves Brokers (Pty) Ltd and Others 
Two Other Cases135 Binns-Ward AJ in the High Court approved this example as being as being 
a standard case of unjust, inequitable or unfair treatment in the context of section 252 of the 
                                                 
132 Quasi-partnership is a legal concept that describes specific types of relationships in a company (Kershaw 
Company Law in Context 677). It usually involves a small private company which in effect runs as a partnership 
between the shareholders. The shareholders agree to go into a business venture together on the basis of an 
agreement or understanding that all the shareholders will participate in the management of the company’s business 
and that they will all be appointed as directors of the company. Voluntary exit of a quasi-partnership by a 
disgruntled minority shareholder is difficult due to the challenges associated with selling a minority stake in a 
private company, and due to the restricted transferability of the shares of a private company. It is not required that 
the company be run as if it were a partnership or that the shareholders regard themselves as being partners (see 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd and Others [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL) at 500; Barnard v Carl Greaves 
Brokers (Pty) Ltd and Others Two Other Cases 2008 (3) SA 663 (C) para 11; Croly v Good and Others [2010] 
EWHC 1 (Ch) paras 9 and 89-93; De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) 
Limited and Others 2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) para 47; Fitzpatrick “Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd” 60; Kershaw 
Company Law in Context 674-679; MF Cassim “Shareholder Remedies and Minority Protection” in FHI Cassim 
et al Contemporary Company Law 758 and French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 
71).  
 
133 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 para 6. See further Hannigan Company Law 503-504. For a discussion of O’Neill and 
Another v Phillips and Others [1999] 1 WLR 1092 see Neyers “Is there an Oppression Remedy Showstopper?: 
O’Neill v Phillips” 447-464. 
 
134 Section 459 of the UK Companies Act of 1985 provided as follows: 
 
“A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the 
ground that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or of some part of its members (including at 
least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or 
omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.” 
 
135 2008 (3) SA 663 (C) para 46. 
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Companies Act 61 of 1973. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Bayly and Others v Knowles136 
agreed with this sentiment.137  
 
Section 994(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 restricts the unfair prejudice remedy to 
shareholders of the company.138 Consequently in order to claim unfair prejudice a director who 
has been removed from office must be a shareholder of the company or must be a person to 
whom shares have been transferred or transmitted.139 In a quasi-partnership, the courts are more 
willing to find that a director removed from office and thus excluded from the management of 
the company, has been subjected to unfairly prejudicial treatment in his capacity as a 
shareholder.140 In many instances in a quasi-partnership a shareholder who has ventured his 
capital in the company’s business has a legitimate expectation that he will continue to be 
employed as a director, and his dismissal as a director and exclusion from the management of 
the company is accordingly regarded as being unfairly prejudicial to his interests as a 
                                                 
136 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA) para 23. 
 
137 See further De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and Others 
2017 (5) SA 577 (GJ) para 44 where the High Court, in dealing with an action brought at the instance of two 
minority shareholders for relief in terms of s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, affirmed that removing a 
minority shareholder from office in circumstances where he has a right or a legitimate expectation to participate 
in the management of the company without a reasonable offer or arrangement being made to enable him to dispose 
of his shares, constitutes unfair prejudice.  
 
138 Section 994(1) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 states as follows: 
 
 “A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the 
 ground –  
(a) that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members (including at 
least himself), 
(b) that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on 
its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.” 
 
139 See s 994(2) of the UK Companies Act of 2006, which provides that the unfair prejudice remedy applies to a 
person who is not a member of a company but to whom shares in the company have been transferred or transmitted 
by operation of law.  
 
140 See for instance Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 523 and Re London School of Electronics 
[1986] 1 Ch 211 where the respective courts held that the removal of directors from office had been unfairly 
prejudicial and had contravened s 75 of the UK Companies Act of 1980, which was the equivalent provision to 
s 994 of the UK Companies Act of 2006. Section 75 of the UK Companies Act of 1980 provided as follows: “Any 
member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this section on the ground that the 
affairs of the company are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests 
of some part of the member (including at least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the 
company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.” 
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shareholder.141 In Quinlan v Essex Hinge Co Ltd142 a director who had been excluded from 
participation in the management of a company by a domineering majority shareholder argued 
that his exclusion from the management of the company was unfairly prejudicial to his interests 
as a shareholder because the whole basis upon which he had acquired his interest in the 
company and had contributed his capital thereto was so that he could participate in effect as a 
partner in the business and affairs of the company. The Chancery Division found that the 
company had the characteristics of a quasi-partnership. It held that section 459 of the UK 
Companies Act of 1985 was applicable on the basis of the exclusion of the director from 
participation in the management of the company.143   
 
More recently, in In Re I Fit Global Ltd144 the petitioner and the respondent had agreed on the 
basis of a partnership understanding to establish a company with each holding an equal 
shareholding. The petitioner was dismissed as a director nineteen months after the company 
had been incorporated and was consequently excluded from the management of the company. 
The Chancery Division found that, given the basis on which the company had been established, 
the exclusion of the petitioner as a director of the company was clearly unfair and prejudicial 
to his interests as a shareholder under section 994 of the UK Companies Act of 2006.145  
 
The mere fact that the company is a quasi-partnership would not necessarily be sufficient to 
raise a legitimate expectation that each partner would take part in the management of the 
company.146 The legitimate expectation that each partner will take part in the management of 
                                                 
141 Re a Company (No 00477 of 1986) [1986] BCLC 376 at 379; O’Neill and Another v Phillips and Others [1999] 
1 WLR 1092 para 6; Croly v Good and Others [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch); In Re I Fit Global Ltd 2013 WL 3550422 
para 46. 
 
142 [1997] BCC 53. This case was decided in terms of s 459 of the UK Companies Act of 1985.   
 
143 Quinlan v Essex Hinge Co Ltd [1997] BCC 53 at 61. The court ordered the majority shareholder to purchase 
the director’s shares in the company. 
 
144 2013 WL 3550422. 
 
145 In Re I Fit Global Ltd 2013 WL 3550422 para 47.  
 
146 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd and Others [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL) at 500; Re Ringtower Holdings 
plc (1989) 5 BCC 82 at 93; Fexuto Pty Limited v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Limited Matter No 3799/97 [1998] NSWSC 
413 (9 September 1998); Dignam Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 448; Kershaw Company 
Law in Context 677; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 72. For a discussion of 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd and Others [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL) see Fitzpatrick “Re Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd” 60-62 and Farrar & Boulle “Minority Shareholder Remedies – Shifting Dispute Resolution 
Paradigms” 11-14. 
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the company is usually derived from the constitution of the company or from the agreements 
between the parties, but the relationship between the parties may also give rise to a legitimate 
expectation to participate in the company’s management.147 The legitimate expectation of 
participation, being the arrangement or understanding, must be proved as a fact.148 This makes 
it difficult to establish a legitimate expectation in larger companies which are not run as quasi-
partnerships.149 For example, in Re Blue Arrow plc150 the petitioner was the president of a public 
listed company. Under the constitution of the company the president was removable from office 
by an ordinary resolution passed at a shareholders’ meeting. The directors of the company 
convened a meeting to amend the articles of association of the company to make the president 
removable by the directors. The petitioner sought relief under section 459 of the UK Companies 
Act of 1985 to restrain the company from passing a special resolution amending the articles of 
association of the company. The Chancery Division held that the petitioner had a legitimate 
expectation that the affairs of the company would be properly conducted within the framework 
of its constitution, but not that the constitution would not be altered by a special resolution in a 
way which enabled her office to be terminated by some different machinery.151 The court held 
that while there are cases where a legitimate expectation might be inferred from arrangements 
outside the formal constitution of a company, in a large public listed company outside investors 
were entitled to assume that the whole of its constitution was contained in the articles of 
association, read with the relevant Companies Act.152 In dismissing the petitioner’s claim under 
section 459 of the UK Companies Act of 1985, the court held that the affairs of the company 
were not being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner and that there was 
                                                 
147 De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and Others 2017 (5) SA 
577 (GJ) para 47. See also Erasmus v Pentamed Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 178 (W) at 182 and Kershaw 
Company Law in Context 689. 
 
148 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 62. See further 
Re Ringtower Holdings plc (1989) 5 BCC 82 where the court held that the fact that a company is small or private 
is not enough to establish that the company is a quasi-partnership giving rise to legitimate expectations (at 93). 
The court stated further that mutual trust and confidence are not in themselves sufficient to make the shareholders’ 
association in substance a partnership with partner-like obligations owed by each shareholder to the others, in the 
absence of proof of a mutual understanding as to those obligations (at 93). 
 
149 Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (5) SA 179 (WCC) para 62; Dignam 
Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 448; French, Mayson & Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law 72 and 583. 
 
150 (1987) 3 BCC 618. 
151 Re Blue Arrow plc (1987) 3 BCC 618 at 623. 
 
152 Re Blue Arrow plc (1987) 3 BCC 618 at 623. 
 
507 
 
no room for any legitimate expectation founded on some agreement between the directors and 
not disclosed to investors.153 
 
A position similar to the one adopted in the UK has been adopted in Australia, under the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, where the exclusion of a director from management was 
held to be oppressive in circumstances where there was a legitimate expectation of participation 
in management.154 Like section 994 of the UK Companies Act of 2006, section 232 of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001155 confers locus standi on members156 to apply for relief 
but the provision does not extend to directors.157 However section 232(e) of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 provides relief where conduct is oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial 
to or unfairly discriminatory against “a member or members whether in that capacity or in any 
other capacity”.158 It follows that a member may seek relief for oppressive conduct that affects 
                                                 
153 Re Blue Arrow plc (1987) 3 BCC 618 at 623. See also Re Ringtower Holdings plc (1989) 5 BCC 82 where the 
petitioners argued that they had been wrongfully excluded from participation in the management of the company 
and that this had constituted unfairly prejudicial conduct in terms of s 459 of the UK Companies Act of 1985. The 
parties had regulated their relationship in the articles of association of the company but had in addition spelt out 
in detailed agreements all the matters which were to govern their relationship. The Chancery Division held that 
the petitioners’ claim that they had legitimate expectations which were not limited to their rights under the service 
agreements was not sustainable. The court emphasised that the fact that a company is small or private is not 
sufficient for it to be construed as a quasi-partnership in the absence of proof of a mutual understanding as to the 
partner-like obligations owed by each shareholder to the others (at 93). It held that the company in question was 
not a quasi-partnership giving rise to a legitimate expectation that the petitioners would continue to participate in 
management, and consequently dismissed the petitioners’ claim under s 459 of the UK Companies Act of 1985 
(at 94). The more detailed the agreements the more likely it is that the company is being operated on a purely 
commercial basis and that it is not a quasi-partnership (Hannigan Company Law 401). 
 
154 See for instance Hogg v Dymock (1993) 11 ACSR 14 and Yazbek v Aldora Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 
330. See further Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 10.460 at 
756-757 on the improper exclusion from participation in management constituting oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial conduct in Australian law. 
 
155 Section 232 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 states that a court may make an order under s 233 of 
the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 if the conduct of a company’s affairs, or an actual or proposed act or 
omission by or on behalf of a company, or a resolution or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members 
of a company, is either contrary to the interests of the members as a whole, or oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial 
to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity. 
 
156 See chapter 5, note 150 for the definition of a “member” under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
 
157 See s 234 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 which lists the persons who may apply for an order under 
ss 232 and 233 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.  
 
158 In accord with s 232(e) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, s 234(a)(i) of the Australian Corporations 
Act of 2001 confers locus standi on a member of the company, even if the application relates to an act or omission 
that is “against the member in a capacity other than as a member”. Section 234(e) confers locus standi on a person 
whom ASIC thinks is appropriate having regard to investigations it is conducting or has conducted into the 
company’s affairs or matters connected with the company’s affairs. Consequently the application may be brought 
by a member if it relates to an act or omission against the member in a capacity other than as a member, and, 
furthermore, ASIC may authorise someone else to bring an application for relief under s 232 of the Australian 
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him in his capacity as a director.159 This puts it beyond doubt that conduct which unfairly 
removes a member from a directorship could attract relief under section 232 of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 on the basis that it is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to a member 
in his capacity as a director.160  
 
A director of a quasi-partnership who has been unfairly removed from office as a director by 
the board of directors in terms of section 71(3) of the (South African) Companies Act has not 
one, but two, grounds on which he may rely on the oppression remedy of section 163 of the 
Companies Act. The first ground is that in his capacity as a shareholder of the quasi-partnership, 
he may contend that an act of the majority shareholders in removing him from office unfairly 
disregards his interests, or legitimate expectation as a shareholder to participate in the 
management of the company, and that neither a fair offer nor some other fair arrangement was 
made to purchase his shares. The second ground is that in his capacity as a director of the quasi-
partnership, he may contend that the powers of the board of directors in removing him from 
office have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that 
unfairly disregards, his interests.   
 
Unlike the position under section 994 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 and section 232 of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, a director instituting an action under section 163 of the 
(South African) Companies Act with regard to his removal from office need not prove that the 
company is a quasi-partnership nor that he had a legitimate expectation that he would not be 
removed from office. Section 163(1)(c) of the Companies Act confers locus standi on a director 
to base his remedy on oppression. A director may rely on section 163 of the Companies Act if 
                                                 
Corporations Act of 2001. See further Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations 
Law para 10.470 at 761-762 for a discussion of the other capacities which may be applicable in this context, such 
as a director, an employee or a creditor. 
 
159 Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law para 10.470 at 761-762.  
  
160 Section 14.30(2)(ii) of the MBCA empowers a shareholder to petition a court for the judicial dissolution of a 
company if it is established that the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted or are acting or will 
act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent. Locus standi has not been conferred by s 14.30 on a director 
to apply to court for relief or to dissolve the corporation if the directors have acted in a manner that is oppressive. 
Judicial dissolution may be an extreme remedy in the case of a director who has been improperly removed from 
office. Since s 163 of the (South African) Companies Act is modelled on and draws from s 994 of the UK 
Companies Act of 2006 and s 232 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 this chapter has focused on the 
application of the oppression remedy under these latter statutes and not the MBCA. For a discussion of the 
oppression remedy under s 14.30(2) of the MBCA and in various USA States see Art “Shareholder Rights and 
Remedies in Close Corporations: Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations” 371-418. 
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he is able to establish that he was removed from office by the board of directors in 
circumstances that were oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or that unfairly disregarded 
his interests. Since a director may be removed by the board of directors in terms of section 
71(3) of the Companies Act, he would have to prove that his removal from office was 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded his interests in order to successfully 
institute an action in terms of section 163 of the Companies Act. 
 
Section 163(2) of the Companies Act confers wide powers and a discretion on the court to make 
any interim or final order “it considers fit”.161 Section 163(2) lists certain orders that a court 
may make, but this list is not closed.162 In making an order under section 163 of the Companies 
Act a court must consider the whole range of possible remedies; it would not be limited to 
putting right the immediate conduct which justifies the order.163 A court must also look to put 
right and remedy for the future the unfair prejudice suffered by the petitioner and the likelihood 
of the conduct recurring.164  
                                                 
161 See Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) para 
25.1; Omar v Inhouse Technical Management (Pty) Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) para 50 and Off-beat 
Holiday Club and Another v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Shareblock Ltd and Others 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC) para 28 
where this is affirmed. In Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd 
and Others [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) para 61 the High Court remarked that the “powers of a court to grant 
appropriate relief in such circumstances are framed in the broadest of terms in section 163”. In De Klerk v Ferreira 
and Others 2017 (3) SA 502 (GP) para 16 the High Court commented that s 163 of the Companies Act confers on 
courts a wide discretion to compel a transfer of shares or interests in order to deal with prejudicial, oppressive, 
unjust and inequitable conduct by a company, director, shareholder or member. 
 
162 This is made clear by the use of the word “including” in s 163(2) of the Companies Act, which indicates that 
the court is not limited to the remedies listed in s 163(2) of the Companies Act. See Grancy Property Ltd v Manala 
and Others 2015 (3) SA 313 (SCA) para 31 where the Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed that the orders that a 
court may make under s 163(2) of the Companies Act are non-exhaustive and open-ended. The orders which are 
listed in s 163(2) of the Companies Act are as follows: (i) an order restraining the conduct complained of; (ii) an 
order appointing a liquidator, if the company appears to be insolvent; (iii) an order placing the company under 
supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings if the court is satisfied that the company is financially 
distressed and the other circumstances set out in s 131(4)(a) of the Companies Act apply; (iv) an order to regulate 
the company’s affairs by directing it to amend its Memorandum of Incorporation or to create or amend a 
unanimous shareholder agreement; (v) an order directing an issue or exchange of shares; (vi) an order appointing 
directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then in office, or declaring a director to be delinquent 
or placing a director under probation; (vii) an order directing the company or any other person to restore to a 
shareholder any part of the consideration that the shareholder paid for shares, or pay the equivalent value, with or 
without conditions; (viii) an order varying or setting aside a transaction or an agreement to which the company is 
a party and compensating the company or any other party to the transaction or agreement; (ix) an order requiring 
the company, within a time specified by the court, to produce to the court or an interested person financial 
statements in a form required by the Companies Act, or an accounting in any other form the court may determine; 
(x) an order to pay compensation to an aggrieved person, subject to any other law entitling that person to 
compensation; (xi) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of the company; and (xii) an 
order for the trial of any issue as determined by the court.  
 
163 See Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 523 at 529 and Hannigan Company Law at 408. 
 
164 See Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 523 at 529 and Hannigan Company Law at 408. 
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In terms of section 163(2)(a) of the Companies Act, one of the orders that a court may make is 
an order restraining the conduct which is the subject of the complaint. It is submitted that a 
director would probably not be able to obtain a court order to restrain the board of directors 
from passing a board resolution to remove him from office, even if the resolution would 
constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct or that unfairly disregards his interests. 
The director who is the subject of a board resolution to remove him from office must be given 
a reasonable opportunity, in terms of section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act, to make a 
presentation to the board of directors, in person or through a representative, before the 
resolution is put to a vote.165 In his presentation a director may well be able to persuade the 
board of directors to vote against his removal from office. Therefore a court order in terms of 
section 163(2)(a) of the Companies Act restraining the board of directors from voting on the 
proposed resolution, would be inappropriate and premature.166 In terms of section 163(1)(a) of 
the Companies Act the act or omission of the company must have “had a result” that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant. As 
the court in Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others167 
emphasised, the phrase “has had a result” in section 163(1)(a) of the Companies Act indicates 
that the act must be completed and that it is the result, and not the act, that must be oppressive 
                                                 
165 The presentation which a director may make to the board of directors is discussed in chapter 3, para 8.4. 
 
166 It is of interest that a director cannot prevent the shareholders from passing a resolution to remove him from 
office since the shareholders have a legal right to remove him under s 71(1) of the Companies Act and may exercise 
their vote as they please (see chapter 4, para 2 where this is discussed). For example, in Desai and Others v 
Greyridge Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 509 (A) two directors applied for an interim interdict to restrain the 
shareholders from removing them from office pending the final determination of an action they intended instituting 
for a declaration of rights. The shareholders had lost confidence in the directors because they had breached their 
fiduciary duties as directors in connection with a certain property transaction. The then Appellate Division refused 
to grant the interim interdict requested by the directors. Likewise, in Bentley-Stevens v Jones [1974] 2 All ER 653 
two directors wished to remove a third director from office. They sent a letter to him notifying him of a board 
meeting of the company to be held the next day at which it was to be resolved that the company should convene 
an extraordinary general meeting for the purpose of removing the director from office. The director did not receive 
the letter until the company had requisitioned the extraordinary general meeting to remove him from office. The 
director who had convened the extraordinary general meeting of the company purported to be acting by order of 
the board thereof whereas in fact no board meeting had been held. At the extraordinary general meeting the votes 
were cast in favour of removing the director from office. The removed director applied for an interlocutory 
injunction restraining the directors from acting on the resolution to remove him from office. The Chancery 
Division declined to grant the interlocutory injunction. It held that even if the director’s complaint of irregularities 
was correct, the irregularities could be cured by going through the proper processes and the ultimate result would 
inevitably be the same (Bentley-Stevens v Jones [1974] 2 All ER 653 at 655. See also James North (Zimbabwe) 
Pvt Ltd v Mattinson 1990 (2) SA 228 (ZHC) at 235 where the court agreed with the approach adopted in Bentley-
Stevens v Jones [1974] 2 All ER 653). 
 
167 [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) para 17.6.  
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or unfairly prejudicial. This was further affirmed in Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v 
Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd and Others168 where the High Court found that 
the act under section 163 of the Companies Act must be something which had already been 
done or performed at the time of the application, and not an act which may or will occur only 
in the future.169 This buttresses the argument that a director would have to apply for relief under 
section 163 of the Companies Act only when the board of directors has removed him from 
office in a manner that was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregarded his 
interests.  
 
Section 163(1) of the Companies Act confers locus standi on a “director” to apply to court for 
relief, and not on a “former director”.  As discussed above, a director may apply for relief under 
section 163 of the Companies Act only when the board of directors has removed him from 
office in a manner that was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregarded his 
                                                 
168 [2012] 4 All SA 203 (GSJ) para 52. The company in this case was a joint venture company constituted for the 
purpose of exploiting prospecting rights. As a result of infighting in the company, the applicant, a forty nine per 
cent shareholder in the company, sought an order to amend the shareholders’ agreement between itself and the 
second respondent, a fifty one per cent shareholder. The order sought by the applicant was the removal of the 
directors of the second respondent from the board of directors so as to retain only one of the current directors of 
the second respondent on the board. In support of the order sought by it the applicant alleged that the infighting 
harmed the company’s ability to conduct the affairs for which it was constituted, and thereby prejudiced the 
commercial rationale behind its existence. The result relied on by the applicant was the uncertainty as to the 
identity of the directors of the second respondent. The court held that the result requirement had been satisfied in 
that there was doubt as to which directors would be authorised to sit on the board of the company, and that no 
meeting could be held or resolution passed in the complete confidence that such meeting or resolution would be 
secure from challenge (para 57). The lack of confidence and uncertainty in this regard was held by the court to be 
the “result” (para 57). 
 
169 See also Porteus v Kelly and Others 1975 (1) SA 219 (W) where the court held that the mere calling of a 
meeting to pass a resolution to amend the articles of association of a private company was not unfairly prejudicial 
in itself (in the context of s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973) on the basis that it related to threatened conduct. 
The court remarked that s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 did not empower a court to interfere to prevent 
the resolution being passed, but the provision only related to something which had been done or performed (at 
222).  It was argued in this case by counsel for the applicant that if a court could interfere after a resolution has 
been passed there is no reason in principle why it could not interfere to prevent the resolution from being passed. 
The court conceded that while it may well be that prevention of an act would be better than curing it after it has 
been committed, the section does not provide therefor, and that this may be a casus omissus (at 222). See further 
Investors Mutual Funds Ltd and Another v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd and Others 1979 (3) SA 170 (W) at 177 
where the High Court agreed with this dictum in Porteus v Kelly and Others 1975 (1) SA 219 (W) and affirmed 
that s 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 did not empower a court to interfere to prevent the passing of a 
proposed resolution, and that the section related to something which had already been done or performed and not 
to something which was to be done in the future. In contrast, s 994(1)(b) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 refers 
to an “actual or proposed” act or omission of the company that “is or would be so prejudicial”. Under this approach 
it would not be necessary for the harm to be inflicted. It is also of interest that s 232(c) of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 (the equivalent provision to s 163 of the (South African) Companies Act) refers to a 
“resolution, or a proposed resolution” being oppressive or unfairly prejudicial. See further Sibanda “The Statutory 
Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South African Company Law” 75-76 for a discussion of the non-applicability of 
s 163 of the Companies Act to threatened conduct or anticipated oppression. 
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interests, and not when such removal is anticipated. This raises the question whether a director 
who has been removed from office by the board of directors or by the Companies Tribunal in 
a manner that was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregarded his interests, and 
is no longer a “director” of the company, would have locus standi to institute an application for 
relief under section 163 of the Companies Act, or whether he would lack standing to do so. 
 
It is noteworthy that section 234 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, which sets out the 
list of persons who have locus standi to apply to court for relief from oppressive conduct under 
section 233 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001,170 explicitly makes provision for 
former members to apply to court for relief from oppressive conduct, in two instances. The first 
instance is where a person has been removed from the register of members because of a 
selective reduction of capital,171 and the second instance is where a person has ceased to be a 
member of the company and the application relates to the circumstances in which such person 
ceased to be a member.172 In a similar vein, it is submitted that, in the interests of fairness, 
clarity and certainty, section 163 of the (South African) Companies Act should be amended to 
state that the provision may be relied on by a person who has been removed from office by the 
board of directors (in terms of section 71(3) of the Companies Act) or the Companies Tribunal 
(in terms of section 71(8) of the Companies Act) if the application relates to the circumstances 
in which he was removed from office. Such an amendment would make it clear that former 
directors, who have been removed from office by the board of directors or the Companies 
Tribunal in a manner that was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregarded their 
                                                 
170 Section 233 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 lists examples of the orders a court may make if it finds 
that s 232 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 is breached. The list of orders in s 233 of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001 is not a closed list (see further Austin & Ramsay Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles 
of Corporations Law para 10.490 at 762-766 on the forms of relief that a court may grant under s 233 of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001).  
  
171 Section 234(b) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. The rules to be followed by a company for 
reductions in share capital and for share buy-backs are set out in Chapter 2J (Transactions Affecting Share Capital) 
of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. These rules are designed to protect the interests of members and 
creditors by, inter alia, seeking to ensure fairness between the company’s members (s 256A(b) of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001). A reduction is either an equal reduction or a selective reduction (s 256B(2) of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001). A reduction is an equal one if it relates only to ordinary shares, it applies 
to each holder of ordinary shares in proportion to the number of ordinary shares they hold, and the terms of the 
reduction are the same for each holder of ordinary shares (s 256B(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001).  
In all other instances, the share reduction is regarded as a selective reduction (s 256(B(2) of the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001). 
 
172 Section 234(e) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. 
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interests, would be entitled to apply to court for relief under section 163 of the Companies 
Act.173  
 
A court may under section 163(2)(f)(ii) of the Companies Act declare any person involved in 
the decision to remove a director in the manner prescribed delinquent or under probation, as 
contemplated in section 162 of the Companies Act. The placing of a director under probation 
in terms of section 163(2)(f)(ii) of the Companies Act is reinforced by section 162(7)(a)(iii) of 
the Companies Act. The latter provision states that a court may place a person under probation 
if while serving as a director the person acted in or supported a decision of the company to act 
in a manner contemplated in section 163(1) of the Companies Act. A court may place a person 
under probation under this ground only if it is satisfied that the declaration is justified having 
regard to the circumstances of the company’s conduct, if applicable, and the person’s conduct 
in relation to the management, business or property of the company at the time.174 In other 
words, the company’s conduct and the conduct of the particular oppressor are examined by a 
court in exercising its discretion175 under section 162(7)(a)(iii) whether to place a director under 
probation. Any person with locus standi may raise the ground of acting in an oppressive manner 
as a basis to apply to court to place a director under probation.176  
 
In contrast, section 162(5) of the Companies Act, which sets out the grounds under which a 
director may be declared delinquent, does not list as a ground a director acting in an oppressive 
manner as contemplated in section 163(1) of the Companies Act. It appears from section 
163(2)(f)(ii) that acting in an oppressive manner as contemplated in section 163(1) is an 
additional ground under which a director may be declared delinquent. However, this ground of 
delinquency may not be relied upon by the persons with locus standi under section 162 of the 
Companies Act since the ground is not listed in section 162(5). It may only be relied upon by 
a court in making an order under section 163(2) of the Companies Act when a director has been 
                                                 
173 A discussion whether or not s 163 of the Companies Act should apply to former shareholders (as is the case 
under s 234(b) and s 234(c) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001) or to directors who have been removed 
from office by the shareholders under s 71(1) of the Companies Act, is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
174 Section 162(8)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
175 Section 162(7) of the Companies Act gives a court a discretion whether or not to place a person under probation, 
as discussed in chapter 6, para 3.9. 
 
176 See chapter 6 para 3.3 for a discussion of the persons with locus standi to apply to court to place a director 
under probation and chapter 3, para 3.5.3 where s 162(7)(a)(iii) is discussed. 
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found to have acted in an oppressive manner. It is submitted that this is a proper approach. A 
court does not have a discretion whether or not to declare a director delinquent if any of the 
grounds set out in section 162(5) are established.177 If this ground were to be listed in section 
162(5) a court would be obliged to declare a director who had acted in an oppressive manner 
delinquent. Such an order could, in certain circumstances, be too harsh. Under the current 
regulation a court has a discretion, under section 163(2)(f)(ii), whether or not to declare a 
director delinquent if he had acted in an oppressive manner. 
 
Under section 163(2)(j) of the Companies Act a court may also order compensation to be paid 
to an aggrieved person, subject to any other law entitling that person to compensation. It is 
submitted that a court may even, if it considers it fit, make an order reinstating a director to the 
board of directors if it finds that the removal of a director by the board of directors was 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded his interests.178 A director who applies 
for relief in terms of section 163 of the Companies Act should indicate the nature of the relief 
that he seeks.179 Nevertheless, even if he does not do so, or does not include a particular remedy, 
section 163(2) empowers a court to make “any interim or final order it considers fit”.  
 
5.  DEFAMATION  
 
Even if a court were to find that a director’s removal from the board of directors was invalid, 
this may not entirely alleviate the humiliation a director may have suffered on his purported 
removal from office by his fellow board members. This is particularly so in the case of an unfair 
removal of a director of a listed company, where much publicity may have been given to the 
director’s removal director from office. A director who has unlawfully suffered reputational 
damage in the course of being removed from office may have a right to institute an action in 
delict for defamation against the director or directors responsible for the defamation. A 
defamation action would not arise in every instance when a director is removed from office. It 
                                                 
177 See s 162(5) of the Companies Act which obliges a court to declare a person a delinquent director if any of the 
grounds set out in that section are established. The absence of a discretion in s 162(5) of the Companies Act is 
discussed in chapter 6, para 3.9. 
 
178 For a discussion on the reinstatement of a director who has been removed from office in breach of the fiduciary 
duties of the board of directors, see chapter 4, para 4.1, and see chapter 5, para 2.2 on the reinstatement of an 
executive director. 
 
179 Lourenco and Others v Ferela (Pty) Ltd and Others (No 1) 1998 (3) SA 281 (T) at 295; Louw and Others v Nel 
2011 (2) SA 172 (SCA) para 23. 
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may arise in addition to the other remedies which a director may have for removal from office 
by the board of directors, in circumstances where the director has unlawfully or wrongfully 
suffered reputational harm in the course of his removal from office.  
 
Defamation law seeks to protect the legitimate interest that individuals have in their 
reputation.180 Defamation claims often attract constitutional law issues because they require a 
balance to be struck between the entrenched right of an individual to reputation, privacy and 
dignity on the one hand and the entrenched right to freedom of expression on the other.181 The 
right to dignity is enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution,182 while section 16 protects the 
right to freedom of expression.183 Section 14 of the Constitution protects the right to privacy,184 
but there is no explicit provision in the Constitution protecting one’s right to a reputation. In 
National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi185 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the right 
to reputation is encapsulated in the constitutional right to dignity. This was followed by the 
Constitutional Court in Khumalo v Holomisa186 where the court stated that “human dignity in 
our Constitution . . . values both the personal sense of self-worth as well as the public’s 
estimation of the worth or value of an individual.” Human dignity accordingly includes the 
                                                 
180 Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 28. South African common law draws a distinction 
between three categories of legal interest, being corpus, fama and dignitas. Corpus protects against infringements 
to the bodily integrity of a person, fama is the right to reputation protected by the law of defamation and dignitas 
is an umbrella concept which embraces personality rights such as the right to dignity, the right to identity, the right 
to feelings and the right to privacy. Fama is protected in South African law as an independent personality interest 
(see Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 129; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of 
Delict 111-122 and Milo Defamation and Freedom of Speech 25-26). 
 
181 Botha and Others v Mthiyane and Another 2002 (1) SA 289 (W) para 58; Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom 
of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 171; Waldis 
and Another v Von Ulmenstein 2017 (4) SA 503 (WCC) para 22. 
 
182 Section 10 of the Constitution states that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have his dignity 
respected and protected. 
 
183 In terms of s 16 of the Constitution, everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom 
of the press and other media, freedom to receive or impart information or ideas, freedom of artistic creativity and 
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. This right does not extend to propaganda for war, incitement 
of imminent violence or advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion and that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm. 
 
184 Section 14 of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have 
their person or home searched, their property searched, their possessions seized or the privacy of their 
communications infringed.  
 
185 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1216.   
 
186 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 27. 
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intrinsic worth of human beings shared by all people as well as the reputation of each person 
built upon his own individual achievements.187  
 
Defamation is the wrongful, intentional publication of words or behaviour concerning another 
which has the effect of injuring his status, good name or reputation.188 The requirements for an 
action based on defamation are the wrongful and intentional publication of a defamatory 
statement concerning the plaintiff.189 The wrongfulness element lies in the infringement of the 
right to fama or a good name.190 The plaintiff in a defamation action must prove that there was 
(i) publication (ii) of a defamatory statement (iii) referring to him.191 Proof of the publication 
of defamatory matter referring to the plaintiff gives rise to the presumptions of wrongfulness 
and animus injuriandi (intention on the part of the defendant to impair the plaintiff’s reputation, 
with knowledge of wrongfulness).192 
 
                                                 
187 Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 27. 
 
188 Tap Wine Trading CC v Cape Classic Wines (Western Cape) CC and Another [1998] 4 All SA 86 (C) at 107; 
Waldis and Another v Von Ulmenstein 2017 (4) SA 503 (WCC) para 19; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s 
Law of Personality 131. 
 
189 Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 17; Botha and Others v Mthiyane and Another 
2002 (1) SA 289 (W) para 47; Waldis and Another v Von Ulmenstein 2017 (4) SA 503 (WCC) para 19; Neethling, 
Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 131. A detailed discussion of the defamation action is beyond 
the scope of this study. See generally Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa 59-145; Burchell 
Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum 179-204; Neethling, Potgieter & 
Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 131-171; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict 117-122; Du Bois 
et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 147-155 and 1165-1197 and Midgley & Bester “Delict” in LAWSA 
paras 105-133. 
 
190 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 135. 
 
191 A Neumann CC v Beauty Without Cruelty International 1986 (4) SA 675 (C) at 680-681; Sauls and Others v 
Hendrikse 1992 (3) SA 912 (A) at 918; Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 
(A) at 20; Sokhulu v New Africa Publications Ltd and Others 2001 (4) SA 1357 (W) para 4; Khumalo and Others 
v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 18; Botha and Others v Mthiyane and Another 2002 (1) SA 289 (W) para 
48; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian and Another 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 25; Independent 
Newspapers Holdings Ltd and Others v Suliman 2004 3 All SA 137 (SCA) para 19; National Education, Health 
& Allied Workers Union and Another v Tsatsi [2006] 1 All SA 583 (SCA) para 8; Aymac CC and Another v 
Widgerow 2009 (6) SA 433 (W) para 20; Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and 
Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 84; Afriforum and Another v Pienaar 
2017 (1) SA 388 (WCC) para 12. See Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa 59-145; Burchell 
Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum 179-204; Neethling, Potgieter & 
Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 131-171; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict 117-123; Du Bois 
et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1167-1176 and Midgley & Bester “Delict” in LAWSA para 105 where 
these requirements are discussed in detail. 
192 Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum 179. These 
presumptions are discussed further below. 
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Defamation may occur only if the defamatory statement is made known to a third party because 
without such publication the esteem which others hold for that person cannot be diminished.193 
The publication may be written or verbal, and it may be to a particular person or persons or 
generally to the public at large.194 A distinction is drawn between “particular publication” to 
named and known individuals and “publication to the public at large”.195 In Rivett-Carnac v 
Wiggins196 the court explained that particular publication is publication to one or more named 
or known or specific persons, while publication at large is publication to the public at large or 
a class or number of unknown or undesignated persons. A plaintiff in a defamatory action may 
rely on either particular publication or publication to the public at large.197 The publication 
requirement would be met even if the defamatory statement were published to only one 
person.198 In the case of particular publication, the names of all the persons to whom the 
publication was made must be provided in a defamation action, but this is not essential with 
regard to publication to the public at large.199  
 
The defamatory material must refer to the plaintiff, whether expressly or by implication.200 It 
must be such that it lowers the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking or right-minded 
                                                 
193 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 131. The element of publication distinguishes 
the action for defamation from the action for impairment of dignity (the inherent self esteem of all human beings). 
Publication to a person other than the plaintiff is not required for an action for the impairment of dignity (Burchell 
Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum 181). 
 
194 Vermaak v Van Der Merwe 1981 (3) SA 78 (N) at 80; Botha and Others v Mthiyane and Another 2002 (1) SA 
289 (W) para 48; Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as 
Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 86; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict 117; Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1168. 
 
195 Rivett-Carnac v Wiggins 1997 (3) SA 80 (C) at 88; Botha and Others v Mthiyane and Another 2002 (1) SA 
289 (W) para 48; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict 117; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 1169. 
 
196 1997 (3) SA 80 (C) at 88. In drawing the distinction between particular publication and publication at large the 
court relied on the dictum in (1) African Life Assurance Society Ltd, (2) African Guarantee and Indemnity Co Ltd, 
(3) African Consolidated Investment Corporation Ltd v Robinson & Co Ltd and Central News Agency Ltd 1938 
NPD 277 at 296-297. In this latter case the court stated that general publication would include publication in 
newspapers and books or orally to a public meeting or audience, while particular publication would include 
communications in a letter or in private conversation (at 297). 
 
197 Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa 67. 
 
198 Vermaak v Van der Merwe 1981 (3) SA 78 (N) at 83; Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression 
Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 86.  
 
199 Rivett-Carnac v Wiggins 1997 (3) SA 80 (C) at 88; Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa 70-71. 
 
200 A Neumann CC v Beauty Without Cruelty International 1986 (4) SA 675 (C) at 680-681; Sauls and Others v 
Hendrikse 1992 (3) SA 912 (A) at 918; Aymac CC and Another v Widgerow 2009 (6) SA 433 (W) para 20. 
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persons of society generally.201 “Right-thinking” is generally equated with meaning a person 
of reasonable, ordinary or average understanding and development.202 The test therefore for 
determining whether material is defamatory is whether a reasonable person of ordinary 
intelligence might reasonably understand the words published to convey a meaning that is 
defamatory to the plaintiff.203 The test is objective.204 The determination of whether a 
publication is defamatory involves a two-stage enquiry. The first is to establish the natural or 
ordinary meaning of the words and the second is to determine whether that meaning is 
defamatory.205 A defamatory statement is one which injures the reputation of another with 
                                                 
201 Esselen v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd and Others 1992 (3) SA 764 (T) at 767; Mohamed and Another 
v Jassiem 1996 (1) SA 673 (A) at 702-703; Sokhulu v New Africa Publications Ltd and Others 2001 (4) SA 1357 
(W) para 5; Independent Newspapers Holdings Ltd and Others v Suliman 2004 3 All SA 137 (SCA) para 29; 
National Education, Health & Allied Workers Union and Another v Tsatsi [2006] 1 All SA 583 (SCA) para 8; 
Raliphaswa v Mugivhi and Others 2008 (4) SA 154 (SCA) para 16; Council for Medical Schemes v Selfmed 
(561/2010) [2011] ZASCA 207 (25 November 2011) para 63; Ketler Investments CC t/a Ketler Presentations v 
Internet Service Providers’ Association 2014 (2) SA 569 (GJ) para 48; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of 
Delict 118; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1171; Midgley & Bester “Delict” in LAWSA 
para 106. In Sokhulu v New Africa Publications Ltd and Others 2001 (4) SA 1357 (W) para 7 and Afriforum and 
Another v Pienaar 2017 (1) SA 388 (WCC) para 60 the respective courts stated that it must be accepted that all 
right-thinking or reasonable members of society subscribe to the norms and values of the Constitution.  
 
202 Mohamed and Another v Jassiem 1996 (1) SA 673 (A) at 706; Kyriacou v Minister of Safety and Security and 
Another 1999 (3) SA 278 (O) at 287; Sindani v Van der Merwe and Others 2002 (2) SA 32 (SCA) para 11; Le 
Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 2011 
(3) SA 274 (CC) para 168. See Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 135-140 for a detailed 
discussion on the reasonable person of ordinary intelligence and development in this context. 
 
203 Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) at 20; Sokhulu v New Africa 
Publications Ltd and Others 2001 (4) SA 1357 (W) para 4; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian and Another 
2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 25; Independent Newspapers Holdings Ltd and Others v Suliman 2004 3 All SA 137 
(SCA) para 19; National Education, Health & Allied Workers Union and Another v Tsatsi [2006] 1 All SA 583 
(SCA) para 8; Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as 
Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 89; Waldis and Another v Von Ulmenstein 2017 (4) SA 503 (WCC) 
para 22; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1171-1172. 
  
204 A Neumann CC v Beauty Without Cruelty International 1986 (4) SA 675 (C) at 680; Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) at 20; Sindani v Van der Merwe and Others 2002 (2) SA 
32 (SCA) para 11; National Education, Health & Allied Workers Union and Another v Tsatsi [2006] 1 All SA 583 
(SCA) para 8; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian and Another 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 25; Le Roux 
and Others v Dey 2010 (4) SA 210 (SCA) para 6; Modiri v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2011 (6) 
SA 370 (SCA) para 13; Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre 
as Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) paras 39 and 89. The reasonable person of ordinary intelligence is regarded 
as understanding the words alleged to be defamatory, “in their natural and ordinary meaning” (Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) at 20; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian and 
Another 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 25). In determining the natural and ordinary meaning of words a court must 
take account not only of what the words expressly say but also of what they imply (Argus Printing and Publishing 
Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) at 20; Sindani v Van der Merwe and Others 2002 (2) SA 32 (SCA) 
para 11; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian and Another 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 25). 
 
205 Sindani v Van der Merwe and Others 2002 (2) SA 32 (SCA) para 10; Le Roux and Others v Dey 2010 (4) SA 
210 (SCA) para 5; Council for Medical Schemes v Selfmed (561/2010) [2011] ZASCA 207 (25 November 2011) 
paras 57-58; Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici 
Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) paras 38 and 89. 
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reference to moral character, professional or business reputation, or which exposes him to 
enmity, ridicule or contempt.206 In Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute 
and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae)207 the Constitutional Court gave the following 
examples of statements that are defamatory:  
 
 “Examples of defamatory statements that normally spring to mind are those attributing to 
 the plaintiff that he or she has been guilty of dishonest, immoral or otherwise 
 dishonourable conduct. But defamation is not limited to statements of this kind. It also 
 includes statements which are likely to humiliate or belittle the plaintiff; which tend to 
 make him or her look foolish, ridiculous or absurd; and which expose the plaintiff to 
 contempt or ridicule that renders the plaintiff less worthy of respect by his or her peers.”  
 
Once the publication of defamatory material has been proved, the presumptions arise that the 
publication of the defamatory material was wrongful and that it was intentional.208 The onus is 
then on the defendant to rebut these presumptions by proving a defence which excludes either 
wrongfulness or intent, such as fair comment, privileged occasion, reasonable publication, or 
                                                 
206 A Neumann CC v Beauty Without Cruelty International 1986 (4) SA 675 (C) at 686; Botha and Others v 
Mthiyane and Another 2002 (1) SA 289 (W) para 49; Ketler Investments CC t/a Ketler Presentations v Internet 
Service Providers’ Association 2014 (2) SA 569 (GJ) para 49; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict 118-
119; Midgley & Bester “Delict” in LAWSA para 106. 
 
207 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 91. 
 
208 See National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1202; Khumalo and Others v 
Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 18; Botha and Others v Mthiyane and Another 2002 (1) SA 289 (W) paras 
51 and 171; Modiri v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2011 (6) SA 370 (SCA) para 12; Le Roux and 
Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 
(CC) para 85; Waldis and Another v Von Ulmenstein 2017 (4) SA 503 (WCC) para 20; Burchell Personality Rights 
and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum 207-230; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s 
Law of Personality 135-140; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1176-1177 and Midgley & 
Bester “Delict” in LAWSA para 111 where these presumptions  are discussed in detail. The presumption of 
intention relates to the defendant’s subjective state of mind, that is, the deliberate intention to inflict injury is 
presumed, while the presumption of wrongfulness relates to objective matters of law and fact (National Media Ltd 
and Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1202; Botha and Others v Mthiyane and Another 2002 (1) SA 
289 (W) para 51; Modiri v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2011 (6) SA 370 (SCA) para 12). 
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truth and for the public benefit (or public interest).209 The onus on the defendant to rebut either 
of these presumptions must be discharged on a balance of probabilities.210  
 
With regard to the defence of truth and for the public benefit or public interest (which defence 
rebuts the presumption of wrongfulness) the defendant need not prove that the defamatory 
statement was true in every detail. He merely needs to prove that the gist or the sting of the 
statement was true.211 Even if the defendant is able to prove that the defamatory statement is 
true, this would not be sufficient to succeed in this defence.212 The defendant must also prove 
that the statement was made for the public benefit or public interest.  The public benefit must 
be determined having regard to questions of legal or public policy.213  Whether or not a 
                                                 
209 Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 18; Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of 
Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 85. These 
defences are not all-encompassing. Publication of defamatory material which amounts to fair comment or a fair 
expression of opinion based upon true facts and which is shown to be in the public interest is justified, and is 
therefore lawful. In respect of the defence of privileged occasion, the publication of defamatory material in 
privileged circumstances is also justified and therefore lawful. A privileged occasion includes one where material 
is published while exercising a right, in discharging a duty or in furthering a legitimate interest; in judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceedings, and where material is published in reports on court proceedings, proceedings of 
Parliament and proceedings of public bodies. With regard to the defence of reasonable publication, publication of 
false defamatory statements will not be regarded as unlawful if, upon a consideration of all the circumstances of 
the case, it is found to have been reasonable to publish the particular facts in the particular way and at the particular 
time. Publication of defamatory material which is true and for the public benefit or public interest is justified and 
therefore lawful. A detailed discussion of the defences to a defamation claim is beyond the scope of this study. 
For a general discussion of these defences and their specific requirements see Argus Printing and Publishing Co 
Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) at 588-590; National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi 1998 
(4) SA 1196 (SCA); Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) paras 18-20; Lady Agasim-Pereira 
v Johnnic Publishing Eastern Cape (Pty) Ltd and Others [2003] 2 All SA 416 (SE); Allie v Foodworld Stores 
Distribution Centre (Pty) Ltd and Others 2004 (2) SA 433 (SCA) paras 55-56; Independent Newspapers Holdings 
Ltd and Others v Suliman 2004 3 All SA 137 (SCA) paras 34-51; Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa 
203-286; Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum 207-300; 
Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 143-161; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of 
Delict 147-155; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1177-1190; Milo Defamation and Freedom 
of Speech 68-75 and Midgley & Bester “Delict” in LAWSA paras 110-133. 
 
210 Mohamed and Another v Jassiem 1996 (1) SA 673 (A) at 709; National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi 1998 
(4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1202; Modiri v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2011 (6) SA 370 (SCA) para 10; 
Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 2011 
(3) SA 274 (CC) para 85. 
 
211 Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) at 589; Modiri v Minister 
of Safety and Security and Others 2011 (6) SA 370 (SCA) para 13; Waldis and Another v Von Ulmenstein 2017 
(4) SA 503 (WCC) para 41. See Independent Newspapers Holdings Ltd and Others v Suliman 2004 3 All SA 137 
(SCA) paras 34-51 for a further discussion of this defence.  
 
212 In Modiri v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2011 (6) SA 370 (SCA) para 22 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal pointed out that our law does not regard the publication of a defamatory statement as justified merely 
because it is true since a court may find that in the particular circumstances of the case, freedom of expression was 
outweighed by the victim’s right to privacy or dignity. 
 
213 Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) at 589. 
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statement is published for the public benefit would depend on the time, manner and the occasion 
of the publication.214  When deciding what is in the public interest it is important that a clear 
distinction be drawn between what is in the public interest to be made known and what is merely 
interesting to the public.215 Publication of true statements about public officials and figures is 
generally regarded as being for the public benefit.216 But it is not for the public benefit to 
publish matters which are highly personal and private.217 The ultimate question is whether or 
not the disclosure of the material was reasonable in the circumstances.218 The test for public 
benefit or interest is objective.219    
 
If all the defences fail, a court would find that defamation has been proved and probably award 
damages to the plaintiff (also referred to as sentimental damages).220 Damages for defamation 
should compensate the plaintiff for both wounded feelings and for loss of reputation.221 The 
measure of damages is in the discretion of the court.222 In calculating the amount of damages 
to be awarded a court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case.223 The damages 
awarded by courts are generally not generous because an action for defamation is seen as a 
                                                 
214 Kemp and Another v Republican Press (Pty) Ltd 1994 (4) SA 261 (E) at 266; Allie v Foodworld Stores 
Distribution Centre (Pty) Ltd and Others 2004 (2) SA 433 (SCA) paras 55-56. 
 
215 National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1212; Lady Agasim-Pereira v Johnnic 
Publishing Eastern Cape (Pty) Ltd and Others [2003] 2 All SA 416 (SE) at 425; Independent Newspapers 
Holdings Ltd and Others v Suliman 2004 3 All SA 137 (SCA) para 42; Waldis and Another v Von Ulmenstein 
2017 (4) SA 503 (WCC) para 23. 
 
216 Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) at 589; Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1178. 
 
217 National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1210; Lady Agasim-Pereira v Johnnic 
Publishing Eastern Cape (Pty) Ltd and Others [2003] 2 All SA 416 (SE) at 425. 
 
218 Midgley & Bester “Delict” in LAWSA para 126.  
219 Independent Newspapers Holdings Ltd and Others v Suliman 2004 3 All SA 137 (SCA) para 49. 
 
220 Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) at 590; Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1190. 
 
221 Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 
2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 151l; Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio 
Injuriarum 435. 
 
222 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1191. 
 
223 Muller v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd and Others 1972 (2) SA 589 (C) at 595. 
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method whereby a plaintiff vindicates his reputation and “not as a road to riches”.224 Factors 
that a court may take into account in determining the amount of damages are the gravity of the 
allegation, the nature of the words used, the extent of the publication, its effect, the character 
and status of the plaintiff, the extent and nature of the plaintiff’s reputation and any malice by 
the defendant.225 
 
Applying the above legal principles to the removal of a director from office, a director who has 
been removed from office by the board of directors in terms of section 71(3) of the Companies 
Act may institute an action in delict for defamation against the responsible director or directors 
in circumstances where his personal or professional reputation has been unlawfully harmed, or 
where he has unlawfully been exposed to enmity, ridicule or contempt. In Lewis Group Limited 
v Woollam and Others226 the Western Cape Division, Cape Town, stated, obiter, that: 
 
“The appropriate remedy for any damage to the reputation of the applicant or the second 
 to fifth respondents [being directors of the company] that may have been caused 
 unlawfully as a result of the demand (as to which I express no view) falls to be sought in 
 proceedings in delict.”   
 
Ncube correctly expresses the view that directors “who are subjected to frivolous dismissal 
proceedings based on unfounded or unreasonable allegations may have remedies under the 
common law for defamation.”227 It is, however, submitted that even if a director is lawfully 
removed from office, he may nevertheless have valid grounds for a defamation action. It is 
doubtful whether a director who has lawfully been removed from office would institute a 
defamatory action, but if defamatory statements were wrongfully and intentionally made about 
him in the course of his removal from office, he would have a right to institute such an action. 
Even if the director in question has not been removed from office but in an attempt to do so a 
                                                 
224 Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) at 590; Burchell 
Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum 436; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 
of South African Law 1191. 
 
225 See Muller v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd and Others 1972 (2) SA 589 (C) at 595-596; Burchell Personality 
Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio Injuriarum 435-475 and Milo Defamation and Freedom of 
Speech 246 for a discussion of these factors. 
 
226 (17199/2016) [2017] ZAWCHC 15 (1 March 2017) para 15. This case dealt with whether the first respondent 
(Woollam) was legally able to withdraw a demand made in terms of s 165 of the Companies Act without the 
consent of Lewis Group Limited or without the leave of the court. The main judgment in this case, reported as 
Lewis Group Limited v Woollam 2017 (2) SA 547 (WCC), is discussed in chapter 6, para 3.3.1.2. 
 
227 Ncube “You’re Fired! The Removal of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 40. 
 
523 
 
director or directors on the board of directors has wrongfully and intentionally injured his 
reputation, he may have a right to institute an action for defamation against the director or 
directors concerned. The success of such an action would depend on whether the director in 
question is able to prove successfully the elements of a defamation action, and on whether such 
defamatory conduct was wrongful and intentional. In the context of removal proceedings, it 
may be necessary for a board member to state matters of a defamatory nature about the director 
whose removal is in issue. It is important to balance the director’s right to reputation against 
the interests of the board of directors and its right to remove a director from office on valid 
grounds. A fear of a defamation action should not act to inhibit the board of directors from 
taking the necessary steps under section 71(3) of the Companies Act to remove a director from 
office where valid grounds to do so exist. At the same time, the board of directors should take 
care not to unlawfully and intentionally defame a director’s reputation in the course of removal 
proceedings, particularly by making allegations against him which do not relate to any of the 
grounds of removal provided for in section 71(3) of the Companies Act.  
 
In order to succeed in a defamation action, the director must prove that there was (i) publication 
(ii) of a defamatory statement (iii) referring to him.228 Such publication may be written or 
verbal. For instance, the publication could take place in the statement of reasons proposed for 
the removal of the director (which is to be included in notice of the meeting),229 drafted by the 
chairman of the board of directors and circulated to the board. The notice of a board meeting is 
generally confidential; it is not a public document, but, as indicated, the publication requirement 
would be satisfied if publication is made to a particular named or known or specific persons. It 
need not be publication at large. Thus, the circulation of a statement of reasons drafted by the 
chairman of the board of directors containing defamatory statements about the director 
concerned and which is circulated to the board of directors, could arguably constitute 
publication of defamatory statements by the chairman of the board regarding the director 
concerned. If the entire board of directors were involved in drafting the defamatory statement 
of reasons for the removal of a director, and no persons other than the board members had 
attended the board meeting and, further, the statement is not made available to persons other 
than those who attended the meeting,230 a director would find it difficult to prove the element 
                                                 
228 See note 191 above.  
 
229 Section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act. 
 
230 See Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1169. 
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of publication. This is because the defamatory statement must be communicated or made 
known to at least one person other than the plaintiff.231 A verbal defamatory statement made 
by a board member at a board meeting would satisfy the publication element since the 
defamatory statement would have been communicated or made known to the board members 
present at the meeting. This would again constitute particular publication to named and known 
individuals, rather than publication to the public at large.  
 
If the publication element is satisfied the plaintiff director must prove that the statements made 
are defamatory and that they refer to him. To do this, he would have to prove that a reasonable 
person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand the words published, whether in 
writing or verbally, to convey a meaning defamatory to him.232 Whether a director institutes a 
defamation action against an individual board member or against the entire board of directors, 
would depend on whether the individual board member, or the entire board had published the 
defamatory statement.  
 
The director concerned is not required to prove that the defamatory statements are wrongful or 
that they were published intentionally. If he is able to prove that there was a publication of 
defamatory material about him, the presumptions would automatically arise that the publication 
of the defamatory material was wrongful and that it was intentional. The particular board 
member or members responsible for publishing the defamatory statement would then have the 
onus of rebutting either the presumption of wrongfulness or intention by proving a defence 
which excludes either wrongfulness or intention. 
 
One defence that may be raised in this context is that the defamatory statements about the 
director who was the subject of removal proceedings were true and, in addition, that their 
publication was in the public benefit. For instance, a defamatory statement which was published 
for the benefit of the company and its shareholders may arguably be published for the public 
benefit. It is not however in the public benefit to publish matters which are highly personal and 
private.233 If the director in question has a high public profile and is a public figure (such as a 
                                                 
231 Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 
2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 86. 
 
232 See note 203 above. 
 
233 National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1210; Lady Agasim-Pereira v Johnnic 
Publishing Eastern Cape (Pty) Ltd and Others [2003] 2 All SA 416 (SE) at 425. 
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director of a well known listed company) this fact may assist the defendants to prove that the 
statements were made in the public interest since publication of true statements about public 
officials and figures is generally regarded as being for the public benefit.234 If, on the other 
hand, a board member makes a statement at the board meeting about a highly personal matter 
relating to the director who is the subject of removal proceedings and which has no bearing on 
the grounds for removal listed in section 71(3) of the Companies Act, that is, whether the 
director is ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated, negligent or derelict, such a statement would 
arguably not have been published in the public benefit. If the defendants are not able to prove 
a defence to the defamation claim which rebuts either the presumption of wrongfulness or 
intention, the plaintiff director would be successful in his defamation action. A court would in 
such event most likely make an appropriate award of damages to him for loss of reputation, 
taking into account, inter alia, the nature of the words used, the extent of the publication, its 
effect, the character and status of the director in question, and any malice by the persons or 
persons who made the statements.  
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter examined the various remedies which a director cold rely on should he be removed 
from office by the board of directors in terms of section 71(3) of the Companies Act. In order 
to successfully rely on these remedies, the affected director must of course comply with the 
specific requirements of each remedy.  
 
A director has a right to institute a review application to court, within twenty business days of 
his removal from office by the board of directors, in terms of section 71(5) of the Companies 
Act.235 The person who had appointed that director in terms of section 66(4)(a)(i) of the 
Companies Act also has locus standi to institute the review application.236 Section 71(5) is 
silent on the payment of costs of a section 71(5) review application.237 Presumably the common 
law civil procedure rule that costs follow the event would be followed.238 Assuming that a court 
                                                 
234 Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) at 589.  
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is empowered to review the substance and merits of the board’s decision to remove a director 
from office, it was argued that a challenge a director may face in relying on section 71(5) is to 
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he was removed from office with ulterior motives.239 
This is particularly so if the board has framed the grounds for his removal as neglect of his 
functions or having been derelict in the performance of his functions, or that he failed to meet 
any other broadly expressed or subjective standard.240 
 
The following recommendations were made with regard to improving and enhancing the review 
application in terms of section 71(5) of the Companies Act: 
 
 In order for there to be consistency with section 71(6) of the Companies Act and to 
broaden the scope on which a director may challenge his removal from office, a court 
should not be confined to enquiring into the procedural correctness of the decision to 
remove a director from office. It should be empowered under a section 71(5) review to 
enquire into the merits of the board’s decision to remove a director from office.241  
 
 In the interests of clarity and legal certainty, section 71(5) should specify when the period 
of twenty business days would commence. Presumably this would be from the date that 
the board of directors makes the decision to remove the director from office.242  
 
 Clarity must be provided by the legislature on the orders a court may make on a review 
in section 71(5) should it set aside the board’s decision to remove a director from 
office.243 It must be elucidated whether a court would be empowered to reinstate an 
improperly removed director to office, in appropriate circumstances, and whether it may 
order compensation to be paid to such a director.244 
 
                                                 
239 See para 2.1 above. 
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 Since a director would be suspended from office during the twenty business day period 
within which the review application may be lodged, it is submitted that, in accordance 
with section 1726(d) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, section 70(2) of the 
Companies Act should incorporate a provision to the effect that any acts of the board 
during the period of suspension of a director who is later reinstated by a court under a 
section 71(5) review, may not be impugned or invalidated.245 This would ensure minimal 
disruption to the running of the company if the suspended director were to be reinstated 
to the board by a court.246 Such a provision would also remove any doubt whether 
decisions taken by the board of directors in the absence of the suspended director, once 
he is reinstated to the board, remain valid.247 It would furthermore ensure that any 
decisions taken by the board of directors in the absence of the suspended director would 
not be subject to challenge by third parties when the suspended director is reinstated to 
the board.248 The provision would also accord with the purpose of the Companies Act in 
section 7(j) of encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies.249 
 
A second remedy discussed in this chapter was the right of a director to apply for damages or 
other compensation for loss of office in terms of section 71(9) of the Companies Act.250 While 
a director may claim damages or other compensation for loss of office, he may do so only if he 
has the right to do so under the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or his service 
contract.251 In order to successfully claim damages or other compensation the director must not 
have breached the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or his service contract, and he 
must be able to prove his damages.252 Importantly, the director would be under a duty to 
mitigate his loss by looking for and taking alternative employment where this is reasonably 
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expected.253 His damages would therefore generally be reduced by the value of any such 
alternative employment which he could have taken.254  
 
A director may in addition claim damages or other compensation for the loss of any other office 
as a consequence of being removed as a director.255  The damages which a director may claim 
for his loss of office could be very steep and could result in significant financial loss for the 
company.256 It is important for the board of directors to ensure that the measure of the damages 
resulting from the removal of a director is not prohibitive to the extent that removal becomes 
impractical for the company.257 Generally, the longer the period of the service contract, the 
greater the damages that are payable to a director who has been removed before the end of the 
period specified in his service contract.258 It is advisable for directors not to be given lengthy 
terms of employment because of the potential financial implications involved in removing them 
from office prior to the expiry of their contractual terms.259  
 
Neither the Companies Act, nor the King IV Report or the JSE Listings Requirements require 
the termination payments of directors for loss of office to be approved by the shareholders of 
the company.260 In order to moderate the scale of the termination payments to be paid to 
directors for loss of office and to prevent directors from abusing their influence and serving 
their own interests, it was submitted that the (South African) Companies Act must adopt 
provisions akin to section 226C of the UK Companies Act of 2006 or section 200E of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001 requiring shareholders to approve the payments made to 
directors for loss of office.261 This would confer on shareholders some control over termination 
payments and would result in enhanced transparency with regard to the termination payments 
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made to directors.262 Adopting such a provision would also accord with the purposes of the 
Companies Act in sections 7(b)(iii) and 7(j) of promoting the development of the South African 
economy by encouraging transparency, and of encouraging the efficient and responsible 
management of companies.263  
 
A director who has been removed from office by the board of directors in breach of its fiduciary 
duties may rely on section 163(1)(a) of the Companies Act on the ground that an act or omission 
of the company (the board of directors) has had a result (his removal from office) that is 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or that unfairly disregards his interests.264 A director may also 
rely on section 163(1)(c) of the Companies Act to contend that the powers of a director or 
directors have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or 
that unfairly disregards his interests.265 The motive of the board of directors in removing a 
director from office would assist a court in deciding whether the act or the exercise of the power 
is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded the director’s interests in the context 
of section 163(1) of the Companies Act.266 In order to succeed under section 163 of the 
Companies Act, a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors must 
be able to prove that his removal was in fact oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or that it unfairly 
disregarded his interests.267 These terms have not been defined in the Companies Act but there 
is ample case law on the meaning of these terms.268 
 
If a director who is also a shareholder is removed from office in a small domestic company or 
a quasi-partnership in the absence of a fair offer by the majority shareholders to purchase his 
shares or some other fair arrangement, this would assist him to prove that the exercise of the 
board’s power in removing him from office was unfairly prejudicial.269 The director must 
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however be able to prove as a fact that he had a legitimate expectation that he would participate 
in the company’s management.270 Proving such a legitimate expectation is more challenging in 
larger companies which are not run as quasi-partnerships.271 Unlike the position under section 
994 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 and section 232 of the Australian Corporations Act of 
2001 where the oppression remedy is limited to shareholders, a director acting under the (South 
African) Companies Act does not have to prove that the company is a quasi-partnership in order 
to institute an action under section 163 of the Companies Act since section 163(1)(c) confers 
locus standi on a director to rely on the oppression remedy in his capacity as a director.272 
 
In considering an application in terms of section 163(1) of the Companies Act a court has wide 
powers and also a discretion to make any interim or final order it considers fit.273 A director 
may apply for relief under section 163 only when the board has removed him from office since 
section 163(1)(a) of the Companies Act requires the result, and not the act, to be oppressive.274 
It was submitted that, in the interests of fairness, clarity and certainty, section 163 of the 
Companies Act should be amended to state that the provision may be relied on by a person who 
has been removed from office by the board of directors (in terms of section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act) or the Companies Tribunal (in terms of section 71(8) of the Companies Act) 
if the application relates to the circumstances in which he was removed from office.275 Such an 
amendment would make it clear that former directors who have been removed from office by 
the board of directors or the Companies Tribunal in a manner that was oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial or that unfairly disregarded their interests, would be entitled to apply to court for 
relief under section 163 of the Companies Act.276  
 
A director who applies for relief in terms of section 163 of the Companies Act should indicate 
the nature of the relief that he seeks, but even if he fails to do so a court is empowered to make 
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any interim or final order it considers fit.277 If a court were to find that the removal of a director 
from office by the board of directors constituted oppressive conduct it may declare any director 
so involved delinquent or under probation.278 It may also order compensation to be paid to the 
affected director, subject to any other law entitling him to compensation.279 In addition, a court 
may, if it considers it fit, make an order reinstating the affected director to the board of 
directors.280 
 
In addition to the remedies discussed above, a director may also be able to institute a delictual 
action against a director or directors for defamation if he has unlawfully suffered reputational 
damage in the course of his removal from office.281 The right of a director to institute an action 
for defamation in the course of his removal from office depends on whether he is able to 
successfully prove the elements of a defamation action, and on whether such defamatory 
conduct was wrongful and intentional. If the director is able to prove that there was a 
publication of defamatory material about him, the presumptions would automatically arise that 
the publication of the defamatory material was wrongful and that it was intentional. The 
particular board member or members responsible for publishing the defamatory statement may 
rebut these presumptions by proving a defence that excludes either wrongfulness or intent.282 
If the defences fail a court would probably award damages to the affected director.283 In 
accordance with section 158(1)(a) of the Companies Act, in adjudicating a defamation claim 
by a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors, a court must develop 
the common law as necessary to improve the realisation and enjoyment of rights established by 
the Companies Act.284 
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CHAPTER 8      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION  
2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis set out to examine the provisions in the Companies Act relating to the removal of 
directors from office by the board of directors and the judiciary. The removal of directors by 
the Companies Tribunal was also examined. The shift in the balance of power between the 
board of directors and the general body of shareholders brought about by sections 71(3) and 
162 of the Companies Act was explored. In addition, the fiduciary duties of directors when 
removing a fellow director from office were examined. The removal of directors holding 
additional positions or capacities in relation to the company such as a company employee, or a 
shareholding-director holding loaded voting rights, was also considered. In the last instance, 
the remedies on which a director may rely should he be removed from office by the board of 
directors were examined. This concluding chapter summarises the conclusions and 
recommendations that were set forth and developed in the preceding chapters of this thesis on 
these matters.  
 
2.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The conclusions reached in this thesis on the removal of directors by the board of directors and 
the judiciary are set out below. As a result of these conclusions, recommendations, including 
legislative amendments to the Companies Act,1 are suggested. 
                                                 
1 In this chapter the recommended insertions to provisions of the Companies Act are underlined, while the 
recommended deletion of specific wording in the Companies Act is “struck out.” This approach was selected 
rather than the one generally adopted in the amendments to statutes which is slightly more complicated. 
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2.1  Philosophical Underpinnings with Regard to the Removal of Directors from Office  
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis examined the underpinning philosophy of the removal of directors from 
office, as well as the division of powers between directors and shareholders.2 The extent and 
impact of the innovative power given to the board of directors under section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act to remove directors from office, and of the equivalent power given to courts 
under section 162 of the Companies Act, were explored.3 It was contended that the conferral 
of power on the board of directors to remove fellow directors has shifted the balance of power 
and the dynamics between the board of directors and shareholders.4 It has also had an impact 
on the balance of power between the shareholders and the board of directors, between the 
shareholders themselves and between the directors themselves.5 It was shown that the conferral 
of power on the judiciary to remove directors from office has impacted on the relationship 
between the shareholders, the directors and the judiciary.6 It is submitted that the balance of 
power between the shareholders and the directors can no longer be maintained in the manner 
that had existed prior to the conferment of the power of removal on the board of directors and 
the judiciary.7 In an effort to achieve the proper balance sought by section 7(i) of the Companies 
Act, that is, to balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and the board of directors 
within companies, the following submissions are made with regard to containing the 
redistribution of power between the directors and shareholders: 
 
(a) Before removing a fellow director from office, the board of directors should give due 
consideration to the concept of corporate democracy. It should consider whether the 
inherent rights of shareholders to remove directors should be honoured, or whether it 
                                                 
2 See chapter 2, paras 2, 3 and 4. 
 
3 See chapter 2, paras 5 and 6. 
 
4 See chapter 2, para 5. 
 
5 See chapter 2, para 5. 
 
6 See chapter 2, para 6. 
 
7 See chapter 2, para 7. 
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should be disregarded, particularly where the director in question was appointed by 
the shareholders and not by the board.8 
 
(b) The board should consider whether a fellow director whom the board of directors 
wishes to remove is a representative of the minority shareholders, and if so, the impact 
of such removal on the dynamics between the majority and minority shareholders.9 
 
(c) The board should consider whether in removing a director from office it would be 
breaching its fiduciary duties or acting with ulterior motives.10  
 
(d) The board should consider whether it is acting openly and transparently at all times 
and in the best interests of the company when removing a director from office.11 
 
It is further suggested that the courts should deliberate on the following factors in exercising 
their removal power so as to give due consideration to the inherent right of shareholders to 
remove directors and to the principle of non-interference by courts in the internal affairs of a 
company: 
 
(a) the circumstances and reasons why the shareholders or the board of directors failed to 
remove the director in question; 
 
(b) whether the removal of the director would be in the best interests of the company; 
 
(c) the adequacy of any other available remedies; 
 
(d) whether, in making its decision to remove a director from office, the board of directors 
has complied with its fiduciary duties in removing the director in question, or whether 
it has acted with ulterior motives; 
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(e) whether the board of directors has made an objective, and not a subjective, assessment 
of a fellow director with regard to whether he had neglected his functions or had been 
derelict in the performance of his functions, should this be the reason the board gives 
for the removal of the director in question; and 
 
(f) whether the board of directors has acted openly and transparently and in the best 
interests of the company in removing the director in question.12  
 
2.2  The Removal of Directors by the Board of Directors 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis examined the grounds for the removal of a director by the board of 
directors, set out in section 71(3) of the Companies Act, and the procedures to remove a director 
from office, set out in section 71(4) of the Companies Act. It compared the grounds and 
procedures with the equivalent provisions in the UK Companies Act of 2006, the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and the corporation laws of various States in 
the USA. The removal of directors by the Companies Tribunal under section 71(8) of the 
Companies Act was also examined. 
 
Compared to the equivalent provisions in certain foreign jurisdictions, section 71(3) of the 
(South African) Companies Act is unique in that the board’s power to remove fellow board 
members is an unalterable provision.13 An unalterable provision is a provision of the 
Companies Act that does not expressly contemplate that its effect on any particular company 
may be negated, restricted, limited, qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or 
effect by a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules.14 A company may not “contract 
out” of the unalterable provisions of the Companies Act, but a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation may impose a more onerous requirement on the company than that contained by 
an unalterable provision of the Companies Act.15 An alterable provision is a provision of the 
Companies Act in which it is expressly contemplated that its effect on a particular company 
may be negated, restricted, limited, qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or 
                                                 
12 See chapter 2, para 7. 
 
13 See chapter 3, para 2.5 
 
14 See chapter 3, para 2.1.  
 
15 See chapter 3, para 2.1.  
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effect by that company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.16 Many of the alterable provisions of 
the Companies Act are “opt-out” provisions, that is, they will apply to the company unless it 
opts out of them by so stipulating in its Memorandum of Incorporation, as opposed to the “opt-
in” provisions which do not apply to a company unless it specifically so provides in its 
Memorandum of Incorporation.17 The corporation laws of most States in the USA have not 
conferred on the board of directors the power to remove fellow board members.18 The majority 
of the States in the USA that have conferred such power on the board of directors have made 
such power alterable rather than mandatory, in that the board of directors may remove fellow 
board members but only if the articles of incorporation or the by-laws make provision for this 
to be done.19 The UK Companies Act of 2006 and the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 
both provide that the board of directors may remove directors only if empowered to do so by 
the constitution of the company.20  
 
A second unique feature of section 71(3) of the (South African) Companies Act is that the 
removal rights do not follow appointment rights. The board of directors is empowered to 
remove from office any director, regardless of whether the shareholders or a person named in, 
or determined in terms of, the Memorandum of Incorporation had appointed that director to 
office.21 It was observed that section 71(3) has not imposed any legal safeguards to ensure that 
directors cannot remove from office the director representatives of minority shareholders. In 
contrast, the corporation laws of those States in the USA that permit directors to remove fellow 
board members distinguish between directors who were appointed by the board of directors 
and those who were appointed by the shareholders, and contain provisions to protect minority 
shareholder representatives on the board from removal by the board of directors.22 
 
                                                 
16 See chapter 3, para 2.1.  
 
17 See chapter 3, para 2.1. 
  
18 See chapter 3, para 2.4. 
 
19 See chapter 3, para 2.4. 
 
20 See chapter 3, paras 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
21 See chapter 3, para 3. 
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It is submitted that section 71(4) of the (South African) Companies Act has certain 
commendable elements compared to the equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions 
reviewed. In general, section 71(4) of the (South African) Companies Act regulates in more 
detail the procedures for the board of directors to remove a director compared to the equivalent 
procedures in the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the UK Companies Act of 2006 and 
the statutes of the various States in the USA that permit the board of directors to remove 
directors. The prescribed procedures in the (South African) Companies Act are clear, binding 
on all companies and standardised for all companies (save to the extent that the notice period 
for board meetings varies for each company and to the extent that the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company alters the alterable provisions relating to the threshold for passing 
board resolutions and the quorum for board meetings).23 The requirement in section 71(4)(a) 
that the board must provide a director with a statement setting out the reasons for the proposed 
resolution to remove him from office, is unique to the Companies Act.24 It is submitted that 
this requirement is a laudable one which enables the impugned director to prepare a response 
to the allegations made against him, prior to the proposed board meeting to remove him from 
office.25 
 
It is submitted that there is merit in permitting the board of directors to remove fellow board 
members, and, provided the board acts openly and there are acceptable safeguards against 
abuse of the power to remove fellow board members, this power ought to remain in the 
Companies Act.26 Nevertheless, in order to clarify, enhance and strengthen sections 71(3) and 
71(4) of the Companies Act, the following recommendations are made:  
 
(a) It is recommended that the power to remove directors in section 71(3) of the 
Companies should be an alterable rather than a mandatory power.27 It should further 
be an “opt out” provision in that the board’s power to remove a director should apply 
unless the company opts out of it by expressly so stipulating in its Memorandum of 
                                                 
23 See chapter 3, para 8.5. 
 
24 See chapter 3, para 8.3. 
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26 See chapter 2, para 5.1 and chapter 3, para 2.5. 
 
27 See chapter 3, para 3.  
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Incorporation.28 An alterable power of removal of directors by the board of directors 
would give a company the option of weighing up the advantages and disadvantages 
of empowering its particular board of directors to remove directors.29 A company 
would consequently be empowered to determine whether it wishes to retain the default 
provision under the Companies Act empowering the board of directors to remove 
fellow board members or whether to limit or alter this default provision to suit its 
particular needs by negating, restricting, limiting, qualifying, or extending the board’s 
power to remove fellow board members.30 Under the terms of an alterable power of 
removal, a company would additionally be empowered to incorporate in section 71(3) 
provisions to protect the minority shareholder representatives on the board of 
directors, should it wish to do so.31 An alterable power of removal would moreover 
bring section 71(3) in line with the equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions 
reviewed. Furthermore, it would accord with the purpose in section 7(i) of the 
Companies Act of balancing the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors 
within companies.32 It is consequently recommended that section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act should be preceded by the following phrase: 
 
“Except to the extent that the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
provides otherwise, Iif a company has more than two directors, and a 
shareholder or director has alleged that a director of the company –” 
 
(b) Section 71(3)(a) of the Companies Act provides that one of the grounds on which a 
director may be removed by the board of directors is that he has become ineligible or 
disqualified in terms of section 69 of the Companies Act.33 Section 69(6) provides that 
the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company may impose additional grounds of 
ineligibility or disqualification of directors or minimum qualifications to be met by 
                                                 
28 See chapter 3, para 3. 
 
29 See chapter 3, para 4.4. 
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31 See chapter 3, para 3. 
 
32 See chapter 3, para 3. 
 
33 See chapter 3, paras 6.1.2 and 6.1.3. 
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directors. It is proposed that any such additional qualifications in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation should endeavour to enhance the ability of the board of directors to 
perform its role effectively, should not be used for improper purposes, and should not 
be unreasonable or unlawful.34 An amendment to this effect in section 69(6) would 
avoid any ambiguity regarding the type of permissible qualifications or additional 
grounds of ineligibility or disqualification that may be inserted in the Memorandum 
of Incorporation of a company.35 It is of concern that section 71(3)(a) read with section 
69(6) does not contain any provision guarding against the introduction of a new 
qualification requirement or a new ground of ineligibility or disqualification being 
misused to remove directors from office.36 It is recommended that a new section 
69(6A) be inserted in the Companies Act in order to prevent a new qualification or a 
new ground of ineligibility or disqualification being introduced and abused as a means 
of removing a director from office under section 71(3)(a) of the Companies Act. 
Drawing on the equivalent provisions in sections 8.02(a) and 8.02(e) of the MBCA, it 
is recommended that section 69(6) of the Companies Act be amended as follows: 
 
“(6) Subject to subsection (6A), Iin addition to the provisions of this 
section, the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company may impose – 
(a) additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification of 
directors; or 
(b) minimum qualifications to be met by directors of that company., 
 provided that such additional grounds or minimum qualifications are 
reasonable as applied to the company and are lawful. 
 
 (6A) Any additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification or any 
minimum qualifications to be met by directors, as referred to in subsection 
(6), which are prescribed after a director has been elected or appointed, 
shall not apply to that director before the end of that director’s term.”  
 
                                                 
34 See chapter 3, para 6.1.2.3. 
 
35 See chapter 3, para 6.1.2.3. 
 
36 See chapter 3, para 6.1.2.3. 
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(c) It would be too disruptive to the running of a company’s business and its affairs if the 
past acts of an ineligible or disqualified director were not regarded as valid. It is 
submitted that a provision similar to section 214 of the previous Companies Act 61 of 
1973 and section 161 of the UK Companies Act of 2006 should be inserted in the 
Companies Act, to the effect that the acts of a person acting as a director will be valid 
notwithstanding that it is afterwards discovered that there was a defect in his 
appointment or that he was disqualified from holding office. 
 
(d) Incapacity in the employment law context is a form of no-fault dismissal.37 No-fault 
dismissal involves a form of behaviour, conduct or inability which is not intentional 
or negligent.38 It is proposed that a similar approach be adopted to the ground of 
incapacity in section 71(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act. Under this approach, before 
the board of directors removes a director from office on the ground of incapacity, it 
should consider the degree of the incapacity, the cause of the incapacity, and the 
possibility of securing a temporary replacement, such as an alternative director, for 
the ill or injured director while he recovers from his incapacity.39 In order to guard 
against this ground being improperly applied to remove directors from office in 
instances where the board of directors is not properly qualified to make the relevant 
incapacity assessment, it is recommended that a registered medical practitioner or a 
court should assess (i) whether a director is incapacitated to the extent that he is unable 
to perform the functions of a director and (ii) whether he is incapacitated to the extent 
that he is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable period of time.40 This 
approach would further guard against this ground of removal being abused when 
conflicts arise between the directors, and would bring section 71(3)(a)(ii) in line with 
the equivalent provisions in the UK and in various States in the USA, which have 
adopted such an approach.41 It is recommended that section 71(3)(a)(ii) be amended 
as follows: 
                                                 
37 See chapter 3, para 6.2.1. 
 
38 See chapter 3, para 6.2.1. 
 
39 See chapter 3, para 6.2.3. 
 
40 See chapter 3, para 6.2.4. 
 
41 See chapter 3, para 6.2.4. 
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 “(ii) incapacitated to the extent that the director is unable to perform the 
functions of a director, and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a 
 reasonable time, as assessed by a registered medical practitioner or by a 
court; or” 
 
(e) The phrase “the functions of a director” as used in sections 71(3)(a)(ii) and 71(3)(b) 
indicates that an objective standard of assessment is utilised and not a subjective 
standard.42 Consequently, in order to ascertain whether a director is incapacitated or 
has neglected or has been derelict in the performance of the functions of a director, 
one must objectively determine whether he has failed to fulfil the functions of a 
director; the issue is not whether he has failed to fulfil his own specific functions as a 
director of the particular company.43 It is recommended that a subjective, and not an 
objective, standard should explicitly be provided for in these provisions.44 This is 
important in light of the fact that the functions of a director vary depending on the 
type of company of which he is a director, the type of director he is, and the nature of 
the company’s business.45 An objective test does not distinguish between the functions 
of a director of a public, private, personal liability, non-profit or state-owned 
company, or between an executive and a non-executive director.46 A subjective 
standard would furthermore result in there being consistency between section 71(3)(b) 
and section 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Companies Act, which imposes a subjective 
standard in ascertaining whether a director is delinquent.47 It is essential that there be 
consistency and harmony between these two provisions since the right of removal of 
a director is in addition to the right of a person to apply to a court in terms of section 
162 for an order declaring a director delinquent.48 It is consequently recommended 
that sections 71(3)(a)(ii) and 71(3)(b) be amended as follows:  
                                                 
42 See chapter 3, para 6.3.1. 
 
43 See chapter 3, para 6.3.1. 
 
44 See chapter 3, para 6.3.1. 
 
45 See chapter 3, para 6.3.1. 
 
46 See chapter 3, para 6.3.1. 
 
47 See chapter 3, para 6.3.1. 
  
48 See chapter 3, para 6.3.1. 
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“Except to the extent that the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
provides otherwise, Iif If a company has more than two directors, and a 
shareholder or director has alleged that a director of the company – 
(a) has become – 
(i) ... 
(ii) incapacitated to the extent that the director is unable to perform 
the functions of a directordirector’s functions within the 
company, and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a 
reasonable time, as assessed by a registered medical practitioner 
or by a court; or  
(b) has neglected, or been derelict in the performance of, the functions of 
directorthe director’s functions within the company,” 
 
(f)  It is not clear whether the term “derelict” as used in section 71(3)(b) of the Companies 
Act contemplates the fault element of intention or whether a director could be found 
guilty of being derelict in the performance of the functions of director if he had acted 
negligently.49 In the absence of any guidelines from the Companies Act and in light 
of the fact that a negligent dereliction of duty is recognised in South African case law, 
it is submitted that a negligent dereliction of duty would suffice as a valid ground of 
removal under section 71(3)(b) of the Companies Act, provided that both the elements 
of “negligence” and “dereliction” are clearly present, based on the facts and 
circumstances of the case.50 Due to the vagueness and imprecision of the term 
“derelict”, which is not defined by the Companies Act, until the legislature or our 
courts clarify the meaning of this term as used in section 71(3)(b) of the Companies 
Act, it is important to guard against this ground being invoked vexatiously by 
shareholders or the directors as a ground for the removal of a director in the case of 
conflicts arising between the shareholders and directors or between the directors 
themselves.51 Care must be taken that this ground is not used as a “catch-all” ground 
where cases are pushed into the mould of “dereliction of duty” when they do not really 
                                                 
49 See chapter 3, para 6.3.2. 
 
50 See chapter 3, para 6.3.2. 
 
51 See chapter 3, para 6.3.2. 
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fit there.52 The imputation of a dereliction of duty should not be lightly made against 
an individual director; there must be a clear and strong basis before the board of 
directors finds that one of its members has been derelict in the performance of the 
functions of director.53 
 
(g)  It was observed that the legislature has used the term “negligent” in sections 71(3), 
71(5), 71(6)(a) and 71(6)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act instead of the term “neglect” 
when the term “neglect” is referred to in section 71(3)(b) as a ground for the proposed 
removal of a director from office by the board of directors.54 It was argued that the 
terms “neglect” and “negligent” do not have the same meaning.55 It is not clear 
whether the legislature confused the terms “neglect” and “negligent”, and intended to 
refer to the term “neglectful” instead of “negligent”.56 It is recommended that the 
legislature clarify this perplexity by amending legislation. Until such clarity is 
provided, it appears that negligence may be an additional statutory ground which a 
shareholder or a director may invoke for the removal of a director.57 
 
(h) Section 69(6)(a) of the Companies Act provides that the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a company may impose additional grounds of ineligibility or 
disqualification of directors. While additional grounds of removal of a director from 
office may be indirectly inserted in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
by means of inserting additional grounds of ineligibility or disqualification in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation, it is not clear whether additional grounds for the 
removal of a director by the board of directors may be directly inserted in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation.58 This must be clarified by the legislature or the 
                                                 
52 See chapter 3, para 6.3.2. 
 
53 See chapter 3, para 6.3.2. 
 
54 See chapter 3, para 6.4. 
 
55 See chapter 3, para 6.4. 
 
56 See chapter 3, para 6.4. 
 
57 See chapter 3, para 6.4. 
 
58 See chapter 3, para 6.5. 
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courts.59 In contrast, section 168(5) of the UK Companies Act of 2006 states that 
section 168 is not to be taken as “derogating from any power to remove a director that 
may exist apart from” section 168.60 This has the implication that the UK articles of 
association of a company may provide additional grounds for the removal of 
directors.61 The corporation laws of most States in the USA that permit directors to 
remove fellow board members state that the removal must be for “cause”, which 
implies that there is scope for a broad spectrum of grounds for the removal of a 
director.62 While the statutes are silent on the meaning of the term “cause” the 
common law in the USA has provided some guidelines on the meaning of this term.63 
In general, “for cause” means that there must be a justifiable reason for the removal.64 
It was argued that a general ground permitting directors to be removed for “cause” 
should not be adopted in section 71(3) of the Companies Act.65 But, in order to ensure 
that directors may be removed from office by the board of directors in appropriate 
circumstances that do not fall under any of the grounds listed in section 71(3), it is 
recommended that the Companies Act should explicitly permit companies to insert in 
their Memorandums of Incorporation additional grounds for the removal of directors, 
over and above those specified in section 71(3). This would introduce a level of 
flexibility in section 71(3) that is currently lacking compared to the equivalent 
provisions in the UK, Australia and the statutes of many States in the USA.66 As 
suggested, if section 71(3) of the Companies Act were an alterable and not a 
mandatory provision,67 a company would be empowered to insert specific additional 
grounds for the removal of a director in order to suit the particular needs of the 
company. It is accordingly submitted that if the phrase “Except to the extent that the 
                                                 
59 See chapter 3, para 6.5. 
 
60 See chapter 3, paras 2.3 and 6.5. 
 
61 See chapter 3, para 2.3. 
 
62 See chapter 3, para 6.5. 
 
63 See chapter 3, para 6.5. 
 
64 See chapter 3, para 6.5. 
 
65 See chapter 3, para 6.5. 
 
66 See chapter 3, para 6.5. 
 
67 See chapter 3, para 6.5 and para (a) above. 
 
545 
 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise” were to precede 
section 71(3) of the Companies Act, this would enable companies to provide for 
additional specific grounds for the removal of directors to suit their particular needs.68 
 
(i) Section 71(4)(a) of the Companies Act does not specify the notice period of the board 
meeting to consider the resolution to remove a director from office.69 In the interests 
of clarity and to avoid any controversy regarding the notice period to be given to a 
director who is to be removed from office, and to ensure that the notice period is fair 
and reasonable, it is submitted that a director ought to receive notice of the meeting 
which is at least equivalent to the notice period of any other board meeting.70 It is 
consequently recommended that section 71(4)(a) be amended as follows: 
 
  “(a) notice of the meeting, at least equivalent to the notice period of a 
board meeting, including a copy of the proposed resolution and a statement 
setting out reasons for the resolution, with sufficient specificity to 
reasonably permit the director to prepare and present a response; and” 
 
(j) It is submitted that, in the interests of both clarity and certainty, section 71(4)(b) of 
the Companies Act should make explicit provision for the right of a director to make 
written representations to the board meeting, which must be circulated to the board 
members prior to the board meeting. This would remove any uncertainty whether a 
director is entitled to make written representations to the board meeting or whether 
the “presentation” referred to in section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act is confined to 
a verbal presentation.71 Written representations would give the board members an 
opportunity to consider and reflect on the director’s defence before the meeting is 
convened.72 It also gives board members an opportunity to investigate the impugned 
director’s defence, and to prepare pertinent questions for him at the board meeting in 
                                                 
68 See chapter 3, para 6.5. 
 
69 See chapter 3, para 8.2. 
 
70 See chapter 3, para 8.2. 
 
71 See chapter 3, para 8.4. 
 
72 See chapter 3, para 8.4. 
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order to satisfy themselves on the validity and merits of his defence.73 Written 
representations may furthermore be more effective than a verbal presentation in a 
meeting which becomes disorderly, unruly or hostile.74 In order to ensure that the 
option of circulating written representations is not abused, it is suggested that, in 
accordance with section 203D(6) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the 
written representations need not be circulated if they exceed one thousand words or 
if they are defamatory. It is submitted further that, as was the case under the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973, in addition to the right to make written representations, 
a director should also be entitled to make a verbal presentation to the board meeting, 
in person or through a representative, before the resolution is put to the vote.75 Since 
the written representations would be circulated to the board of directors only (and not 
to the shareholders) the costs thereof could easily be borne by the director 
concerned.76 It is consequently recommended that section 71(4) be amended as 
follows: 
 
 “(4) Before the board of a company may consider a resolution contemplated in 
subsection (3), the director concerned must be given -  
(a) notice of the meeting, at least equivalent to the notice period of 
a board meeting, including a copy of the proposed resolution 
and a statement setting our reasons for the resolution, with 
sufficient specificity to reasonably permit the director to 
prepare and present a response; and 
(b) an opportunity to make written representations in respect of the 
reasons for the resolution referred to in paragraph (a), which 
representations may not exceed 1 000 words and which shall 
be circulated by the company, at the costs of the director 
concerned, prior to the board meeting to every member of the 
board to whom notice of the meeting is sent, unless such 
                                                 
73 See chapter 3, para 8.4. 
 
74 See chapter 3, para 8.4. 
 
75 See chapter 3, para 8.4. 
 
76 See chapter 3, para 8.4. 
 
547 
 
written representations are received by the company too late 
for it to do so, or they exceed 1 000 words or are defamatory; 
and 
(b)(c) a reasonable opportunity to make a verbal presentation, in 
person or through a representative, to the meeting before the 
resolution is put to a vote.” 
 
(k) The Companies Act does not require the removal of a director by a person who is 
named in, or determined in terms of, the Memorandum of Incorporation, pursuant to 
section 66(4)(a)(i), to comply with any specific procedural requirements.77 
Presumably the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company which empowers a 
specific person to appoint and remove a director from office would prescribe fair 
procedural requirements to remove such a director, but a company is not compelled 
to make provision for such procedures in its Memorandum of Incorporation.78 In the 
interests of clarity and certainty it is recommended that the Companies Act should 
state that the removal of a director by a person named in or determined in terms of the 
Memorandum of Incorporation must follow a fair procedure in that the affected 
director should be provided with the reasons for his removal from office by the person 
who appointed him, as well as a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation to such 
person before the decision to remove him from office is taken.79 It is consequently 
recommended that a new section 71(4A) be inserted in the Companies Act, to the 
following effect: 
 
“71(4A) The provisions of subsection (4), read with the changes required 
by the context, shall apply to the removal of a director by any person who 
is named in, or determined in terms of, the Memorandum of Incorporation 
as contemplated in section 66(4)(a)(i).”  
 
In terms of section 71(8) of the Companies Act, the Companies Tribunal must determine 
whether a director should be removed from office in companies which have less than three 
                                                 
77 See chapter 3, para 10. 
 
78 See chapter 3, para 10. 
 
79 See chapter 3, para 10. 
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directors.80 The following recommendations are made with regard to the removal of a director 
by the Companies Tribunal:  
  
(a) In terms of section 71(8)(c) read with section 71(6)(a) of the Companies Act any 
director or shareholder may apply to the Companies Tribunal for a determination 
concerning the removal of a director from office.81 If the Companies Tribunal removes 
a director from office, the director or a person who appointed that director as 
contemplated in section 66(4)(a)(i) of the Companies Act may apply to court within 
twenty business days to review the decision of the Companies Tribunal.82 If the 
Companies Tribunal decides not to remove the director from office, a shareholder with 
voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director or “any director 
who voted otherwise on the resolution” may apply to court to review the determination 
of the Companies Tribunal. Since the remaining director in the company (whose 
removal is not in issue) would not have voted on the resolution as the matter would 
have been determined by the Companies Tribunal, it is not clear whether he is 
empowered to apply to court to review the decision of the Companies Tribunal.83 It is 
submitted that in light of the fact that section 71(8)(c) of the Companies Act states 
that section 71(6) would apply to the determination of the removal of a director by the 
Companies Tribunal as “read with the changes required by the context” that the 
remaining director ought to have this right.84 It must however be clarified by the 
legislature or the courts whether the remaining director does have such a right. 
 
(b) Under section 70(2) of the Companies Act if the board of a company has removed a 
director under section 71(3) of the Companies Act a vacancy on the board would not 
arise until the later of the expiry of the time for filing an application for a review of 
the board’s decision in terms of section 71(5) of the Companies Act (which time 
period is twenty business days), or the granting of an order by the court on such an 
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81 See chapter 3, para 9. 
 
82 See chapter 3, para 9. 
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84 See chapter 3, para 9. 
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application.85 The director would, however, be suspended from office during that 
time.86 It was observed that the legislature did not impose a similar requirement with 
regard to the removal of a director by the Companies Tribunal.87 This could be an 
oversight by the legislature.88 It is recommended that in the interests of clarity and 
consistency and to remove any ambiguity, section 70(2) of the Companies Act must 
be amended to include a reference to a removal of a director by the Companies 
Tribunal in terms of section 71(8) of the Companies Act.89  It is consequently 
recommended that section 70(2) of the Companies Act be amended as follows: 
 
“If, in terms of section 71(3) or section 71(8), the board of a company or the 
Companies Tribunal has removed a director, a vacancy on the board does not 
arise until the later of – 
(a) the expiry of the time for filing an application for review in terms of 
section 71(5) or section 71(8)(c); or 
(b) the granting of an order by the court on such an application, 
    but the director is suspended from office during that time.” 
 
2.3  Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and the Removal of Directors 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis examined the fiduciary duties of directors which apply when the board 
of directors removes a director from office under section 71(3) of the Companies Act. It was 
argued that when the board removes a director from office it has a duty to act in good faith, for 
a proper purpose and in the best interests of the company.90 It was suggested further that 
directors must exercise their power to remove a fellow board member from office for the proper 
purpose for which the power was given to them, and not for a collateral or ulterior purpose.91 
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In addition, it was submitted that directors must exercise an unfettered discretion and an 
independent judgment when removing directors from office.92 It was argued that these duties 
would also apply when the board of directors decides not to remove a director from office.93  
 
It was seen that in the pivotal UK case of Lee v Chou Wen Hsien94 and the USA case of Murray 
v Conseco Inc95 the respective courts did not reinstate a director who had been wrongly 
removed by the board of directors with ulterior motives and in breach of its fiduciary duties.96 
It was contended that the removal of directors under section 71(3) of the (South African) 
Companies Act is distinguishable from the removal of directors in the circumstances that had 
applied in these cases.97 It is consequently submitted that, contrary to the decisions of the 
respective courts in these cases, a decision to remove a director under section 71(3) of the 
Companies Act which is made in breach of the fiduciary duties of the directors, must be set 
aside by a court, and, if appropriate in the circumstances, the improperly removed director 
should be reinstated to the board of directors.98 
 
A further consequence of removing a director from office in breach of the fiduciary duties of 
directors (or in failing to remove that director from office) is that under section 77(2) of the 
Companies Act a director may be held liable in accordance with the common law principles 
relating to a breach of a fiduciary duty for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company 
as a consequence of the breach by the director of a duty contemplated in sections 76(3)(a) (the 
duty to act in good faith and for a proper purpose) and 76(3)(b) (the duty to act in the best 
interests of the company).99 A director who has contravened sections 76(3)(a) or (b) of the 
Companies Act in removing a fellow director would also incur liability under section 218(2) 
of the Companies Act to the improperly removed director, or to any other person, for any loss 
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or damage suffered by the improperly removed director or third person as a result of the breach 
of fiduciary duties.100 
 
2.4  The Removal of Directors Holding Multiple Positions in a Company 
 
Chapter 5 of this thesis discussed two considerations to be taken into account by the board of 
directors when removing a director from office. The first consideration is where the director is 
both a director and an employee of the company.101 As an executive director he would enjoy 
the protection of both the Companies Act and the LRA. Thus, when he is removed from office, 
the provisions of both the Companies Act and the LRA must be taken into account by the board 
of directors.102 A distinction must be drawn between the removal of a director from his office 
as a director of the company, and the removal of a director from his position as an employee 
of the company.103 It was argued that automatic termination clauses, which provide for the 
automatic and simultaneous termination of employment upon the termination of board 
membership, are not valid.104 Consequently if an executive director is removed from office by 
the board of directors, it is essential that the proper procedures under the LRA are followed to 
dismiss the director as an employee.105 A company may not contract out of compliance with 
these procedures by the mechanism of automatic termination clauses. A purported waiver by 
an executive director of his right to be fairly dismissed as an employee is against public policy 
and is unenforceable.106 It was argued that reverse automatic termination provisions (or self-
executing rules) which provide for the automatic termination of a directorship upon the 
occurrence of an event, are however valid.107 
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This chapter also highlighted other limitations which the board of directors must take into 
account prior to removing an executive director from office and terminating his employment 
with the company. It was submitted that if a company does not have a valid substantive ground 
to fairly dismiss an executive director as an employee, it may have to accommodate the former 
director in another employee capacity.108 If an appropriate vacancy does not exist in the 
company, the company would have to retrench the former-director employee, and follow the 
procedures for dismissal based on operational requirements under section 189 of the LRA.109  
It was shown that the consequences of not terminating the employment of an executive director 
in a substantially and procedurally fair manner are severe for a company.110 It is suggested that 
before the board of directors removes an executive director from office, it should consider 
whether it will be feasible to retain the former director as an employee, particularly if there has 
been a breakdown in the relationship between the director and the company.111 It is, however, 
not always practical to strictly separate the two positions held by an executive director or to 
consistently apply a strict separation of such positions.112 
 
The second consideration which must be taken into account before removing a director from 
office is whether the director is a shareholder of the company who holds loaded voting rights 
in the company.113 The expression “loaded voting rights” or “weighted votes” is used to 
describe the device whereby certain shares are given additional voting strength above that 
enjoyed by other shares which, in every other respect, are identical to their participation in the 
company.114 In essence, loaded voting rights are voting rights that are disproportionate to 
shareholdings.115  This chapter discussed and evaluated the controversial leading UK case of 
Bushell v Faith,116 in which a shareholding-director successfully prevented his removal from 
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office through the exercise of his loaded voting rights.117 The persuasive force of the majority 
and minority judgment in this case in South African law was evaluated.118 It was argued that 
there is no difference in general principle between the UK law which applied in Bushell v 
Faith119 with regard to loaded voting rights and section 37(2) of the (South African) Companies 
Act, which permits loaded voting rights to be conferred on shareholders.120 It is submitted that 
while the majority decision in Bushell v Faith121 may have persuasive authority in South 
African law, a provision in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company that confers loaded 
voting rights on a particular class of shares and has the effect of defeating an ordinary resolution 
to remove a director, would be an indirect method of entrenching a director in office.122 Such 
a provision may contravene section 71(1) of the Companies Act, and may also fall foul of the 
anti-avoidance provision contained in section 6(1) of the Companies Act.123 In order to prevent 
an evasion of section 71(1) of the Companies Act, it is recommended that section 37(2) of the 
Companies Act be tightened up by the legislature.124 In this respect it is recommended that 
section 37(2) of the Companies Act be amended as follows: 
 “(2) Each issued share of a company, regardless of its class, has associated with 
it one general voting right, except to the extent provided otherwise by- 
(a) this Act; or 
(b) the preferences, rights, limitations and other terms determined by or in 
terms of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation in accordance 
with section 36., 
provided that the Memorandum of Incorporation may not make provision for an 
issued share of a company to have associated with it more than one general 
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voting right in circumstances where this will have the effect of primarily or 
substantially defeating section 71(1) of this Act.” 
 
2.5  The Judicial Removal of Directors from Office  
 
Chapter 6 examined the removal of directors from office under sections 71(6) and 162 of the 
Companies Act. In terms of section 71(6) a court is empowered to remove a director from 
office if the board of directors has voted not to remove him from office and a disgruntled 
director or a holder of voting rights in the election of that director applies to court for the 
board’s decision to be reviewed. Section 71(6) confers on courts a direct power to remove a 
director from office.125 It was argued that the court’s review powers under section 71(6) may 
be described as a “substantive” or a “wide review” or as a special statutory power of review.126 
A “substantive” or a “wide review” contains a merits-based substantive element, while a 
“special statutory power of review” confers on a court powers of both appeal and review.127 
The following recommendations are made with regard to improving and enhancing section 
71(6) of the Companies Act:  
 
(a) There is no time bar in which a director or a holder of voting rights is required to apply 
to court under section 71(6) to review the board’s decision not to remove a director 
from office.128 In order to bring the matter to a finality and to have consistency with 
the time limit of twenty business days prescribed in a section 71(5) review (for a 
director to apply to court to review his removal from office by the board of directors), 
it is suggested that a time limit of twenty business days should be imposed in section 
71(6).129 It is consequently recommended that section 71(6)(a) be amended as follows: 
 
“(a) any director who voted otherwise on the resolution, or any holder of 
voting rights entitled to be exercised in the election of that director, may 
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apply within 20 business days of the board’s determination to a court to 
review the determination of the board; and” 
 
(b) Section 71(7) of the Companies Act has excluded the common law discretion 
conferred on courts with regard to the making of a costs order.130 Courts should be 
conferred a discretion to make an appropriate costs order under section 71(6) so as to 
strike the right balance in ensuring, on the one hand, that directors and holders of 
voting rights are not discouraged from instituting bona fide and genuine review 
applications and that, on the other hand, they do not institute vexatious and frivolous 
review applications.131 It is recommended that section 71(7) of the Companies Act 
should be deleted and replaced with a provision conferring on a court the discretion 
to make any order it considers appropriate on the costs of the application in terms of 
section 71(6).132 It is consequently recommended that section 71(7) be amended as 
follows: 
 
“71(7) An applicant in terms of subsection (6) must compensate the company, 
and any other party, for costs incurred in relation to the application, unless 
the court reverses the decision of the board”.A court may make an appropriate 
order of costs in relation to an application in terms of subsection (6).” 
 
The distinct advantage of the provisions of section 71(6) of the Companies Act is that these 
provisions are a deterrent and a safeguard against the board of directors favouring a director 
who should be removed from office.133 Nevertheless, section 71(6) offends the principle of 
non-interference by courts in the internal affairs of the company.134 Such judicial interference 
is arguably justified in instances such as illegality, oppressive conduct or fraudulent conduct 
by the board of directors in failing to remove a director from office.135  It is notable that section 
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71(6)(b) gives a court a discretion whether or not to remove a director from office.136 It is 
recommended that in order to ensure that a court does not unduly interfere in the internal affairs 
of the company, before a court exercises its discretion to remove a director from office under 
a section 71(6) review application, it should give due consideration to the reasons why the 
board of directors did not remove the director from office, whether the board of directors had 
complied with its fiduciary duties in not removing the director from office, and whether it had 
acted openly and transparently and in the best interests of the company in not removing the 
director from office.137  
 
Under section 162 of the Companies Act various stakeholders have locus standi to apply to 
court for an order declaring a director delinquent or under probation. Section 162 confers on 
courts an indirect power to remove a director from office since a court is empowered to declare 
a director delinquent which has the effect of disqualifying him to be a director, and hence 
removing him from office.138 While section 162 is said to have a protective purpose, it is 
submitted that there is also a penal element to the section in that a declaration of delinquency 
involves a substantial and significant interference with the individual’s freedom, and carries a 
stigma and reputational damage for the director.139 For this reason it is suggested that declaring 
a director delinquent must not be done without due and proper consideration by a court.140 
 
This chapter concluded that section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act is much wider, 
stricter and far-reaching than its equivalent provisions in the UK, Australia and the USA.141 
For instance, the range of persons who have locus standi to apply to court to remove a director 
from office are much wider under section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act compared 
to the equivalent provisions in the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and the legislation of many other 
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States in the USA.142 Care must be taken to guard against the abuse of section 162 by the wide 
group of person with locus standi to apply to court to declare a director delinquent, particularly 
since the provision does not contain safeguards or filters to protect against vexatious and 
frivolous applications.143  It was contended that if shareholders were to institute delinquency 
proceedings by means of the derivative action this would have the advantage of curbing the 
abuse of section 162.144  
 
In general, the grounds to declare a director delinquent and hence to remove him from office 
and much wider and far-reaching under section 162, and the threshold of misconduct set much 
lower, compared to the equivalent provisions in the foreign jurisdictions reviewed.145 
Nevertheless, the specified list of grounds of delinquency in section 162(5) of the (South 
African) Companies Act is a closed one, unlike the legislation of some USA States which give 
courts the power to remove directors from office for any proper cause.146 It is submitted that in 
light of the harsh effects of a declaration of delinquency it is preferable to have a closed list of 
grounds on which a director may be declared delinquent.147 It was shown that in ascertaining 
whether the grounds in section 162(5)(c) of the Companies Act have been breached, the courts 
apply both an objective and a subjective assessment.148 The objective element lies in 
ascertaining whether the relevant ground has been infringed, while the subjective element lies 
in considering and weighing the personal qualifications and experience of the particular 
director in determining whether the offence in question has been committed by the particular 
director.149 
 
There is no prescription period imposed on instituting an application to declare a director 
delinquent or to place him under probation in terms of section 162 of the (South African) 
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Companies Act, unlike the equivalent provision in the UK Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986 which imposes a prescription period of three years.150 It is suggested that a statutory 
time limit of three years should be imposed with regard to instituting applications to declare a 
director delinquent or to place him under probation.151 It is submitted further that the twenty 
four month prescription period imposed on a director who ceases to be a director of a company 
should be extended to three years, so as to have consistency and harmony with the three-year 
prescription period imposed with regard to section 77 of the Companies Act, particularly since 
there is some overlap between the offences in section 77 and those set out in section 162(5)(c) 
of the Companies Act.152 Imposing a three-year statutory time limit would ensure that directors 
are not left in a state of uncertainty; that they will be able to organise their affairs once the 
statutory time bar has passed free of the risk of future delinquency proceedings being instituted 
against them, and that a delinquent director is not left to function as a director for longer than 
necessary, thus protecting the public.153 In order to ensure that in those instances where an 
application to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation is not able to be 
lodged within the three-year time period, it is suggested that, as is the case under section 7(2) 
of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, with the leave of the court, an 
application to apply to court to declare a director delinquent or to place him under probation 
after the three-year period may be made.154 This would ensure that delinquent directors are not 
immune from applications to declare them delinquent after three years, but in order to bring 
such an application after three years, the leave of the court must be sought.155 It will further 
serve to balance the public interest and the legitimate interests of the director.156 Factors that 
may be relevant in considering whether to grant leave to commence delinquency or probation 
proceedings after three years would be the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the 
strength of the case against the director and the degree of prejudice caused to the director by 
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the delay.157 It is consequently recommended that sections 162(2)(a), 162(3)(a) and 162(4)(a) 
of the (South African) Companies Act be amended as follows: 
 
“(2) . . .  
(a) the person is a director of that company or, within the 24 36 months 
immediately preceding the application, was a director of that company; 
and” 
“(3) . . .  
(a) the person is a director of that company or, within the 24 36 months 
immediately preceding the application, was a director of a company; and” 
“(4) . . .  
(a) the person is a director of that company or, within the 24 36 months 
immediately preceding the application, was a director of a company; and” 
 
It is further recommended that a new section 162(14) be inserted, as follows: 
 
“(14) Except with the leave of the court, an application to declare a director 
delinquent or under probation under this section may not be commenced 
more than three years after the act that gave rise to such application.” 
 
It is further recommended that the courts make more effective use of their power to impose 
appropriate ancillary conditions to declarations of delinquency and probation in an effort to 
protect the public from any recurrence of the conduct by the director in question and to facilitate 
the rehabilitation of delinquent directors and directors under probation.158  
 
It was observed that, unlike the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the MBCA, the DGCL and the legislation of various 
States in the USA, section 162 of Companies Act does not confer on South African courts any 
discretion to determine the minimum period of the declaration of delinquency.159 A declaration 
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of delinquency which is made on the basis that a person consented to serve as a director or 
acted in the capacity of a director while ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69 of the 
(South African) Companies Act, or acted as a director in a manner that contravened an order 
of probation, is unconditional and subsists for the lifetime of the person declared delinquent.160 
In all other instances a declaration of delinquency subsists for seven years from the date of the 
court order, or such longer period as determined by the court at the time of making the 
declaration.161 It was argued that the absence of a discretion is justifiable because a delinquent 
director may apply to court after three years to suspend the order of delinquency.162 Unlike the 
legislation of the foreign jurisdictions referred to above, section 162 of the South African 
Companies Act also does not confer on South African courts any discretion whether or not to 
declare a director delinquent.163 The provision is far stricter than the equivalent provisions in 
the foreign jurisdictions reviewed.164 It is anomalous that a court has been given a discretion 
whether to remove a director from office under section 71(6) of the Companies Act, whether 
to place a director under probation under section 162(7) of the Companies Act and whether to 
disqualify a person from being a director (under section 69(11) of the Companies Act) but has 
not been given a discretion under section 162(5) whether to declare a director delinquent when 
the effect of all of these provisions is that the director in question is not permitted to serve as a 
director.165 It was contended that the absence of a discretion results in a clear interference by 
the judiciary in the internal affairs of a company.166 Section 162 of the (South African) 
Companies Act does not contain provisions designed to minimise judicial interference in the 
internal affairs of the company, unlike the equivalent provision in section 8.09(a) of the 
MBCA.167 It is recommended that section 162 of the (South African) Companies Act should 
incorporate the following provisions modelled on the legislation of foreign jurisdictions in 
order to limit the extent of judicial interference in the internal affairs of a company:  
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(a) courts should have a discretion whether or not to declare directors delinquent and hence 
remove them from office; 
 
(b) courts should be required to consider whether the declaration of delinquency and 
removal of the director would be in the best interests of the company; 
 
(c) courts should consider whether any other remedies besides a declaration of delinquency 
and removal of the director from office are adequate; and 
 
(d) in addition to being able to grant any conditions ancillary to a declaration of delinquency 
or probation, courts should have the power to order any other relief under section 162 
of the Companies Act.168 
 
Setting aside a delinquency order is a two-stage process under section 162(11) of the 
Companies Act.169 The applicant must first apply to have the delinquency order suspended and 
substituted with an order of probation, and thereafter, after a period of at least two years, he 
may apply for the probation order to be set aside.170 It is submitted that the mandatory two-
stage approach to set aside a delinquency order under section 162(11) of the Companies Act is 
commendable since it affords a court time and opportunity to monitor and assess the conduct 
of the delinquent director during the period that the delinquency order is substituted with a 
probation order.171 Various challenges which a director may encounter in applying to court to 
set aside a delinquency order or a probation order were identified.172 The following 
recommendations are made with regard to interpreting, applying and enhancing the remedy in 
section 162(11) of the Companies Act:  
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(a) In exercising its discretion whether or not to grant the application in terms of section 
162(11) of the Companies Act it is recommended that a court should, in accordance 
with the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, bear in mind that section 162 of 
the Companies Act is a protective remedy in the public interest, and that suspending 
or setting aside a delinquency order or a probation order must not frustrate the 
achievement of this object.173 This is important in order to accord with the purpose of 
the Companies Act in section 7(j) of encouraging the efficient and responsible 
management of companies. It is recommended further that, in accordance with the 
approach adopted in the UK and Australia, in exercising its discretion under section 
162(11) the hardship on the applicant should not weigh too heavily as a factor to be 
considered by the court.174 
 
(b) Courts should ensure that the conditions imposed by them on a suspended delinquency 
order are capable of being monitored and are not easily disregarded by a director.175 
Suggestions were made on how the compliance with the conditions could be 
monitored.176 This is important to ensure the proper protection of the public.177 It also 
accords with the purpose of the Companies Act of encouraging the efficient and 
responsible management of companies, as contained in section 7(j) of the Companies 
Act. 
 
(c) It is recommended that the applicant should propose to the court appropriate 
conditions which it may consider imposing, should it exercise its discretion to suspend 
the delinquency order.178 This would serve to guide the court on the conditions to be 
imposed on the applicant in order to guard against the recurrence of the applicant’s 
misconduct.179 It may also serve to persuade a court to grant the application in terms 
                                                 
173 See chapter 6, para 3.11.2. 
 
174 See chapter 6, para 3.11.2. 
 
175 See chapter 6, para 3.11.3.1. 
 
176 See chapter 6, para 3.11.3.1. 
 
177 See chapter 6, para 3.11.3.1. 
 
178 See chapter 6, para 3.11.3.2. 
 
179 See chapter 6, para 3.11.3.2. 
 
563 
 
of section 162(11) if the conditions proposed by the applicant would serve to protect 
the public from a recurrence of the applicant’s misconduct.180 
 
(d) It is recommended that the conditions to be imposed by a court on a suspended 
delinquency order should be specifically tailored to the misconduct committed by the 
director which had resulted in the original delinquency order being granted.181 This 
would ensure that during the suspension of the delinquency order the risk of the 
director committing the same offence again would be minimised.182 
 
(e) It is recommended that if an applicant breaches any of the conditions imposed on him 
by the court during the suspended delinquency order, the original delinquency order 
should be reinstated in full.183 It is not clear from section 162 of the Companies Act 
whether or not a court may extend the delinquency order if the conditions are breached 
by the applicant.184 This should be clarified by the legislature. 
 
(f) It is recommended that in considering the circumstances leading to the original 
delinquency or probation order in terms of section 162(12)(b) of the Companies Act, 
in accordance with the approach adopted in the UK and Australia, a court should take 
into account the gravity of the misconduct which led to the original order.185 It is 
further recommended that a distinction should be drawn between offences that are 
connected with the conduct of the company’s affairs and those that are unrelated to 
the company’s affairs.186 
 
(g) Clarity is required on the meaning of the term “conduct” as used in section 162(12)(b) 
of the Companies Act.187 It is recommended that, in considering the conduct of the 
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applicant in the ensuing period, a court should take into account both the specific 
conduct of the applicant in relation to his dealings with companies as well as his 
general conduct which may demonstrate progress towards rehabilitation.188 
 
(h) The meaning of the term “rehabilitation” as used in section 162(12)(b)(i) of the 
Companies Act should be clarified.189 It is recommended that guidance on the 
meaning of this term may be sought in the criminal law context, where the term 
“rehabilitation” is used in sentencing proceedings.190 In the criminal law context, the 
term “rehabilitation” connotes positive impressions of the betterment of the offender, 
and connotes that the offender has learnt new values, has reformed and is now fit to 
take his place in society.191  
 
(i) Certainty is required on the meaning of the phrase “reasonable prospect” of serving 
successfully as a director in the future, as used in section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the 
Companies Act. The Companies Act does not define this term in the context of section 
162(12)(b)(ii) and its meaning has been left to the courts to determine.192 Since the 
phrase “reasonable prospect” is used in the context of business rescue proceedings in 
section 131(4)(a) of the Companies Act, reference to the numerous judicial decisions 
on section 131(4)(a) would provide useful guidance on the meaning of the phrase in 
section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act.193 Drawing on the interpretation of the 
phrase “reasonable prospect” in the context of business rescue proceedings, it is 
submitted that the phrase “reasonable prospect” in section 162(12)(b)(ii) of the 
Companies Act means a possibility based on objectively reasonable grounds, that the 
director will be able to serve successfully as a director in the future. While vague 
averments and mere speculative suggestions would not suffice, an applicant need not 
go so far as to establish a reasonable probability that he would be able to serve 
successfully as a director of a company in the future.  
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2.6  Remedies with Regard to the Removal of Directors from Office by the Board of 
Directors  
  
Chapter 7 examined the remedies which may be relied on by a director who has been removed 
from office by the board of directors.  The following remedies were examined: (i) application 
to court under section 71(5) of the Companies Act to review the board’s decision;194 (ii) 
application for damages or other compensation for loss of office in terms of section 71(9) of 
the Companies Act;195 and (iii) the oppression remedy.196 The right of a director to institute an 
action for defamation, in appropriate circumstances, was also discussed.197 It was shown that a 
director would encounter certain challenges with respect to the application of each of these 
remedies. The following recommendations are made with regard to improving and enhancing 
the above remedies: 
 
(a) Clarity should be provided by the legislature whether a court is empowered under a 
section 71(5) review application to enquire into the merits of the board’s decision to 
remove a director from office. In order to strengthen and enhance the review 
application in terms of section 71(5) of the Companies Act, it is recommended that a 
court should be empowered under a section 71(5) review to enquire into the merits of 
the board’s decision to remove a director from office, and should not be confined to 
only enquiring into the procedural correctness of the decision to remove the director 
from office.198 It is further recommended that clarity should be provided by the 
legislature on the orders a court may make on a review in section 71(5) should it set 
aside the board’s decision to remove a director from office.199 In order to avoid any 
ambiguity, it should be specified in section 71(5) that the period of twenty business 
days for an application to court to review the board’s decision to remove a director 
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should commence from the date of the board’s decision to remove the director from 
office.200 A further submission is that in order to ensure that there will be a minimal 
disruption to the running of the company if the suspended director were to be 
reinstated to the board by a court, section 70(2) of the Companies Act should provide 
that any acts of the board of directors during the period that a director is suspended 
may not be impugned or invalidated if the suspended director were to be later 
reinstated to office by a court under a section 71(5) review application.201 Such a 
provision would also remove any doubt whether decisions taken by the board of 
directors in the absence of the suspended director, once he is reinstated to the board, 
remain valid. It would furthermore ensure that any decisions taken by the board of 
directors in the absence of the suspended director would not be subject to challenge 
by third parties when the suspended director is reinstated to the board. The provision 
would also accord with the purpose of the Companies Act in section 7(j) of 
encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies.202 It is 
consequently recommended that sections 71(5) and 70(2) of the Companies Act be 
amended as follows: 
 
“(5) If, in terms of subsection (3), the board of a company has determined 
that a director is ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, or has been 
negligent or derelict, as the case may be, –    
(a) the director concerned, or a person who appointed that director as 
contemplated in section 66(4)(a)(i), if applicable, may apply within 
20 business days of the board’s determination to a court to review the 
determination of the board.; and 
(b) the court, on application in terms of paragraph (a), may – 
(i) confirm the determination of the board; or 
(ii) reinstate the director to office, if the court is satisfied that the 
director is not ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, or has 
not been negligent or derelict, as the case may be, or make any 
other order which it considers appropriate.” 
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“(2) If, in terms of section 71(3) or section 71(8), the board of a company or the 
Companies Tribunal has removed a director, a vacancy on the board does not 
arise until the later of –  
(a) the expiry of the time for filing an application for review in terms of section 
71(5) or section 71(8)(c); or  
(b) the granting of any order by the court on such an application,  
but the director is suspended from office during that time, and any acts of the 
board of directors during the period that a director is suspended are not 
impugned or invalidated if the suspended director is reinstated to office by a 
court in terms of section 71(5).” 
 
(b) With regard to the remedy of applying to court for damages or other compensation for 
loss of office in terms of section 71(9) of the Companies Act, it is recommended that 
directors should not be given lengthy employment contracts because of the potential 
financial implications involved in removing them from office prematurely.203 It is 
recommended further that the (South African) Companies Act must adopt provisions 
akin to section 226C of the UK Companies Act of 2006 or section 200E of the 
Australian Corporations Act of 2001 requiring shareholders to approve payments made 
to directors for loss of office.204 Such a provision would confer on shareholders some 
control over termination payments; would result in enhanced transparency with regard 
to the termination payments made to directors, and would accord with the purposes of 
the Companies Act in sections 7(b)(iii) and 7(j) of promoting the development of the 
South African economy by encouraging transparency, and encouraging the efficient 
and responsible management of companies.205 
 
(c) With regard to the oppression remedy under section 163 of the Companies Act, it is 
recommended that, in the interests of fairness, clarity and certainty, section 163 of the 
Companies Act should be amended to state that the provision may be relied on by a 
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person who has been removed from office by the board of directors (in terms of 
section 71(3) of the Companies Act) or the Companies Tribunal (in terms of 
section 71(8) of the Companies Act) if the application relates to the circumstances in 
which he was removed from office.206 Such an amendment would make it clear that 
former directors, who have been removed from office by the board of directors or the 
Companies Tribunal in a manner that was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or that 
unfairly disregarded their interests, would be entitled to apply to court for relief under 
section 163 of the Companies Act.207 It is consequently recommended that a new 
section 163(4) of the Companies Act be inserted, as follows: 
 
“(4) This section shall apply to a person who has been removed from office 
as a director under section 71(3) or section 71(8) of this Act if the 
application relates to the circumstances in which he was removed as a 
director.” 
 
3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As indicated, the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 states that clause 
71 of the Bill (now the Companies Act 71 of 2008) provides “a more certain and nuanced 
scheme for the removal of directors from office”.208 It is submitted that this object has, to some 
extent, been achieved with regard to the provisions in section 71 of the Companies Act on the 
removal of directors from office. Section 71 of the Companies Act is commendable in several 
respects. But, in other respects, it is respectfully submitted that the provisions of section 71 do 
not provide certainty since there are some ambiguities on the interpretation of this provision. 
The recommendations set out in this chapter seek to clarify certain ambiguities in sections 
71(3); to contain the redistribution of power between the directors and shareholders brought 
about by section 71(3); to guard against the abuse of section 71(3) by the board of directors; to 
improve and strengthen the procedures in section 71(4) to remove directors from office; to 
clarify and improve the review procedures in sections 71(5) and 71(6); to clarify certain 
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ambiguities in section 71(8) pertaining to the removal of directors by the Companies Tribunal, 
and to enhance the practical effect of the remedy in section 71(9) to claim damages or other 
compensation for loss of office.  
 
While the innovative provisions on the removal of a director by the judiciary in section 162 of 
the Companies Act are also laudable, the recommendations set out in this chapter seek to 
clarify, improve and strengthen the statutory provisions on the application to court to declare a 
director delinquent or to place him under probation; to address the principle of non-interference 
by the judiciary in the internal affairs of a company; to guard against the abuse of section 162, 
and to offer guidance on the interpretation and application of the remedy in section 162(11) of 
applying to court to suspend or set aside an order of delinquency or probation.  
 
The recommendations set out above are intended to accord with the purposes of the Companies 
Act of balancing the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies,209 
promoting the development of the South African economy by encouraging transparency,210 and 
encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies.211 It is submitted that 
these recommendations will further clarify, enhance and strengthen the provisions of the 
Companies Act on the removal of directors by the board of directors and the judiciary. 
  
                                                 
209 Section 7(i) of the Companies Act. 
 
210 Section 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act. 
 
211 Section 7(j) of the Companies Act. 
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